TNA ADM 199 792

VERY SECRET
928
WAR REFUGEES
6
While nothing in this memorandum should be taken as indicating that
H.M. Government has any special reason to suppose that the possibilities with which it deals are imminent, considerations of humanity and prudence have led the Departments concerned to consider what steps would have to be taken to deal with an influx of refugees from Belgium or Holland in the event of a German invasion of those countries.
During the last war nearly 250,000 Belgian refugees were accommodated here without insuperable difficulty, but it is estimated that at least
500,000 might be expected to escape on this occasion.,In addition to this great increase in numbers, the problem of accommodation has been very greatly complicated by the danger of large scale air raids and the necessities of existing evacuation schemes.
The French Government has indicated that although it would be prepared to do all in its power to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Belgium, it could not undertake to retain any substantial number owing to the grave problems arising from the evacuation of the population of Northern France and the presence in that country of the British Expeditionary Force as well as the French Army.
For obvious reasons, any appeal to the public is impossible at present but energetic steps are being taken to prepare emergency schemes for accommodation in public buildings etc., in neutral areas. The resources of reception areas are already fully taxed and it would be undesirable to send large numbers of refugees - especially women and children - to evacuation areas, where they might be expected to be subjected to severe air raids.
It is doubted, however, whether this course can be avoided if the total should prove to be as large as is now feared.
H.M. Government is therefore anxious to explore all the possibilities of accommodation outside Great Britain and semi-official approaches have already been made to the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland.
The advantages to the unfortunate people concerned of being placed in an area free from enemy attack will at once be apparent.
The purpose of this note is to bring the problem to the notice of
/the

CONFIDENTIAL 114
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
8
Page 3. 11?
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
consisted
Attempts of the following:- by the enemy to frustrate the operation
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfiro by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying hours by aircraft. Minelaying during the and was probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, dark following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk the Roads maintained with great intensity during mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route x and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering and the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in simil ar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing formations. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, Route two and two trawlers, while the north 26 miles
Y further was destroyers in use. the When south the westward, middle Route was brought X, some into though use the to M.T.B. units failed to follow up, the the continuous stream and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads Commander. provienemy of unescorted traffic during ded dark a hours tempting target to any enterprising (a)/

M.011883/40.
180
5
DRAFT I.
182
All Flag Officers.
I am to forward herewith for your information a copy of the report of the V.A. DOVER on operation
"Dynamo" (Evacuation of the B.E.F.)
This report and in particular those sections dealing with the inter-service co-operation are under consideration between the Admiralty, War Office and
Air Ministry. Their Lordships desire to place you in full possession of the facts concerning this operation and have not omitted those sections of the report in which criticisms of other Services are stated or implied. Their Lordships are of the opinion that a great deal of valuable work which was vital to af the success of the operation was being carried out in areas not under the immediate observation of the C.Os. of
H.M. Ships and Naval Authorities concerned. Consequently nd the reports may in some cases necessarily be based on incomplete knowledge of the whole situation and of the
R.A.F. operations which were proceeding concurrently with the evacuation.
BY COMMAND OF THEIR LORDSHIPS.
is
3
S
r.
e is
>p
11

Ed into the long allisk
1. Lieut. E. Treweeks.
192
When we were bombed I was taking cover in after
194
lobby, then proceeded to E.R. hatch but could not get below because of steam, was joined by C. Sto. Ricketts and C.E.R.A.,
Westlake, gave orders to shut off all boiler room emergency valves and then safety valves and shut main steam bulkhead valve on deck. As soon as possible E. Room and after boiler room were entered.
Attention first given to casualties but all bar one were dead.
First thought possible to get some part of machinery going but not possible. Concentrated on leaks. Bomb dropped port fore side E.R. bulkhead and stove in boiler room bulkhead.
Disabling port fan, engine, oil full pump, number three boiler, port circulator, main and reserve feed tanks and all pipes and leads adjacent were pierced and broken.
Leak at after end of E.R. oil fulo tank plugged.
Efforts made to run petrol dynamo for WD/T but the magneto connection broke. Hands were told off to get hand steering in use. P.O. of fore boiler room reported no damage after first.
raid although C. Sto. reported oil suction line pierced and shut off.
2. Sub. Lieut. Jeaves.
During the first attack I was on the bridge as
Officer of the Watch and remained there for some time afterwards while the Captain went off to the engine and boiler rooms.
On the Captain's orders I went aft to the after steering compartment to see whether it was possible to steer by hand.
This was so, and leaving a Leading Stoker and two or three hands I returned to the bridge as the ship was being taken in tow.
When the second attack took place I WAS in the fore and aft passage below the wheelhouse-for some time and eventually went into the Petty Officers' Mess to try and assist the foremost supply party.
After the attack, on the First Lieutenant's orders,
I placed charts in the whaler and a small private motor boat and unshipped the steering compass from the wheelhouse, end put it in the whaler. I then went aft to continue connecting up to steer by hand. To do this it was necessary to clear a good deal of gear out of the compartment. This took about half an hour. By this time another attempt was being made to take the ship in tow, so 1 recovered the charts from the motor boat, and went up on the bridge.
When the ship was attacked for the third time I again went down to the fore and aft passage beneath the wheelhouse, where I stayed till the order Bandon ship was given. of the two charts containing confidential matter concerning minefields in the Dover area, one was destroyed and the other left in the whaler which has not yet returned.
The Fleet notices to Marines were thrown overboard in mid-channel. Fleet charts were left in their folios in the
Charthouse.

page 5.
198
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
196
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Was ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 1/2 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too väolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

-2-
was stopped to other engined
The trip allow across a German was diesel uneventful. The
Several passed one destroyers floating At 03.30 and mine the which engine craft I decided stopped passed to us, leave while we time two drifters hove in sight. I decided to hail th untouched. and about the drifter because I was uncertain of my position, having chart or maps. The drifter altered course towards us took us aboard and the boat in tow. I found my positi to be about 15 miles S.E. of Ramsgate and I estimate the my course made good would have brought us to a point S.
Ramsgate (Deal?) at about 0800 on Thursday, May 30th.
P.O. Bennion remained at the wheel continuousl from 2100 to 0200 and with P.O. Emery brought the wounde seamen safely to the Naval base in spite of attempts by the Army to claim him as a casualty. The two P.O's mentioned carried out all duties with precision and showe great initiative in the handling of the situation. The behavious of the naval party was exemplary and their unflagging energy and support enabled us to escape and at the same time bring eight English and two French soldiers safely to England.
(Sgd) Reginald J. Crews.
5.6.40.

Dynamo 65
ROYAL NAVAL BARRACKS,
CHATHAM.
285
291
TAI
6th June, 1940.
200
288
87
kerque,
LENA
90
I have the honour to report that the Dutch
293
ot "LENA" (D.B.10) departed Sheerness at 0430
the 27th May calling at Southend for orders.
times given are approximate, as the rough log ation t was left in the ship at Dunkirk.
ennant
3
h May. Departed Sheerness 0430. Called at
1e.
Southend for orders. Anchored off Deal 1100.
Departed for Zuidcote Beach 1300. Arrived 2130.
ds.
Embarked 120 British troops between 2206 -
ong
0400 (28th).
ome h
May. 0001 - 0400. Embarking troops. Slow ling loading due to darkness and lack of boats.
say
Transferred the 120 to "SHIKARI" during forenoon sh and embarked 350 British early in the afternoon.
Departed for Ramsgate by Zuidcote Pass route.
Ships off the beaches attacked shortly after
89
leaving and hospital ship and transport bombed without success off the Middlekerke buoy.
Anchored off Ramsgate 2330.
LE
th May. Disembarked 350 troops 0700.
Anchored in roads.
107
oyer
1500 entered for water and provisions.
ht:
1600 departed for Dunkirk by direct route.
th May. Embarked 300 British at daylight using our own boats. 0800 departed for Ramsgate. Disembarked take troops during the afternoon. Informed at Ramsgate men that no further embarkations at Dunkirk would be n
effected.
Anchored in Roads.
g
..
st June. 0545. Received orders to proceed to Dunkirk
Le had with 25 small kedge anchors. Departed Ramsgate and arrived off beaches at Dunkirk 1300. No other ships ties were present. Embarked 400 British using our own ed.
I
boats and grass to kedge anchor ashore. Attacked by train dive bombers before entering Dunkirk roads and again off beach. There was one minor casualty from of splinters. Engineroom gauges smashed and ship
Panne holed forward which was plugged with wooden wedge.
D and
As the enemy were bombing the wrecks in the roads, re idently taking them for transports afloat, I
nd msidered it inadvisable to get under way before to rk. The troops were put below and no movement owed to give the appearance of being abandoned.
set
5. Departed for Ramsgate.
tions, 1"
0630. Disembarked 400 troops at Ramsgate.
i/c hit.
hed in roads to await orders for dispersal.
ise ore
1100. Received orders to disperse, calling and
- uthend for further instructions.
que
N. Retd.)
al
Proceeded.
5. Recalled. Anchored in roads.
ark
0
0. Received operation orders for embarkation si inkirk harbour.
D
Departed for Dunkirk in company with thre chopts.

4
296
VA, A destroyer Dover, having reported that Dunkerque was
293
0830 I asked me if ships should be sent there. usable,
0830
signalled from HEBE that destroyers could At into
Dunkerque in succession and that troops were waiting come close to the pier. Loading off beaches was proceeding slowly:
conditions were not bad, but the slight swell running in was enough to render boats liable to broach to. At La
Panne and Braye, lorries were being driven into the sea to form a sort of breakwater.
Noon
About midday there was an air attack on ships and on La
Panne. Later, when it had cleared a bit overhead, there was an attack on Dunkerque. Several French destroyers came in by Y channel and were fired on from the north of
La Panne; some guns tried to shell beach between Braye and La Panne, but the steep dunes protected it.
On returning to La Panne met Stevenson who had transferred to a motor launch and was doing excellent work. He saw
(9)
Lord Gort who was anxious to see me. As conditions were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded, decided to go to Dunkerque and drive to La Panne from there.
HEBE could not be detained any longer, so sent her back to
Dover with troops and wounded and told Bush to explain the boat situation and point out vital necessity for sending out boats and crews.
1530
Transferred my staff to WINDSOR and went into Dunkerque in
MTB 102, sent at my request. Badly wanted some means of getting about quickly and a fast boat of light draught would have been invaluable: when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost at once to
Dover.
On getting to Dunkerque found Tennant was with Gort and that to drive there would take up more time than I cared to be away: decided to land from a boat after all.
The MTB had not enough fuel to reach La Panne and return to Døver, SO boarded GOSSAMER and took her to La Panne
1730
where I transferred to WORCESTER at about 1730.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England;
also received W/T messages from Dover. One (1749) said ships were urgently wanted off La Panne: actually, at
1900, there were 4 destroyers and 1 minesweeper there and situation was constantly changing.
G.H.Q. was in touch with Admiralty and VA, Dover, and gave views and criticisisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for signal from 1st SL on this day asking if boats were distributed along beaches to best advantage.
Actually, only boats that could get inshore, except distri- pontoons bution depended on position of ships they belonged but and a few local craft, were the whalers, and their to.
(10)
badly So hampered by lack of quick transport: once ships had far as possible kept ships off all beaches, was boats away a re-distribution was impracticable.
1900
beaches; with ammunition. Told her to beach cleared at as La
Small and about this time the TINY puffer herself their numbers of aircraft attacked La Panne and arrived, ships off loaded tide being then high; did so and was of was
Panne, tide fell, though think that a good deal cargo finally on beach in slight swell (thied attempt visual to see Gort), dumped in the sea.
2000
Landed Flag-Lieut. and a few signalmen to and open General went with them to GHQ - last villa but one on communication taking with GHQ. Met by Tennant south edge Lees;
of La Panne. situation. Seemed obvious to me back that more the
(11)
Discussed felt they had successfully fallen it now or soldiers intact inn face of great odds and that was not making up to less the Navy to get them off, but that Navy were
Stressed of large scale embarkation from beaches; off said from any real difficulty, effort to do slowness so. and dependence on fine weather that bulk of any troops should move westward and come This
Dunkerque.

7
299
206
were An impracticable not feature of this plan was that craft inshore asking too much to think that when our crying need It was for to be used except for the rear guard. small boats, any such could be held idle while was men were on beaches with ships waiting to take them so many off.
Actual development of this plan was very different.
(19)
HEBE sent up to La Panne, to be there at 1800 to receive
Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off.
Beaches shelled during the day, but in most cases shells landed on dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protected the beach. Shelling was principally to westward of
Braye; at one time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of
Dunkerque on top of dunes, but close to sea, received a lot of attention.
1330
As I was returning to eastward HEBE signalled she had been shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward a couple of miles.
1430
Went up in KEITH off La Panne to see if battery could be shelled, but had to withdraw - not essential to be so far to the eastward and battery was not visible. Its fore was directed by an observation balloon over Nieuport;
aircraft came out to shoot it down, but without result;
it was re-hoisted as soon as they left. Shell bursts appeared to be 6 or 8-inch, in salvoes of four.
(17)
Owing to the shelling of anchorage at La Panne urged Gort to embark as soon as possible, but he would not leave before the time arranged.
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkerque so as to be on spot when boats arrived. En route a terrific air battle overhead - 3 Spitfires shot down, 2 in the sea; onepilot killed, the other not found.
While waiting off Dunkerque signal from VA, Dover, to say
Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100.
Replied: Boats had not arrived and sloops would not be there then, but would do my best. (This had an unfortunate effect: as sloops could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, etc., off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent to Dunkerque during the night.
Result = though many were embarked from beaches, very few ships went into Dunkerque where men were waiting, and full use of it was not made.)
Always impossible for me to do more than deal with the situation of the moment. Did not know what ships were coming or when - except for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops; nor could Dover give me much information.
The stream of ships was constant, but irregular; not possible to see any way ahead. My policy was to keep only enough ships off the beaches and send all others into
Dunkerque, but situation changed continually. I wanted
(18)
to be in several places at once.
The first of the boat tows did not arrive until 1700 - a tug with what looked like 6 dinghies in tow: she was
Could not wait off Dunkerque as I wanted to get up to La preceded by some motor yachts which came in company.
Panne for Gort, so left Wynne-Edwards in a motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number of hoppers and other craft that were lying off the westwen beaches to beach themselves on the rising tide so that men could embark.
Gort's embarkation produced some odd incidents.
Dover had sent over 4 MTBs and MA/SBs to get him: the reached me. During the afternoon 2 MTBs came to me and signal informing me of this, like many others, never said they were to embark a party from a point 2 miles west of La Panne. Could not understand this; thought they must have been sent to fetch off some of Naval landing the H.
party, but realise now the party concerned was
Staff. While approaching La Panne, shortly before 1800, HEBE
1800
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you, and saw a group at water's edge with 2 cars and some KEITH'S gnalmen.

318
315
- 10 is
30/5
So for as was possible I kept ships off all beaches, but in doing DO I
was badly hampered by the lack of means of gotting about quickly. Often when I was off La Penne ships would arrive and stop off the other two beaches, send in their boats and start loading, by then perhaps some off
La Panno would leave and a redistribution might be desivable, but it WAS
impracticable once ships had their boats may.
At 1900 small numbers of aircraft made attacks on I.O. Panne and ships off the beaches and about this time a puffer, the "Tiny," loaded with
/Shoot.
ammunition arrived. She was told to beach herself at In Fanno, the tide being then high; this she did and was cleared as the tide vont out, though I believe 8. good deal of her cargo Was finally dumped in the 502.
At 2000 I started inshore again in "WORCESTER'S" whaler on my third attempt to see Lord Gort, There was a slight swell and I got wet to the waist landing. I took in with me my Flag Licutenant and a small party of signalmen to open visual communications with G.H.Q.
I was met on the beach by Tennant and General Lees and werrt with them to G.H.Q. which was established in the last villa but one on the south edge of La Panne. This was a pretentions house with a largish dining-room with French windows opening direct on to S road ruming along the top of the sandy slope from the beach,
I found Lord Gort and his staff about to have dinner and he insisted on my joining thom. No was charming and seemed very checrful and 1111-
perturbed and glad to see me. He had been told that a Rear Admirel was being sent to take charge of the embarkation and made TO feel that that simple fact should have E. great effect. I must confess I did not feel so confident of what 10 was possible for me to do. However, we aid not really disouss matters till after dinner.
I shall not easily forget that meal. For one thing my brousors and seat were very wet and it seemed so strange to be sitting there sharing the Commander-in-Ohief's last bottle of champagne and looking out BOROSS
the beach to the sea, There were eight 02 nine of us including Tonnant and myself. I forget what we ate except that the final dish WOB fruit salad from a tin and I felt that my extra mouth was robbing the others of

IS
Name
Ex.
Present
Appointment
Location
Tempy.Lieut.J.
KING ORRY PEMBROKE addl.
Lee, R.N.R.
Not to join;
Home address:
noticoal
59, Cambridge Avenue,
DEAL
.Loring nationali
Great Crosby,
Liverpool, 23.
Tempy.Sub-
GRIVE
R.N.Hospital,
Miles, R.N.V.R.
Cha them.red
Proby.Sub-Lieut.
MOSQUITO Sick Leave.
E.S.Flint,R.N.R.
(f.om)
(is a nominee for
Submarine Course)
STOTHO
STATED
Directment nt surary exas
LODA 7MYX
(signed) T.C. SKEAT
Chin
YHOTOKV
YXJOYAT for HEAD OF C.W.
22 July, 1940.
PRONABORT
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FOLLTAN TESTORAD 201
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KNIL 202
HERTUMA
10%
SPELIOD
EXTURED
SIDAR
CONDTOIV

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO"
Page 3.
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
Attempts by the enemy to frustrate the operation consisted of the following:-
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfire by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying by aircraft. Minelaying during the dark hours probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, and was maintained with great intensity during the following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk Roads mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
X and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone and
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in similar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing forma ons. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, two dostroyers and two trawlers, while the north Route
Y was in use, When the middle Route x, some 26 miles further to the south westward, was brought into use the enemy M.T.B. units failed to follow up, though the continuous stream of unescorted traffic during the dark hours and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads provided a tempting target to any enterprising Commander.
(a)/

Ship sailed from Dover at 0850 on 29th May, did a days minesweeping and arrived off Dunkirk, lit by the red flames of the burning oil tanks at 0040 on 30th May. On this occasion troops were embarked off BRAY
DUNE in our own boats and canvas punts. There were no incidents of note, and we sailed at 0515, arriving at Dover at 1015 on Thursday morning. All boats were left on the beach by order from Rear Admiral
Dover.
Third trip. Sailing from Dover at 1330 with a party of signalmen for LA PANNE, we arrived off BRAY at 1830. Admiral Wake Walker came on board for passage to LA PANNE, where we transferred him to H.M.S.
"WORCESTER" and enchored at 1930. I can recall no. features of this trip, which was eclipsed by the incidents of the following one.
we proceeded at 0118 and arrived at Dover at 0600.
Fourth trip. In order to comply with Vice Admiral Dover's
0446/30 12 hours were spent at Dover.
A
smallamotor-boat, the
"Handy
Billy! was requisitioned. We left at 1800 and anchored as ordered, one mile west of LA PANNE and 4 cables from the shore, at 1207.
Sub-Lieutenant M.Phipps proceeded to search the shore in "Handy Bill and reported no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however, the situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship.
UI called for more boats by searchlight up and down the immic coast, and eventually was much assisted by H.M.S. "IVANHOE" who lent me a motor-boat. The vital need now was for more boats. About this time
Lieutenant-Commander McLelland swam off from shore with a message for
Dover which he was just able to gasp out before collapsing. The troops had been forcedout of LA PANNE and were marching West.
We also embarked a Major, 2nd in Command 2nd Coldstream Guards, and on his advice ordered the bulk of the troups to move West on Dunkirk in small groups.
I decided to remain where I was and to embark the wounded and such troops as refused to move on. "IVANHOE" remained with me.
At this time a paddle minesweeper most gallently grounded herself close inshore to save as many as possible. I do not know har name.
At 0500 as I had expected a flight of Messerschmidt 109's appeared from Eastward, flew low over the beaches and sprayed ships and men with machine-gun fire. The silvery tracer bullets were clearly visible in the morning light. Our fire did something to disperse these machines and casualties did not appear to be heavy.
At 0600 Captain D in H.M.S. "CODRINGTON" asked me my intentions
End as I had 675 troops on board I replied I was proceedingt He ordered me to Dunicirk to "Fill up".
On our way there we went alongside H.M.S. "SKIPJACK" who required
8oz.
chloroform. We then berthed on East Arm just beyond the break, and very quickly embarked some 170 French troops. The enemy was now bombing the town and massing off the harbour entrence. As I went astern "IVANHOE" was hit as she steamed full speed past the pierhead.
We set course west, and were about to turn North at 5W Buoy when we were attacked by some five Junkers 87 dive bombers. These were followed by nine or ten otheres the a few minutes later. It was at this time that H.M.S. "HAVANT" was hit. During these attacks
I
attribute our escape to the coolness and precision with which Lieutenant.Menisty and Yeoman of Signals J.Young ( C/J X 131436
observed each aircraft as it turned to the attack, and assisted me in handling the ship. The salvoes sonbanneck of four small bombs and one large one fell very close; on two occasions it was only our swing during the flight of the bombs that saved us. The 0.5" machine-gun fired until all the feree springs fell off. The 4" guns were hampered by the swing of the ship.
This was a most trying time for the troops between decks who could not tell whether or not we were hit. A great deal was done to calm them by P.O. Std. A.Hockney ( L 14824 ) who actually sat on the ladder to the messdeck and sang to the soldiers.

REFERENCE SHEET.
FROM Relatives of Naval Officers
Information Bureau, Admiralty.
To R.Y. Gleadowe, Esq.,
Secretary, C.W., 41 Arch Block,S.l
Admiralty.
DATE 2.10.40.
No.694.
Personal.
I attach the letter about which Commander Yonge spoke to you on the telephone yesterday.
I understand that you said you would deal with this direct, and
I shall be much obliged if you will do SO. I have acknowledged the
Humphreys, the father of the Officer.
receipt of the letter to Mr. W.E.
It Womor.
VICE-ADMIRAL.
AMS.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Office of
The Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No. B. 14/0/1316.
18th June, 1940.
The Secretary of the Admiralty, London, S.W.1.
Copies to: The Ministry of Shipping.
The Permanent Under Secretary of State for War.
The Director of Sea Transport, Admiralty.
The Principal Sea Transport Officer,
Southampton.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Work of Personnel Vessels.
I have deemed it desirable, in drawing up my report on Operation DYNAMO, namely the evacuation of the Allied
Armies from Dunkirk between 26th May and 4th June, to deal separately with the work carried out by the "Personnel" vessels
(or transports) in order that copies may be sent to other authorities concerned, without the necessity for sending them the full report.
2. The work of these vessels has accordingly been summarised in the accompanying report, which it is requested may be placed before Their Lordships for their information.
3. I have already transmitted (Dover Letter 4th June,
1940 - No.B.23/862/40) a brief list of personnel recommended for immediate award or decoration (which His Majesty has been pleased to accept), and I will forward a further list at a later date when time has permitted a full examination of all the reports.
Vice Admiral.

Page 26.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
M.S. SALADIN. - Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence J. Dover, R.N.
when This off ship Dunkirk proceeded to La Panne beach but result of damage was attacked by aircraft on 29th May, unable to take a received further part she returned in the evacuation. to Dover, and and as was a
Recommendations.
FFICERS:
Lieutenant John Henry Edwards, R.N. (Retired).
During one attack by aircraft a fire was with it. He found the ready use cordite in the reported aft and Lieutenant Edwards was sent to deal after gun position burning and with the aid of two able seamen threw the burning charges overboard, as also the charges in another box which was burning.
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS:
M
Able Seaman Graham Briden, P/J.94686.
Able Seaman James Garfoot. P/SSX.19346.
Assisted Lieutenant Edwards in throwing overboard burning cordite charges during an attack by aircraft off Dunkirk.
Recommended for mention.
ing ered ors om of nu

Darre 71.2
Page 139
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Ramsgate and Margate Base Organisation (Continued).
most ably performed the multifarious duties required of him throughout the operation.
Recommended for mention.
Temporary Surgeon Lieutenant Basil Henry Palmer, R.N.V.R. (Base
Medical Officer).
For outstanding zeal and devotion to duty in his attention to casualties and survivors both personally and through his Sick Berth Staff. This officer worked continuously or the Pier at Ramsgate and many times went out into the anchorages to vessels waiting to come alongside. He got away all casualties with utmost promptitude and worked in conjunction most successfully with the Military Medical Officers.
Recommended for mention.
Engineer Captain John Lewis Deacon. R.N. (Retd.) M.V.O. (Base
Engineer Officer).
For outstanding zeal and devotion to duty in his attention to the fuelling and re-servicing all craft, through his department, at both Margate and Ramsgate.
A very large number of mechanically propelled craft were used and all had to be re-fuelled after their various trips, at all hours of the day and night.
That there was no hitch in these arrangements throughout, is testimony to the effectiveness of his organisation. 170 vessels were actually repaired during the operation.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Sick Berth Petty Officer Wilfred Harry Groves, C/MX.48183.
For outstanding zeal and devotion to duty as the senior member of the Medical Officer's Staff throughou the operation. He remained on duty long hours untiringly, and assisted at the temporary casualty clearing station in MERRIE ENGLAND as well as going afloat to ships waiting to come alongside.
Recommended for decoration.
Chief Yeoman of Signals Lawrence Hamer Hanson. P.229251.
For outstanding zeal and devotion to duty while in charge of the signal bridge at the end of the
East Pier, Ramsgate, during the entire operation.
The signal bridge had to deal with a bewildering complexity of signal work - by day and by night -
one and/
nd

pt. C.W. 29685
40
Page 150
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
3.
SeaTransport
SEA TRANSPORT OFFICERS.
adminal Shipway
The work done by the Sea Transport Officers throughout the Operation of Dynamo, entailed an enormous amount of labour, which was carried out in a highly efficient manner.
0/
Commodore Jukes-Hughes was in charge at Dover, ing and it was entirely due to his organisation and smooth working that enabled nearly 181,000 to be disembarked at Dover without any hitch whatsoever,
8
and at Folkestone, nearly 32,000.
Commodore Edward Glyn de Styrap Jukes-Mughes. R.N. (Retd.)
As P.S.T.O. was responsible for the successful disembarkation of troops, and the greatest credit is due to the capable and efficient way in which the troops were disembarked and able manner in d
CBE
which he was able to arrange for the quick turn rounds of the various transports that came into ion harbour.
h and in
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Allan Raymond MacKewn, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out the ordinary duties of Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant MacKewn went in command of an armed party to the ST. SEIRIOL, where the Master had refused to sail, thereby showing great devotion to duty.
n,
Min
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph William Soper, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out his ordinary duties this officer volunteered to take over the duty of
Chief Officer of Transport, Canterbury, as there was no relief available, thereby showing great is devotion to duty.
ly
Mit
Recommended for decoration.
m
Major Lionel Steele Wilkinson, R.M.
During the period of the operation he was in almost constant attendance at the office and was only absent for very brief periods for sleep. His
0
local knowledge was of great assistance to the alty
P.S.T.O., and a great deal of the success of the organisation is due to his great devotion to duty.
this in on
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant/
td.

pt. C.W. 29685 40
(Revised-June, 1933.)
M
DATE
g,
TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Page 151
-
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
TRANSPORT OFFICERS (continued).
ing
Lieutenant Charles Edward Stoker, R.N.R.
8
Was in charge at Folkestone under the P.S.T.O.
He showed marked ability and was untiring in
"
carrying out his duties and relieving the P.S.T.O
of a great deal of work as regards Folkestone.
Recommended for decoration.
d
S.T.O. Dunkirk.
ion
Commander Edward Reginald Lewis. D.S.C., R.N.
h and
Great credit is due to the very efficient organisation at Dunkirk in view of the great difficulties obtaining there, due to the French authorities. The greatest tact had to be observed, and it was in no small way due to the able handling and tact shown by the staff workin under the S.T.O. that Store ships and Personnel et ships were able to use the port and evacuate so many troops. (See Page 135).
Signalman Richard F. Jones, C/JX. 144282.
n,
Was sent over to Dunkirk to assist with the signalling arrangements under the S.T.O. He showed a complete disregard for danger in carry ever out his duties. His bearing and example was of the greatest influence to the other 2 signalmen t, all of whom showed the greatest devotion to dut is
DSM
Recommended for decoration.
ily
M
Signalman James S. Duffy, R.N.V.R., C/TDX.1412.
Signalman Ronald H. Walter, R.N.V.R., C/LDT.4178.
m
By their great devotion to duty were of the greatest assistance in enabling communications to be carried out under most trying circumstano
.0
due to aerial bombardment and shelling of the alty throughout the operations.
Recommended for mention.
this on td.
SI-6444
ion/

Page 26.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommen lations of Personnel.
H.M.S. SALADIN. - Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence J. Dover, R.N.
This ship proceeded to La Panne beach on 29th May, but when off Dunkirk was attacked by aircraft and as a result of damage received she returned to Dover, and was unable to take a further part in the evacuation.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS:
Lieutenant John Henry Edwards, R.N. (Retired),
During one attack by aircraft a fire was reported aft and Lieutenant Edwards was sent to deal with it. He found the ready use cordite in the after gun position burning and with the aid of two able seamen threw the burning charges overboard, as also the charges in another box which was burning.
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS:
Able Seaman Graham Briden, P/J.94686.
Able Seaman James Garfoot. P/SSX. 19346.
Assisted Lieutenant Edwards in throwing overboard burning cordite charges during an attack by aircraft off Dunkirk.
Recommended for mention.

Operation Coaster H.M.S. "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. Page
126
utch ZEUS de Lieutenant-Commander Cecil Brooke
Recommendation.
Hoggan, R.N.R.
RATING.
Petty Officer Acted Francis as Herbert Franklin, P/J.96765.
Petty successful great deal round of coxswain useful trips. work of Ship ZEUS, was which not carried well out 2
He helped was Officer cool on board in every preparing soldier was the carried vessel. out by found this a example to the and younger cheerful members under of fire, the crew. good
Recommended for mention.
Page 125
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnol.
Dutch Skoot H.M.S. TWENTE (Continued).
3 nights continuous work under way without any rest whatsoever recovered a large number of troops from Dunkirk harbour and La Panne beach, and displayed great seamanship and judgment going alongside H.M.P.S. GRACIE FIELDS when she was bombed and reduced to a sinking condition by enemy aircraft with about 800 troops on board. GRACIE FIELDS was unmanageable and unable to stop her engines. TWENTE
secured alongside under way and removed injured and other survivors until full. Subsequently,
Lieutenant-Commander Boys-Smith commanded two army motor launches and a Dutch motor launch, and completed
3 other trips to Dunkirk beaches and Dunkirk harbour, the majority of which were executed during the worst periods of intensive air attack. Many difficulties were encountered and overcome with the greatest determination.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Leading Seaman Reginald William Legg, D/J.107221.
the several trips launch KESTREL. Largely sinking GRACIE
Displayed as coxswain of the responsible coolness and resource under TWENTE fire and during latel
FIELDS for the by successful his seamanlike actions.
in the motor rescues from the His conduct at all times was admirable.
Recommended for decoration.

Page 126
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
tch Coaster H.M.S.ZEUS is Lieutenant-Commander Cecil Brooke
Hoggan, R.N.R.
Recommendation.
ATING.
Petty Officer Francis Herbert Franklin, P/J.96765.
Acted as coxswain of ZEUS, which carried out 2
successful round trips. Ship was not well found a great deal of useful work was carried out by this
Petty Officer in preparing the vessel. He personally helped on board every soldier embarked (more than 700).
He was cool and cheerful under fire, setting a good example to the younger members of the crew.
Recommended for mention.

Page 150
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Recommendations of Personnel.
SEA TRANSPORT OFFICERS.
The work done by the Sea Transport Officers throughout the Operation of Dynamo, entailed an enormous amount of labour, which was carried out in a highly efficient manner.
Commodore Jukes-Hughes was in charge at Dover, and it was entirely due to his organisation and smooth working that enabled nearly 181,000 to be disembarked at Dover without any hitch whatsoever, and at Folkestone, nearly 32,000.
Commodore Edward Glyn de Styrap Jukes-Hughes.R.N. (Retd.)
As P.S.T.O. was responsible for the succes disembarkation of troops, and the greatest cre is due to the capable and efficient way in whi the troops were disembarked and able manner in which he was able to arrange for the quick tur rounds harbour. of the various transports that came into
CBE
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Allan Raymond Mackewn, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out the ordinary dut of Sea Transport Officer, Lieutenant MacKewn wen in command of an armed party to the ST. SEIRIOL, where the Master had refused to sail, thereby showing great devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant-Commander Ralph William Soper, R.N.R.
In addition to carrying out his ordinary duti this officer volunteered to take over the duty 03
Chief Officer of Transport, Canterbury, as there was no relief available, thereby showing great devotion to duty.
Recommended for decoration.
Major Lionel Steele Wilkinson, R.M.
During the period of the operation he we almost constant attendance at the office and only absent for very brief periods for sleep.
local knowledge was of great assistance to the
P.S.T.O., and a great deal of the success of th organisation is due to his great devotion to du
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutens

Page 151
peration "DYNAMO"
-
Recommendations of Personnel.
RANSPORT OFFICERS (continued).
Lieutenant Charles Edward Stoker, R.N.R.
Was in charge at Folkestone under the P
He showed marked ability and was untiring 1
carrying out his duties and relieving the E
of a great deal of work as regards Folkesto
Recommended for decoration.
S.T.O. Dunkirk.
Commander Edward Reginald Lewis. D.S.C., R.N.
Great credit is due to the very effic organisation at Dunkirk in view of the ST
difficulties obtaining there, due to the F:
DSO
authorities. The greatest tact had to be observed, and it was in no small way due to able handling and tact shown by the staff under the S.T.O. that Store ships and Perso ships were able to use the port and evacus many troops. (See Page 135).
Signalman Richard F. Jones, C/JX,144282.
Was sent over to Dunkirk to assist with tl signalling arrangements under the S.T.O. He
Ism showed a complete disregard for danger in car:
out his duties. His bearing and example was the greatest influence to the other 2 signal all of whom showed the greatest devotion t
Recommended for decoration.
Signalman James S. Duffy. R.N.V.R., C/TDX.1412.
Signalman Ronald H. Walter, R.N.V.R., C/LDT.4178.
By their great devotion to duty greatest assistance in enabling or to be carried out under most try due to aerial bombardment and S
throughout the operations.
Recommended for