TNA ADM 199 792

124
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 5.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
126
125
Tuesday, 28th May (continued).
to S.N.O., Dunkirk by signal - timed 1555/28 - and provided for the use of 3 Hospital Carriers, 7 personnel steamers and
2 destroyers at the East Pier, Dunkirk, while some 20
destroyers, 19 paddle and fleet sweepers, 17 drifters, 20 to
40 skoots, 5 coasters, 12 motor boats, 2 tugs, 28 pulling cutters and life-boats were to be distributed between La
Panne and point 1½ miles East of Dunkirk, on the beaches; the destroyers running continuous round trips.
It was estimated that the personnel vessels and hospital:o carriers would be clear of the danger area by 0630. As regards the beaching and other small craft which had not yet reached the Dover Straits, arrangements were made with other authorities to route all small craft, which had not already been despatched, direct to the beaches East of Dunkirk, provided they had charts, food, fuel, etc.
At this time some difficulty was experienced in having at hand the large number of charts required for these additional vessels.
17,
Owing to the suspension of daylight work by personne vessels it was necessary to increase the number handled in
Dunkirk during the dark hours as the attempt to use the surplus personnel vessels off the beaches by night seemed unlikely to bear fruit. Accordingly, Dunkirk, was asked whether personnel vessels could be berthed inside
Dunkirk harbour, the only information in Vice Admiral's k.
possession having indicated that the East Pier of the harbour entrance was the only suitable berth for such ships to which
British troops could have access. To increase the off-shore forces, Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was asked to sail CALCUTTA
to be opposite La Panne at 2200 to embark troops using own boats.
Orders were issued that all ships proceeding to Dunkirk from Dover were to use the southern route Z provided that the passage from No. 6 Calais Buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
S
18.
At 1830 GRAFTON reported that several thousand troops remained on beaches at Bray and that more were arriving. At that time there were off Bray, one tow of pulling boats, number uncertain, 2 power boats, at least
2 skoots, CALCUTTA, GALLANT, WAKEFUL, VERITY and GRAFTON, using what survived of their own whalers and motor boats.
This force was reinforced by 2 minesweepers at 2115. Later reports of concentrations of troops on the beaches were received, particularly at La Panne and Bray. Craft approaching the coast were directed accordingly. Naval Officer-in-
Charge, Ramsgate, was requested to maintain a continuous evacuation service by skoots between Margate and Ramsgate and the beach, and take over responsibility for servicing those vessels. Meantime CALCUTTA, who was off La Panne, reported that conditions for embarkation there were very bad owing to heavy surf, but that they might improve with the rising tide.
Shortly after midnight CALCUTTA was informed that the third corps of the B.E.F. and the Commander-in-Chief were all now at La Panne. She was directed to make every endeavour to concentrate all destroyers and light craft at that end of the beach/

149
38
1.1%
148
146
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 27
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
1/6
or
Saturday 1st June (continued).
and at 0815 was attacked by enemy aircraft. Ship was hit aft of
No.3 boiler room and put out of action. About 0945 another attack took place but no hits were registered. A third attack took place at about noon and the ship began to settle and the order to abandon ship was given.
Destroyer KEITH attacked by enemy aircraft off Bray r
severely hit and abandoned at anchor by No.8 buoy. Finally sank.
Harbour Defence Craft AMULREE sunk in collision by
VIMY at 0200.
2/6
Sunday, 2nd June.
80.
The arrangements to set in motion the night's evacuation had proceeded smoothly as far as could be ascertained at
Dover. During the early hours, reports of sailings from Dunkirk indicated that destroyers at least were doing well.
At about 0200, however, a signal was received from
LYDD, who was off the Dunkirk beach, as follows:-
"Brigadier tells me that C. in C. says it is essential that rearguard B.E.F. embarks from the beaches east of Mole on account of French congestion on Mole. Considerable number
British troops still on Mole. Military are expecting further arrivals there. Rearguard expects to arrive at beach by 0230."
The Vice Admiral accordingly ordered all ships known to y
be outside Dunkirk Harbour to endeavour to embark the rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300 if necessary. Owing to the time in transit and coding it was feared that this signal would reach few ships still on the coast, unless they had remained on their own initiative after 0300, the previously ordered time of withdrawal.
At 0200, authority was received from the Admiralty to
1
continue evacuation by destroyers from Dunkirk Harbour until
0700, transports to leave Dunkirk at 0300.
81. During the early hours there was considerable haze and smoke off Dunkirk Harbour, Dunkirk East Beach, Dunkirk Roads and the entrance therefrom to X Route. For this reason some of the smaller vessels, including minesweepers, failed to make either
Dunkirk Harbour or Dunkirk East Beach, but on the whole it appears
Ly that evacuation, both from the beach and from the harbour had
G
proceeded satisfactorily with the resources available.
Between 0200 and 0900, 6 personnel vessels reached
United Kingdom from Dunkirk Harbour with about 5,500 troops. 2
others had been turned back before reaching Dunkirk by 2 unknown destroyers, and one had been in collision before reaching Dunkirk and had to return.
82. Considerable doubt existed during the forenoon as to the numbers remaining to be evacuated in Dunkirk. It was thought that
2,000, plus the 4,000 rearguard British troops, might well be found in Dunkirk. The number of French troops remaining was increasing from the 25,000 quoted the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000.
83. The Rear Admiral, Dover, arrived back from the coast in a M.T.B. and during the forenoon a joint Naval and Military conference was held to devise a plan for the forthcoming night's evacuation. The fact that evacuation traffic was suspended in

234
REPORT ON THE LOSS OF H.M.S. SKIPJACK, 1st JUNE 1940. 0845 222
(1).
Skipjack anchored at 0030 on June 1st, 1940 off La Panne.
She had only one serviceable small boat and that had no rudder, the ship's boats having been left behind off Dunkirk on a previous trip.
Puler 52
(2).
It was understood that embarkation of troops would commence at once in boats believed to be organised by the Army and beach parties ashore. No boats, however, arrived.
(3).
During the time Skipjack was anchored off La Panne there was considerable enemy air activity, one parashutemine being dropped about one cable inshore from the ship. There was some shelling.
(4).
At break of dawn about 0330 it was decided to weigh and
1/6
endeavour to pick up and man any derelict boats that could be found. Skipjack, therefore, set a course to the westward and managed to secure three boats; some troops were also picked up. As several of H.M. ships were in the vicinity, course was continued to opposite a point on the beach about one mile to the eastward of Dunkirk, where there was only one small skoot operating. The boats were then sent inshore and the embarkation of troops commenced. The ship was kept under weigh owing to considerable enemy air activity.
(5).
From this time onwards, thought to be about 0530, there were continued enemy bombing attacks. Several W/T messages were transmitted asking for fighter assistance. Except for one period of about 5 minutes no fighters were seen.
(6).
At about 0600 a derelict motor launch was got in working order and embarkation of troops continued apace.
P.T.O.

Dynams 46.
N°.4.
253
H.M.S. "LYNX".
251
31st May, 1940.
The Commander M/S,
Dover.
ze NAUTILUS
Sir,
I have the honour to make the following report:-
71
At 1700 on Tuesday 28th May H.M.T. "Nautilus" and "Comfort"
left Dover under my directions en route for La Panne.
At 0030 the 29th May in vicinity of Kwinte Bank Buoy we heard cries for help and "Nautilus" picked up six survivors from
Destroyer "Wakeful" which had been torpedoed. "Comfort" picked up sixteen, including her Captain.
I instructed "Comfort" to return to Dover and land survivors.
Was unable to transfer any of the survivors to "Comfort" owing to weather conditions.
"Nautilus" proceeded to La Panne arriving there at 0540.
Closed "Calcutta" and transferred "Wakeful's" survivors to her.
29/5
"Nautilus" then proceeded closer in shore and started ferrying soldiers to the H.19 and when she left at noon we ferried them to H.05 ("Greyhound").
Panne
At 1630 with 150 B.E.F. on board German bombers came along and in the endeavour to hit "Sandown" and "Greyhound" straddled the
"Nautilus". Although not actually hit the engines and steering gear of "Nautilus" were put completely out of action and the vessel began making water rapidly.
"Nautilus" managed to get alongside Destroyer "Greyhound"
and embark troops. In the middle of this the "Greyhound" was damaged by a bomb and her Captain decided to weigh anchor and proceed towards Dover.
Decided on consulting Skipper of "Nautilus" and Captain of "Greyhound" to abandon "Nautilus".
The Skipper poured petrol on C.B's and set them on fire.
He then set his bunk on fire pouring more petrol on same endeavouring to set "Nautilus" completely on fire, as being a very stoutly built wooden ship she would not sink.
About ten soldiers were wounded by bombs falling around
"Nautilus" but none fatally. None of the crew were injured.
Two of "Nautilus" crew were left behind as crew of a large ship's lifeboat which was working in conjunction with a flat bottomed motor punt.
The "Nautilus" transferred between 700 and 800 B.E.F. to the two destroyers.
The crew of the "Nautilus" were grand, in particular the us
Skipper, 2nd engineer, and the cook.
(Continued over).

258
3 -
131
King
255
this damage did not seem so serious as the fact that the steering gear was out of action and that the steam which prevented us from getting into the steering flat being no stop valve accessible.
could not be cut off the boilers - there apparently
29/5
76
A fire had broken out in the Stewards' quarters on the starboard side, but I was able to put this out without much trouble. The holes made forward were of a jagged nature, from three to four inches at greatest width, and also a number of rivets were blown out. Some damage to an oil bunker was apparent, as oil fuel was coming into the seamen's sleeping quarters forward in considerable but not heavy quantity. The worst hole in the stokers' quarters was caused by the blowing in of a completely deadlighted porthole.
All leaks were eventually stopped that were visible, and the pumps seemed to be coping with any influx successfully. Owing to the darkness it was difficult in some parts of the ship to fully ascertain all damage or possible hidden weaknesses.
I went ashore to discuss the situation with the
Senior Naval Officer and had to report that I did not anticipate the ship being seaworthy before dawn, and that she was certainly not in a fit state to take on troops.
The ship had in the meantime been secured alongside, bow in.
It was considered from information now gained that the ship would again become subject to attacks at dawn, and would then most probably be destroyed. The Senior
Naval Officer instructed me to either proceed to sea or endeavour to ground the ship on the East side of the Pier, where she would be useful as a breakwater.
Soon after 0030 on the 30th May I decided to leave
30/5
the berth, as the ship was aground and might be difficult to get off later. I also decided that if the ship was sufficiently manoeuvreable to be grounded where required that she could also possibly be extricated either bow or stern first from Dunkirk Roads and possibly reach assistance
Ph
I found thes:-
my hungomy:- one V.U and 4 scander wounded hilding
:- 4 here killed / Officer and nt men mounded.
tomage to the ship was rus tamed as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly boled
3- Boar back piered Priside
4. are rentilator holed and sundy minor depects to wining etc

92
CONFIDENTIAL
27SEP RAL
NL
11385
REGISTRY
/24AB/40.
1940
21st September, 1940.
Report of enquiry into the loss of H.M. Paddle Minesweeper
GRACIE FIELDS
in Operation "Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter.6245/40 dated
1st August 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held into the loss of H.M.Paddle Minesweeper GRACIE FIELDS on 29th May 1940.
2. Temporary Acting Lieutenant Commander A. C. Wicks,R.N.R., who was in command of GRACIE FIELDS, was interviewed on
21st September, 1940.
3. At about 2030, on 28th, when ship was in vicinity of
Middlekerk Buoy, she was subjected to attack by enemy bombers for about a quarter of an hour. Two bombs scored direct hits in the Engine Room, wrecking the control platform and bursting steam pipes.
(ii) Endeavour was made to shut off steam at the main stop valve on the upper deck near the funnel, but the valve could not be closed.
(iii) The explosion put the steering gear out of action by fracturing the nal and chain connection.
4. Fires were drawn, the Engine Room was flooding steadily and by the time access could be gained, there was about 6 feet of water in the compartment.
5. PANGBOURNE came alongside and took off all troops and crew of GRACIE FIELDS, except those required for taking her in tow.
6. PANGBOURNE towed GRACIE FIELDS till about 0200 when, sponsons being awash and Engine Room and Stokehold flooded to a depth of 10 feet, it was decided to abandon her. Tow was cast off and remainder of crew were taken on board PANGBOURNE.
7. The ship was then in about 10 fathoms and sinking.
Although it was not revealed when she actually sank, it seems, from the evidence, unlikely that she remained afloat more than about half an hour after being abandoned.
8. C.B.'s and S.P.'s not in use were in steel chest in
Captain's cabin, which was so wrecked that it was not possible to have them. Those in use were taken on board PANGBOURNE and landed at the port of arrival.
SS
retary he Admiralty.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 5.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Tuesday, 28th May (continued).
to S.N.O., Dunkirk by signal - timed 1555/28 - and provided for the use of 3 Hospital Carriers, 7 personnel steamers and
2 destroyers at the East Pier, Dunkirk, while some 20
destroyers, 19 paddle and fleet sweepers, 17 drifters, 20 to
40 skoots, 5 coasters, 12 motor boats, 2 tugs, 28 pulling cutters and life-boats were to be distributed between La
Panne and point 1½ miles East of Dunkirk, on the beaches; the destroyers running continuous round trips.
It was estimated that the personnel vessels and hospital carriers would be clear of the danger area by 0630. As regards the beaching and other small craft which had not yet reached the Dover Straits, arrangements were made with other authorities to route all small craft, which had not already been despatched, direct to the beaches East of Dunkirk, provided they had charts, food, fuel, etc.
At this time some difficulty was experienced in having at hand the large number of charts required for these additional vessels.
17, Owing to the suspension of daylight work by personnel vessels it was necessary to increase the number handled in
Dunkirk during the dark hours as the attempt to use the surplus personnel vessels off the beaches by night seemed unlikely to bear fruit. Accordingly, S.N.O., Dunkirk, was asked whether personnel vessels could be berthed inside
Dunkirk harbour, the only information in Vice Admiral's possession having indicated that the East Pier of the harbour entrance was the only suitable berth for such ships to which
British troops could have access. To increase the off-shore forces, Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was asked to sail CALCUTTA
to be opposite La Panne at 2200 to embark troops using own boats.
Orders were issued that all ships proceeding to Dunkirk from Dover were to use the southern route Z provided that the passage from No. 6 Calais Buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
18. At 1830 GRAFTON reported that several thousand troops remained on beaches at Bray and that more were arriving. At that time there were off Bray, one tow of pulling boats, number uncertain, 2 power boats, at least
2 skoots, CALCUTTA, GALLANT, WAKEFUL, VERITY and GRAFTON, using what survived of their own whalers and motor boats.
This force was reinforced by 2 minesweepers at 2115. Later reports of concentrations of troops on the beaches were received, particularly at La Panne and Bray. Craft approaching the coast were directed accordingly. Naval Officer-in-
Charge, Ramsgate, was requested to maintain a continuous evacuation service by skoots between Margate and Ramsgate and the beach, and take over responsibility for servicing those vessels. Meantime CALCUTTA, who was off La Panne, reported that conditions for embarkation there were very bad owing to heavy surf, but that they might improve with the rising tide.
Shortly after midnight CALCUTTA was informed that the third corps of the B.E.F. and the Commander-in-Chief were all now at La Panne. She was directed to make every endeavour to concentrate all destroyers and light craft at that end of the beach/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 27
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday 1st June (continued).
and at 0815 was attacked by enemy aircraft. Ship was hit aft of
No.3 boiler room and put out of action. About 0945 another attack took place but no hits were registered. A third attack took place at about noon and the ship began to settle and the order to abandon ship was given.
Destroyer KEITH attacked by enemy aircraft off Bray severely hit and abandoned at anchor by No.8 buoy. Finally sank.
Harbour Defence Craft AMULREE sunk in collision by
VIMY at 0200.
Sunday, 2nd June.
80. The arrangements to set in motion the night's evacuation had proceeded smoothly as far as could be ascertained at
Dover. During the early hours, reports of sailings from Dunkirk indicated that destroyers at least were doing well.
At about 0200, however, a signal was received from
LYDD, who was off the Dunkirk beach, as follows:-
"Brigadier tells me that C. in C. says it is essential that rearguard B.E.F. embarks from the beaches east of Mole on account of French congestion on Mole. Considerable number
British troops still on Mole. Military are expecting further arrivals there. Rearguard expects to arrive at beach by 0230."
The Vice Admiral accordingly ordered all ships known to be outside Dunkirk Harbour to endeavour to embark the rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300 if necessary. Owing to the time in transit and coding it was feared that this signal would reach few ships still on the coast, unless they had remained on their own initiative after 0300, the previously ordered time of withdrawal.
At 0200, authority was received from the Admiralty to continue evacuation by destroyers from Dunkirk Harbour until
0700, transports to leave Dunkirk at 0300.
81. During the early hours there was considerable haze and smoke off Dunkirk Harbour, Dunkirk East Beach, Dunkirk Roads and the entrance therefrom to X Route. For this reason some of the smaller vessels, including minesweepers, failed to make either
Dunkirk Harbour or Dunkirk East Beach, but on the whole it appears that evacuation, both from the beach and from the harbour had proceeded satisfactorily with the resources available.
Between 0200 and 0900, 6 personnel vessels reached
United Kingdom from Dunkirk Harbour with about 5,500 troops. 2
others had been turned back before reaching Dunkirk by 2 unknown destroyers, and one had been in collision before reaching Dunkirk and had to return.
82. Considerable doubt existed during the forenoon as to the numbers remaining to be evacuated in Dunkirk. It was thought that
2,000, plus the 4,000 rearguard British troops, might well be found in Dunkirk. The number of French troops remaining was increasing from the 25,000 quoted the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000.
83. The Rear Admiral, Dover, arrived back from the coast in a M.T.B. and during the forenoon a joint Naval and Military conference was held to devise a plan for the forthcoming night's evacuation. The fact that evacuation traffic was suspended in daylight/

C.W.19295
(Revised-June, 1983.)
D-51.
1940
FROM WHOM
DATE
Merchant Service Vessels employed in Operation "Dynamo".
/
(Extracted from Case 5458).
Personnel Ships
Case 5458 Vol. III. 7.)
29.
QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL
"
III. 6.
sunk
1.
"
DORRIEN ROSE
"
1.
NEW PRINCE OF WALES
"
III. 6.)
sunk
1.
SCOTTISH CORPORATION
"
III. 6.)
1.
MASSEY SHAW
"
III. 6 & 8)
1.
LIGHTER X 209
"
III. 6.)
1.
C.E.in C. TUG PRIMA
)
"
III. 6.)
1.
"
HOPPER BARGE W.24)
1.
"
"
"
W.26)
1.
"
"
"
W.95)
1.
THYRA
1.
PUDGE
London and Rochester ( "
II.5.)
1.
CABBY
Trading Company,
1.
SEINE
)
Limited.
1.
BEFENDER
1.
RELIANCE
1.
LETITIA
Bawley Boats
III 8
1.
ENDEAVOUR
"
Civilian crews.
1.
RESOLUTE
1.
RENOWN (Sunk)
1.
QUEENSLAND,
Tilbury Dredging Company.
(Case 5458.Vol.III.8.)
1.
JOHANNA
"
(Dutch eel boat)
III.8. 1.
River M/L "MADAME SANS GENE" (sunk)
"
III.8.) 1.
M/V "SEA ROAMER"
"
III.8.) 1.
"FAAR BREEZE" Drifter
1.
Votor Boat "KIT CAT"
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Southend Lifeboat "GREATER LONDON"
1.
Launch belonging to Skylark Shipbuilding
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Co. Poole.
opper " Barge "Lady Southborough"
1.
"
1.
QUEEN'S CHANNEL
"
"
GALLIONS RANCH
Tilbury l.
"
(
"
"
FOREMOST 101.
Contracting
III.8.) 1.
"
"
FOREMOST 102.
& Dredging
1.
"
"
1.
JAMES 67.
Company.
Dutch eel boat "CHANTECLER"
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Motor Life Boat unnamed,
#
(S.Lt.Amos, R.N.V.R.)
III.8.) 1.
Motor Yacht "RYGATE II"
"
III.8. 1.
M/B "QUICKSILVER"
"
III.8. 1.
Motor Cruiser "BOBELI"
"
III.8.) 1.
M/B "RAPIDE"
"
III.8.) 1.
"NAID ERRANT"
"
III.8.) 1.
M/B "THARK"
#
III.8.) 1.
Total. 71.
Mainly civilian crew, but R.N. or R.N.R.Officer in command.

Page 12
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. HAVANT - Lieutenant Commander Anthony Frank Burnell-Nugent
D.S.C., R.N
first trip, while alongside home 1,500 troops in all. On the the
HAVANT 2 trips made she 3 brought trips including 2 to the beaches.
3rd embark during an intense Dunkirk pier waiting for On assistance. off offall the troops (about to
IVANHOE Having amidships taken and on fire so steamed out she saw her to struck aerial bombardment, troops including subjected many wounded) to HAVAN proceeded for Dover, 500
bombing bombs in the from hore batteries. She level soon and bombardment intense di bombing, high and low but wa by 2 which fell engineroom, and then a large delay was action hit bomb, about 50 yards ahead of ship, exploded right underneath her.
Further bombing caused more underwater damage and
HAVANT finally rolled over and sank after the troops and crew had transferred to AEGIR
Recommendations.
OFFICER.
Lieutenant Commander Anthony Frank Burnell-Nugent, D.S.C., R.N.
Evacuated troops from the beaches and from Dunkirk during heavy bombardment. When his ship had been heavily damaged by bombs, made every endeavour to save her when still subject to intense aerial attack, though without success.
D.S.C,
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Chief Stoker M. Gallon, P/K. 59221.
ing ered
The Engineer Officer and 2 E.R.A.s having been killci and all the other E.R.A.S having been wounded, this rating became in charge of the engineroom department.
He showed great initiative and resource by letting the steam out of the boilers at a critical time, thereby saving the ship from running on to a sandbank opposite
Dunkirk. He subsequently showed great calmness and presence of mind in doing all he could to save the ship and to keep the Captain informed of the state of affairs
DSM D.S.M.
below. He was the last rating to leave the ship.
Recommended for decoration.
Sick Berth Attendant A. Keller D/X.6785.
When faced with a large number of wounded under heavy fire, carried out his duties with the utmost calm,
M
deliberation and efficiency.
P.S.M.M
Recommended for mention.
Petty Officer Steward J. Lysaght, D/L.13388.
IDSM
This rating showed great initiative and resource in getting wounded men from HAVANT to AEGIR. He took charge well and set a fine example.
Recommended for decoration.

Page 12
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
I.S. HAVANT - Lieutenant Commander Anthony Frank Burnell-Nugent
D.S.C., R.N.
HAVANT made 3 trips including 2 to the beaches. On the first 2 trips she brought home 1,500 troops in all. On the
3rd trip, while alongside Dunkirk pier waiting for troops to embark during an intense aerial bombardment, she saw
IVANHOE struck amidships and on fire so steamed out to her assistance. Having taken off all the troops (about 500
including many wounded) HAVANT proceeded for Dover, but wa soon subjected to intense di- bombing, high and low level bombing and bombardment from lore atteries. She was hit by 2 bombs in the engin room and then a large delay action bomb, which fell about 50 yards ahead of ship, exploded right underneath her.
Further bombing caused more und rwater damage and
HAVANT finally rolled over and sank after the troops and crew had transferred to AEGI
Recommendations.
FFICER.
Lieutenant Commander Anthony Frank Burnell-Nugent, D.S.C., R.N.
Evacuated troops from the beaches and from Dunkirk during heavy bombardment. When his ship had been heavily damaged by bombs, made every endeavour to save her when still subject to intense aerial attack, though without success.
Recommended for mention.
ATINGS.
Chief Stoker M. Gallon. P/K.59221.
The Engineer Officer and 2 E.R.A.s having been killi and all the other E.R.A.S having been wounded, this rating became in charge of the engineroom department.
He showed great initiative and resource by letting the steam out of the boilers at a critical time, thereby saving the ship from running on to a sandbank opposite
Dunkirk. He subsequently showed great calmness and presence of mind in doing all he could to save the ship and to keep the Captain informed of the state of affairs below. He was the last rating to leave the ship.
Recommended for decoration.
Sick Berth Attendant A. Keller D/X.6785.
When faced with a large number of wounded under heavy fire, carried out his duties with the utmost calm, deliberation and efficiency.
Recommended for mention.
Petty Officer Steward J. Lysaght. D/L.13388.
This rating showed great initiative and resource in getting wounded men from HAVANT to AEGIR. He took charge well and set a fine example.
Recommended for decoration.