TNA ADM 199 792

104
101
31-1
M.011883/40
got
Evacuation of allied Troops from N.W. France. 26.5-4.6.40
10 peration "Dynamo")
Report submitted by V.A.Dover including:-
Narrative of Events.
HM ships taking part.
31-1 H.M. ships lost.
sembarkations in U.K. ports.
-
103
numbers disembarked in England.
the French Troops
1
2 destroyed by ships fire.
too freatrate operation.
Noted.
Carb
:
28/5
ate etc etc e thing officers.
tobe co-operation requested in ing recommendations.
28/5
40.
O.D. (H)
VCNS tells me this has been dealt with
&
servens
30/5.
NAVY BILL
ISSUED

104
f
52
drance
101
31-1
M.011883/40
90.1
Evacuation of allied Troops from N.W. France. 26.5-4.6.40
10 peration "Dynamo")
Report submitted by V.A.Dover V. including:-
Narrative of Events.
HM ships taking part.
31.1 H.M. ships lost.
Daily list of disembarkations in u.k. ports.
Daily record of numbers disembarked in England.
Co - operation of the French Troops
Enemy aircraft destroyed by ships fire.
Enemy efforts too frustrate operation.
40-19-0 air Co. operation.
control of Troops.
atc etc etc
Report to be forwarded to all thing officers.
90-1 air Ministry & Was Office co-operation tobe requested in analysing report and froming recommendatious.
1940.
NAVY BILL
ISSUED

111 12
109
CONFIDENTIAL to
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
MILITARY BRANC
19 JUN1940
*
(Dover Despatch A. 14/0/876/40 of 18th June, 1940). A DMIRALI
STATEMENT OF CONTENTS.
1
Pages.
Report dated 18th June, 1940
...
1 - 8
Introduction
...
...
1 - 2
Narrative of Events
...
...
1 - 40
Appendix I
:.
H. M. Ships, etc. taking part.
1 - 2
Appendix II
:.
H. M. Ships, etc. lost during
1 - 2
Operation "DYNAMO".
d
Appendix III
:
Daily list of disembarkations
1 - 10
in U. K. ports.
"
:h
Appendix IV
:
Daily record of numbers
1
disembarked in England.
Appendix V: Co-operation of the French le e
1
troops.
Appendix VI: Enemy aircraft destroyed by
1
ships' fire.
istribution made by over. lag Officer Commanding,
No. of Copies.
dmiralty
...
... 12, together with
...
original stencils
Ornander-in-Chief, Nore.
1
...
Portsmouth.
1
ve
1
...
1
er
Sheerness
1
an aval Officer-in-charge, Ramsgate. Dover.
1
he
1
0/
: was rench

112
CONFIDENTIAL
110
Office of
The Flag DOVER. Officer Commanding,
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an
Naval definitely committed to provide for the extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
50,000. evacuation or French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French
Secretary as/
London,,Salty, 1.

CONFIDENTIAL
113
Report OR Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 2. 111
as to any termination of the operation which threatened to drag on painfully, and finally to lose momentum and expire through the exhaustion of Naval personnel and the liquidation of shipping.
It will be seen, therefore, that the initial problem called for a maximum effort over a limited period regardless of the future, and accordingly all resources in the way of small boats were thrown on the beaches, before adequate provision had been made for their maintenance off the coast in such matters as relief of the personnel and the provision of large beach parties.
It was only due to the foresight of the Admiralty in making arrangements for a continued flow in ever increasing numbers of small power boats and beach craft, which became available on the fifth day onwards, that the continued evacuation from the beaches remained a reasonable proposition after the initial crisis had passed.
4. A perusal of the signals that passed between Dover and the French coast reveals the many occasions on which the responsible officers stationed on the coast considered so little had been achieved from the beaches that they advocated restriction of evacuation to Dunkirk Harbour. Many compaints of "no boats", "no ships", might lead a detached observer to the conclusion that the great effort that was being made was proving abortive.
At Dover, where the whole operation could be viewed in truer perspective, the number and origin of the troops being landed in England being always to hand, it was clear that the evacuation from the beaches required by the military situation, was, in fact, achieving a considerable success, as the following figures will show. Of the 226,000 troops landed in the United Kingdom, between May 28th and June 1st inclusive -
the period during which both Dunkirk and the beaches eastward were available day and night except for enemy interference -
49,000 were landed by personnel vessels and hospital carriers direct from Dunkirk Harbour, 95,000 were lifted from the beaches, leaving 82,000 as having been lifted from Dunkirk
Harbour by vessels other than troop transports.
5. WEATHER CONDITIONS.
The operation was favoured by extremely good weather.
It was found, however, that any northerly wind caused a surf, which greatly reduced the rate of lifting from the beaches.
It must be fully realised that a wind of any strength in the northern sector between South West and North East would have made beach evacuation impossible. At no time did this happen.
6. DISPOSAL OF TROOPS AFTER REACHING ENGLAND.
On arrival in England the despatch of troops from the points of disembarkation proceeded with great smoothness under the War Office movement control organisation.
7./

Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
CONFIDENTIAL18
Page 7.
Boulind
116
WAVERLEY. abandoned 600 in troops were on board before ship picked up.
sinking condition, but only 200-300 was were have through these and similar disasters on
In been all lost it is regretted that about 2,000 troops must the return voyages to England.
14.
CO-OPERATION OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
French warships and other vessels were employed evacuating French troops from Dunkirk harbour, and on the last three nights from the beach 1½ miles eastward from Dunkirk.
Details are given in Appendix V.
15.
BASE ORGANISATION.
An operation of this magnitude involving the maintenance and movements of close on 900 vessels and boats could not have been conducted without the wholehearted and unceasing efforts of the base establishments at Dover and
Ramsgate, as well as those at Sheerness and Harwich in the
Nore Command, At all these places officers and men, Naval and civilian, laboured unceasingly throughout the Operation.
In particular I wish to acknowledge the great assistance received from the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, who in many cases anticipated my requests for assistance through his constant watch on the progress of the Operation.
The prompt and unfailing assistance afforded by the Chatham Depot in providing personnel for the numerous small craft, working parties and beach parties, was a feature essential to the successful outcome of the Operation.
The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, by taking over the servicing and control of the great majority of the small craft of the inshore flotillas relieved Dover of an immense volume of work which it would otherwise have been impossible to handle.
It was also broughtto my notice that at Harwich an exceptional Naval and Military system was in being for assisting those ships which called there to make a quick turn round, relieving the tired ships' companies of the work of cleaning and clearing their vessels.
16.
SERVICES OF STAFF, INCLUDING OFFICERS
TEMPORARILY APPOINTED.
I was fortunate in having the services or
Rear Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker, C.B., O.B.E., as Flag Officer afloat off Dunkirk, and Captain W.G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O., as Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk on shore. Admiral Wake-
Walker was responsible for supervising the embarkation afloat and Captain Tennant for organising embarkation from the shore, keeping touch with the French Naval Authorities and the Staff of the British Commander-in-Chief.
Detailed particulars of their services were given in Dover Despatch No. B.23/862/40 of 4th June, 1940.
I cannot conclude this despatch without reference to the splendid work of my staff under the guidance of my Staff/ Chica

132
130
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
29/5
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

139
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
137
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6, Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B,'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
31MAY
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England, These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and romain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C.,
New motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and foreshore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer, MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

144 33
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 23
142
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
1/6
Saturday, 1st June, (continued)
machines being noted. During this attack BASILISK was put out of action off La Panne and later sank while struggling home.
KEITH, SALAMANDER and SKIPJACK, who were moving westward along the coast as the Bray and La Panne beaches had been emptied, were heavily bombed, t. e former was hit and set on fire and the latter sank. KEITH was abandoned and finally sank.
Nearly all troops on board KEITH and the crews of both vessels were rescued by other ships. A third attack started over
Dunkirk, extending well out along Route X, and occurred between
1000 and 1040, to be again resumed at noon. After that there was a lull until 1550, when another attack was delivered on
Dunkirk Harbour and all shipping therein for over half an hour.
At 1800 the Vice Admiral received the following signal from
Dunkirk: "Things are getting very hot for ships; over 100
bombers on ships here since 0530, many casualties. Have directed that no ships sail during daylight. Evacuation by transports therefore ceases at 0300. If perimeter holds will complete evacuation tomorrow, Sunday night, including most
French. General concurs." The sense of this message was passed on to Rear Admiral, Dover, off the coast.
69. In addition to the heavy scale of air attack during the afternoon the sea traffic was very seriously interrupted by artillery fire brought to bear on X Route near No.5 buoy. The fire appeared to be accurate and it is believed some French ships were sunk. 2 French Destroyers in the vicinity stopped
British ships approaching from England on X Route short of this point, and it became evident that a very serious threat to daylight evacuation was in being. Meantime, the toll of casualties of ships during the day was mounting particularly amongst the destroyers and shortly after midday the Commanderin-Chief, Nore, called the attention of the Admiralty to this, suggesting the discontinuation of the use of destroyers by day off the French Coast. The summarisation of all these incidents led to the Admiralty directing the Vice Admiral, Dover, to suspend evacuation from Dunkirk at 0700, Sunday 2nd June, and for it to be resumed the following night or from 1730/2, depending upon the circumstances. From the above it will be seen that there were to be no ships proceeding to Dunkirk between 0700/2 and 1730/2. The above Admiralty directions crossed a message from the Vice Admiral stating that all ships had been ordered to withdraw from Dunkirk before daylight the following day, owing to the heavy casualties to shipping.
70. In spite of enemy action more than 60,000 troops were landed in the United Kingdom during the 24 hours, thanks to the unremitting determination of Naval vessels who all executed a succession of round trips, interrupted only by necessary refuelling. The majority of the surviving vessels had been operating ceaselessly for at least 5 days, and officers and men were approaching a condition of complete exhaustion.
the
71./
each of the on

153
CONFIDENTIAL,
Page 34.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
155
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, finding it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and infl: 1 motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats.
104, Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coass jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of' soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. Of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

page 5.
198
Sub Lieut. Galbraith.
196
6.
I was by Y gun for first attack. After hit I though ship was on fire and took some of gun's crew forward to deal with it, ordering a torpedoman to start jettisoning Port forrard depth charges, which appeared to be in danger. Found no fire but hauled on board two burned men who were in water Port side. Went aft where it was reported that shell room was flooding. Had all hatches closed. Assisted Gunner with jettisoning depth charged.
Tried to render cabin flat water tight. Went forward to assist with tow forward observed bow to be bulged by close bomb near water line. Took cover in P.O's mess for start of 2nd. attack.
Captain ordered me to get Vickers in action. Found torpedoman who knew its action and managed to get only three single rounds off during attack. Complete jam resulted. Later saw G.M. who declared nothing could be done. Took cover for 3rd. attack.
Watched destruction of A/S Pannel. Was ordered by 1st. Lieut. to load.Army boat and supervise its manning. Accompanied Sub. Lt.
Ellis to Captain's cabin to get C.B's for destruction. Just reached deck when last attack started. Took cover by Y gun and inside after screen. On order to abandon ship, saw boat manned, threw some C.B's which I saw on U.D. over the side and then jumped for boat. A/S C.B's were not destroyed.
Lieut. Sowry.
7.
At the beginning of the first attack I was on the bridge on the G.C.O's phones. Soon after bombers were sighted I
gave the order "All guns with H.E:T.F - load" and "Rapid Salvos".
Planes were sighted astern, angle of sight about 60° and at no time was the Director Layer able to report Director on during this attack due to the A of S being too great. Consequently no executive order to shoot was given.
After this attack I was told by the Captain to take the motor boat away and commandere two fishing smacks which were passing 1/2 miles away. The first of these was abandoned and I
returned in the second and stood by to tow. A wire was passed and made fast round a stout beam in the smack, which carried away some 15 minutes later. A second wire was then made fast round the foremast but as the tow was not clear of the deck house, the smack veered round and had to be pulled back into position by the motor boat. An additional rope was passed and made fast on the other quarter and the ship was turned through about 60 degrees., but the smack was again in the wrong position for towing, being alongside the forecastle bows pointing aft. At this point second bombing attack took place and I slipped tow and stood off to about 1 mile, the smack being machine-gunned by four planes. When attack was over I returned and reconnected tow which later parted due to taking up the slack too väolently. This was due to the language difficulty of giving orders to the French crew of the smack, the only other man on board the smack being an R.A.F. pilot. A
further bombing attack started, the final one, and I again stood off from the ship. When I returned the crew was abandoning ship and I picked up all men in the water, two Carley floats, one RE
pontoon and some men from each whaler. At this point, with 70
men aboard, Whitehall appeared in the distance and we made out to intercept her, using the smack's siren and the French ensign half way up the foremast. We met her about 12 miles away and passed information to her and requested her to collect men from remaining boats. I then set out on a course for England and in mid-chai.nel we transferred everyone to H.M. Trawler Olvina.

Page 6.
197
Leading Seaman Wordhouse.
Motor hoat.
199
Whilst pushing the towing vessel into position, the bombing formation came over. I let go and sheered off, the first salvo lifting the boat almost out of the water.
Messerschmidt fighters attacked us with machine gun and cannon (Bombs were also dropped) for just a few minutes short of an hour. L.S. Hicks watched their flight and gave me helm and engine orders, the boat not being hit though a couple of cartridge cases dropped into us. We found ourselves out of sight of the ship, had a little council of war, and decided, knowing the ship was out of wireless communication to make Dunkirk for help. We headed west, and not far outside the harbour two troopships were bombed and sunk. We picked up what we considered a safe complement, tried to get in touch with a vessel to assist Basilisk.
In this were not successful and were told to make England.
We drew a rough chart and set our course, arraving
Ramsgate roughly eight hours later. I then turned over the boat to the Naval authorities. We reported that Basilisk was badly hit and were assured that help had been sent.

219
217
SECRET.
Appendix II. to report of sinking of H.M.S. GRENADE.
After the explosion aft I observed a large number of ratings blown into the oily water, several of whom were badly injured. With the aid of the Gunner T. I cut away the lashing of the after Carley float and launched it. I
swam after the drifting float and with the mutual help of one or two ratings we hauled each other on board. I then collected the seriously injured and one or two uninjured men.
The First Lieutenant was heard to order men to to remain in the ship and I took the float back to the ship collecting a steward en route. The ship lurched heavily to port as I reached the side and since the forecastle was blazing I ordered the raft to stand off. At this juncture another rating was observed in a patch of oil fuel about 40
yards from the ship. I rescued this man with the float and took in tow a T.S.D.S. float which was supporting two P.Os who had since abandoned ship. Two destroyers and two trawler passed without stopping and a French tug landed our party on the west side of the docks amid the blazing ruins. An ambulance picked up our party and proceeded towards the heart of the town. When the ambulance stopped for more casmalties the party disembarked, and were forced to leave one seriously injured seaman (Coates) who WELE then taken to the base military hospital. At this point a lost Bren gun crew joined forces and the idea of escaping to England in a small boat was formulated.
I took the whole party, eight sailors and eight soldiers, and proceeded on the carrier to the docks.
A
gendarme prevented our embarkation in a drifter, the captain of which had signified his willingness to take us. We then proceeded on the carrier towards the eastern jetty, but our progress was halted by a blazing ammunition lorry. The commencement of intense aerial bombardment forced us to seek shelter in the vaults where Army officers and men provided us with dry clothing etc.
I then reported the Naval party to the S.N.O.
Dunkirque and after suggesting we remained in the town he gave the party full permission to seek a boat and sail to
England. We made our way towards the pier and P.O. Emery and myself became detached from the main party. In the course of a talk with a French soldier I discovered he possessed a motor boat with which he was desirous of escaping to England.
P.O. Emery sought out and brought along the remainder of the party, including the Bren gun crew and with P.O. Bennion managed to embark the whole party, with equipment, and against the wishes of the Frenchman. Then after considerable tactful persuasion and adjustment of top weight, plus the encouragement of casting off the painter, the engine was started and the bows pointed towards England at 21.00/29.
P.O. Bennion took the wheel and I shaped a course for the harbour mouth and channel buoys. After darkness fell
I checked my compass on the stars and found it had a variation of about 10° W. I.was then able to set a course for the S.E.
coast of England. All lights were extinguished outside the small cabin and most of the party fell asleep after having eaten a little food. The boat was well equipped with fuel and stores and the small engine gave us an estimated speed of five knots.

-2-
was stopped to other engined
The trip allow across a German was diesel uneventful. The
Several passed one destroyers floating At 03.30 and mine the which engine craft I decided stopped passed to us, leave while we time two drifters hove in sight. I decided to hail th untouched. and about the drifter because I was uncertain of my position, having chart or maps. The drifter altered course towards us took us aboard and the boat in tow. I found my positi to be about 15 miles S.E. of Ramsgate and I estimate the my course made good would have brought us to a point S.
Ramsgate (Deal?) at about 0800 on Thursday, May 30th.
P.O. Bennion remained at the wheel continuousl from 2100 to 0200 and with P.O. Emery brought the wounde seamen safely to the Naval base in spite of attempts by the Army to claim him as a casualty. The two P.O's mentioned carried out all duties with precision and showe great initiative in the handling of the situation. The behavious of the naval party was exemplary and their unflagging energy and support enabled us to escape and at the same time bring eight English and two French soldiers safely to England.
(Sgd) Reginald J. Crews.
5.6.40.

224
"
Page 5.
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - PRELIMINARY REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
PERIOD 30TH MAY - 1ST JUNE, 1940.
(Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Keith's" No.4/32 of 15th June '40)
Junel
51. As the ship was getting lower the order to abandon ship was given and the majority of men, who were able to find some timber to hold on to or to find a place in the floats, left the ship. At this moment the enemy launched a further dive bombing attack and a bomb struck our exposed starboard side in the engine room, making a large hole. Several bombs fell very close to and one fell among the men who had abandoned ship. The aircraft were engaged by pom poms and lewis guns.
52. Some twnety minutes later the tug "St. Abbe" was sighted and eventually came alongside to take men off the ship.
This she did with the exception of volunteers who remained or.
board. She was ordered to go and pick up "Keith's" men in the water.
In this she was assisted by the tug "Vincia" which took back to Margate: Lieutenant Beauchamp, 83 ratings from
"Keith" and about ten of the General Headquarters Staff, together with six seriously injured ratings.
A grey scoob also assisted and recovered Lieutenant
Verney, Pay. Sub. Lieutenant Craig-Waller, P.N.V.R., and about four of "Keith's" men. Having a full load of soldiers, she returned to England.
53. "Keith" was again bombed by dive bombers at this time.
54. After an interval, in which a search was made for wounded and any confidential matter remaining, the tug "St.
Abbs" returned and, the ship now being not only immoveable but without H.A. ammunition and sinking slowly, the remaining men left the ship in her at about 0840.
1/6
55. Signals were made to "Salamander" and to "Basilisk"
asking them to sink "Keith" finally but both replied that they were out of control and required tug assistance. The minesweep er however proceeded westwardsand shelled "Keith" in vicinity of Asdic cabinet.
ed
56. "St. Abbs" proceed/to the recovery of a number of men in the water and on a wreck of the "Skipjack"
which had been sunk during, it 1s believed, the last attack on
"Keith".
57. After recovering all these men and a number of soldiers from a ship's lifeboat, the "St. Abbe" was attacked by part of a large formation of enemy aircraft but without result.
58. However, somewhat later, another extremely large formation was sighted consisting mainly of high level bombers.
These did not attack the "St. Abbs" but proceeded to destroy the "Keith" and attacked "Basilisk" some miles to the East.
"Keith" sank in a heavy salvo of bombs at about 0915.
59. A single, high flying twin-engined bomber was then seen returning from Dunkirk. Again the "St. Abbs" circled as fast as she could but this time a single bomb hit her amidships and she sank very rapidly in about 30 seconds and with her many wounded survivors at about 1000.

225
223
Page 6
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - PRELIMINARY REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
PERIOD 30TH MAY - 1ST JUNE, 1940.
(Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Keith's" No.4/32 of 15th June '40)
59 continued.
All who had reached the water swam for the shore and a
1/6
number reached the wreck of the "Clan MacAlister" which was resting on her stern after being sunk in one the of the above raids. They were later taken off by a lighter and transferred to Sheerness Yard Craft No.63 then loaded with troops from the beach.
60. Survivors from "Keith" thus reached England in the following ways:-
Rear Admiral Dover and his Staff by M.T.B.
1 Officer and 88 ratings by tug "Vincia": also
H.Q. Staff.
2 Officers and 4 ratings by a scoot.
Captain, 3 Officers and 13 men, some of whom were wounded, in Yard Craft 63.
1 Officer and an II.A.S.B. from Dunkirk, after swimming ashore from "St. Abbs".
7 ratings by "Salanander".
D.Jon. Barthan D.jon.
CAPTAIN.
P.S. In continuation of paragraph 40:-
Lord Gort came onboard "Keith", had about 25
minutes conference with Rear Admiral Dover, and then proceeded in a British M.T.B., accompanied by his Chief
Staff Officer, for Dover.
VICE AD MIRAL
#
DO
O
Tu
O
S

SECRET
34.
La
Panne anchorage was
Nieuport passed or La until Caxide the and town this and became under more shell fire under time continuous shell and machine beach at withdrawn from this gun hit and proceeded to the westward.
troops were area. "Vivacious proceeded now reaching. Braye, which the anch
35. At at 0030 slow speed on 1st towards June "Keith" weighed at artillery 0206. were The ship arrived of
36. As dawn broke ships embarking men from weighed anchor, the beach being clear to the eastwa th before returning to England.
the ships proceeded towards Dunkirk to fill up with
37. At 0510 ten enemy fighters attacked the
"Keith" and other ships with bursts of machine gun which were inaccurate but might have caused serious to bridge personnel if pressed home.
38. Shells, apparently fired from shore batter the eastward, again fell close to the ship at 0520
off Braye.
4.7" 39. barrage and pom-pom fire. This barrage was eff
At 0555 enemy bomber aircraft were engaged and split the formation. A fuze setting of 18=4000
considered to be the shortest practical setting than firing this be used the aircraft are above the was at formations of aircraft. If a shorter elevation setti the guns before they get into range.
0630 "Keith" was standing off between ships with and collected La from the beaches during the night.
40. Panne From superintending the departure of
At 0737 a very large number dive heavy 41. bomber and fighter round aircraft were vertical
"Keith" bombers circling which rapidly carried out extremely a no doubt that at the releasing dive five as bombs 80° and each. that the There bombs is good are released as no with mass tar was 900 is as feet. offered steep The and each flying pilot was delivered extremely was attack able skill ammunition and dash. was The exhausted, enemy normal. attack. effect effective gunners gun 42. until in All keeping The addition 3" 3" H.A.gun ammunition the to attackers the proved hit ship's was in this attack a beating but lineaused there action several jamb 43. of bombs the steering very "Keith" eteering.gearterwards.com near across was misses the not after and one part of of these, the Fore as enemy was manoeuvrentro for hand ship engines continued steering aft to by circle at high vouched were in
(NOTE: continually Times from sight. now forward cannot.44. be At about

SECRET
PAGE 7.
22?
H.M.S. "KEITH" - FINAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 30th MAY - 1st
229
JUNE, 1940, WITH HER EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION.
(Captain Berthon's No.31 of 1st July, 1940 to V.A. Dover.)
62. At about 0950 a single high flying twin-engine bomber was seen returning from Dunkirk. Again"St. Abbs"
circled as fast as she could but this time a single bomb hit her amidships and she sank very rapidly, (in about 30
seconds), with her many wounded survivors. The "Keith's"
medical officer Surgeon Lieutenant R.H.A.Turner Royal Navy,
Ret'd, who was attending to wounded below and the Gunner (T)
Mr.Gedric James Brown Rpyal Navy, were both lost.
63.
All who had reached the surface of the water swam to the shore and a number reached the wreck of the "Clan
MacAlister", which was now resting on her step off Braye after being sunk in one of the above raids. They were later taken off by a motor lighter and transferred to Yard Craft 63 which with a full load of soldiers proceeded for England and after further trials by bombing on passage landed at Dover at 0800 Sunday,
2nd June. One officer swam to the shore and returned via
Dunkirk in a M.A.S.B.
64.
Survivors from "Keith" thus reached England in the
Following ways:-
Rear Admiral Dover and his staff by M.T.B.
Captain, 3 officers and 13 men by yard craft 63.
1 officer and 83 ratings by tug "Vincia": also
H.Q. staff.
2 officers and 20 ratings by scoot "Hilda"
About 7 ratings by "Salamander"
1 officer by M.A.S.B. from Dunkirk after swimming ashore.
There are 3 officers and 33 men lost.
65.
The discipline and cheerfulness of the ship's company was most marked and I consider was due to the personality of my predecessor the late Captain David Simpson R.N. who lost his life while in command of "Keith" about ten days previously, and to all the officers. No credit for this high morale can be attributed to myself as my active command of "Keith" amounted to 48 hours only.
66.
The cause of "Keith's" loss was the heavy enemy dive bombing attacks carried out when the ship's movements were very restricted owing to shoals, magnetic mines and wrecks and to the lack of effective A.A. fire owing to H.A. ammunition having been expended. The conduct of all officers and men was exempliary but it is desired to bring certain officers and men to your notice who from my personal observations were outstandingly forward in the execution of their duty in action under very trying conditions. Recommendations of these officers and ratings are being made in a separate letter.
VICE ADMIRAL
JUL 1940
D
CAPTAIN.
for Dover uy zuyuevote rass and North channel. The night was

260
2
Royal Naval Hospital,
Cha tham.
Dynamo 251,
B14/0/1276
263
6th
June,
1940.
259
H.M.S. GRIVE - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS. 262
to GRIVE
(Report from Sub Lt. J.K.B. Miles, R.N.V.R., dated 6th June, 1940.)
the movements of
1 The Hon. L.J.O. Lambart bn
II.
5m Portsmouth on Wednesday to notify the changes in
80
and which may possibly y in compiling CR ualty list
No. 0221/80.
ers to proceed from
VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
5-40) S/Lt. F.B. Hobson seen the Medical Officer
Forwarded. It is suggested that e of which he was recommendations for awards to officers should meantime Captain Lambert be made on the contents of this letter, and
Lee-on-Solent as an after further reference to Sub Lieut. Miles operations and he joined as regards ratings. I would like to add that Captain the Hon. Lionel Lambart was 67
years of age and was one of the happiest men th at 1530 on the in England when he came to say goodbye before
2400 awaiting further sailing for Dover.
re at 0800 30th and mander-in-Chief Dover, the evening tide at
Hames
00 and we proceeded
Portsmouth.
ach with our two whalers
10th June, 1940.
Admiral.
ed however that for the d carry this method was
CADMIRAL
VE" remained about two ver A.M. 31st with n air raid on the town
13JUN 1940
but the beach remained
SV-R
attack at the Eastern guns.
at 1400 31st, "GRIVE
bout 2000, and took O
psoy 400 troops Irom the Jetty, more might have been e 2891 but there was a very severe air raid and as the
This were three abreast at the jetty Captain Lambart theade 1 to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid
BMS'S med out to sea and just after clearing the harbour
1th0 uconfidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder
£8006 for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
Heanr 6. June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although having ounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
IBB-0 moon a NORBE. Joproaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded in spett to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. "IVANHOE", gruer Accourival found another vessel alongside already. I
EBHI SETho armanted to Captain Lambart that I could see a group contien anrine owne on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded alongside ca Bk them off undergoing very heavy bombing attacks in De Domenthe babunately left us unharmed although one salvo dropped
Lunde the jetty while we were on the inside. We mcvoe.dh edot missenrom the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendous was proceeding all this time.
and
[over

Decrame 33V.
SECRET
with the idea of 2%
swimming across its bow to attract its attension. The??
next he know was when he was being dragged ouboard a earley floor. This carley theats occupants and many
1/6
on $ bilor timber were picked up by a motor boot which took them to Ramegate. Sub- that is now in
97
The Royal Surrey County Itospital as fuildford and he forwarded me a report of what had happened to him and his party. I consider that this officer throughout the while operation displayed nictiation resource and devotion to duty; he is a reserve oftice of the very best type.
10. Two drifters eventually came alongside and after satisfying myself that then were wo tiering left onbrand, particularly in the Engine and briler 200ms, I lep the ship in the drifter Earl of Canan with the last of the wounded
Mosquito then had a list to port of about 20 depects and ce water was pouring in through three holes in the builes wohn anda laye hole in the wondenser. The Earl Cavan took us into Dunkerque while the other drifter look the unainder direct to England. The very badly wounded, including
Throwith, had to he left at the medical post at the shore in end 51 the pier to wait for the Hospital slip. I and my party returned in H.M.S. Worcester where I sustained wounds in the thigh. I would like to pay Kibule to the magnificant way in which the Worcester, although liter ally Eurounded by borbs, beat more ofr the attacks and jot her load home.
11. There are oneh Hier and two more whom I wish to bring
K your notice. Surgeon Lientenant N.L. Fox RN., an australian who joined the Name on the out break of crar, worked unceasing through out these operations. During our first trip he undoubtedly samed the lives of many soldiers;
after we were his, he remained onboard to the last making certain that there were no living Left orkoard and knding

SECRET
0
with the idea of 27
ue, swimming across its bow to attract its attension. The?? 279
next he know was when he was being dragged ouboard a early floor. This carley thats occupants and many
1/6
on $ bito of timber were picked up by a motor boot which took them to Ramegate. Sub- that is now in
The Royal Surrey County Itospital as faildford and he
97
forwarded me a report of what had happened to him and his party. I consider that this officer throughout the while operation displayed nictiat in resource and devotion to duty; he is a reserve oftice of the very best type.
10. Two drifters eventually came alongside and after satisfying myself that them were 40 tioning left onboand, particularly in the Engine and briles 200ms, I lep the ship yer in the drifter Earl of Canan with the last of the wounded
Hosquits then had a list to ports? about 20 defices and take water was pouring in through three holes in the builes wom men a
anda laye hole in the condenser. The Earl Cavan took us into Dunkerque while the other drifter look the unwander had direct to England. The very badly wounded, including ties
Throwith, had to he left at the medical post at the shore d.
rain and or the pier to wait for the Hospital slip. I and my f
anne party returned in H.M.S. Worcester where I sustained wounds and in the thigh. I would like to pay Kibuli to the magnificat id to way in which the Worcester, although liter ally Eworounded set by bombs, beat ofr the attacks and jot her load home.
ions
11. There are more and two more whom I wish to bring i/c se to your notice. Surgeon Lientenant N.L. Fox RN,, an austialian who joined the Name on the out break J/war, worked unceasingly through out these operations. During our frist trip he undoubtedly samed the lives of many soldiers;
after we were hit, he remained onboard to the last making certain that there were no living Legr orkoard and knding

Dynamo 65.
Dyrans. 33V.
Royal Chatham. Naval Barracks,
202
90
:que,
285
15th June, 1940.
13
sir,
I at have the honour to report the loss of H.M. Tug"St Abbs"
0
at Dunkirk 0930 on 1st June 1940, Lieutenant Brooker in command.
5
2.
Blst May, three barges in tow, the "Duchess", the "H.A.C." and
H.M. with Tug"St Abbs" sailed from Dover at 10 a.m. on Friday, the "Doris", bound for Dunkirk.
ng
3. At 2100 31st May the last barge of the tow, the "Doris"
31/5
ne or broke adrift and was taken in tow by a sloop, name not known.
ing
4. At 0030, 1st June, H.M. Tug"St St Abbs" anchored approximately say six miles from Dunkirk, Lieutenant T.E. Brooker considering it unadvisable and dangerous to proceed further before daylight.
5. At 0330 anchor was weighed and ship proceeded towards
Dunkirk.
6. At 0600 H.M. Tug"St Abbs" passed the piers and proceeded
LE
towards the beaches. Enemy aircraft commenced bombing the piers and shipping.
yer
7. At 0630 the barges were slipped and ordered to proceed it:
inshore to the beaches, the "Duchess" towing the "H.A.C."
H.M. Tug"St Abbs" anchored and waited for soldiers to embark.
8. At 0730 attacks by enemy aircraft intensified and anchor take was weighed, it being intended to proceed closer to the beach to a men on facilitate embarking of soldiers.
9. At 0800 approximately, H.M.S. "Keith" was struck by a bomb ng and settled in the water. H.M.Tug " St Abbs" proceeded alongside s:
H.M.S. "Keith" and took off survivors. Captain(D) of Nineteenth
S
Le had
Flotilla, First Lieutenant of H.M.S. "Keith" and other ratings remained on board to estimate the damage and consider the possibility of S. "Keith" being towed back to England. H.M.Tug "st Abbs"
rties ed.
I
proceeded to pick up survivors from ship's boats and from the water.
train
10. At 0830 H.M.S. "Skipjack" was struck by a bomb and sank of quickly. "Salamander" who was also rescuing survivors
Panne sailed for H.M.S. entrance of the harbour. The bombing was very heavy. the
Lo and remainder "St Abbs" then continued to pick up survivors. Bombing
H.M. Tug the returned alongside H.M.S. "Keith" and took off re and became so of heavy the that crew, it was necessary to keep the ship at full speed
S to and at 0900 H. M. Tug "St Abbs" sailed for the entrance.
O set
11. Tug "St Abbs" was blown up by four delay-action and ations, bombs At 0930 the water ahead of the ship. The bottom stern dropped were completely into shattered and the ship sank in approximatel p
i/c hit
45 seconds.
nise
1
H. 12. were swimming in the water and after
M. Tug "St About Abbs" thirty sank. men Approximately one hundred thirty que al ratings and soldiers were on the ship.
ark
0
13. June, I reached a wreck believed two to ratings be the si
"Clan MacAlfister", At 2400, 1st in company with two "Salamander"s" soldiers, whaler's from crew. H.M.S. "Skipjack" and were one from Captain(D), H.M.S. Nineteenth Flotilla, survivors the First Also Lieutenant on the wreck of H.M.S. "Keith" and eight other

2
(4)
291
Dark oil tanks when we arrived near Dunkerque. burnin above. lighted up the sky, with Flames from smoke at anchor Saw a ship (CLAN MACALLISTER) a black pall of provided a off Braye: burning until the on fire offshore but plight. Another deserted merchant ship was in similar and guns. useful diversion for German bombers end, deserted, shore
0400 30th May. time, parties in destroyer's boats. South, All landing the We approached beach Dunkerque beaches from the
Cdr. and it was not until 0400 that we found HEBE this took (Lieut.-
the John Temple) off Braye and transferred to her. At
Flat same time the 2 Commodores were put into drifters.
to boats off the beaches. Bush (who was in HEBE) seemed and calm: difficult to see in dark; many ships, drifters be rather despondent, having seen the shore black with men standing up to their waists in water; embarkation process being extremely slow.
Dawn
Arrived ahead. in HEBE off La Panne and got some idea of the task
(5)
Physical description of the beach. Long stretch of sand dunes rising fairly steeply in places from a gently shelving beach which dries for 200 yards or more at L.W.
Offshore the water deepens very gradually and a destroyer cannot get nearer than half a mile, etc.
Large groups of men all over the beaches and a dark line of men at the water's edge. Off Braye BIDEFORD was ashore with her stern completely blown off by a bomb: LOCUST -
river g.b. - trying to tow her off, which she eventually did and got her back to England. Farther towards Dunkerque another ship (CRESTED EAGLE?) was high and dry and burnt out; also many boats broached to on the beach. Lying off were destroyers, sloops, drifters, etc., and men making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft.
A slight swell made landing difficult, and many boats broached to and were stranded on a falling tide. The visibility was not good, with low-lying clouds: very thankful for this, a blessing we were not always to enjoy.
Daylight
Could now get a clearer idea of situation and conditions.
Beaches were packed with troops, but they appeared to be orderly and under proper control. A few ships were lying as close in as possible and were being slowly filled up by their own boats and a few local craft. Ships' motor boats were towing off the whalers assisted by motor launchen but these could not get very close in; pontoon craft were being paddled off by soldiers, but it was not easy to get them back ashore again and often they were left to float away empty. As soon as a sloop or destroyer was full up
I
she left and took her boats with her - the boats' crews were guns' crews and no one wanted to be without them.
To anyone with the appreciation of the practical difficult-l ies of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward'
the sight of that beach black with troops was dismaying.
The number steadily increased and at back of our minds all ore the time was question and fear of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair.
(6) 0630
Crux of matter was boats, boats' crews and towage; and at
0630 I signalled the urgent need of these. By about 0730
0730
most of the ships had loaded up and were leaving: I asked r for more ships and again stressed need of boats.
I now moved down to Dunkerque to get in communication with hit.
Tennant and went alongside pier in response to a signal.
nore
Description of Dunkerque (see plan). Outer harbour is formed by 2 breakwaters approx at right angles, leaving a and narrow entrance between. Western Arm of solid stone:
que
Eastern Arm (called here East Pier) only solid for short al part of inshore end, the rest being built of concrete piles.o wide enough for 4 men walking abreast. Alongside short through which tide flows and on which is a narrow pathway East isi
Pier is channel to inner harbour and docks. A
length

4
296
VA, A destroyer Dover, having reported that Dunkerque was
293
0830 I asked me if ships should be sent there. usable,
0830
signalled from HEBE that destroyers could At into
Dunkerque in succession and that troops were waiting come close to the pier. Loading off beaches was proceeding slowly:
conditions were not bad, but the slight swell running in was enough to render boats liable to broach to. At La
Panne and Braye, lorries were being driven into the sea to form a sort of breakwater.
Noon
About midday there was an air attack on ships and on La
Panne. Later, when it had cleared a bit overhead, there was an attack on Dunkerque. Several French destroyers came in by Y channel and were fired on from the north of
La Panne; some guns tried to shell beach between Braye and La Panne, but the steep dunes protected it.
On returning to La Panne met Stevenson who had transferred to a motor launch and was doing excellent work. He saw
(9)
Lord Gort who was anxious to see me. As conditions were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded, decided to go to Dunkerque and drive to La Panne from there.
HEBE could not be detained any longer, so sent her back to
Dover with troops and wounded and told Bush to explain the boat situation and point out vital necessity for sending out boats and crews.
1530
Transferred my staff to WINDSOR and went into Dunkerque in
MTB 102, sent at my request. Badly wanted some means of getting about quickly and a fast boat of light draught would have been invaluable: when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost at once to
Dover.
On getting to Dunkerque found Tennant was with Gort and that to drive there would take up more time than I cared to be away: decided to land from a boat after all.
The MTB had not enough fuel to reach La Panne and return to Døver, SO boarded GOSSAMER and took her to La Panne
1730
where I transferred to WORCESTER at about 1730.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England;
also received W/T messages from Dover. One (1749) said ships were urgently wanted off La Panne: actually, at
1900, there were 4 destroyers and 1 minesweeper there and situation was constantly changing.
G.H.Q. was in touch with Admiralty and VA, Dover, and gave views and criticisisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for signal from 1st SL on this day asking if boats were distributed along beaches to best advantage.
Actually, only boats that could get inshore, except distri- pontoons bution depended on position of ships they belonged but and a few local craft, were the whalers, and their to.
(10)
badly So hampered by lack of quick transport: once ships had far as possible kept ships off all beaches, was boats away a re-distribution was impracticable.
1900
beaches; with ammunition. Told her to beach cleared at as La
Small and about this time the TINY puffer herself their numbers of aircraft attacked La Panne and arrived, ships off loaded tide being then high; did so and was of was
Panne, tide fell, though think that a good deal cargo finally on beach in slight swell (thied attempt visual to see Gort), dumped in the sea.
2000
Landed Flag-Lieut. and a few signalmen to and open General went with them to GHQ - last villa but one on communication taking with GHQ. Met by Tennant south edge Lees;
of La Panne. situation. Seemed obvious to me back that more the
(11)
Discussed felt they had successfully fallen it now or soldiers intact inn face of great odds and that was not making up to less the Navy to get them off, but that Navy were
Stressed of large scale embarkation from beaches; off said from any real difficulty, effort to do slowness so. and dependence on fine weather that bulk of any troops should move westward and come This
Dunkerque.

8
300
KEITH'S I learnt boats he sent in, but Gort was not in 207 and
No one his staff: heavy air attack trips necessary time.
to bring off was in HEBE already. Three first boat
(21)
ships and was hit, though narrow escapes. Many during this on increase beaches; HEBE shot down a Heinkel. attacks
(19)
of shell fire off Braye, where CLAN Great was and a valuable decoy: she was hit and bombed MACALLISTER several times blindly into this area, as shells fell near CLAN MACALLIS-
started burning again. Enemy guns seemed to be firing
TER but not among ships loading which were some inshore of her. Later, these ships did come under fire, way and
VIVACIOUS was hit twice and had 11 casualties - 2-300
troops on board. Ordered her to go into Dunkerque and fill up there.
Lees was Senior Staff Officer of H. Q. Staff, and I thought it would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with me. As Gort was in HEBE I felt he was safe, and as
HEBE was doing good work embarking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Therein, perhaps, I
was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of Government to have him safe and sound at home, but felt he would
1st sooner the ship helped to bring off more men than he should land a few hours earlier in England.
During the day made signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the beach. Critical place likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated; intended to be there myself in KEITH
at daybreak next morning. Also kept BASILISK free of
(22) troops for same purpose.
1700
Weather improved gradually. Signal = "Weather off beaches now good: many more boats should come into use again as tide rises. General movement of troops westward towards
Dunkerque. No petrol supply yet and many boats getting short off La Panne and Braye. Movement from Dunkerque continues. Great air activity. "
1815
Drifters with petrol arrived.
After embarking H. Q. Staff I returned to Dunkerque and found Wynne-Edwards had been doing good work. Saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become famous - small motor yachts, motor launches drifters, Dutch schuyts, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure steamers, tugs towing dinghies, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats.
(20)
As tows of boats appeared they were told to which beach be they should go; particularly anxious there should sufficient at La Panne which was farthest off. Directed 10
miles up the coast; and as light was beginning the remaining to fail, several tows to go on to La Panne, telling them it was
Motor I left and Wynne-Edwards went on up to in La a MA/SB Panne myself. to direct Off Panne Braye were I saw tows I had feared - that tows ordered to La stopping what at Braye: got there just in farther time to on. warn
CODRINGTON (off Braye) to send them out to Lees how easy it was to talk about ten-mile distribu-
Pointed boats and craft at certain places along different a ting of coast, but that it was a very craft which thing stretch it done in practice, in the dark, by to help to get not been there before and with no lights the first place them. they had inevitable tendency was to stop assembled. at
The where other craft were
In the (on a his return to me at about off was La Panne.
came to end pretty fair distribution was 2230) made, and able Wynne- to
Edwards report that it was there this were evening a number that of I boats saw 2 would transports be bombed. go into
Dunkerque and out was just as it was getting from dark, that direction.
I think very nervous that they and shortly
They moved heard very heavy bombing aircraft attacking off
Actually, afterwards bombing was from our NOW own dark and I remained batteries La Panne in down company the coast. with HEBE and several other Stayed ships.

9
may 301 208
by Stayed moving off La Panne during the night, as could do much
Shelling was continuous and by the sound anywhere. some were about after dark. No lights not falling among the ships at the anchorage. News shells
(21)
no boats; ship message = boats found no one on beach.
conflicting: shore message = thousands of men waiting, very but
Probable truth was - Germans had range of lorry breakwater and beaches near it and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one, as troops had moved farther west clear of shell fire. Don't know what really took place. Off shore one felt helpless, etc.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway; MALCOLM off Braye reported a number of parachute mines dropped to westward of there, and suggested ships should leave by Zuidcoote Pass in the morning as passage to west was so heavily mined. Noise of MTB engines often heard to seaward and eastward:? our own patrol.
2300
Received urgent signal from Admiralty asking where Gort was and why I had detailed the MTBs sent for him to other work.
Gort had just left HEBE in a motor launch: after long search for him in the dark, at last found him, transferred
1st (24) June. As a result of the bombing the day before, asked for him to the MA/SB and sent him off to Dover with Lees.
fighter protection at dawn.
0215
Heard that troops were moving westward and decided that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. MALCOLM
and HARVESTER ordered from La Panne to Dunkerque. Also told ships to keep close to fairway buoys to avoid mines in the channel.
0235 (22) To Admiralty and VA, Dover:- "Yesterday ships off Braye under fire. Today's shorter front will bring dangerous area westward. Consider beach work too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkerque. Small craft will be moved westward at dawn.
VA, Dover, reply = "While leaving this to your discretion, essential that beaches be used until found impossible.
0330
Growing light. BASILISK with me - kept empty for support- La fire against tanks or lorries along beach. Up by and ing beach was deserted except for lorry breakwater - boats
Panne scattered cars. Sea also seemed deserbed small to the westward. some of the boats adrift. Off Braye Ships were had One or two motor launches about: there them was to a vanished, a few empty ones drifting on tide told collect and a paddle minesweeper ashore. and men were minesweeper still loading off Braye and to the westward, moving down westward off Braye along and the hailed beaches. a tug which and was try on to its tow way
Moved some soldiers on board to go in was back with minesweeper. Master paid no attention; him and sent an only
(86)
off the get away. Trained a gun on board anxious to to take charge, put the soldiers on
RNVR Sub-Lt. which was nearby, and go off to help the minesweeper with
SABRE, was that tugs had been told to regarded go over them-
Real trouble boats in tow and load up, and never they informed of this pulling transports only. I was tugs.
selves as them as tugs and for use as by
All the night, but the degaussing possible. and and regarded this time I was moving in waters mined proved effieient aircraft
(27)
during to edge of fairway when of the
I kept low clouds. Most ships were though full.
0400 (23)
Misty with that were not I sent into Dunkerque, and some for of the
Those were still many men on beaches, of small craft there small gone back boats to for were England. the still night there, Did and not were majority then going realise back June. as they intended. Troops had had been
Reported are evacuating gradually directing to Dunkerque all boats as and eastern small beaches craft sent over "Situation report at 0600, 1st to
0625
are untenable. and loading Am all ships at Dunkerque. and fighter More attacks ships vicinity required. Heavy bombing on Dunkerque About
(28)
on ships."

313
310
- 5
30/5
at 1017 water. Off shore the water deopons very gradually and a destroyer connot get nosrer than half a mile. At intervals along the coast there ore small towns, seaside resorts, which apposr perched on the top of the dunos which slope there more gently to the beach. Such are La Panno, Braye and
St. Malo - red brick houses, protentious villes and the typical modern seaside architecture. But now the growing light showed a different picture -
at the water' S câge was a dark line of men and there were large groups of mon all over the beaches. Off Brayo the "BIDEFORD" was ashore with her storn completely blown off by a bomb; the "LOCUST" - a shallow draft river-gunboat -
was trying to take her in tow and eventually did BO and got her off and back to England. Further down towards Dunkirk another ship was high and dry and burnt out on the beach - this, I think, was the "CRESTED EAGLE" and there were also many boats of one sort and another broached to on the beach.
Lying off the beaches were Destroyers and Sloops, Drifters and other
X
craft, and men were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and portoon craft.
There was a slight swell which made landing difficult and many boats broached to and were stranded by the tide. The visibility was not good and overhead there were low lying clouds - a blossing for which tye were preatly thankful, and which we were not always to enjoy. As soon as it Was light
I was able to get some clearer idea of the situation and conditions. The beaches were packed with troops, but they appeared to be orderly and under
X
proper control. Off the beaches were a few ships as close as they could got and these were being slowly filled up by their own boats and a fow local craft. Ships' motor boats were towing off the whalers assisted by NOVOR
launches, but these could not get very close in. Pontoon craft were being paddled off by soldiers but it was not easy to got them back inshere again, often they were left to float away empty. All soon as a Sloop 02'
D. Destroyer was full up she left and took her boats with her - the boate'
crews were guns' crews and no-one wanted to be without thom.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficultion of embarking in small Boats with a long pull to seaverd, the sight of that beach black with troops was dismaying. The musibers increased stoudily as more men filed down the sand dunes and at the back of our minds all the

317
311
M 9 -
30/5
the conditions inshore were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded I decided to go into Dunkirk and drive to La Panne from there.
All this time the large number of mon and wounded in "НЯ" had been on my mind. Feeling that I could not keep her any longer I decided to send her back to Dover with Captain Bush to explain the boat situation and point out the vital necessity of sending out boats and crews.
Accordingly at 3.30 I transferred my staff to "WINDSOR" and went into Dunkirk in M.T.B. 102 which had come at my request. I had folt badly in need of means of getting about quickly, and a fast boat of
X
light draft would have been invaluable. The trouble was that when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost immediately
X
to Dover.
On arrival at Dunkirk I found that Tennant was with Lord Gort and that to drive there would be likely to take a longer time than I cared to be away so I decided that I must land from a boat after all.
The M.T.B. had not onough fuel to reach La Panne and roturn to
Dover, so I boarded the "GOSSAMER" and took her up to La Panne where
I transferred to "WORCESTER" at about 5.30 p.m. There I again found
Commodore Stevenson and lent him my spare pair of trousers and underclothea as he got soaked through whenever he landed.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England and sometimes
I received messages by W/T from Dover about the situation there - 80 for
31
instance one timed 1749 saying that ships were urgently wanted off In
Panne actually at 1900 there were four destroyers and one minesweeper
X
at LO. Panne and the situation was constantly changing. G.H.Q. wear in touch with Admiralty and Vice Admiral, Dover, and gave their views and criticisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for a signal from the First Sea Lord on this day asking if boats were distributed along the beaches to the best advantago. Actually of course practically the only boats that could get inshore except the pontoons and D. few local craft were whalers and their distribution was dependont on the position of the ships they belonged to.

327
321
- 19 -
31/5
and bombed several times and started burning again. I got the impression that these guns were firing blindly into this area, as sholls foll near the
Olan Macallistor" and over her but not among the ships loading which were some way inshore of her. Later, however, these chips did COMO under fire, and "VIVACIOUS" reported she had been hit twice and had eleven casualties, and two or three hundrod troops on board, I ordered her to 80 into Dunkirk and fill up there.
General Lees 172.S the Senior Officer of the H.Q. Staff and I thought it
2
would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with ICC. As Lord Gort was in the "EdEE"
I felt that he WGB safe, and as the "HEBE" was doing good work caberking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Thorein perhaps
I was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of the Government to have him safe and sound at home but had felt he would soonor the ship helped to bring off more men rather than that he should land a few hours carlier in
England.
During the day I made a signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the boach. The critical place was likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated, and I intended to be there myself in "KETTH" at deybreak the noxt morning. I also kopt
"BASTLISK" free of troops for the same purpose.
The weather improved gradually and at 1700 I was able to signal:-
" Weather off beaches now good. Many more boats should come into use again
Q.B tido rises. General movement of troops westward towards Dunkirk. No petrol supply yet and many basts are getting short off La Panno and Braye,
Movement from Dunkirk continuos. Great air activity."
Actually drifters with petrol arrived not long after at 1815.
31/5
After embarking the Headquarters Staff I returned to Dunkirk to DOG
how the boat situation was getting on. There I found Wynne-Invardo who had been doing good work, and I saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become Pamous - tuge towing dinghise, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats - small motor yachts, motor Isunchos, drifters, Dutch scoots, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure ateamoro,

331
323
- 23 -
1/6
At 0400 it was misty with low clouds and I hailed these conditions with reliof, but unluckily they did not last, Most of the ships were full, Those that were not I sent into Dunkirk for though thore were still many mon on the beaches, and some of the small boats were still there, the majority of small craft had disappeared back to England. Here again I did not realize that they had beon sent over for the night and were making their way back as intended.
At 0625 I reported "Situation report at 0600 1st June. Troops DIC
evacuating gradually to Dunkirk as Eastern beaches are untonable. I an directing all boats and small craft to vicinity and Ideding all ships at Dunkirk.
More ships required. Heavy bombing on Dunkirk and fighter sittacks on ships."
About this time I suddenly saw a Bolgian fishing boat appear on the scone
Zudcote from seaward down the Ruytigon pass. I WOD suspicious 01 hor and ordered
"BASILISK" to investigate, She turned out to be the first of a dozen such beats which shortly after appeared. They were on their way into Dunkirk to assist in the evacuation.
As the mists and clouds dispersed many aircraft appeared on the scone and
X
fighters constantly came low over us. Mot'c often than not they were Spitfires, but owr ships were not taking chances and nearly always opened fire indiscriminately on them. As this kept happening I hoisted 6 Flag "Coase firo,"
and blow the syren to draw attention and try and stop the firing. In spito of this I can remember our own machine gun aft in "KEITH" firting away regardless of the "cease fire" gong; once started firing they could hear nothing.
"KETTH" by this time was running very short of П.А. amminition and had only about 30 rounds left for her H.A. gun. The 4.7's could be used for barrage fire only and had n. limited elevation. I decided in conseguence that
I would shortly transfer my flag to "BASILISK" and and "KEX" into Dunktik to fill L13) and return to Dover. Before I had time to do SO a very heavy bombing attack developed, first of all in and around Dunkink itsolf. I remember someone saying "B destroyer has blown up off Dunkirk" and I looked and DAY D. ship entirely enveloped in smoke just off the entrance. This was the "IVANEROS"
but she did not below use and = couple of hours later I BOW her boing howell back to Dover- In this attack the "HAVAN was also sunk near the entrence.

CONFIDENTIAL
Admiralty, S.W.1.
years
1st September, 1940.
y Dear Stack,
In reply to your letter of August, 24th enclose a statement of Private Crowther's ervices.
VX
Yours sincerely,
EARLY VERIFICATION
SERVING LEADING STWARD
E WAS THE ONLY STEWARD
r later, when the troops on board had been nsferred to another ship, he offered to dn in BIDEFORD and continue his work there, hough he knew that the ship was badly aged and aground, and it was considered y improbable that she would reach England.
EARLY VERIFICATION
les.
remained to tend his wounded comrades and ked continuously and with great efficiency
ERVING LEADING STWARD
nearly 48 hours.
th
WAS THE ONLY STEWARD
encils.
His decision to remain on board showed at courage.
SEP
1940

CONFIDENTIAL
Lyness
VX
ADM LDN. ACOS. PASS TO ADMIRALTY
ADDRESSED ADMIRALTY
FROM PROSERPINE
A F 0 3178 PAGE 14 LINE 32. REQUEST EARLY VERIFICATION
CHRISTIAN NAMES AND OFFICIAL NUMBER OBSERVING LEADING STWARD
BERTIE LAWRENCE P/I 12007 OF PROCERRINE WAS THE ONLY STEWARD
Admiralty, S.W.1.
1st September, 1940
vate George William Crowther, 6th Field
Ambulance B. Company, No. 1354480.
This man had been embarked from Bray ch after the ship was struck by bombs he at e volunteered to help the Surgeon. An r later, when the troops on board had been nsferred to another ship, he offered to in in BIDEFORD and continue his work there, hough he knew that the ship was badly aged and aground, and it was considered y improbable that she would reach England. EARLY VERIFICATION
Les.
remained to tend his wounded comrades and
ERVING LEADING STWARD
ced continuously and with great efficiency th nearly 48 hours.
WAS THE ONLY STEWARD
encils.
TUC
His decision to remain on board showed it courage.
SEP 1940

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
(Dover Despatch A.14/0/876/40 of 18th June, 1940).
STATEMENT OF CONTENTS.
Pages.
Report dated 18th June, 1940
1 - 8
...
Introduction
1 - 2
...
...
Narrative of Events
1 - 40
...
...
Appendix I
: H. M. Ships, etc. taking part.
1 - 2
Appendix
II
H. M. Ships, etc. lost during
1 - 2
:
Operation "DYNAMO".
Appendix III
Daily list of disembarkations
1 - 10
:
in U. K. ports.
Appendix
IV
:
Daily record of numbers
1
disembarked in England.
Appendix V
:
Co-operation of the French
1
troops.
Appendix VI: Enemy aircraft destroyed by
1
ships' fire.
stribution made by lag Officer Commanding, over.
No. of Copies.
Admiralty
...
...
... 12, together with original stencils.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore.
...
1
ommander-in-Chief, Portsmouth.
...
1
Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches.
...
1
Flag Officer-in-Charge, Harwich.
...
1
Commodore-in-Charge, Sheerness
...
1
Commodore Superintendent, Dover.
...
1
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate.
...
1

CONFIDENTIAL
Office of
The Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
Naval authority was definitely committed to provide for the evacuation of French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
50,000.
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French e Secretary as/
of the Admiralty,
London, S. W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL
Report OAL Operation "DYHAMO".
Page 2.
as to any termination of the operation which threatened to drag on painfully, and finally to lose momentum and expire through the exhaustion of Naval personnel and the liquidation of shipping.
It will be seen, therefore, that the initial problem called for a maximum effort over a limited period regardless of the future, and accordingly all resources in the way of small boats were thrown on the beaches, before adequate provision had been made for their maintenance off the coast in such matters as relief of the personnel and the provision of large beach parties.
It was only due to the foresight of the Admiralty in making avrangements for a continued flow in ever increasing numbers of small power boats and beach craft, which became available on the fifth day onwards, that the continued evacuation from the beaches remained a reasonable proposition after the initial crisis had passed.
4. A perusal of the signals that passed between Dover and the French coast reveals the many occasions on which the responsible officers stationed on the coast considered so little had been achieved from the beaches that they advocated restriction of evacuation to Dunkirk Harbour. Many comdaints of "no boats", "no ships", might lead a detached observer to the conclusion that the great effort that was being made was proving abortive.
At Dover, where the whole operation could be viewed in truer perspective, the number and origin of the troops being landed in England being always to hand, it was clear that the evacuation from the beaches required by the military situation, was, in fact, achieving a considerable success, as the following figures will show. of the 226,000 troops landed in the United Kingdom, between May 28th and June 1st inclusive -
the period during which both Dunkirk and the beaches eastward were available day and night except for enemy interference -
49,000 were landed by personnel. vessels and hospital carriers direct from Dunkirk Harbour, 95,000 reve lifted from the beaches, leaving 82, 000 as having been lifted from Dunkirk
Harbour by vessels ot er than troop transports.
5. WEAT DR CONDITIONS.
The operation was favoured by extremely good weather.
It was found, however, that any northerly wind caused a surf, which greatly reduced the rate of lifting from the beaches.
It must be fully roalised that a wind of any strength in the northern sector between South West and North East would have made beach evacuation impossible. At no time did this happen.
6. DISPOSAL OF TROOPS AFTER REACHING ENGLAND.
On arrival in England the despatch of troops from the points of disembarkation proceeded with great smoothness under the War Office movement control organisation.
7./
(a)/

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 7.
WAVERLEY. 600 troops were on board before ship was abandoned in sinking condition, but only 200-300 were picked up,
In all it is regretted that about 2,000 troops must have been lost through these and similar disasters on the return voyages to England.
14.
CO-OPERATION OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
French warships and other vessels were employed evacuating French troops from Dunkirk harbour, and on the last three nights from the beach 1½ miles eastward from Dunkirk.
Details are given in Appendix V.
15.
BASE ORGANISATION,
An operation of this magnitude involving the maintenance and movements of close on 900 vessels and boats could not have been conducted without the wholehearted and unceasing efforts of the base establishments at Dover and
Ramsgate, as well as those at Sheerness and Harwich in the
Nore Command. At all these places officers and men, Naval and civilian, laboured unceasingly throughout the Operation.
In particular I wish to acknowledge the great assistance received from the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, who in many cases anticipated my requests for assistance through his constant watch on the progress of the Operation.
The prompt and unfailing assistance afforded by the Chatham Depot in providing personnel for the numerous small craft, working parties and beach parties, was a feature essential to the successful outcome of the Operation.
The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, by taking over the servicing and control of the great majority of the small craft of the inshore flotillas relieved Dover or an immense volume of work which it would otherwise have been impossible to handle.
It was also broughtto my notice that at Harwich an exceptional Naval and Military system was in being for assisting those ships which called there to make a quick turn round, relieving the tired ships' companies of the work of cleaning and clearing their vessels.
16.
SERVICES OF STAFF, INCLUDING OFFICERS
TEMPORALLY APPOINTED.
I was fortunate in having the services of
Rear Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker, C.B., O.B.E., as Flag Officer afloat off Dunkirk, and Captain W.G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O., as Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk on shore. Admiral Wake-
Walker was responsible for supervising the embarkation afloat and Captain Tennant for organising embarkation from the shore, keeping touch with the French Naval Authorities and the Staff of the British Commander-in-Chief.
Detailed particulars of their services were given in Dover Despatch No. B.23/862/40 of 4th June, 1940.
I cannot conclude this despatch without reference to the splendid work of my staff under the guidance of my Chica
Staff/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 18.
Operation "DYNAMO". Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (Continued).
Goodwins and commenced to hunt.
55. The arrivals at the home ports indicated that in spite of the frequent requests for more ships and more boats received from the various authorities on the French coast, the rate of evacuation was steadily increasing and would permit, all being well, of implementing the final evacuation plan during the night 31/5 - 1/6. Accordingly, instructions were issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for
Dunkirk via Route X, and Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Flag
Officer-in-Charge, Harwich, were requested to provide all available M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of the outward passage as possible, which was timed to commence from
Ramsgate at 1300/31. Speed of advance - 5 knots. A party of Naval officers had been assembled at Dover to embark in these tows and had been given detailed instructions on the plan. Two M.A./S boats and 2 M.T.B.'s in the Dover Command were ordered to accompany the boat convoy and subsequently embark the Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. and Staff off the beaches.
56. Shortly after sunrise an on-shore wind arose and boat work became difficult, many whalers capsizing, and the prospects of completing the evacuation to plan began to be less favourable. The following extract from the report of
Captain Howson, S.N.O., on the beaches illustrates conditions at Bray at this time:
"At 0400 there was a very considerable number of destroyers, paddlers, trawlers, skoots, etc, off Bray, and embarkation was proceeding satisfactorily, but a lop had already started. There were about 10 motor yachts which had arrived from England. These craft drew 6-7
feet and were unable to get close in to any of the beaches. During the forenoon, considerable towing of empty craft towards the beach was carried out, and only about 2 boats were allowed to get adrift and ultimately ground. With the falling tide, however, a number of boats were seen to ground and remain ashore until the tide rose in the afternoon. These included an A.L.C., motor boat and a lifeboat. Other power boats broke down. Nevertheless, the embarkation, much hindered by the lop, proceeded satisfactorily. As further destroyers and sloops arrived, they were directed to lower their motor boats and whalers as this had not already been done, began to subside and with the rising tide conditions for these boats were quite invaluable. About noon, the lop embarkation very greatly improved, more boats were sent in and more boats floated off and matters were proceeding very well, when the gun at La Panne started to shell the beaches and fore hore with great accuracy. A certain number of light craft were sunk. The A.L.C. broke down and was towed away by a steamer. MOSQUITO, destroyers and sloops proceeded westward clear of the firing.
57/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 23
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday, 1st June, (continued)
machines being noted. During this attack BASILISK was put out of action off La Panne and later sank while struggling home.
KEITH, SALAMANDER and SKIPJACK, who were moving westward along the coast as the Bray and La Panne beaches had been emptied, were heavily bombed, the former was hit and set on fire and the latter sank. KEITH was abandoned and finally sank.
Nearly all troops on board KEITH and the crews of both vessels were rescued by other ships. A third attack started over
Dunkirk, extending well out along Route X, and occurred between
1000 and 1040, to be again resumed at noon. After that there was a lull until 1550, when another attack was delivered on
Dunkirk Harbour and all shipping therein for over half an hour.
At 1800 the Vice Admiral received the following signal from
Dunkirk: "Things are getting very hot for ships; over 100
bombers on ships here since 0530, many casualties. Have directed that no ships sail during daylight. Evacuation by transports therefore ceases at 0300. If perimeter holds will complete evacuation tomorrow, Sunday night, including most
French. General concurs." The sense of this message was passed on to Rear Admiral, Dover, off the coast,
69. In addition to the heavy scale of air attack during the afternoon the sea traffic was very seriously interrupted by artillery fire brought to bear on X Route near No.5 buoy. The fire appeared to be accurate and it is believed some French ships were sunk. 2 French Destroyers in the vicinity stopped
British ships approaching from England on X Route short of this point, and it became evident that a very serious threat to daylight evacuation was in being. Meantime, the toll of casualties of ships during the day was mounting particularly amongst the destroyers and shortly after midday the Commanderin-Chief, Nore, called the attention of the Admiralty to this, suggesting the discontinuation of the use of destroyers by day off the French Coast. The summarisation of all these incidents led to the Admiralty directing the Vice Admiral, Dover, to suspend evacuation from Dunkirk at 0700, Sunday 2nd June, and for it to be resumed the following night or from 1730/2, depending upon the circumstances. From the above it will be seen that there were to be no ships proceeding to Dunkirk between 0700/2 and 1730/2. The above Admiralty directions crossed a message from the Vice Admiral stating that all ships had been ordered to withdraw from Dunkirk before daylight the following day, owing to the heavy casualties to shipping.
70. In spite of enemy action more than 60,000 troops were landed in the United Kingdom during the 24 hours, thanks to the unremitting determination of Naval vessels who all executed a succession of round trips, interrupted only by necessary refuelling. The majority of the surviving vessels had been operating ceaselessly for at least 5 days, and officers and men were approaching a condition of complete exhaustion.
71./

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 340
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued), boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, findi it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and inflated motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats,
104. Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coads jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

Page 21.
Operation "DYNAMO" Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. KEITH - Captain Edward Lyon Berthon, D.S.C., R.N.
After completing a short refit at Chatham the KEITH
sailed for Dunkirk at 1732/30/5 when she took off about
1400 troops, these being disembarked at Dover. At
0305/31/5 she again sailed for Dunkirk where she acted as
-
flagship of the Rear-Admiral, Dover, in charge of all sea forces on the coast.
From the time of her arrival until she finally sank at about 0940/1/6 she was patrolling along the French and
Belgian coasts during which time she was almost continually opening fire on enemy aircraft, two of which were shot down..J
It is to be noted that the 3" H.A. gun was found to be most effective in warding off the attackers and that all 3"
ammunition was expended before the arrival of the final attacks which sank the ship.
It is evident that few if any ships had to face more severe bombing attacks and that during the whole time the conduct of the ships company was exemplary.
On the afternoon of 31st May, the ship survived both dive and high level bombing attacks and early the next day was subjected to machine gun attack followed by an intensive dive bombing attack. A second powerful dive bombing attack followed as a result of which the ship was lost.
Further bombing and machine gun attacks took place while the ship was being abandoned. Many survivors went to the
Tug St. Abbs, which after escaping one dive bombing attack, was sunk in a further attack; many of "Keith's" survivors being lost in her.
Apart from the names given below, there were many incidents of gallant conduct by men who were lost either in
"Keith" or after they had left the ship. 3 officers and
33 men in all were lost.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
OFFICERS:
Captain Edward Lyon Berthon, D.S.C., R.N.
The Rear-Admiral reports: "Under shell fire and bomb attacks Captain Berthon handled his ship with great coolness and judgment, and met all the calls put upon him and his ship".
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Charles Paynder Adams, R.N.
By his personal example in action maintained a hig state of discipline and fighting spirit in the ship when subjected to heavy bombing attacks. Later organised the return passage of survivors to England in Yard Craft 63.
Recommended for decoration

CENTRAL CHANCERY OF THE ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD.
St. James's Palace, S.W.1.
August, 1940.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following Appeintments to the Most Excellent Order of the British
Empire, for good services in orgainising the withdrawal to England, under fire and in the face of many and great difficulties, of
335, 335,490 Officers and Men of the Allied Armies, in about one thousand of His Majesty's Shipa and other craft between the 27th of May and the 4th of June, 1940:-
said
To be Additional Commanders of the Military Division of the/Most
Excellent Order:
Captain william Raigersfield Phillimore, Royal Navy / (Retired).
Commodore Edward Glyn de Styrap Jukes-Hughes, Royal Navy, (Retired).
To be an Additional Officer of the Military Division of the said
Most Excellent Order:4
0
Commander Robert Gordon Hood Linzee, Royal Navy / (Retired).
To be an Additional Member of the Military Division of the Said
Most Excellent Order:-
ing Inspector of Shipwrights Frederick Hercules Harvey.
The KING has been graciously pleased to approve the following Awards for good services in the thdrawal of the Allied Armies from the beaches at Dunkirk:-
The Medal of the Military Division of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, for Meritorious Service:
Acting Master-at-Arms Sidney Welfare, C/M.36212.
Chief 6XXXXXXXX Petty Officer Telegraphist Alexander Arthur
Lee, C/J.96386.
Chief Shipwright Joseph William Heathcote, P/M.23064
Chief Chief Sick Stoker Ingine Hoom Herbert Artificer John Baxter, Reginald C/K.2659. Francis Fox, P/M.5545.
Berth Petty Officer CEcil Ernest Jelley, C/M.39618.

30th July, 40.
C.W.22953/40.
H.M.S. WORCESTER: Aid given to the Royal
Artillery at Dunkerque,
June lst.
Commander-in-Chier,
H. M. Ships and Vessels, Nore.
I am to inform you that General the Viscount Gort has requested that an expression of his thanks and appreciation may be conveyed to the Commanding Officer, the Officers and men of H.M. WORCESTER for the gallant assistance rendered by them on June 1st, when a number of Officers and men of the
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, was embarked at Dunkerque and brought to England. to the at
Lord Gort has expressed warm admiration of the cool and skilful handling of WORCESTER during and after enemy air attacks; he has emphasized the calmness and efficiency with which the troops were assisted during the embarkation and he has drawn attention to the bravery and persistence of the guns' crews who served their guns throughout in spite of casualties.
Their Lordships cordialls endorse Lord Gort's appreciation and 1 am to request you to cause it to be conveyed to WORCESTER accordingly.
by lat, BY COMMAND OF THRIR LORDSHIPS, the erque to
Angland, of hir he has the ith the he has to What sweet crows who casualties.
Their Lordships cordially endorse Lord Gort's appreciation and I am to request you to cause it to be conveyed to WORCESTER accordingly.
BY COMMAND OF THEIR LORDGHIPS,
51-6446

23187
20th August
0
22953/40.
40
DATE
)
18.7.40
è
The Flag Belfast. Officer-in-Charge,
3/40
I am to enclose a copy of a letter from the Military Secretary, B.E.F., and to wester".
request that you will bring it to the notice
Croswell of
C. Gesowell. R.N.
Commander F
A
30th July, 40.
C.W.22953/40.
to
H.M.S. WORCESTER: Aid given to the Royal
Artillery at Dunkerque,
June lst.
Commander-in-Chief,
H. M. Ships and Vessels, Nore.
I am to inform you that General the Viscount Gort has requested that an expression of his thanks and appreciation
4
may be conveyed to the Commanding Officer, the Officers and men of H.M.S. WORCESTER for the gollant assistance rendered by them on June lst, when a number of Officers and men of the
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, was embarked at Dunkerque and brought to England.
Lord Gort has expressed warm admiration of the cool and skilful handling of WORCESTER during and after enemy air attacks; he has emphasized the calmness and efficiency with which the troops were assisted during the embarkation and he has drawn attention to the bravery and persistence of the guns' crews who served their guns throu hout in spite of casualties.
Their Lordships cordially endorse Lord Gort's appreciation and I am to request you to cause it to be conveyed to WORCESTER accordingly.
BY COMMAND OF THEIR LORDGHIPS,
51-6446

With the
Compliments of the
29685/40.
Under Secretary Affairs of State admiralty Esq.,
12.
for Foreign FOREIGN OFFICE,
DATE
19
Dec. 23 1940. 21st S.W.1. December,
1940.
- July 1940
7106/6374/372)
(Ref: EO. letter eldey ho: T7106/6374/372
Sir, of Dec. m
19
The King has informally approved award of decorations and medals the of to the the Order officers of and the British men of the Empire
Belgian Merchant Navy, whose names,
HONOURS AND
together with details of their valuable services in connexion with the evacuation of Allied troops from
Dunkirk, are given in the annexed that, without revealing has been approached these proposals, and inform so as shother the awards be agreeable to
These Belgian Boats based on Dartmouth and manned with volunteers, braved every danger in transferring troops from Dunkirk. The "JULIA" embarked 1007, the
"GUIDO GAZELLE" 403. the "COR JESU" 274. The last named boat made one trip, the others two.
The "MARECHAL FOCH" went alongside the quay at
Dunkirk but on a falling tide the weight of the soldiers jumping on board grounded her. The Master and his one assistant returned to Dover in another trawler and went back again the next day, embarked 300 men in the
"MARECHAL FOCH" and set out for England. Off the Goodwin
Light the vessel was run down by a Warship, which took on board these two brave Belgians and some 150 of the troops.
Mr. Gooding of the Torquay Motor Boat "LADY CABLE" -
with two Naval Ratings,- carried some 560 men in seven trips between Dunkirk beach and two transports. His seamanship was of a high order and his voluntary service of great value.
The bravery, seamanship, high enthusiasm and pertinacity of these volunteer Rescuers effected the saving of some 2,500 men of the Allied Troops and are worth of the highest traditions of the sea.
;inued)

Page 9
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. GRENADE of Commander Richard C. Boyle, R.N.
Lost heavy as a air result of damage from four during attack on her second trip large to Dunkirk. bombs
Recommendations,
OFFICERS
Mr. Reginald William Clare, Gunner (T) R.N.
C D,S.C.
and complete control of after end of ship when taking
Acted with great coolness and courage, moment sinking. Closed and flooded magazine at burning correct gallantry under fire.
thereby minimising disaster. Example of
Recommended for decoration.
Mr. Reginald James Crew B.Sc., Schoolmaster, R.N.
M
Displayed conspicuous coolness and devotion to duty during and after the disaster.
Saved a number of lives by rescuing ratings in distress in the oil covered water, landing with a party of survivors in Dunkirk. Took charge and eventually navigated an old motor boat back to
England.
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Patty Officer Harold Richard Emery C/JE 144399.
k
Petty Officer Samuel Bennion. C/JX.102723.
M.
These two Petty Officers ably backed up Mr.Crew,
M
displaying marked initiative and coolness.
Recommended for mention.
Leading Stoker Frederick Staples, C/KX.84191.
D.S.M.
Acted as right hand man to Mr. Clare, taking charge of younger stokers, by calm bearing dispelling any tendancy to panic.
Assiduous in his attention to wounded, both in
GRENADE and later in the trawler which rescued survivors.
Recommended for decoration.

Page 10
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. GREYHOUND - Commander Walter Roger Marshall-A'Deane.R.N.
Dunkirk from wounded. On the about 1,200 men in England, and 1 to
GREYHOUND pier, made landing 3 trips, 2 to the beaches from misses an attack was made by bombers troops
La Panne beach, 3rd trip, whilst embarking apart room, GREYHOUND killing 20 and wounding 70.
2 near splinters damaged the engine room and No.3 boiler and leaving to to continue ferrying troops from her boats withdrew to Dover to land the wounded, shore ship, often under fire and bombing.
Recommendations.
OFFICER.
X
Commander Walter Roger Marshall-A'Deane, R.N.
tr8ops from La Panne beach and Dunkirk.
For efficient handling of his ship when evacuating
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Leading Seaman A. W. Saunders, P/SSX.15620 and
Leading Seaman S. H. Setterfield, P/J.102005.
Evacuating troops from La Panne beach in difficult conditions and under fire, displaying ability and great endurance.
Recommended for mention.
Stoker Petty Officer E. Teichert, P/K. 59694.
In charge of No.3 boiler room, showed initiative in quickly shutting down the boiler and keeping a fan running, thus enabling the extent of damage to be discovered, when the whole ship was shaking from bomb explosions and splinters had caused damage in his boiler room.
Recommended for mention.