TNA ADM 199 792

CONFIDENTIAL 114
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
8
Page 3. 11?
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
consisted
Attempts of the following:- by the enemy to frustrate the operation
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfiro by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying hours by aircraft. Minelaying during the and was probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, dark following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk the Roads maintained with great intensity during mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route x and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering and the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in simil ar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing formations. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, Route two and two trawlers, while the north 26 miles
Y further was destroyers in use. the When south the westward, middle Route was brought X, some into though use the to M.T.B. units failed to follow up, the the continuous stream and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads Commander. provienemy of unescorted traffic during ded dark a hours tempting target to any enterprising (a)/

CONFIDENTIAL 116
Report on Operation "DYNAMO",
Page 5.
111
more so as the our outnumbered airmen was so of the same evening, gallantry which of recounted the opposite story. The obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols - Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
Enemy aircraft driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
27/5
23
536
20
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
--
I
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
--
I
4/6
3
234
--
I
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the Ist June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was fact noticeable that Army by Officers' its absence, uniform aggravated, is indistinguishable no doubt, in by from the that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared their order in most cases was quickly restored, to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when fighting/ troops of

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Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued)
embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in daylight completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night
X
lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During the day destroyer patrols had been established to the Northward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to reinforce the Dover destroyers.
6.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for the South Downs to co-operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk. In the evening
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the
Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no communication with these vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight.
7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this impossible,
8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most
Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches
East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail
T.O.O. 2005/37". Meanwhile Vice Admiral, Lover, had asked the Commender-in Chief, Nore, to send every available shallow draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel and provisions for two days; this move being made with a view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time
X
(2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A
further signal: "Please send every available craft to beache
East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is ir problematicalTo01958/27 was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk.
Later that evening a roport WAS received from

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Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the dayligh passage through coastal waters, was obvious, Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
3
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, ed and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26. At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the k
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But e
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary le if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss or H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buo the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 degrees every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship smidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 secends, each remaining standing midship/ with the

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7/5
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray.
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, not only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end of x Route. These attacks were to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers ahead of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them with the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer ahead of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of the Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
GRENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
In addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour but further inside. This presented a very good target and the ships were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the time being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in leaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed part of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
CANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops but was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again in these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying alongside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
GRENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and the trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire had to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the fairway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, who witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by bombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having ceased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and trawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a sunk drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived to find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, was with no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in thantly harbour uld little
36

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Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM, however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however, continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed the previous evening and during the night, None of these ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night, but horwhereabouts was unknown and it was feared that she had refused to sail.
In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be used for some of the trips and short endurance necessitated coaling between trips which could not be done in the vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy during the evening and night, and operations were greatly hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

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effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and tugs, which were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been ear-marked for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time, the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were being thinned out by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B. would shepherd the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats, whalers, cutters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had
31MM
occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and was informed by a Staff Officer that no more troops would embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

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Friday, 31st May (continued).
63. General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan, stating that General Alexander had been placed in command of the final phase of the evacuation. Composition of force not known. Further, that it was impossible now to say how long the French evacuation would take but that the Alexander force would remain till the last. No firm information could be obtained from the French as regards:-
(i) The number of French troops to be evacuated.
(ii) The nature and extent of French sea borne transport.
(iii) The French military plan for the defence of the perimeter and the final withdrawal of French troops.
64. General remarks: The main features of the day were:-
(a) The increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk and La Panne beach, and on the approach channels.
(b) The set-back to evacuation from the beaches that occurred during the choppy weather of the forenoon, followed by an excellent recovery inthe afternoon and evening when large numbers were lifted from the beaches.
(c) The change in the military plan as regards the locality and time of lifting the final contingents of the B.E.F.
It should be noted that in spite of (b) the rate of embarkation had, in fact, come up to expectations, and if other circumstances had permitted it would have been possible to adhere to the original plan of lifting the final 4,000
B.E.F. off the beaches between 0130 and 0300 1st June.
65/

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31/5
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M, Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66.
2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous
1/6
evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of personnel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German guns eastward, and later information was received that the troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move wast, with boats in tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships under orders for La Panne to other positions further west, concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and the wounded that could conveniently be embarled should go with personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Government policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

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Saturday, 1st June (continued).
71. As for personnel vessels, there was an increasing unwillingness to sail, so steps were taken to place on board each a Naval Lieutenant-Commander or Commander, with 10 seamen acting as a moral stiffening, the officer acting as adviser and persuader to the Master of the ship, and the seamen for handling the wires and going alongside under fire. By this means it was hoped not only to ensure the timely sailing of these essential ships, but also to eliminate the many occasions when these vessels had lingered outside Dunkirk harbour to await a quiet opportunity to enter, or had failed to enter the harbour at all.
72. Early in the forenoon a number of Senior Officers were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all stray motor boats in the Downs and along the routes, and direct them back in the evening to the beach stretching 1½¹
miles eastward of Dunkirk, and a second large flight of tugs with lifeboats was prepared at Ramsgate to send over for what was hoped to be a final effort off the beach. In addition a number of flotillas under Commodore Taylor and Captain Fraser were reorganised for the night's effort.
73. General Alexander was informed at 0951 that on the likely assumption that complete evacuation would be ordered that night, the problem of transport made it essential to use the beach adjacent to Dunkirk as well as the harbour facilities and that the Vice Admiral was planning evacuation to start at 2200.
74. At 1841 the following signal was received from
C.I.G.S. for the Senior Military Commander: "We do not order any fixed moment for evacuation. You are to hold on as long as possible in order that the maximum number of French and
British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial. You must act in this matter on your own judgment."
75. S.N.O. Dunkirk, was informed that drifters and other small craft would be sent into the inner harbour at
Dunkirk to take troops from the Felix Faure Quay, North Quay, in the shipyard, and the quay in the new outer harbour.
76. The plan for the night provided for all minesweepers including paddlers, skoots and all small craft, except certain special flotillas especially organised, to go to the beach stretching eastward 1/2 miles from Dunkirk. Dunkirk Harbour was to be served by up to 7 personnel ships, 8 destroyers, and the inner harbour 9 drifters and special power boats organised from Ramsgate. The French vessels were to serve the
Quay in the new outer harbour and private small boats, the
Quay Felix Faure, and in addition about 100 French small beach fishing craft and drifters for the beach immediately east of
Dunkirk. It was estimated that the British vessels could lift about 17,000 between 2100/1 and 0300/2, probably in the proportion/

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or
Saturday 1st June (continued).
and at 0815 was attacked by enemy aircraft. Ship was hit aft of
No.3 boiler room and put out of action. About 0945 another attack took place but no hits were registered. A third attack took place at about noon and the ship began to settle and the order to abandon ship was given.
Destroyer KEITH attacked by enemy aircraft off Bray r
severely hit and abandoned at anchor by No.8 buoy. Finally sank.
Harbour Defence Craft AMULREE sunk in collision by
VIMY at 0200.
2/6
Sunday, 2nd June.
80.
The arrangements to set in motion the night's evacuation had proceeded smoothly as far as could be ascertained at
Dover. During the early hours, reports of sailings from Dunkirk indicated that destroyers at least were doing well.
At about 0200, however, a signal was received from
LYDD, who was off the Dunkirk beach, as follows:-
"Brigadier tells me that C. in C. says it is essential that rearguard B.E.F. embarks from the beaches east of Mole on account of French congestion on Mole. Considerable number
British troops still on Mole. Military are expecting further arrivals there. Rearguard expects to arrive at beach by 0230."
The Vice Admiral accordingly ordered all ships known to y
be outside Dunkirk Harbour to endeavour to embark the rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300 if necessary. Owing to the time in transit and coding it was feared that this signal would reach few ships still on the coast, unless they had remained on their own initiative after 0300, the previously ordered time of withdrawal.
At 0200, authority was received from the Admiralty to
1
continue evacuation by destroyers from Dunkirk Harbour until
0700, transports to leave Dunkirk at 0300.
81. During the early hours there was considerable haze and smoke off Dunkirk Harbour, Dunkirk East Beach, Dunkirk Roads and the entrance therefrom to X Route. For this reason some of the smaller vessels, including minesweepers, failed to make either
Dunkirk Harbour or Dunkirk East Beach, but on the whole it appears
Ly that evacuation, both from the beach and from the harbour had
G
proceeded satisfactorily with the resources available.
Between 0200 and 0900, 6 personnel vessels reached
United Kingdom from Dunkirk Harbour with about 5,500 troops. 2
others had been turned back before reaching Dunkirk by 2 unknown destroyers, and one had been in collision before reaching Dunkirk and had to return.
82. Considerable doubt existed during the forenoon as to the numbers remaining to be evacuated in Dunkirk. It was thought that
2,000, plus the 4,000 rearguard British troops, might well be found in Dunkirk. The number of French troops remaining was increasing from the 25,000 quoted the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000.
83. The Rear Admiral, Dover, arrived back from the coast in a M.T.B. and during the forenoon a joint Naval and Military conference was held to devise a plan for the forthcoming night's evacuation. The fact that evacuation traffic was suspended in

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Monday, 3rd June (continued).
that 4 ships were now alongside, that there were no French troops. Reported again at 0115, "Plenty of ships cannot get troops."
At 0312, Dunkirk reported that all ships were leaving and that the block ships had entered.
When the ships returned to United Kingdom, it was learnt that he flow of French troops had dwindled away shortly after midnight. One ship waited 2-2 hours to embark her load instead of the normal half hour. A possible explanation was thought to be that a French counter attack, which had been arranged for the afternoon of the 2nd, had had to be postponed to the evening, no doubt deranging despatch of troops to the rear for evacuation. The result was that between midnight and 0300/3 a lifting capacity of about 10,000 was left empty
91. The night's embarkation at Dunkirk had been carried out without disturbance by enemy action. During the forenoon a conference was held at Dover to improve the arrangements for the night 3/6 - 4/6 as a result of experience gained. The general plan remained unaltered except that provision was made for the use by British ships of the west pier in the New Outer
Port, since it appeared that the French had insufficient shi at their disposal to make full use of this valuable berth.
Similarly a number of power boats which had been working off the Malo Beach were, on this occasion, to be sent in to Quay
Felix Faure. No assurance could be obtained that this coming night would terminate the operation and considerable anxiety was felt regarding the effect of the gradual exhaustion of officers and men of the ships taking part in the Dynamo. This exhaustion was particularly marked in the Destroyer force the remnants of which had been executing a series of round trips without intermission for several days under navigation considitions of extreme difficulty and in the face of unparallelled air attack.
The Vice Admiral accordingly represented to the
Admiralty that the continuance of the demands made by evacuation would subject a number of officers and men to test which might be beyond the limit of human endurance, and requesting that fresh forces should be used if evacuation had to be continued after the coming night, with the acceptance of any consequent delay.
92. The evacuation plan was communicated to Units taking part at 1440 and was briefly as follows:-
Commence 2230/3, withdraw 0230/4. From East Pier evacuation by Personnel Vessels, Destroyers and Paddle Minesweepers.
From West Pier, new outer port, by other Minesweepers,
Corvettes, Skoots and French vessels. Drifters and smaller craft into the inner harbour, LOCUST remaining outside entrance receiving loads ferried out by small boats. Tugsing available outside entrance to assist ships in berthing is in leaving.
lunteer
1
nt the channel with troops on board. It was acce scided to inary/
have

CONFIDENTIAL.
153
Page 32.
151
152
4/6
150
its
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
it of
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
he
3/6
at
S
ed 33
h
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
d
93.
In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked in the time available, and this number only if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
toots
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards ere tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow the
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier makin berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship king to due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the theless,
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
power
4/6
or
Tuesday, 4th June.
tretch
00/2/6.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced thin the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the cipally
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships llery the to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without intere ruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation r to extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armada ne gun, from enemy aircraft.
German ceasing
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was ements ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result d as of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the operation should be considered as completed, observing that all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the olunteer numbers left behind were small consisting principally of noncombatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
1
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might be a number of open boats, barges, etc. tsmouth, bout in the channel with troops on board. It was accr scided to inary/
have

CONFIDENTIAL.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Page 36 155
Inshore Flottllas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
111. Locally, at oth Ramsgate and Dover a number of civilian volunteers came forward to man the boats and to drive their engines. These men did good work.
112. At both Ramsgate and Dover when the business of manning these civilian power boats was set about the same difficulties were experienced:-
(i) of obtaining drivers with knowledge of the very varied types of internal combustion engines;
(ii) of making the engines of these boats run, most of them having been laid up since the previous summer.
Throughout the operation all engines continued to give trouble. Many engines were old and almost all were of different types. Several boats could not be used as they had diesel engines and no stokers or civilians trained in these were available. Each engine, especially the older ones, required careful nursing, and signs of distress from the engines were not understood. These difficulties were partly overcome by obtaining engine drivers from Chatham and by the provision of cadet ratings, and Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.V.R.
from KING ALFRED who claimed knowledge of I.C. engines, but many engines were of types unknown even to these.
These difficulties would never have arisen had the civilian crews, or even their drivers, been willing to take their boats across to Dunkirk.
113. Fresh water for the motor boats was difficult to supply in sufficien quantity, owing to lack of water tanks in most boats, especially those of the open type. Large supplies were required as the troops were reported to be suffering severely from thirst. Both at Ramsgate and Dover the Base Staff provided as many galvanized iron cylinders and tanks as could be found and made serviceable, and these proved most satisfactory,
114. On two occasions skoots and small boats approaching the coast were turned back through false information. On the first occasion on the afternoon of 28th May, at least 6
skoots, who were without definite orders where to proceed, encountered a returning skoot when about 10 miles off the coast. This skoot stated that Dunkirk had already fallen into
German hands and that the evacuation had ceased. It is believed that this report originated from an Army officer embarked in the skoot. He had stated, consequent on the capitulation of Belgian troops that the Germans would be advancing along the coast that evening. As a result of this ill-judged comment, the arrival of at least 6 skoots was delayed at over 24 hours, until this situation had been cleared up.
The second occasion occurred during the night of 1st
June and has been referred to in paragraph 76 of the narrative. On this occasion although the services of a number of small craft were lost to the coast, it transpired that sufficient were already there to cope with the troops available.
115./

216
214
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
GRENADE hithybomb
34
Sir,
May 29/1800 Sank
I have the honour to submit the following report in accordance with your verbal instructions. The delay has been occasioned by the difficulty in collecting the necessary information from the Officers, some of whom landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening at the same time that I have described firstly what happened in the vicinity of the Bridge and what action I
took, and, secondly, what happened aft. As appendices
I have attached the report of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and a statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2.
During the evening o? the 28th May I left
28/5 Dunkirque with over 900 troops for Dover; these troops were disembarked without incident, and on the Forenoon of
29/5 the 29th of May I received orders from V.A. Dover to proceed with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with me. I was ordered to take route X to report if I
was subjected to shelling off!ravellines. No shelling was experienced but all destrovers were subjected to a dive bombing attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered damage astern but as she did not appear to require assistance
I proceeded alongside the western side of the pier, berthing
JAGUAR outside me. A certain number of attacks were experienced but no bombs came ery close to either ship.
GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to JAGUAR being on her starboard side and the pier on her port side.
3.
JAGUAR was filled wi h troops and then proceeded, being subsequently bombed and it whilst on passage. About this time some bombs from a hi h level attack fell fairly
GRENADE
Dynams 319
213
ass
215
SUBJECT:
LOSS OF H.M.S. "GRENADE".
33
pm
FROM
THE CAPTAIN (D), FIRST DESTROYER FLOTILLA, the
...
H.M.S. "CODRINGTON".
-
e
...
14th June, 1940.
NO. T.3.
DATE
GRENADF
ill ibt he
TO
THE VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER.
...
LE
The attached report from Commander Richard C Boyle,
Royal Navy, Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "GRENADE", is submitted t
for your information.
BEAUMIRA
ly
As this is the only copy available in my office it is rd
15 JUN 1940 requested 2. that it may be returned in due course.
*
ear
DOVER
GFSnom Guille.
CAPTAIN.

216
214
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
GRENADE hithybomb
34
Sir,
May 29/1800 Sank
I have the honour to submit the following report in accordance with your verbal instructions. The delay has been occasioned by the difficulty in collecting the necessary information from the Officers, some of whom landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening at the same time that I have described firstly what happened in the vicinity of the Bridge and what action I
took, and, secondly, what happened aft. As appendices
I have attached the report of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and a statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2.
During the evening o? the 28th May I left
28/5 Dunkirque with over 900 troops for Dover; these troops were disembarked without incident, and on the Forenoon of
29/5 the 29th of May I received orders from V.A. Dover to proceed with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with me. I was ordered to take route X to report if I
was subjected to shelling off!ravellines. No shelling was experienced but all destrovers were subjected to a dive bombing attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered damage astern but as she did not appear to require assistance
I proceeded alongside the western side of the pier, berthing
JAGUAR outside me. A certain number of attacks were experienced but no bombs came ery close to either ship.
GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to JAGUAR being on her starboard side and the pier on her port side.
3.
JAGUAR was filled wi in troops and then proceeded, being subsequently bombed and it whilst on passage. About this time some bombs from a hi gh level attack fell fairly close to GRENADE but did no damage. No troops were put into GRENADE as the S.N.O. stated that he wished a destroyer to remain alongside. A transport ahead of
GRENADE left and this position was taken by 6 trawlers.
Acting on the instructions of the S.N.O. I order a V class destroyer whose name I have fo 'gotten to proceed alongside ahead of these trawlers.
29/5
4.
At about 15.00 the f rst deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced; two bombs Cell about 20 - 25 yards from the Starboard Bow, killing one and wouding one rating on the Forecastle, damaging A-gun and woundingone rating on the
Searchlight Platform. Some ratings in the trawlers ahead of GRENADE and one in the CRES ED EAGLE on the other side le of the pier were killed. I atched these bombs fall until they were about 50 feet from the water and there is no doubt that they were released simultaneously, as was, I think, the case 0. the bombs which hit GR SNADE at 1800.
h
5.
At about 17.50 12 enemy aircraft circled over the end of the pier and the second deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced. Two planes commenced a dive bombing attack and a number of bombs dropped. I have found it bomb difficult to discover exactly where GRENADE was hit, but I
am of the opinion that two bombs were dropped simultaneously as in the earlier raid, No. 1 Talling close to the Starboard
Side between A & B guns, making ahole in the side, causing a fire at the after end of the Fore Mess Deck and sinking a trawler just ahead of GRENADE; No. 2 hitting the ship near the Sick Bay, penetrating nearly to the bottom of the ship before exploding.

216
214
COPY.
SECRET.
c/o Admiralty,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
11th June, 1940.
GRENADE hithybomb
34
Sir,
May 29/1800 Sank
I have the honour to submit the following report in accordance with your verbal instructions. The delay has been occasioned by the difficulty in collecting the necessary information from the Officers, some of whom landed at Dover, some at Margate and some at Ramsgate.
During and just after the final attack so much was happening at the same time that I have described firstly what happened in the vicinity of the Bridge and what action I
took, and, secondly, what happened aft. As appendices
I have attached the report of the adventures of Mr. Crews,
Warrant Schoolmaster, after he had left the GRENADE and a statement of the known damage done by the bombs.
2.
During the evening of the 28th May I left
28/5 Dunkirque with over 900 troops for Dover; these troops were disembarked without incident, and on the Forenoon of
29/5 the 29th of May I received orders from V.A. Dover to proceed with all dispatch to Dunkirque, taking JAGUAR and GALLANT
with me. I was ordered to take route X to report 1f I
was subjected to shelling off!ravellines. No shelling was experienced but all destro ers were subjected to a dive bombing attack when close to the coast. GALLANT suffered damage astern but as she did not appear to require assistance
I proceeded alongside the western side of the pier, berthing
JAGUAR outside me. A certain number of attacks were experienced but no bombs came ery close to either ship.
GRENADE could not fire her guns owing to JAGUAR being on her starboard side and the pier on her port side.
3.
JAGUAR was filled wi in troops and then proceeded, being subsequently bombed and it whilst on passage. About this time some bombs from a high level attack fell fairly close to GRENADE but did no damage. No troops were put into GRENADE as the S.N.O. stated that he wished a destroyer to remain alongside. A transport ahead of
GRENADE left and this position was taken by 6 trawlers.
Acting on the instructions of the S.N.O. I order a V - class destroyer whose name I have fo gotten to proceed alongside ahead of these trawlers.
29/5
4.
At about 15.00 the first deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced; two bombs 'ell about 20 - 25 yards from the Starboard Bow, killing one and wouding one rating on the Forecastle, damaging A-gun and woundingone rating on the
Searchlight Platform. Some ratings in the trawlers ahead of GRENADE and one in the CRES EAGLE on the other side e
of the pier were killed. I atched these bombs fall until they were about 50 feet from the water and there is no doubt that they were released simultaneously, as was, I think, the case of the bombs which hit GR SNADE at 1800.
5.
At about 17.50 12 enomy aircraft circled over the end of the pier and the second deliberate attack on
GRENADE commenced. Two planes commenced a dive bombing attack and a number of bombs were dropped. I have found it bomb difficult to discover exactly here GRENADE was hit, but I
am of the opinion that two bombs were dropped simultaneously as in the earlier raid, No. 1 falling close to the Starboard
Side between A & B guns, making ahole in the side, causing a fire at the after end of the Fore Mess Deck and sinking a trawler just ahead of GRENADH; No. 2 hitting the ship near the Sick Bay, penetrating nearly to the bottom of the ship before exploding.

260
2
Royal Naval Hospital,
Cha tham.
Dynamo 251,
B14/0/1276
263
6th
June,
1940.
259
H.M.S. GRIVE - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS. 262
to GRIVE
(Report from Sub Lt. J.K.B. Miles, R.N.V.R., dated 6th June, 1940.)
the movements of
1 The Hon. L.J.O. Lambart bn
II.
5m Portsmouth on Wednesday to notify the changes in
80
and which may possibly y in compiling CR ualty list
No. 0221/80.
ers to proceed from
VICE ADMIRAL, DOVER.
5-40) S/Lt. F.B. Hobson seen the Medical Officer
Forwarded. It is suggested that e of which he was recommendations for awards to officers should meantime Captain Lambert be made on the contents of this letter, and
Lee-on-Solent as an after further reference to Sub Lieut. Miles operations and he joined as regards ratings. I would like to add that Captain the Hon. Lionel Lambart was 67
years of age and was one of the happiest men th at 1530 on the in England when he came to say goodbye before
2400 awaiting further sailing for Dover.
re at 0800 30th and mander-in-Chief Dover, the evening tide at
Hames
00 and we proceeded
Portsmouth.
ach with our two whalers
10th June, 1940.
Admiral.
ed however that for the d carry this method was
CADMIRAL
VE" remained about two ver A.M. 31st with n air raid on the town
13JUN 1940
but the beach remained
SV-R
attack at the Eastern guns.
at 1400 31st, "GRIVE
bout 2000, and took O
psoy 400 troops Irom the Jetty, more might have been e 2891 but there was a very severe air raid and as the
This were three abreast at the jetty Captain Lambart theade 1 to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid
BMS'S med out to sea and just after clearing the harbour
1th0 uconfidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder
£8006 for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
Heanr 6. June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although having ounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
IBB-0 moon a NORBE. Joproaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded in spett to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. "IVANHOE", gruer Accourival found another vessel alongside already. I
EBHI SETho armanted to Captain Lambart that I could see a group contien anrine owne on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded alongside ca Bk them off undergoing very heavy bombing attacks in De Domenthe babunately left us unharmed although one salvo dropped
Lunde the jetty while we were on the inside. We mcvoe.dh edot missenrom the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendous was proceeding all this time.
and
[over

260
2
Royal Naval Hospital,
Chatham
263
6th June, 1940.
The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M. Ships & Vessels.
Portsmouth.
to GRIVE
Sir,
I have the honour to report the movements of
H.M.S. "GRIVE", commanded by Captain The Hon. L.J.O. Lambart g
D.S.O., R.N., from her departure from Portsmouth on Wednesday
29th May, 1940, and also especially to notify the changes in officer personnel which took place and which may possibly have caused confusion or uncertainty in compiling CA ualty list
At the time of receiving orders to proceed from
Portsmouth to Dover (i.e. 1300. 29-5-40) S/Lt. F.B. Hobson
R.N.V.R. was unwell and had already seen the Medical Officer at R.N.B. Portsmouth, in consequence of which he was immediately put ashore, but in the meantime Captain Lambert had obtained Lt. Branwell R.N. from Lee-on-Solent as an additional officer for the pending operations and he joined the ship just before sailing.
H.M.S. "GRIVE" left Portsmouth at 1530 on the
29/5 29th May and anchored off Dover at 2400 awaiting further orders. Captain Lambart went ashore at 0800 30th and after receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief Dover, decided to sail at 1400 and utilise the evening tide at
Dunkirk.
30/5
Dunkirk was reached about 1900 and we proceeded to take off troops from the East beach with our two whalers and two motor boats, it was evidenced however that for the number of troops which "GRIVE" could carry this method was not an economic proposition. "GRIVE" remained about two and a half hours and returned to Dover A.M. 31st with just under 300 troops. There was an air raid on the town during the period of "GRIVE'S" stay but the beach remained untouched except for some artillery attack at the Eastern end, directed I think, against A.A. guns.
Setting out again from Dover at 1400 31st, "GRIVE"
31/5
this time entered Dunkirk Harbour about 2000, and took O
nearly 400 troops from the jetty, more might have been taken, but there was a very severe air raid and as the ships were three abreast at the jetty Captain Lambart decided to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid continued out to sea and just after clearing the harbour it was confidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder accounted for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
0100 lst June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although havin,
8
only 5 rounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
1/6
Approaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded "IVANHOE" in to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. I
but response arrival found another vessel alongside already.
of on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded attacks alongsidle then on reported to Captain Lambart that I could see a group troops them off undergoing very heavy bombing and which we fortunately took left us unharmed although one salvo dropped lle withdrew just from the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendouss outside the jetty while we were on the inside.
ned air battle was proceeding all this time.
[over

262
Royal Naval Hospital,
265
Chatham.
6th June, 1940.
The Commander-in-Chief,
H.M.Ships & Vessels.
GRIVE
Portsmouth.
Sir,
83
I have the honour to report the movements of
H.M.S. "GRIVE", commanded by Captain The Hon. L.J.O.Lambart
D.S.O., R.N., from her departure from Portsmouth on Wednesday
29th May, 1940, and also especially to notify the changes in officer personnel which took place and which may possibly have caused confusion or uncertainty in compiling casualty lists.
At the time of receiving orders to proceed from
Portsmouth to Dover (i.e. 1300. 29-5-40) S/Lt. F.B.Hobson
R.N.V.R. was unwell and had already seen the Medical Officer at R.N.B. Portsmouth, in consequence of which he was immediately put ashore, but in the meantime Captain Lambert had obtained Lt. Branwell R.N. from Lee-on-Solent as an additional officer for the pending operations and he joined the ship just before sailing.
H.M.S. "GRIVE" left Portsmouth at 1530 on the
29th May and anchored off Dover at 2400 awaiting further orders. Captain Lambart went ashore at 0800 30th and after receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief Dover, decided to sail at 1400 and utilise the evening tide at
Dunkirk.
Dunkirk was reached about 1900 and we proceeded to take off troops from the East beach with our two whalers and two motor boats, it was evidenced however that for the number of troops which "GRIVE" could carry this method was not an economic proposition. "GRIVE" remained about two and a half hours and returned to Dover A.M. 31st with just under 300 troops. There was an air raid on the town during the period of "GRIVE'S" stay but the beach remained untouched except for some artillery attack at the Eastern end, directed I think, against A.A. guns.
Setting out again from Dover at 1400 31st, "GRIVE"
this time entered Dunkirk Harbour about 2000, and took off nearly 400 troops from the jetty, more might have been taken, but there was very severe air raid and as the ships were three abrenst at the jetty Cantain Lambart decided to withdraw and reduce the target. This air maid continued out to sea and just after clearing the harbour it was confidentally thought that "GRIVE'S" after 12 pounder accounted for an enemy machine. Returning to Dover by
0100 1st June, "GRIVE" landed her troops, and although having only 5 rounds of ammunition per gun, set out again at 0300.
response to a signal to the assistance of H.M.S. "IVANHOE", I
Approaching Dunkirk about 0800 "GRIVE" proceeded in but arrival found another vessel alongside already.
of on the jetty and he accordingly proceeded attacks alongside then on reported to Captain Lambart that I could see a group and troops took them off undergoing very heavy bombing just outside the jetty while we were on the inside.
hich we fortunately left us unharmed although one salvo We dropped withdrew from the harbour and proceeded to sea, a tremendous air battle was proceeding all this time.
[over

Royal Noval Hospital Chatham 267
June 6" 1940.
The Commander in Chief
264
H.M. Ships of Vessels.
GRIVE
Portsmouth original
95
Su
I have the honour to report the movements of
H.M.S. grive commanded by Captain the Hon
L.J.O. Lambart D.S.O. R.N., from her departure from Partsmouth on Wednesday 29th Way 1940, o also especially to notify the changes m officer personnel which took place D which may possibly have caused confision or uncertainty in compiling casualty lists.
at the time of receiving orders to proceed from
Portsmouth to Dover (ie. 1300 29-5-40) S/Lt
F.B. Hobson R.N.U.R. was unwell D had already seen the medical officer at R.N.B. Partsmouth, in consequence of which he was immediately put ashore, but in the meantime Capt. hambart had obtained ht Branwell R.N. from Lee-on-Solent as an additional officer for the pending operations 0 he joined the ship just before sailing H.M.S. grive left Partsmouth at 1530 m the
29th may 0 anchored off Dover at 2400
awaiting further orders. Capt. Lambart went ashore at 0800 30th Q after receiving orders from the commander in chief Dover, decided to sail at 1400 of utilise the evening tide at
Dunkisk
Dun kish was reached about 1900 I we proceeded
[over

8
300
KEITH'S I learnt boats he sent in, but Gort was not in 207 and
No one his staff: heavy air attack trips necessary time.
to bring off was in HEBE already. Three first boat
(21)
ships and was hit, though narrow escapes. Many during this on increase beaches; HEBE shot down a Heinkel. attacks
(19)
of shell fire off Braye, where CLAN Great was and a valuable decoy: she was hit and bombed MACALLISTER several times blindly into this area, as shells fell near CLAN MACALLIS-
started burning again. Enemy guns seemed to be firing
TER but not among ships loading which were some inshore of her. Later, these ships did come under fire, way and
VIVACIOUS was hit twice and had 11 casualties - 2-300
troops on board. Ordered her to go into Dunkerque and fill up there.
Lees was Senior Staff Officer of H. Q. Staff, and I thought it would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with me. As Gort was in HEBE I felt he was safe, and as
HEBE was doing good work embarking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Therein, perhaps, I
was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of Government to have him safe and sound at home, but felt he would
1st sooner the ship helped to bring off more men than he should land a few hours earlier in England.
During the day made signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the beach. Critical place likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated; intended to be there myself in KEITH
at daybreak next morning. Also kept BASILISK free of
(22) troops for same purpose.
1700
Weather improved gradually. Signal = "Weather off beaches now good: many more boats should come into use again as tide rises. General movement of troops westward towards
Dunkerque. No petrol supply yet and many boats getting short off La Panne and Braye. Movement from Dunkerque continues. Great air activity. "
1815
Drifters with petrol arrived.
After embarking H. Q. Staff I returned to Dunkerque and found Wynne-Edwards had been doing good work. Saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become famous - small motor yachts, motor launches drifters, Dutch schuyts, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure steamers, tugs towing dinghies, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats.
(20)
As tows of boats appeared they were told to which beach be they should go; particularly anxious there should sufficient at La Panne which was farthest off. Directed 10
miles up the coast; and as light was beginning the remaining to fail, several tows to go on to La Panne, telling them it was
Motor I left and Wynne-Edwards went on up to in La a MA/SB Panne myself. to direct Off Panne Braye were I saw tows I had feared - that tows ordered to La stopping what at Braye: got there just in farther time to on. warn
CODRINGTON (off Braye) to send them out to Lees how easy it was to talk about ten-mile distribu-
Pointed boats and craft at certain places along different a ting of coast, but that it was a very craft which thing stretch it done in practice, in the dark, by to help to get not been there before and with no lights the first place them. they had inevitable tendency was to stop assembled. at
The where other craft were
In the (on a his return to me at about off was La Panne.
came to end pretty fair distribution was 2230) made, and able Wynne- to
Edwards report that it was there this were evening a number that of I boats saw 2 would transports be bombed. go into
Dunkerque and out was just as it was getting from dark, that direction.
I think very nervous that they and shortly
They moved heard very heavy bombing aircraft attacking off
Actually, afterwards bombing was from our NOW own dark and I remained batteries La Panne in down company the coast. with HEBE and several other Stayed ships.

328
325
- or
31/5
As the town of boats appeared they were told to which beach they should go, and I was particularly anxious that there should be sufficient at La Panno which was farthest off. I directed several town to 80 on to In Penno, tolling them it was ten miles up the coast, and shortly after, as the light WDD
failing, I decided to leave Wynne-Edwards in an M.A.S.B. to direct the remaining town and go Q11 up to La Panne myself. are Braye I saw what I had fourd, that the tows I had ordered to La Panne were stopping at Braye and I arrived there just in time to warn "CODRINGTON," who was off Braye, to send them on. further.
I had General Lees on the bridge and I remember pointing out to him how easy
Z
it was to talk about distributing boats and craft at certain places along a ten mile stretch of coast, but that it was a very different thing to get it done in practice, In the dark, by craft which had not been there before and with no lights to help them. The inovitable tendency was to stop at the first place they came to where other craft were assombled.
However, in the end a protty fair distribution vas made and Wynno-
Edwards, when he returned to me at about 2230, was able to tell no that there were a number of boats off LQ Panne.
It must have been on this evening that I saw two Transports go into
Dunkirk and I was very nervous that they would be bombed. Just as it was getting dark they moved out and shortly after there came the sounds of Very heavy bombing from that direction. I felt sick SC I thought that these two ships were being attacked, but I learnt later that 10 was not so, and this bombing, I think, was from our own aircraft attacking battorios down the posst.
It was now dark and I remained off La Panne in company with and
Hebe several other ships.
Once it was dark I ase not feel that much could be done by moving about, so I stayed off LA Panne during the night. I waited there wordoring how things were going. Everything was Back, ships and boats end shore showed no lights though I had asked for a light to be shown ssaward to guide boats inchore. So far as I know the rearguard was falling back and 1t was a question whother to could got off before the Germans found out and could follow up. Shelling was continuous and by the sound some shells were falling among the ships at the anchorage. what nows I had was conflicting - a message from shore to Day that

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO"
Page 3.
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
Attempts by the enemy to frustrate the operation consisted of the following:-
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfire by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying by aircraft. Minelaying during the dark hours probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, and was maintained with great intensity during the following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk Roads mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
X and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone and
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in similar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing forma ons. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, two dostroyers and two trawlers, while the north Route
Y was in use, When the middle Route x, some 26 miles further to the south westward, was brought into use the enemy M.T.B. units failed to follow up, though the continuous stream of unescorted traffic during the dark hours and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads provided a tempting target to any enterprising Commander.
(a)/

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on OPeration "DERTAMO".
Page 5.
of the same evening, which recounted the opposite story. The more so as the gallantry of our outnumbered airmen was so obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
20
27/5
23
536
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
:
--
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
I
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
I
I
4/6
3
234
--
-
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the 1st June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was noticeable by its absence, aggravated, no doubt, by the fact that Army Officers' uniform is indistinguishable from that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared in their unmistakable uniform, order in most cases was quickly restored, the troops responding to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party. was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when troops of fighting/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 2.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued)
embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in daylight completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During the day destroyer patrols had been established to the Northward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to reinforce the Dover destroyers.
6.
Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for the South Downs to CO operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk, In the evening
Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the
Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no communication with these vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight,
7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this impossible.
8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most
Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches
East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail.
T.O.O. 2005/27". Me while Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked the Commender-in Chier, Nore, to send every available shallow draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel and provisions for two days; this move being made with a view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time
(2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A
further signal: "Please send every available craft to beaches
East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is problematical. 1958/27" was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk.
Later that evening a roport was received from
2/:

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, S.N.O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the daylight passage through coastal waters, was obvious. Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26.
At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of' the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss of H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 deg es every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 seconds, each remaining standing with the midship/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray,
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, nt only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end or X Route. These attacks vere to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers head of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them vith the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer head of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of
;he Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
RENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
in addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour ut further inside. This presented a very good target and the hips were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the ime being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in eaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed art of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
ANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops ut was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again n these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying longside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
RENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and he trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire ad to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the airway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, no witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by ombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having eased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and rawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a ink drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived o find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, th no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in the harbour/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM, however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however, continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed the previous evening and during the night. None of these ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night, but herwhereabouts was unknown, and it was feared that she had refused to sail. In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be used for some of the trips and short endurance necessitated coaling between trips which could not be done in the vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy during the evening and night, and operations were greatly hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

Page 20.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and ear-marked tugs, which were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time, the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were boing thinned out by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B.'s would shepherd the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats, whalers, outters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R.)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and was informed by a Starf Officer that no more troops would embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 21.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (continued).
63. General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan, stating that General Alexander had been placed in command of the final phase of the evacuation. Composition of force not known. Further, that it was impossible now to say how long the French evacuation would take but that the Alexander force would remain till the last. No firm information could be obtained from the French as regards:-
(i) The number of French troops to be evacuated.
(ii) The nature and extent of French sea borne transport.
(iii) The French military plan for the defence of the perimeter and the final withdrawal or French troops.
64. General remarks: The main features of the day were:-
(a) The increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk and La Panne beach, and on the approach channels.
(b) The set-back to evacuation from the beaches that occurred during the choppy weather of the forenoon, followed by an excellent recovery inthe afternoon and evening when large numbers were lifted from the beaches.
(c) The change in the military plan as regards the locality and time of lifting the final contingents of the B.E.F.
It should be noted that in spite of (b) the rate of embarkation had, in fact, come up to expectations, and if other circumstances had permitted it would have been possible to adhere to the original plan of lifting the final 4,000
B.E.F. off the beaches between 0130 and 0300 1st June.
65/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M. Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66. 2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of personnel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German guns eastward, and later information was received that the troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move west, with boats in tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships under orders for La Panne to other positions further west, concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and the wounded that could conveniently be embarked should go with personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Government policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 24
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday, 1st June (continued).
71. As for personnel vessels, there was an increasing unwillingness to sail, so steps were taken to place on board each a Naval Lieutenant-Commander or Commander, with 10 seamen acting as a moral stiffening, the officer acting as adviser and persuader to the Master of the ship, and the seamen for handling the wires and going alongside under fire. By this means it was hoped not only to ensure the timely sailing of these essential ships, but also to eliminate the many occasions when these vessels had lingered outside Dunkirk harbour to await a quiet opportunity to enter, or had failed to enter the harbour at all.
72. Early in the forenoon a number of Senior Officers were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all stray motor boats in the Downs and along the routes, and direct them back in the evening to the beach stretching 1/2
miles eastward of Dunkirk, and a second large flight of tugs with lifeboats was prepared at Ramsgate to send over for what was hoped to be a final effort off the beach. In addition a number of flotillas under Commodore Taylor and Captain Fraser were reorganised for the night's effort.
73. General Alexander was informed at 0951 that on the likely assumption that complete evacuation would be ordered that night, the problem of transport made it essential to use the beach adjacent to Dunkirk as well as the harbour facilities and that the Vice Admiral was planning evacuation to start at 2200.
74. At 1841 the following signal was received from
C.I.G.S. for the Senior Military Commander: "We do not order any fixed moment for evacuation. You are to hold on as long as possible in order that the maximum number of French and
British may be evacuated. Impossible from here to judge local situation. In close co-operation with Admiral Abrial. You must act in this matter on your own judgment."
75. S.N.O. Dunkirk, was informed that drifters and other small craft would be sent into the inner harbour at
Dunkirk to take troops from the Felix Faure Quay, North Quay, in the shipyard, and the quay in the new outer harbour.
special flotillas especially organised, to go to the beach including paddlers, skoots and all small craft, except certain
76. The plan for the night provided for all minesweepers stretching eastward 1 1/2 miles from Dunkirk. Dunkirk Harbour was and to be served by up to 7 personnel ships, 8 destroyers, the inner harbour 9 drifters and special power boats organised from Ramsgate. The French vessels were to serve the
Quay in the new outer harbour and private small boats, the
Quay Felix Faure, and in addition about 100 French small beach
Dunkirk. It was estimated that the British vessels could fishing craft and drifters for the beach immediately east of lift about 17,000 between 2100/1 and 0300/2, probably in the proportion/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 27
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Saturday 1st June (continued).
and at 0815 was attacked by enemy aircraft. Ship was hit aft of
No.3 boiler room and put out of action. About 0945 another attack took place but no hits were registered. A third attack took place at about noon and the ship began to settle and the order to abandon ship was given.
Destroyer KEITH attacked by enemy aircraft off Bray severely hit and abandoned at anchor by No.8 buoy. Finally sank.
Harbour Defence Craft AMULREE sunk in collision by
VIMY at 0200.
Sunday, 2nd June.
80. The arrangements to set in motion the night's evacuation had proceeded smoothly as far as could be ascertained at
Dover. During the early hours, reports of sailings from Dunkirk indicated that destroyers at least were doing well.
At about 0200, however, a signal was received from
LYDD, who was off the Dunkirk beach, as follows:-
"Brigadier tells me that C. in C. says it is essential that rearguard B.E.F. embarks from the beaches east of Mole on account of French congestion on Mole. Considerable number
British troops still on Mole. Military are expecting further arrivals there. Rearguard expects to arrive at beach by 0230."
The Vice Admiral accordingly ordered all ships known to be outside Dunkirk Harbour to endeavour to embark the rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300 if necessary. Owing to the time in transit and coding it was feared that this signal would reach few ships still on the coast, unless they had remained on their own initiative after 0300, the previously ordered time of withdrawal.
At 0200, authority was received from the Admiralty to continue evacuation by destroyers from Dunkirk Harbour until
0700, transports to leave Dunkirk at 0300.
81. During the early hours there was considerable haze and smoke off Dunkirk Harbour, Dunkirk East Beach, Dunkirk Roads and the entrance therefrom to X Route. For this reason some of the smaller vessels, including minesweepers, failed to make either
Dunkirk Harbour or Dunkirk East Beach, but on the whole it appears that evacuation, both from the beach and from the harbour had proceeded satisfactorily with the resources available.
Between 0200 and 0900, 6 personnel vessels reached
United Kingdom from Dunkirk Harbour with about 5,500 troops. 2
others had been turned back before reaching Dunkirk by 2 unknown destroyers, and one had been in collision before reaching Dunkirk and had to return.
82. Considerable doubt existed during the forenoon as to the numbers remaining to be evacuated in Dunkirk. It was thought that
2,000, plus the 4,000 rearguard British troops, might well be found in Dunkirk. The number of French troops remaining was increasing from the 25,000 quoted the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000.
83. The Rear Admiral, Dover, arrived back from the coast in a M.T.B. and during the forenoon a joint Naval and Military conference was held to devise a plan for the forthcoming night's evacuation. The fact that evacuation traffic was suspended in daylight/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 30
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
that 4 ships were now alongside, that there were no French troops. Reported again at 0115, "Plenty of ships cannot get troops."
At 0312, Dunkirk reported that all ships were leaving and that the block ships had entered.
When the ships returned to United Kingdom, it was learnt that he flow of French troops had dwindled away shortly after midnight. One ship waited 2-1/2 hours to embark her load instead of the normal half hour. A possible explanation was thought to be that a French counter attack, which had been arranged for the afternoon of the 2nd, had had to be postponed to the evening, no doubt deranging despatch of troops to the rear for evacuation. The result was that between midnight and 0300/3 a lifting capacity of about 10,000 was left empty
91. The night's embarkation at Dunkirk had been carried out without disturbance by enemy action. During the forenoon a conference was held at Dover to improve the arrangements for the night 3/6 - 4/6 as a result of experience gained. The general plan remained unaltered except that provision was made for the use by British ships of the west pier in the New Outer
Port, since it appeared that the French had insufficient ships at their disposal to make full use of this valuable berth.
Similarly a number of power boats which had been working off the Malo Beach were, on this occasion, to be sent in to Quay
Felix Faure. No assurance could be obtained that this coming night would terminate the operation and considerable anxiety was felt regarding the effect of the gradual exhaustion of officers and men of the ships taking part in the Dynamo. This exhaustion was particularly marked in the Destroyer force the remnants of which had been executing a series of round trips without intermission for several days under navigation considitions of extreme difficulty and in the face of unparallelled air attack.
The Vice Admiral accordingly represented to the
Admiralty that the continuance of the demands made by evacuation would subject a number of officers and men to a test which might be beyond the limit of human endurance, and requesting that fresh forces should be used if evacuation had to be continued after the coming night, with the acceptance of any consequent delay.
92. The evacuation plan was communicated to Units taking part at 1440 and was briefly as follows:-
Commence 2230/3, withdraw 0230/4. From East Pier evacuation by Personnel Vessels, Destroyers and Paddle Minesweepers.
From West Pier, new outer port, by other Minesweepers,
Corvettes, Skoots and French vessels. Drifters and smaller craft into the inner harbour, LOCUST remaining outside entrance receiving loads ferried out by small boats. Tugs available outside entrance to assist ships in berthing and in leaving.
93., val

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 32.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 31
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Monday, 3rd June (continued).
93. In the evening the Vice Admiral was informed by the
B.N.L.O. Marceau that it was estimated 30,000 French remained and that the French Admiralty agree that evacuation should be terminated that night if possible. Force used was to consist of 9 Personnel Vessels with one in reserve, 9 Destroyers is
(maximum number available), 4 Paddle Minesweepers, 7 Fleet
Minesweepers, 9 Drifters, LOCUST, 2 Corvettes, 4 French
Destroyers and a number of organised motor boat flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. The lifting capacity of this force, if used to the full, was more than 30,000, but it was certain that the facilities within
Dunkirk could not permit more than about 25,000 to be embarked in the time available, and this number only if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. This point was impressed upon the French Liaison
Officers and a number of French officers and ratings added to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200 in advance of the evacuation force.
94. The movements commenced according to plan. The weather conditions at Dunkirk, although favourable as regards tide were adverse with a north easterly wind tending to blow
S,
Personnel Vessels and Destroyers off the vital East Pier making berthing difficult. The MANXMAN, the seventh Personnel Ship due to sail refused to sail, and her place was taken by the
ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
Tuesday, 4th June.
95. At midnight when the earlier vessels had commenced the return voyage fog was reported in mid-channel and off the r
Thanet coast and a number of ships had to anchor before entering harbour. The EXPRESS and SHIKARI were the last ships to leave Dunkirk at 0318 and 0340 and carried approximately
1,000 troops and the British pier parties. Except for an air attack on SHIKARI this final passage was made without interruption by the enemy and though the fog made navigation extremely difficult it undoubtedly served to shield the Armadas from enemy aircraft.
I
96. When the count was taken later in the day it was ascertained that 27,000 troops had been evacuated as a result of the night's operation and Admiral Nord agreed that the operation should be considered as completed, observing that all anmunition at Dunkirk had been expended and that the numbers left behind were small consisting principally of noncombatant troops. This decision was agreed to by the French
Admiralty at 1100, and the operation Dynamo terminated by
Admiralty Message 1423/4.
97. It was realised that in all probability there might be a number of open boats, barges, etc. drifting about in the channel with troops on board. It was accordingly decided to have val

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 36
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flottllas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
111. Locally, at both Ramsgate and Dover a number of civilian volunteers came forward to man the boats and to drive their engines. These men did good work.
112. At both Rams ate and Dover when the business of manning these civilian power boats was set about the same difficulties were experienced:-
(i) of obtaining drivers with knowledge of the very varied types of internal combustion engines;
(ii) of making the engines of these boats run, most of them having been laid up since the previous summer.
Throughout the operation all engines continued to give trouble. Many engines were old and almost all were of different types. Several boats could not be used as they had diesel engines and no stokers or civilians trained in these were available. Each engine, especially the older ones, required careful nursing, and signs of distress from the engines were not understood. These difficulties were partly overcome by obtaining engine drivers from Chatham and by the provision of cadet ratings, and Sub-Lieutenants, R.N.V.R.
from KING ALFRED who claimed knowledge of I.C. engines, but many engines were of types unknown even to these.
These difficulties would never have arisen had the civilian crews, or even their drivers, been willing to take their boats across to Dunkirk.
113. Fresh water for the motor boats was difficult to supply in sufficient quantity, owing to lack of water tanks in most boats, especially those of the open type. Large supplies were required as the troops were reported to be suffering severely om thirst, Both at Ramsgate and Dover the Base Staff prov..ed as many galvanized iron cylinders and tanks as could be found and made serviceable, and these proved most satisfactory.
114. On two occasions skoots and small boats approaching the coast were turned back through false information. On the first occasion on the afternoon of 28th May, at least 6
skoots, who were without definite orders where to proceed, encountered a returning shoot when about 10 miles off the coast. This skoot stated that Dunkirk had already fallen into
German hands and that the evacuation had ceased. It is believed that this report originated from an Army officer embarked in the skoot. He had stated, consequent on the capitulation of Belgian troops that the Germans would be advancing along the coast that evening. As a result of this ill-judged comment, the arrival of at least 6 shoots was delayed at over 24 hours, until this situation had been cleared up.
The second occasion occurred during the night of 1st
June and has been referred to in paragraph 76 of the narrative. On this occasion although the services of a number of small craft were lost to the coast, it transpired that sufficient were already there to cope with the troops available,
115./

tions of Commander k.
der Dove, Sub Lieutenant
N.V.R. The object was to erect
7th June, 1940.
rt of Dunkirk. Commander Dove atsuki" on May 2000 with 200
-Admiral Sir James ut. Field and Sub Lieut Addis
Somerville, K. C.B., D.S.O.,.
taul". On instructions from took command of the Drifter
On the orders of Commander Yates, we iled from Dover 6345 Friday the honour to submit the following es for the demolition party, 4
ort on the activities of Commander officer Major Russell, 1 Army e's party at Dunkirk.
3 signal ratings. After an
Dunkirk 0930 to find a large
We have the honour to be, Sir, rogress. We noted then, and for that in spite of the courage and
Your obedient Servants, the great majority of their targets. We immediately entered
J.L. Field Subtient RNVILE
the South Quay.
R.G.addis Subtient RMVR.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with portion of a demolition party.
re-enter the harbour and took
CS.
threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel y. The, "Gervaise" was mana side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who y primersor detonators for the a two hospital ships which were
$
The attached papers have been ng these was just put in hand seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made
* available at any time during for his list of personnel recommendations.
himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
e situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cress rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of the atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading ship eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes sincleithe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Cdr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad Deen 1814 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove,R.N., Sub.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
& lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with H.M.D. "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2014 with 200
sets of lethal kite year.,Lieut, Field and ub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P Dover,.Lieut. Field took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoes were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with
OFFICE OF
portion of a demolition party.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
re-enter the harbour and took threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
18th June, 1940.
7. The, "Gervaise" was man-
1 side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
Dear Gleadowe, y primersor detonators for the
The attached papers have been a two hospital ships which were seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made ng these was just put in hand for his list of personnel recommendations.
* available at any time during himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
8 situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cres rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr.Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of th atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading shi eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes circledthe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Odr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad been 1810 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200
sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr.
Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with
Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party.
Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was maneeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the depth charges.
Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the
South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr.
Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a regrettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th
At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncombatant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number*
of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over
(ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr.
Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

[HCLOSURE
No.
TO DOVER LETTER OF 18 guay 1940
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS AT BRAYDUNE AND LA PANNE.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report.
On the night of Tuesday, 28th. May 1940, while serving in
H.M.S. "Harvester", under your command, I went ashore in the motor boa accompanied by Petty Officer Pleasance, Signalman Bird and Able Seamer
Potter and Law. We landed at Bray Dune where we found about 4,000
oldiers awaiting embarkation. I remained on shore with Signalman Bird and
Able Seaman Law. There was a strong cross sea and sand bars made the launching of boats difficult. Throughout the night we managed to evacuate about 700 which included about 100 wounded. Discipline was very bad.
At 0400 Wednesday, the supply of boats for embarkation ceased and I returned with Bird and Law to H.M.S. "Harvester".
There had been considerable wastage of boats through lack of discipline in the troops; overcrowding was hard to control as the embarkation beach extended for over one mile.
About 0500 Wednesday, H.M.S. "Harvester" moved eastward to
La Panne and I landed in the motor skiff with Petty Officer Shrimpton, and Leading Seaman Kendall. Mr. Robinson, Gunner T, H.M.S. "Harvester
Petty Officer Steward Beale, Able Seamen Potter and Law also landed and evacuation was resumed. On the beach we found 14 boats which we launched. A line ferry was established from a paddle steamer which was aground close in shore and this steamer served as a pier alongside which other boats were able to come. A.B. Potter remained on shore, the others continued ferrying. Throughout the day embarkation continued.
About 1400 Wednesday bombing commenced - there were no casualties though 8 heavy bombs fell within 100 yards of the place of embarkation. A supply ship to the right of the beach was fired and destroyed by a near miss, and a destroyer was hit by an incendiary bomb but continued in action. I joined up with the Army
Staff controlling evacuation - there were no other Naval Officers at
La Panne. There was some panic among troops, one boat overturning and seven men were drowned in four feet of water. We were unable to revive these men.
About 1700 Wednesday the following requests were telephoned to the Admiralty:- that Naval staff be sent, that fighter protection be extended to La Panne and that numerous flat bottomed boats be sent immediately. (Two Lieutenants R.N. and some seamen arrived at La Panne early on Thursday morning, Lieut. Cmdr. McCullough and signal staff on
Thursday evening and some fighter protection was given.) There was but it did not interfere; enemy planes raided in the gaps between occasional shelling to the right of the beach throughout Wednesday immediately. There was A.A. protection on the beach - the four our fighter patrols and a destroyer was hit by a heavy bomb and sank
Bofors proving most effective.
but was told nothing could be done that night. Owing to lack of
About 2300 Wednesday I requested that piers should be built boats the only a few men removed morning that and night. asked what could Lord be Gort done arrived to assist. on
1 The
The erection of piers, and under Colonel Porter's the pier at La Panne being ready and in use action and destroyed some of our own fighters; there appeared to
No bombing occurred on Thursday but the beach guns were in
Sta. 47/88.
U. E. 7881/1922.
81500 We 12/11/0514 450,000 3/39-McO & Co Ltd-T. 3255

(1952) Wt. 20006/971* 100
CW. 24984/40
51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
740
FROM WHOM
DATE
5.6.40.
MARKINGS TO BOARD,
ENCLOSURE Mo.
to DOVER LETTER OF 18 July 1961
no signals from the fighters and the guns' crews had no information th regarding recognition signals.
Up till 2000 Thursday, it is estimated that 17,000 men were embarked from La Panne.
On Thursday evening a method of identifying the beaches was established - two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray Dune and communicated to the Admiralty, Dover. The Admiralty were also asked to send more ships.
On Friday embarkation at La Panne was slowed up as shelling caused some ships to move westward to Bray Dune. The rest camp in the rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut were hit during bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday and ships also suffered shell fire.
Early Friday afternoon the 12th Lancers, who had been marshalling the beaches for 24 hours were relieved and marched to
Dunkirk.
On Friday evening German Gunners found the range of the beach and were aided by two observation balloons which we did not manage to destroy. Lord Gort and his staff were embarked in a whaler from
La Panne and taken to a patrol vessel. Lieut. Cmdr. McCullough ordered me to embark in H.M. Yacht PHELE and I went with the remainder of the Commander-in-Chief's staff. About 2000 the enemy sent over a large number of planes accompanied by fighters, but the intensive bombing appeared to have little effect, though it provided ten minutes of extreme discomfort. Throughout the night H.M.Y.PHELE continued to assist with evacuation. Shelling at La Panne was intensified, the pier being the objective.
At 0200 Saturday La Panne was abandoned as a place of embarkation and H.M.Y. PHELE sailed to Bray Dune and thence to Dover where we arrived without further incident at 10.30 Saturday.
Except during the first day of evacuation, the bearing of the
B.E.F. at La Panne was magnificent.
I was not given orders to remain ashore, but as at La Panne there was no liaison between Army and Navy I realised I could do a much more useful job by remaining there.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
ER.
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) EDMUND C. CRESSWELL.
Sub Lieutenant Royal Navy
24th June, 1940.
Royal Naval Hospital,
Haslar.
To
The Commending orficer,
Sta. 47/88.
U. 10. 7881/1922.
21500 Wt. 12/11/0514 430,000 8/39-McO & Co Ltd-T. 3255

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. Page
70
H.M.S. BIDEFORD This - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
being off the bombed beach vessel and proceeded machine-gunned to Bray on beach the on the 29th May bombing blown was quarter gun In spite platforms grounded away, deck, attack of No.2 the aft embarking wrecked, about took damage and gun 40 place. put of done, feet in the troops out addition casualties of The of of stern in the action ship the to fact being was much evening, way and that struck other completely the across. the 0.5 the on damage. ship machi While the third and continued 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men suffered (3 BIDEFO offic eventually England towed off and home, carried 400 troops and when to to embark troops during the night, wounded), on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by
D.S.C
bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and eventually carried 400 to England.
M
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan, M.B., B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an outstanding example to all. His sick berth attendant seriously wounded, he doalt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously wounded, and performed several major operations, having organised his limited resources to their utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients continuously and at all times displayed great ability, patience and understanding. No effort was too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most worthy manner.
D.S.O. D.S.C.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
DSM.
(D.M)
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After was Office to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troop the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteer on said he would remain in BIDEFORD and continu was board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther work there, knowing full well that BIDEFORD time his severely damaged. and aground, and at the that ship very considered highly improbable that to would it was reach England, but he gave up his comrades. chance
Carried get away out his voluntary duties for all but hor in order to tend his wounded 48
continuously in a most efficient manner.

Operation "DYNAMO" Les Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 74
H.M.S. LOCUST - Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie R.N.
batteries, not This only evacuating ship played troops a prominent but in part in Operation DYNAMO, hour passage, and and in taking BIDEFORD bombarding in tow to shore
MOSQUITO to out demolition work in the saving of ship. Also carried is probably responsible for Dover, a that 30
and other ensure the destruction of all wreck matter. already The taken the correct steps to safeguard MOSQUITO secret had gear, it not then being known that secret books fortnight prior to joining this operation.
ship had only been in commission for a
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie, R.N.
Displayed good judgment and initiative throughout the operation, frequently under fire from shore artillery and under air bombardment, particularly when he found himself the Senior Officer afloat off
La Panne beach on the evening of the 29th, and his personal efforts in organising the various inshore boats and the troops ashore resulted in more than
1,000 troops being lifted from the beach to his ship and other offshore craft, there being no Army officers present in charge of these troops.
D.S.C
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Arundell Holdsworth. R.N.
Did excellent work on board and on shore, where on the last night of beach evacuation he hunted up several small parties of troops hidden amongst the sand dunes, thereby ensuring their safety. He also iring took charge of the successful demolition work in tere
MOSQUITO, a job of great difficulty owing to the vors movement of the wreck in the swell. At all times he displayed exceptional initiative.
vas whom
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Signalman E. E. Roden, C/D.360.
Signalman H. O. Carter, C/SSX.17317.
Accompanied the officers when they landed. Behaved with great courage and resource and were personally instrumental in organising the soldiers and handling the boats, and in detailing the military for embarkation. Their initiative and bearing set a fine examplo to the soldiers, who certainly would have failed to launch the boats without their leadership.
MM (?DSM) Recommended for mention.

Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 101.
RATING:
Engineer C. Coggins.
This civilian kept the engines of this motor yacht running the whole time, in spite of propeller required. He also put the engines of several other being fouled frequently and the continuous running boats to rights when they broke down. He ably assisted the Skipper throughout the operations.
Recommended for mention.
30 ft. Motor Yacht MAID ERRANT. - Able Seaman S. Palmer, D/JX.
148052.
Recommendations.
Able Seaman S. Palmer. D/JX. 148052.
Sailed from Sheerness on Friday, 31st May, in convoy for Dunkirk. En route rescued survivors of a French destroyer, then proceeded to the beaches.
There he was swamped by French soldiers swarming over his boat, which drifted ashore. Later the boat refloated and he took one V.C.O. and 8 British soldiers; he had no crew except one Stoker, who had great difficulty with the engine. Off Dunkirk, on the way home, the engine broke down, so he broke up the yacht's wood fittings and made the 8 soldiers paddle the boat. Later, the engine restarted after furing an 18 hour voyage. Next day, without orders, he ister sailed with a crew of one other Able Seaman, but was vivor turned back as his craft was too slow to take part in the night evacuation ordered for that evening.
was
Able Seaman Palmer states that he passed for whom
Leading Seaman in May, 1927. He states he
D.S.M.
possesses the L. S. & G. C. Medal.
n
Recommended for immediate advancement.
Drifter OCEAN BREEZE, War Department Launch HAIG and Skoot PASCHOLL.
(Lieutenant Victor Alexander Christian Henry George de Mauny,
R.N.Retired.
Recommendations,
X
Lieutenant Victor Alexander C.H.G. de Mauny, R.N.
Between noon on the 30th May and 0815 4th June continuously engaged under way on evacuation was duties without any intermission. Commanded in of a group of skoots in PASCHOLL. Brought back more succession OCEAN BREEZE, HAIG and then as Navigator conditions on two separate occasions. Was notably than 300 troops from Dunkirk beach in surf

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Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. BIDEFORD - Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
This vessel proceeded to Bray beach on the 29th May, being bombed and machine-gunned on the way across. While off the beach embarking troops in the evening, the third bombing attack took place. The ship was struck on the quarter deck, about 40 feet of stern being completely blown away, No.2 gun put out of action and the 0.5 machin gun platforms wrecked, in addition to much other damage.
In spite of the damage done, of the fact that the ship was grounded aft and of the casualties suffered (3 office and 13 men killed, 1 officer and 18 men wounded), BIDEFOR
continued to embark troops during the night, and when eventually towed off and home, carried 400 troops to
England on the 31st May.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Commander John Hugh Lewes, R.N.
In spite of the severe damage to his ship by bombs and the fact that his ship was aground, he continued to rescue troops from Bray beach, and
D&C eventually carried 400 to England.
Recommended for mention.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Jordan. M.B., B.Ch., R.N.
Displayed zeal and unswerving devotion to duty throughout the period 29th-31st May, when he was an outstanding example to all. His sick berth attendant seriously wounded, he doalt with some 50
casualties, many horribly mutilated or dangerously wounded, and performed several major operations, having organised his limited resources to their
DSD.
utmost. Throughout the period tended his patients continuously and at all times displayed great ability, patience and understanding. No effort was too much for him - no call was left unanswered.
He was completely selfless and upheld the traditions of the Royal Navy and of his profession in a most worthy manner.
Recommended for decoration.
RATINGS.
Private George William Crowther, 6th Field Ambulance
B. Company, No. 7354480.
= Dsmandard byour
This man had been embarked from Bray beach. After to assist the Surgeon. An hour later, when the troops the ship was struck by bombs he immediately volunteere board had been transferred to another ship,
Crowther on said he would remain in BIDEFORD BIDEFORD and continue his severely damaged and aground, and that at the work there, knowing full well that that time was very considered highly improbable chance ship to would in order to tend his wounded for all but it was reach England, but he gave up his comrades.
get away out his voluntary duties manner. 48 hours
Carried continuously in a most efficient

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Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M.S. LOCUST - Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie R.N.
This ship played a prominent part in Operation DYNAMO, not only evacuating troops but in bombarding shore batteries, and in taking BIDEFORD in tow to Dover, a 30
hour passage, and is probably responsible for saving that ship. Also carried out demolition work in the wreck of
MOSQUITO to ensure the destruction of all secret books and other gear, it not then being known that MOSQUITO
had already taken the correct steps to safeguard secret matter. The ship had only been in commission for a fortnight prior to joining this operation.
Recommendations.
OFFICERS.
Lieutenant Ackroyd Norman Palliser Costobadie, R.N.
Displayed good judgment and initiative throughout the operation, frequently under fire from shore artillery and under air bombardment, particularly when he found himself the Senior Officer afloat off
La Panne beach on the evening of the 29th, and his personal efforts in organising the various inshore boats and the troops ashore resulted in more than
1,000 troops being lifted from the beach to his ship and other offshore craft, there being no Army officers present in charge of these troops.
ase
Recommended for decoration.
Lieutenant Arundell Holdsworth, R.N.
Did excellent work on board and on shore, where on the last night of beach evacuation he hunted up several small parties of troops hidden amongst the sand dunes, thereby ensuring their safety. He also took charge of the successful demolition work in
MOSQUITO, a job of great difficulty owing to the movement of the wreck in the swell. At all times he displayed exceptional initiative.
M
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS.
Signalman E. E. Roden, C/D.360.
Signalman H. O. Carter, C/SSX.17317.
Accompanied the officers when they landed. Behaved with great courage and resource and were personally instrumental in organising the soldiers and handling the boats, and in detailing the military for embarkation. Their initiative and bearing set a fine example to the soldiers, who certainly would have failed to launch the boats without their leadership.
Recommended for mention.