TNA ADM 199 792

Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
CONFIDENTIAL
115
Page 4.
8
(d)
Shore
Artillery.
At the the southern batteries Route Z was found commencement to be under of the operation, from only be used by near night. Calais, The and consequently gunfire could only by night fire to when later the northern batteries Route near Y was usable brought too narrow to permit bear on the Zuydecoote Pass, Nieuport which was running Route X was gauntlet of fire. By this time, however, the a reasonable chance of ships batteries available, and was free of gunfire
German Dunkirk near Gravelines brought its exit until into the Roads under gunfire. This occurred in with the of enemy air attack, led to the the afternoon result on Saturday, 1st June, and in conjunction suspension of daylight traffic altogether.
(e) Submarines. U-boats do not appear to have caused any casualties. It is unlikely that the one thought to be present penetrated further than the northern Route Y.
It may well be that this U-boat laid moored mines, which are thought to have caused the loss of two A/S trawlers.
8.
AIR CO-OPERATION.
The system of co-operation between the Naval and
R.A.F. Commands does not permit of direct contact with the
R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command. For this reason much time appears to be lost and the needs of the ever-changing situation may not be provided for. Delays and lag occur, resulting often in the R.A.F. effort being brought to bear either in the wrong place or at the wrong time, or with inadequate force to meet the current situation. The requirement is for the Naval Commander in charge of an operation to be able to convey his requirements direct to the R.A.F. Commander of the R.A.F. Operational Units, and for this latter officer to communicate direct to the Naval Commander the steps that he is taking to meet the stated requirement.
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity for effective air co-operation in an operation of this nature. Not only did unopposed German air effort interrupt and reduce seaborne traffic, but it also prevented embarkation by suspending troop movement. To both Naval and Military observers on the coast, the situation at times was extremely disheartening. Rightly or wrongly, full air protection was expected, but instead, for hours on end the ships offshore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs and machine gun bullets.
Required by their duty to remain offshore waiting for the troops, who themselves were unable to move down to the water for the same reason, it required the greatest determination and sense of duty, amounting in fact to heroism, on the part of the ships' and boats' crews, to enable them to complete their mission.
In their reports, the Commanding Officers of many ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F. personnel for gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships, at the same time express their sense of disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air protection during the height of this operation.
In this connection, as one Commanding Officer remarks, the formations of our own fighters when operating machines surprise down than were enemy, and feelings was no area were to so the observer to note that more of over the outnumbered by enemy aircraft British that it disgust were were engendered shot on listening in to the B.B.C. of report

CONFIDENTIAL 116
Report on Operation "DYNAMO",
Page 5.
111
more so as the our outnumbered airmen was so of the same evening, gallantry which of recounted the opposite story. The obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols - Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
Enemy aircraft driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
27/5
23
536
20
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
--
I
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
--
I
4/6
3
234
--
I
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the Ist June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was fact noticeable that Army by Officers' its absence, uniform aggravated, is indistinguishable no doubt, in by from the that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared their order in most cases was quickly restored, to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when fighting/ troops of

122
CONFIDENTIAL
120
OPERATION DYNAMO".
26/5-
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.
Sunday, 26th May, 1940.
Admiralty ordered Operation DYNAMO to commence at
1857. Prior to the receipt of this order, the despatch of
Personnel Vessels to Dunkirk had already commenced at 1500.
At this time a flow of 2 vessels every 4 hours had been agreed to by the B.E.F., the first of these reached Dover on the return trip at 2230 and 1312 personnel were landed.
2. On this day the only Inshore Craft available to
Vice Admiral, Dover, were 4 Belgian Passenger Launches and the
Naval Small Craft of the Dover Command such as drifters, and
Motor Boats from the Contraband Control Base at Ramsgate. The only ones capable of lifting personnel direct from a beach being the boats from Ramsgate. The Admiralty had been asked for the supply of small boats, especially whalers and cutters, but there was always the difficulty of arranging for the personnel to man them. When matters became urgent, the
Admiralty made a signal to the various Home Ports asking them to report how many cutters and whalers could be made available for immediate service under Vice Admiral, Dover.
Monday, 27th May.
3. The Vice Admiral, Dover, was informed by the
Admiralty of the various steps taken to supply coasting vessels, skoots, motor boats and other small craft including pulling boats for inshore work off the beaches. Very few of such inshore craft could be available during the day and the main effort was concentrated on maintaining the flow of Personnel
Vessels to Dunkirk at the rate of 2 every 3½ hours. After a good start during the night 26th/27th the effect of enemy action against these transports was felt. Between sailings timed 0300/27 and 1500/27, no less than 5 transports were shelled and returned to United Kingdom without making the trip.
In addition MONA'S ISLE was damaged by shell fire and QUEEN OF
THE CHANNEL was bombed and sank during the early hours of the
28th. As a result the Vice Admiral, Dover, reported to the
Admiralty that the normal channel, Dover to Dunkirk, was impracticable in daylight owing to fire from shore batteries extending from Les Hemmes to Gravelines. Zuydecoote Pass had to be used instead and consequently the distance run for the round trip increased from 80 miles to 172 resulting in a general slowing up of traffic. This route had to be used before it could be swept. Work was also commenced to sweep a channel from the North Goodwin to the Ruytingen Pass and thence into the Dunkirk Roads, thus shortening the round trip from 172
miles to 108.
4. The S.N.O., Dunkirk, with naval beach and pier party of 12 officers and 160 ratings, plus communication staff, left
Dover in WOLFHOUND at 1345, and were attacked by dive bombers at half-hour intervals between 1600 and 1800, on the voyage to
Dunkirk.
5. During the day preparations were advanced for an embarkation

137
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 16.
135
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May (continued).
50. Casualties to H.M. Ships - 30th May.
Destroyer SABRE damaged by enemy aircraft.
Destroyer ANTHONY. Badly damaged by enemy aircraft
Had to be sent under tow to dockyard for repair.
e
Hospital Carrier ST. JULIAN attacked by enemy aircraft and damaged by near misses.
Personnel Vessel PRINCESS MAUD, damaged by enemy gunfire from shore batteries off Gravelines whilst proceeding to Dunkirk.
Armed Boarding Vessel KING ORRY severely damaged by near miss bombs inside Dunkirk Harbour, and finally foundered when taken out of harbour.

149
147
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 28
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
2/6
Sunday, 2nd June (continued).
daylight hours enabled all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent upon Dunkirk Harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and traffic controlled by motor boat in the harbour channels, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100/
2 and 0300/3.
The times of sailing of all vessels were adjusted so as to space them out over the evacuation period at Dunkirk, and allowance was made for a proportion failing to make the passage.
The French agreed to make their own arrangements for embarkation from the Dunkirk East Beach and the West Pier on the new outer harbour.
At. 1530 two R.A.F. Motor Boats, 243 and 270, left in company for Dunkirk carrying Commander J.C. Clouston and an augmented pier party. When off Gravelines attacks were made on the boats by eight Junkers 87 with machine guns and small bombs. No. 243 had a near miss which damaged her. For ten minutes No.270 carried on trying to avoid attacks. She then returned to No.243 but Commander Clouston who was in the water instructed 270 to proceed. Destroyers were instructed to look for survivors. Two were picked up only. One stated that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water.
84. At 1030 an urgent request transmitted "en clair"
was received from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships as follows:-
"Wounded situation acute and Hospital Ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed it is felt and that the enemy will refrain from attacking."
As this appeared to be the only way of evacuating the wounded, observing that the whole facilities of the port during the night evacuation hours would be required for fighting troops, it was decided to send two Hospital Ships. The WORTHING
sailed at 1300 and the PARIS at 1700. At 1440, the A/S Patrol was overheard on R/T reporting that the WORTHING was being bombed at a point about two-thirds of the way across the
Channel. She returned to United Kingdom reporting that she had been attacked by 12 Junkers. The attack caused no casualties, but plates were started and there was some superficial damage. She had to return to harbour to refuel before commencing another trip to Dunkirk.
At 1915 PARIS reported that she was bombed and badly damaged with engines useless, at the point where the WORTHING
had been attacked, and at 1947 she sent out an S.O.S. Tugs were sent to her assistance.
Thus the last attempt to evacuate the wounded by
Hospital Carrier from Dunkirk was brought to nought.
The PARIS subsequently sank shortly after midnight at W. buoy 10 miles off the French coast.
85./

CONFIDENTIAL.
153
Page 32.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
151
4/6
Tuesday, 4th June (continued).
have an air reconnaissance over the Channel.
It was reported that a Transport was lying on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines and also a barge east of the Goodwins with survivors on board.
C. in C. Nore, despatched 2 M.T.B.'s to find the
Transport with no avail. On the 5th the R.A.F. speedboat
$
did a sweep south of a line Goodwin/Boulogne and recovered 33
French troops and two naval ratings. In addition French troops were picked up by patrols and brought in to Dover,
Margate and Ramsgate. Troops also arrived in French and
Belgian Trawlers totalling in all some additional 1,100.
Air reconnaissance was also carried out on the morning of the 5th but nothing was reported.
REMARKS ON THE INSHORE FLOTILLAS
and
NAVAL SHORE PARTIES.
98. About 400 small craft, ranging from Dutch skoots to 30 ft. Motor boats, set out at various times to the
Flanders Coast. In addition scores of pulling boats, merchant ship life-boats, Naval cutters and whalers, were sent off in tow. Only a proportion - particularly of the pulling boats - succeeded in reaching the coast and taking active part in the evacuation. Fewer still were able to remain off the coast for more than one period. Nevertheless, these small craft, in conjunction with the pulling and power boats of H. M. ships off the coast, were responsible for lifting more than 100, Allied troops direct off a stretch of open beach in shoal waters between 1600/27/5 and 0400/2/6.
Further, a large number of the power boats operated within
Dunkirk harbour on the last three nights, working principally in the inner harbour, which was continually under artillery fire, ferrying a further large uncounted number out to the comparative safety of ships lying off.
99. Throughout the period all these craft of the inshore flotillas were subjected at one time or another to intense attack from the air, both by bombing and machine gun, and a large proportion also to sporadic bombardment by German artillery. Under this fire no case occurred of boats ceasing work as long as troops were in sight on shore, and movements of boats westward away from the fire zone only occurred as dictated by the military situation ashore.
100. The initial despatch of requisitioned and volunteer small craft was controlled from -
1
Naval Control Service, London,
Westminster Pier,
Ramsgate,
Gravesend,
Dover,
Southend,
Newhaven,
Sheerness,
Portsmouth, preliminary/

153
CONFIDENTIAL,
Page 34.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
155
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, finding it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and infl: 1 motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats.
104, Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coass jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of' soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. Of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

CONFIDENTIAL.
APPENDIX. VI.
179
to
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
177
5
Enemy aircraft destroyed by ships' fire.
Ship.
Locality.
Time.
Polish T.B.D. BLYSKAWICA
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS
0315/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS
1130/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. WOLFHOUND
1140/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.P.M/S MEDWAY QUEEN
1500/27
North Goodwin.
HcM.Sc MONTROSE
Dawn/28
Near Kwinte Buoy.
M.T.B. 16
1500/28
Bray.
1530/28
H.M.S. SABRE and other ships
Dunkirk Harbour.
1630/29
H.M.S. BIDEFORD
Dunkirk Roads.
1700/29
H.M.S. EXPRESS
Dunkirk Roads.
1700/29
H.M.S. MOSQUITO
Bray.
1900/29
S.S. LEVENWOOD (Store ship}
Bray.
S.S. LEVENWOOD ( - do
1210/31
Bray.
1220/31
H.M. Skoot AMAZONE
Dunkirk Roads.
1440/31
H.M.S. HEBE
La Panne.
1700/31
af
H.M.S. SCIMITAR and other ships
Bray.
1700/31
S.S. LADY OF MAN (Trassport) Dunkirk Roads.
1700/31
nd
H.M.Y. ARONIA
La Panne.
1830/31
H.M.S. WHITSHED
Dunkirk Roads.
1930/31
H.M.S. SALTASH
Bray.
2000/31
S.S. NEPHRITE (Store ship)
On Route X.
2030/31
H.M.Y. GRIVE
Dunkirk Roads.
2030/31
H.M.Y. ARONIA
Dunkirk Harbour.
0500/1
H.M.S. IVANHOE
La Panne.
0530/1
is
H.M.S. LYDD
Bray.
0600/1
H.M.S. HARVESTER
Dunkirk Harbour.
0600/1
H.M.S. HARVESTER and other ships
Dunkirk Roads.
0610/1
H.M.Ships CODRINGTON,
3
HARVESTER and others
Off Gravelines.
0750/1
S
H.M.S. SKIPJACK
La Panne.
0900/1
H.M.S. MALLARD
On Route X.
1015/1
H.M.S. CALCUTTA
Between W and Y Buoys.
1020/1
H.M.P. M/S MEDWAY QUEEN
West of Dunkirk.
1600/1
H.M.Y. ALOUETTE
Off Gravelines.
1700/1
H.M.Y. CRISTOBEL II and other ships
La Panne.
1730/1.
H.M.S. WORCESTER
Dunkirk Roads.
2000/1
TOTAL: 35 enemy aircraft definitely destroyed by ships'
gun fire between 0300/27 and 2000/1.
ery
In addition over the same period 21 others were heavily damaged by ships' fire (and seen in distress but
NOT seen to crash definitely) of H.M. Ships HARVESTI
IVANHOE, VIVACIOUS, WINCHELSEA, WOLFHOUND, SABRE,
LOCUST, FITZROY, LYDD, MALLARD, MOSQUITO, WOLSEY,
EXPRESS, JAGUAR, GLEN AVON, ORIOLE, H.N.Y. ARONIA, as
Storeship NEPHRITE and French M.T.B.24.
)p]
Note: On 30th May flying conditions were bad and few enemy aircraft operated. After the 1st June operations proceeded only between dusk and day.
i

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 4.
(a) Shore Artillery. At the commencement of the operation, the southern Route Z was found to be under gunfire from batteries near Calais, and consequently could only be used by night. The northern Route Y was usable only by night when later the batteries near Nieuport brought fire to bear on the Zuydecoote Pass, which was too narrow to permit a reasonable chance of ships running the gauntlet of fire. By this time, however,
Route X was available, and was free of gunfire until
German batteries near Gravelines brought its exit into the Dunkirk Roads under gunfire. This occurred in the afternoon on Saturday, 1st June, and in conjunction with the result of enemy air attack, led to the suspension of daylight traffic altogether.
(e) Submarines. U-boats do not appear to have caused any casualties. It is unlikely that the one thought to be present penetrated further than the northern Route Y.
It may well be that this U-boat laid moored mines, which are thought to have caused the loss of two A/S trawlers.
8.
AIR CO-OPERATION.
The system of co-operation between the Naval and
R.A.F. Commands does not permit of direct contact with the
R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command. For this reason much time appears to be lost and the needs of the ever-changing situation may not be provided for. Delays and lag occur, resulting often in the R.A.F. effort being brought to bear either in the wrong place or at the wrong time, or with inadequate force to meet the current situation. The requirement is for the Naval Commander in charge of an operation to be able to convey his requirements direct to the R.A.F. Commander of the R.A.F. Operational Units, and for this latter officer to communicate direct to the Naval Commander the steps that he is taking to meet the stated requirement.
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity for effective air co-operation in an operation of this nature. Not only did unopposed German air effort interrupt and reduce seaborne traffic, but it also prevented embarkation by suspending troop movement. To both Naval and Military observers on the coast, the situation at times was extremely disheartening. Rightly or wrongly, full air protection was expected, but instead, for hours on end the ships offshore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs and machine gun bullets.
Required by their duty to remain offshore waiting for the troops, who themselves were unable to move down to the water for the same reason, it required the greatest determination and sense of duty, amounting in fact to heroism, on the part of the ships' and boats' crews, to enable them to complete their mission.
In their reports, the Commanding Officers of many ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F. personnel for gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships, at the same time express their sense of disappointment and surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air protection during the height of this operation.
In this connection, as one Commanding Officer remarks, the formations of our own fighters when operating over the area were so outnumbered by enemy aircraft that it was no surprise to the observer to note that more British machines were shot down than were enemy, and feelings of disgust were engendered on listening in to the B.B.C. of/ report

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on OPeration "DERTAMO".
Page 5.
of the same evening, which recounted the opposite story. The more so as the gallantry of our outnumbered airmen was so obvious at the time, and was the admiration of all.
9.
No. 11 Group Fighter Patrols Dunkirk area history.
Total flying
Enemy aircraft
Enemy aircraft
Date. Patrols.
hours daily.
destroyed.
driven down.
26/5
22
480
30
20
27/5
23
536
48
32
28/5
11
576
20
6
29/5
9
674
78
8
30/5
9
704
:
--
31/5
8
490
36
4
1/6
8
558
69
I
2/6
4
231
16
6
3/6
4
339
I
I
4/6
3
234
--
-
Total flying hours 4,822
Notes: (1) It will be observed that the number of patrols decreased from 27th May onwards, whilst there was an increase in the daily flying hours. This is due to the fact that the fighters were employed in increasingly bigger patrols as the enemy air opposition increased.
(2) Operation Dynamo suffered most from enemy air effort on 29/5 and on 1/6, after which latter date the combination of enemy air attack and shore artillery fire led to the suspension of the operation by day.
10.
The position of enemy batteries had been located by air reconnaissance by nightfall on 31st May, and additional batteries in the Gravelines area on the 1st June.
Air bombardment of these batteries during the 1st and 2nd
June undoubtedly reduced their fire during dusk and dawn on each of the nights 2/6 - 3/6 and 3/6 - 4/6, when seaborne traffic was passing within range of the enemy batteries commanding the south end of X Route, the Dunkirk Roads, and
Dunkirk Harbour. This was a valuable contribution by the
R.A.F. to the successful outcome of the operation. A
similar beneficial result was obtained by the bombing of the batteries which had Dunkirk Pier and roadstead under fire.
11.
CONTROL OF ALLIED TROOPS.
In the earlier stages the large number of British troops located in the dunes off the beach were of rear formations with few officers. Command of these mixed units was noticeable by its absence, aggravated, no doubt, by the fact that Army Officers' uniform is indistinguishable from that of other ranks. When Naval Officers appeared in their unmistakable uniform, order in most cases was quickly restored, the troops responding to commands in a disciplined manner.
In the absence of any Army embarkation staff or organisation a strong Naval party. was required to form up and embark the troops. Later, no difficulty was experienced when troops of fighting/

CONFIDENTIAL.
OPERATION "DYNAMO".
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.
Sunday, 26th May, 1940.
Admiralty ordered Operation DYNAMO to commence at
1857. Prior to the receipt of this order, the despatch of
Personnel Vessels to Dunkirk had already commenced at 1500.
At this time a flow of 2 vessels every 4 hours had been agreed to by the B.E.F., the first of these reached Dover on the return trip at 2230 and 1312 personnel were landed.
2. On this day the only Inshore Craft available to
Vice Admiral, Dover, were 4 Belgian Passenger Launches and the
Naval Small Craft of the Dover Command such as drifters, and
Motor Boats from the Contraband Control Base at Ramsgate. The only ones capable of lifting personnel direct from a beach being the boats from Ramsgate. The Admiralty had been asked for the supply of small boats, especially whalers and cutters, but there was always the difficulty of arranging for the personnel to man them. When matters became urgent, the
Admiralty made a signal to the various Home Ports asking them to report how many cutters and whalers could be made available for immediate service under Vice Admiral, Dover.
Monday, 27th May.
3. The Vice Admiral, Dover, was informed by the
Admiralty of the various steps taken to supply coasting vessels skoots, motor boats and other small craft including pulling boats for inshore work off the beaches. Very few of such inshore craft could be available during the day and the main effort was concentrated on maintaining the flow of Personnel
Vessels to Dunkirk at the rate of 2 every 3½ hours. After a good start during the night 26th/27th the effect of enemy action against these transports was felt. Between sailings timed 0300/27 and 1500/27, no less than 5 transports were shelled and returned to United Kingdom without making the trip.
In addition MONA'S ISLE was damaged by shell fire and QUEEN OF
THE CHANNEL was bombed and sank during the early hours of the
28th. As a result the Vice Admiral, Dover, reported to the
Admiralty that the normal channel, Dover to Dunkirk, was impracticable in daylight owing to fire from shore batteries extending from Les Hemmes to Gravelines. Zuydecoote Pass had to be used instead and consequently the distance run for the round trip increased from 80 miles to 172 resulting in a general slowing up of traffic. This route had to be used before it could be swept. Work was also commenced to sweep a channel from the North Goodwin to the Ruytingen Pass and thence into the Dunkirk Roads, thus shortening the round trip from 172
miles to 108.
4. The S.N.O., Dunkirk, with naval beach and pier party of 12 officers and 160 ratings, plus communication staff, left
Dover in WOLFHOUND at 1345, and were attacked by dive bombers at half-hour intervals between 1600 and 1800, on the voyage to
Dunkirk.
5. During the day preparations were advanced for embarkation/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 16.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Thursday, 30th May (continued).
50. Casualties to H.M. Ships - 30th May.
Destroyer SABRE damaged by enemy aircraft.
Destroyer ANTHONY. Badly damaged by enemy aircraft
Had to be sent under tow to dockyard for repair.
Hospital Carrier ST. JULIAN attacked by enemy aircraft and damaged by near misses.
Personnel Vessel PRINCESS MAUD, damaged by enemy gunfire from shore batteries off Gravelines whilst proceeding to Dunkirk.
Armed Boarding Vessel KING ORRY severely damaged by near miss bombs inside Dunkirk Harbour, and finally foundered when taken out of harbour.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 28
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Sunday, 2nd June (continued).
daylight hours enabled all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent upon Dunkirk Harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and traffic controlled by motor boat in the harbour channels, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100/
2 and 0300/3.
The times of sailing of all vessels were adjusted so as to space them out over the evacuation period at Dunkirk, and allowance was made for a proportion failing to make the passage.
The French agreed to make their own arrangements for embarkation from the Dunkirk East Beach and the West Pier on the new outer harbour.
At 1530 two R.A.F. Motor Boats, 243 and 270, left in company for Dunkirk carrying Commander J.C. Clouston and an augmented pier party. When off Gravelines attacks were made on the boats by eight Junkers 87 with machine guns and small bombs. No. 243 had a near miss which damaged her. For ten minutes No.270 rried on trying to avoid attacks. She then returned to No.243 but Commander Clouston who was in the water instructed 270 to proceed. Destroyers were instructed to look for survivors. Two were picked up only. One stated that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water.
84. At 1030 an urgent request transmitted "en clair"
was received from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships as follows:-
"Wounded situation acute and Hospital Ships should enter during day. Geneva Convention will be honourably observed it is felt and that the enemy will refrain from attacking."
As this appeared to be the only way of evacuating the wounded, observing that the whole facilities of the port during the night evacuation hours would be required for fighting troops, it was decided to send two Hospital Ships. The WORTHING
sailed at 1300 and the PARIS at 1700. At 1440, the A/S Patrol was overheard on R/T reporting that the WORTHING was being bombed at a point about two-thirds of the way across the
Channel. She returned to United Kingdom reporting that she had been attacked by 12 Junkers. The attack caused no casualties, but plates were started and there was some superficial damage. She had to return to harbour to refuel before commencing another trip to Dunkirk.
At 1915 PARIS reported that she was bombed and badly damaged with engines useless, at the point where the WORTHING
had been attacked, and at 1947 she sent out an S.O.S. Tugs were sent to her assistance.
Thus the last attempt to evacuate the wounded by
Hospital Carrier from Dunkirk was brought to nought.
The PARIS subsequently sank shortly after midnight at W. buoy 10 miles off the French coast.
85./

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 32.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Tuesday, 4th June (continued).
have an air reconnaissance over the Channel.
It was reported that a Transport was lying on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines and also a barge east of the Goodwins with survivors on board.
C. in C. Nore, despatched 2 M.T.B.'s to find the
Transport with no avail. On the 5th the R.A.F. speedboat did a sweep south of a line Goodwin/Boulogne and recovered 33
French troops and two naval ratings. In addition French troops were picked up by patrols and brought in to Dover,
Margate and Ramsgate. Troops also arrived in French and ots
Belgian Trawlers totalling in all some additional 1,100.
Air reconnaissance was also carried out on the it morning of the 5th but nothing was reported.
at
:
1g n
ts
REMARKS ON THE INSHORE FLOTILLAS
NAVAL SHORE PARTIES.
ers,
98. About 400 small craft, ranging from Dutch skoots of to 30 ft. Motor boats, set out at various times to the
Flanders Coast. In addition scores of pulling boats, merchant ship life-boats, Naval cutters and whalers, were sent off in tow. Only a proportion - particularly of the ed pulling boats - succeeded in reaching the coast and taking active part in the evacuation. Fewer still were able to the remain off the coast for more than one period. Nevertheless these small craft, in conjunction with the pulling and power for boats of H. M. ships off the coast, were responsible for ps lifting more than 100,000 Allied troops direct off a stretch of open beach in shoal waters between 1600/27/5 and 0400/2/6.
Further, a large number of the power boats operated within
Dunkirk harbour on the last three nights, working principally in the inner harbour, which was continually under artillery fire, ferrying a further large uncounted number out to the 168
comparative safety of ships lying off.
off
99. Throughout the period all these craft of the inshore flotillas were subjected at one time or another to intense attack from the air, both by bombing and machine gun, and a large proportion also to sporadic bombardment by German artillery. Under this fire no case occurred of boats ceasing work as long as troops were in sight on shore, and movements of boats westward away from the fire zone only occurred as dictated by the military situation ashore.
100. The initial despatch of requisitioned and volunteer small craft was controlled from -
Naval Control Service, London,
S
Westminster Pier,
Ramsgate,
Gravesend,
Dover,
Southend,
Newhaven,
¡aval
Sheerness,
Portsmouth, preliminary/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 340
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued), boats which never left the estuary and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.
in command of the Unit and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack.
103. The difficulties of passage from the United
Kingdom to the Flanders coast were great. With compasses of doubtful accuracy and no navigational instruments other than a lead pencil, once a boat lost contact with a main convoy the chances of making a correct landfall in the strong currents of the straits were slight. Many of the small craft had not even a compass, yet all who left the Flanders coast in safety managed to reach the English coast to refuel and the majority set off again to repeat the adventure.
Cases occurred, however, of boats attempting to enter Calais instead of Dunkirk, where they received a rousing reception from the Boche, and yet another case where the landfall was made between Gravelines and Calais and the Sub-Lieutenant in command landed, findi it necessary to shoot 2 German soldiers before leaving for his proper destination of Dunkirk.
Open boats of all kinds, from the naval cutters and whalers to seaside dinghies, were towed over from
England by the motor boats themselves or in special tows by tugs. Some of these pulling boats were manned by odd naval ratings as boat keepers, and others by soldiers off the beach.
One of the principal difficulties was to avoid fouling the motor boats' screws with painters and lines attached to all these pulling boats. Carley floats and inflated motor inner tubes also played their part in carrying men from the beach to the motor boats,
104. Having reached the coast the business of ferrying from the water line to the offshore craft was by no means easy. Apart from the surf, which was usually experienced for some hours every day, derelict lorries, which had been abandoned below the high tide mark, proved a serious danger to boats. Another source of much trouble close inshore was the large amount of floating grass rope which various craft had used and lost in their rescue work, and numerous articles of military equipment such as great coads jettisoned during the evacuation. A great number of small power boats were put temporarily out of action by such ropes and garments fouling the screws, usually resulting in broaching to and being swamped while they were thus unmanageable.
The number of soldiers taken off the beaches by motor boats cannot be estimated, One 35 ft. motor launch, however, ferried off 600 men to transports and carried 420
direct to England.
105. of the pulling boats used, the main difficulty was insufficient provision made for Naval boat keepers to take charge of the outgoing boats and bring them back to the disembarkation points. As a result, the soldiers detailed to act as boat keepers for an outward trip, failed to return the boat on the inward trip and it was necessary for the
Naval boat keepers to swim or to wade out to the drifting boats/

9.
Page 97.
Operation"DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
H.M. Yacht ALOUETTE II. - Sub. Lieutenant Reginald Edward Lee.R.N.V.R.,
Unit Officer.
Recommendations.
OFFICER:46. -Lieutenant Reginald Edward Lee, R.N.V.R.
Showed considerable judgment off Dunkirk beach p.m.31/5 in working small boats through the surf.
On 1/6 executed a successful trip into Dunkirk harbour, embarking 140 men during an intense air-raid.
Air-raid continued after leaving harbour, and altogether
ALOUETTE II was under bombing and machine-gunning nearly 4 hours continuously. Shoots down one e
aircraft. Sub. -Lieutenant Lee displayed great n
determination and powers of leadership under fire.
y
Recommended for mention.
h ne
RATINGS:
em ht
Second Hand John W. Fenwick, LT/KX.188753.
in a
Kept continuous watch and was indefatigable in the execution of his duties under extremely difficult
In conditions. Ably assisted the Commanding Officer.
Recommended for mention.
Able Seaman Frederick Henry Herbert Wyatt.R.N.V.R
B.9/1806.
Displayed great coolness under fire when fighting with his Lewis gun. On one occasion he uring deliberately withheld his fire until the aircraft was stered within 100 yards range, then scored a number of hits ivors on the aircraft which crashed on the Gravelines Point was
DSM
Recommended for mention.
whom

Page
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Person:
Motor Launch MERMAIDEN: - Petty Officer F.J. Norton. May 31st
Sub, ieutenant Charles Edward Stew
R.N. June 3rd - June
MOT
Page 107.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
or
32 ft. Motor Boat BONNIE HEATHER (Chris Kraft Boat 18 knots).
eat
(Lieutenant Charles Waterland Read, R.N.R.)
a nn.
Recommendations.
the rsear,
OFFICER:
Lieutenant Charles Waterland Read, P.N.R.
Between 29/5 and a.m. 4/6 made seven complete round trips to Dunkirk beaches, carrying to England about
420 troops. On the last night ferried off about 600
troops from Dunkirk Mole to transports lying off. When personnel vessel SCOTIA sank rescued 40 personnel from the water. Was periodically bombed and machine gunned and was under gunfire in Dunkirk harbour. Played a great part in the evacuation and showed great determination and endurance under fire.
Recommended for decoration.
$ during egistered urvivors
VARIOUS SMALL CRAFT:
he was of whom
Recommendation.
78
am
Sub. Lieutenant William Ronald Williams, R.N.
itr ei
Commanded in succession a motor lighter, a tug and
:e, motor boat SWALLOW. Completed five round trips between p.m. 30/5 and a.m. 4/6. On first trip made beach between
Gravelines and Calais, landed, encountered two German soldiers, shot both, re-emberked and proceeded to Dunkirk,
On all trips did very well using pulling boats as well as his own craft. Finally left Dunkirk harbour on 4/6 when un
German troops penetrated into the harbour area.
cer an
ASC
Recommended for decoration.
suc ed ect person

Operation"DYNAMO" our Recommendations of Personnel.
Page 97.
Yacht
ALOUETTE
II.
H.M.
- Sub.Lieutenant Unit Officer. Reginald Edward Lee.R.N.V.R.,
Recommendations.
OFFICER: -Lieutenant Reginald Edward Lee, R.N.V.R.
Showed considerable
On harbour, executed a successful trip into the surf.
p.m.31/5 1/6 in working small judgment boats through off Dunkirk beach
Air-raid continued embarking 140 men during an Dunkirk
ALOUETTE II was under after nearly 4 hours bombing continuously.
aircraft. determination Sub.-Lieutenant Lee displayed one and powers of leadership under great fire.
Recommended for mention.
RATINGS:
Second Hand John W. Fenwick, LT/KX.188753.
Kept continuous watch and was indefatigable in the execution of his duties under extremely difficult conditions. Ably assisted the Commanding Officer.
Recommended for mention.
Able Seaman Frederick Henry Herbert Wyatt. R.N.V.R
B.9/1806.
h
Displayed great coolness under fire when fighting with his Lewis gun. On one occasion he deliberately withheld his fire until the aircraft was within 100 yards range, then scored a number of hits on the aircraft which crashed on the Gravelines Point.
Dsm.
Recommended for mention.

shipwright 2nd Class Indefatigable (Pensioner) Charles Greenwood craft As Portsmouth for beaches the operation. in preparing P/M.8899. small
Dunkirk Served the in beaches Yacht ERICA to effect and H. repairs tunteer M. a to boats proceeded there. to exceptional off devotion assisting to duty. in evacuation Drifter ROBERT work. Displayed CLIFF,
Recommended for mention.
DS
Sub.Lieutenant Arthur Gabbett-Mulhallen, R.N.)
Boats, Fast Motor George Boat VERNON I, W.D.Fast Launch PIGEON.
Recommendations,
ICER:
Sub.Lieutenant George Arthur Gabbett-Mulhallen, R.N.
This enterprising and determined officer commanded in succession a number of small craft working from
Ramsgate and ferried off a large number of troops from the beaches, in surf, and from Dunkirk harbour, on four successive days and nights. Brought off almost the last part from Dunkirk in the PIGEON. Frequently under fire, displayed courage and leadership of high order.
Recommended for decoration.
Recommendation.
Sub, Lieutenant William Ronald Williams, R.N.
Commanded in succession a motor lighter, a tug and motor boat SWALLOW. Completed five round trips between p.m. 30/5 and a.m. 4/6. on first trip made beach German between
Gravelines Calais, landed, encountered two
On all well using pulling boats as 4/6 when soldiers, shot and both, re-embarked and proceeded to Dunkirk, well as his own trips craft. did very Finally left Dunkirk harbour on
German troops penetrated into the harbour area.
Recommended for decoration.

shipwright 2nd Class Indefatigable (Pensioner) Charles Greenwood
Dunkirk Served craft for in beaches Yacht the operation. ERICA to effect in and preparing H. repairs As a volunteer Portsmouth to boats P/M.8899. proceeded small to off the beaches assisting M. Drifter there, exceptional devotion to duty. in evacuation ROBERT work, Displayed CLIFF,
Recommended for mention.
hips
Boats, Fast Motor George Boat Arthur VERNON I, W.D.Fast Fast Launch PIGEON.
Sub.Lieutenant Gabbett-Mulhallen, R.N.
Recommendations,
FICER:
,Lieutenant George Arthur Gabbett-Mulhallen, R.N.
This enterprising and determined officer commanded in succession a number of small craft working from
Ramsgate and ferried off a large number of troops from the beaches, in surf, and from Dunkirk harbour, on four successive days and nights. Brought off almost the last part from Dunkirk in the PIGEON, Frequently under fire, displayed courage and leadership of high order.
Recommended for decoration.
PSC
Recommendation.
Sub. Lieutenant William Ronald Williams, R.N.
succession a motor lighter, a tug between and motor boat SWALLOW. 4/6. on first trip made two German
Commanded in Completed five round trips beach between
Gravelines shot and Calais, both, re-embarked and proceeded boats to as Dunkirk, well as p.m. 30/5 and a.m. landed, encountered
On soldiers, all trips did very well using Dunkirk pulling harbour on 4/6 when his German own troops craft. penetrated Finally left into the harbour area.
Recommended for decoration.

Page 108.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Launch
MERMAIDEN:
otor
- Petty Sub,Lieutenant Officer R.N. F.J Charles Norton, Edward May 31st Stewart - June Beale, 3rd
June 3rd - June 4th.
Page 107.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel.
Motor Boat BONNIE Charles HEATHER (Chris Kraft Boat 18 knots).
Lieutenant Waterland Read, R.N.R.).
Recommendations.
CER:
Lieutenant Charles Waterland Read. R.N.R.
Between 29/5 and a.m. 4/6 made seven complete round trips to Dunkirk beaches, carrying to England about
420 troops. On the last night ferried off about 600
troops from Dunkirk Mole to transports lying off. When personnel vessel SCOTIA sank rescued 40 personnel from the water. Was periodically bombed and machine gunned and was under gunfire in Dunkirk harbour. Played a great part in the evacuation and showed great determination and endurance under fire.
Recommended for decoration.
OUS SMALL CRAFT:
Recommendation.
Sub. Lieutenant William Ronald Williams, R.N.
succession a motor lighter, a tug between and motor p.m. boat SWALLOW. on first trip made German
Commanded in Completed five round trips beach between
30/5 and a.m.
Gravelines shot and to as Dunkirk, well as
On soldiers, all trips did very well left using Dunkirk harbour on 4/6 when his German own troops craft. penetrated Finally into the harbour area.
Recommended for decoration.
1