TNA ADM 199 792

131
1?9
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9, 130
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
128
7/5
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray.
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, not only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end of x Route. These attacks were to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers ahead of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them with the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer ahead of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of the Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
GRENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
In addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour but further inside. This presented a very good target and the ships were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the time being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in leaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed part of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
CANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops but was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again in these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying alongside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
GRENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and the trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire had to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the fairway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, who witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by bombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having ceased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and trawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a sunk drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived to find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, was with no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in thantly harbour uld little
36

131
129
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 10.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
29/5
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
harbour. She was immediately subjected to heavy bombing attacks, having previously had her steering gear put out of action by a dive bombing attack when about mile outside of the entrance. She remained in sole occupation of the harbour until shortly after midnight 29th/30th, when her Captain rightly decided to take the ship out of harbour before she also was sunk, thus freeing the berth and safeguarding the channel from being blocked.
Little information of these disasters filtered through to
Dover, except that it was known that Dunkirk was under heavy air bombardment, and that the destroyers there were being hit soon after 1600.
32.
At 1.906 the Vice Admiral promulgated the plan for the night by signal as follows: "Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained to Dunkirk
East Pier, destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except hospital carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of
La Panne. Whole length is divided into three equal parts referred to as LA PANNE, BRAY, MALO, from East to West with a mile gap between each part. LA PANNE and BRAY have troop concentration points each end and in Middle, MALO at each end.
These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass the message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T as opportunity offers".
33,
About 1900 a telephone message was received from
La Panne Military Headquarters through the War Office and the
Admiralty to the effect that Dunkirk harbour was blocked by damaged ships, and that all evacuation must therefore be effected from the beaches.
About the same time a corrupt message from S.N.O.,,Dunkirk, was received stating continuous bombing, one destroyer sinking, one transport with troops on board damaged and impossible at present to embark more troops, though pier undamaged.
34. In this confused situation the Vice Admiral, Dover, at 2128, ordered all ships approaching Dunkirk not to close the harbour, but instead to remain off the Eastern beach to collect troops from the shore, and the drifters and minesweepers which were about to be despatched to Dunkirk harbour were also diverted to the beaches.
It appeared, therefore, at this time that the use of
Dunkirk harbour would be denied to us except possibly to the small ships.
Signals addressed to S.N.O., Dunkirk, HEBE, VERITY, who were known to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk, were sent requireing information as to the accessibility of the Eastern pier for personnel vessels. Admiral Nord was also informed that Dover was out of touch with Captain Tennant, and asked whether it was still possible for transports to enter harbour and berth alongside.
No reply to these enquiries could be expected until after midnight.
35, In the event only 4 trawlers and a yacht entered
Dunkirk during the hours of darkness, and as enemy activity was much reduced only two bombing attacks being made, it subsequently transpired that a good opportunity had been missed, It is probable that ships to lift some 8000 to 10, 000 troops could have been made available for Dunkirk during the night at little loss to embarkation from the beaches.
36,

132
130
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
29/5
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

134
13
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
132
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
4 hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as much grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as possible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the shortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
24 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice
Admiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
VESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance with Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed for repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much exercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of
Dunkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously awaiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to investigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report was received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that obstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
Pending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels to Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still
4 personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk
Harbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night still remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE, whether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In the meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and destroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the beaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were urgently required there. Although it was known that the destroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the best division of transport was to send the great majority of destroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be ignored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an occasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced number now available for the operation.
44/

143
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
141
31/5
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M, Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66.
2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous
1/6
evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of personnel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German guns eastward, and later information was received that the troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move wast, with boats in tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships under orders for La Panne to other positions further west, concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and the wounded that could conveniently be embarled should go with personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Government policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

APPENDIX I.
160
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
162
-
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
A.A. CRUISER:
CALCUTTA
DESTROYERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VIMY
(40)
SLOOPS:
BIDEFORD
GUNBOATS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
UNESWEEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
EL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGO
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH WESTWARD HO
A/S VESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SANGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
re
SPECIAL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
ROYAL EAGLE
ESSELS:
"LL" TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
it
A/S TRAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
ore
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WESTELLA
an
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
ue
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
all
INE RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
SILVER DAWN
RIFTERS:
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

APPENDIX
to
1st June
Page 7
Operation "DYNAMO" Narrative of Events.
DESTROYERS
PERSONNEL SHIPS
MINESWEEPERS
PADDLE MINESWEEPERS
SKOOTS
FRENCH DESTROYERS
VANQUISHER (I)
640
ST. HELIER
659
GOSSAMER
845
QUEEN OF THANET 850
DEMOK
114
FLORE
351
HAVANT
882
LADY OF MANN
870
NIGER
310
SANDOWN
800
ORANJE
100
BOUCLIER
300
WHITEHALL (I)
871
MAID OF ORLEANS 1856
FITZROY
67
ORIOLE
470
HEBE
365
SCIMITAR (I)
584
TYNWALD
2000
LYDD
252
PRINCESS ELIZABETH 510
AEGIR
130
WOLSEY
533
ROYAL SOVEREIGN
47
LEDA
650
MEDWAY QUEEN
700
ANTJE
150
MALCOLM
1200
KING GEORGE V
700
DUCHESS OF
WESTWARD HO
918
PACIFICO
414
WORCESTER (I)
661
BEN-MY-CHREE
2080
FIFE
535
WIPPINGHAM
2500
AMAZONE
111
WINDSOR
493
ST. HELIER
1250
HALCYON
243
QUEEN OF THANET 1500
HILDA
530
VIVACIOUS
427
ROUEN
800
SALAMANDER
479
WESTWARD Ho
900
RIKA
200
Total 58,4
VANQUISHER (II)
1200
COTE D'ARGENT 1000
SPEEDWELL
972
FRISO
648
HARVESTER
576
SALTASH
400
ICARUS
1114
QUEEN OF THE
ROSS
260
CODRINGTON
746
CHANNEL
52
DUNDALK
280
SABRE
451
HALCYON
508
SHIKARI
623
SALTASH
400
DRIFTERS
MISCELLANEOUS
453
HOSPITAL SHIPS
FOREIGN VESSELS
WINCHELSEA
1150
SUTTON
SCIMITAR (II)
376
KELLETT
40
Miscellaneous 1110
FOREMOST
200
ESK (I)
979
WESTWARD Ho
900
ST. ANDREW 130
INCENIEUR CACHIN
1
GOLDEN GIFT
123
VINCIA
108
PATRIE
WHITEHALL
(II)
34
157
GRIEVE (F.A.A.
GASTON RIVER
120
WORCESTER
(II)
900
OCEAN BREEZE
TRAWLERS
Trg. vessel)
374
MISCELLANEOUS (Cont.)
MONIQUE CAMILLE
302
JACKETA
564.
MOSQUITO (Gunboat) 610
REINE DE FLOTS
62
LORD INCHCAPE 240
LOCUST
"
620
LADY
ANDRE LOUIS
317
17.97
SATURN
307
NEPHRITE
500
SOUTHBORO
350
CHALUTIER
100
D. TRAWLER
100
ESKBURNE
27
RAPID
25
CHASSEUR MARIE
117
GRIEVE (Yacht)
411
MAYSPEAR
15
NORMANVILLE
500
647
UNNAMED M.B.
23
TENIAS
100
ONDERS ONS
95
II's CHANNEL
108
GALLEON
FRANSAH
500
KINGFISHER (A/S Exp.
REACH
123
Ship) (I)
180
HOPPER 24
580
KINGFISHER
-do-
(II)210
LLANTHONY
90
IOLANTHE
35
(ex serv.vessel)
10593
173171
THREE KINGS
59
GOLDEN EAGLE
KINGSGATE
910
(sp.serv.) 1250
CHRISTOBEL II
33
ROYAL EAGLE
10503
OLIVIA
103
(AA Ships)1250
ATHOLA
6
ROEBUCK (Coastal steamer)408
Lifeboat
35
MINWOOD
=
51
509
MONA'S ISLE
(A.B.V.)
1500
FL
TB
S
3
e
S
d it

CONFIDENTIAL.
APPENDIX. VI.
179
to
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
177
5
Enemy aircraft destroyed by ships' fire.
Ship.
Locality.
Time.
Polish T.B.D. BLYSKAWICA
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS
0315/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. VIVACIOUS
1130/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.S. WOLFHOUND
1140/27
Dunkirk Roads.
H.M.P.M/S MEDWAY QUEEN
1500/27
North Goodwin.
HcM.Sc MONTROSE
Dawn/28
Near Kwinte Buoy.
M.T.B. 16
1500/28
Bray.
1530/28
H.M.S. SABRE and other ships
Dunkirk Harbour.
1630/29
H.M.S. BIDEFORD
Dunkirk Roads.
1700/29
H.M.S. EXPRESS
Dunkirk Roads.
1700/29
H.M.S. MOSQUITO
Bray.
1900/29
S.S. LEVENWOOD (Store ship}
Bray.
S.S. LEVENWOOD ( - do
1210/31
Bray.
1220/31
H.M. Skoot AMAZONE
Dunkirk Roads.
1440/31
H.M.S. HEBE
La Panne.
1700/31
af
H.M.S. SCIMITAR and other ships
Bray.
1700/31
S.S. LADY OF MAN (Trassport) Dunkirk Roads.
1700/31
nd
H.M.Y. ARONIA
La Panne.
1830/31
H.M.S. WHITSHED
Dunkirk Roads.
1930/31
H.M.S. SALTASH
Bray.
2000/31
S.S. NEPHRITE (Store ship)
On Route X.
2030/31
H.M.Y. GRIVE
Dunkirk Roads.
2030/31
H.M.Y. ARONIA
Dunkirk Harbour.
0500/1
H.M.S. IVANHOE
La Panne.
0530/1
is
H.M.S. LYDD
Bray.
0600/1
H.M.S. HARVESTER
Dunkirk Harbour.
0600/1
H.M.S. HARVESTER and other ships
Dunkirk Roads.
0610/1
H.M.Ships CODRINGTON,
3
HARVESTER and others
Off Gravelines.
0750/1
S
H.M.S. SKIPJACK
La Panne.
0900/1
H.M.S. MALLARD
On Route X.
1015/1
H.M.S. CALCUTTA
Between W and Y Buoys.
1020/1
H.M.P. M/S MEDWAY QUEEN
West of Dunkirk.
1600/1
H.M.Y. ALOUETTE
Off Gravelines.
1700/1
H.M.Y. CRISTOBEL II and other ships
La Panne.
1730/1.
H.M.S. WORCESTER
Dunkirk Roads.
2000/1
TOTAL: 35 enemy aircraft definitely destroyed by ships'
gun fire between 0300/27 and 2000/1.
ery
In addition over the same period 21 others were heavily damaged by ships' fire (and seen in distress but
NOT seen to crash definitely) of H.M. Ships HARVESTI
IVANHOE, VIVACIOUS, WINCHELSEA, WOLFHOUND, SABRE,
LOCUST, FITZROY, LYDD, MALLARD, MOSQUITO, WOLSEY,
EXPRESS, JAGUAR, GLEN AVON, ORIOLE, H.N.Y. ARONIA, as
Storeship NEPHRITE and French M.T.B.24.
)p]
Note: On 30th May flying conditions were bad and few enemy aircraft operated. After the 1st June operations proceeded only between dusk and day.
i

222
220
Page 3.
OPERATION "DYNAMO" - PRELIMINAT REPORT OF PROCENDINGS FOR
PERIOD 30TH MAY - 1ST JUNE, 1940.
(Commanding Officer, I.M.S. "Keith's" No.4/32 of 15th June 1940)
29. At 1703 the ship was attached by enemy dive bombing 31/5
X
aircraft, which were engaged by the 3" П.А. and pom poms. One aircraft was shot down by the port pom pom and two other enemy machines were seen to crash, probably due to our fighters.
30. At 1716 a bomb dropped close on the port quarter and the aircraft was engaged by H.A. armament.
31. At 1730 six enemy Messerschmitt aircraft were observed attacking three friendly Hudson reconnaissance aircraft. The attack dispersed after "Keith" opened fire with 3" H.A. sun.
32. At 1815 "Keith" arrived off La Panne to find that the anchorage was under fire from a gun or guns situated near
Nieuport. Its location could not be seen but an enemy observation balloon was observed.
33. At 1835 "Keith" proceeded Westwards again until at
1845, when between La Panne and Braye, signalling was seen from the beach informing us that the General Headquartero were there awaiting embarkation. The motor boat and starboard whaler were lowered and proceeded inshore. At 1908 the first boat load were aboard. Lord Gort, the Commander-in-Chief, went to H.M.S.
31
"Hebe" in a yacht. Our boats returned inshore for other officer
34. At 1910 about 80 enemy aircraft were sighted coming over and "Keith" circled in the constricted space at high speed engaging the enemy with 3" H.A. The enemy however proceeded in the direction of Dunkirk. At 1927 large numbers of enemy aircraft again appeared overhead on their way back to enemy territory.
35. At 1937 an enemy high level bomber attacked "Keith"
dropping four bombs without result. This aireraft was engaged by 3" H.A. and pom pom: the ship was again circling.
36. At 1942 the boats returned from the beach with their second load of Staff officers and was sent back for the remaining men.
37. At 2005 a further large number of enemy bombers and fighters were seen overhead and the ship engaged them with H.A.
armament. On this occasion, a few bombs were dropped near the ship and one aircraft attacked the boats inshore, narrowly missing them. At 2016 the boats returned to the ships and were hoisted. At 2018 "Keith" proceeded towards Dunkirk. The dunes and beaches near La Panne were at this time under steady artillery fire.
May
38. At 2120 "Keith" was off Dunkirk passing orders to boats tugs and yachts as to their duties.
39. At 2125 she proceeded Bastwards again and at 2140 was off Braye where she remained for some time marshalling small craft.
40. At 2310 "Keith" proceeded to La Panne where at 0015/1
after laying off, she anchored.

SECRET
PAGE 3. 225
H.M.S. "KEITH" - FINAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 30th MAY - 227
1st JUNE, 1940, WITH HER EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION.
(Captain Berthon's No.31 of 1st July to Vice-Admiral,1 Dover)
22.
Six enemy Messerschmidt aircraft were observed at
1730 attacking three British Hudson reconnaissance aircraft.
The attack dispersed after "Keith" opened fire with 3" H.A.
gun.
23.
At 1815 "Keith" arrived off La Panne to find that the anchorage was under shell fire from a gun or guns situated near Nieuport. The location of the battery could not be established but an enemy observation balloon observed to the eastward was immediately hauled down by the enemy on the approach of our fighter aircraft.
24. "Keith" resumed course to the westward at 1835 until at 1845, when between La Panne and Braye, signalling was observed from the beach informing us that the Army G.H.Q.Staff was there awaiting embarkation. The motor boat and starboard whaler were lowered and proceeded inshore.
25. At 1908 the first boat load of the staff was onboard.
Lord Gort, the Commander-in-Chief, went to H.M.S. "Hebe" in a yacht. Our boats returned inshore for other officers.
26. At 1910 about 80 enemy bombing aircraft were sighted coming over and "Keith" circled in the constricted space at high speed, engaging the enemy with 3" H.A. The enemy however carried on to Dunkirk.
31/5
27.
A large number of enemy aircraft again appeared overhead at 1927 on their way back to enemy territory. At
31/5
1937 an enemy high level bomber attacked "Keith", dropping four bombs without result. This aircraft was engaged by
3" H.A. and pom-pom, the ship again circling.
28. "Keith's" boats returned from the beach at 1942
with their second load of staff officers and were sent back for the remaining men.
29. At 2005 a further large number of enemy bombing aircraft were sighted overhead and the ship engaged them with the H.A. armament. On this occasion a few bombs were dropped near the ship and one aircraft attacked the boats inshore narrowly missing them.
30. At 2016 the boats returned to the ship with the last load of the Army staff and were hoisted. "Keith" then proceeded towards Dunkirk. The dunes and beaches near La
Panne were at this time under steady shell fire.
31. "Keith" was off Dunkirk at 2120 passing orders to boats, tugs and yachts as to their duties. At 2125 she continued to the eastwards and at 2140 was off Braye where she remained for some time marshalling boats and small craft.
32. At 2310 "Keith" proceeded to La Panne where she anchored at 0015 after lying off for a short period. Between
2200 and midnight several enemy aircraft passed overhead and, as was reported later dropped magnetic mines to the west of
La Panne and off Braye.
reduced 33. to 2 rounds of 3" H.A. ammunition and 150 rounds of
After the air attacks of the day the ship was now
X
pom-pom per gun. This shortage was represented to the
Admiral in view of the certainty of further attacks on the following day.
...34.
La Panne anchorage

2
291
.017978/41.
9.11.41.
(R.A., 1st C.S. 461/K.16)
Rear-Admiral 29th May to 4th Wake-Walker's June, 1940. account of the evacuation from Dunkerque, 200
29th May.
293
1445
Asked there. by VCNS to go to Dunkerque to organise embarkation
Title:- R.-A., Dover. Not to supersede Captain Tennant
(SNO, Dunkerque), but to be i/c offshore at Dunkerque.
5
70,000 men already embarked.
Accompanied by Cdr. Norfolk, Lieut. -Cdr. Wynne-Edwards.
Own Flag-Lieut. then at Newcastle, so one lent from among the signal officers at Dover (Viscount Kelburn) with some signal ratings.
Told by ISL that the French were not thought to be pulling their weight:? to refuse them embarkation if British troops were ready to embark. (On 31st May, signal to say
Government policy was for equal opportunities to British and French troops.)
(2)
1600 Left for Dover by car. Arrived at 1800.
General idea:-
3 beaches, each in 3 sections, for British troops at
La Panne, Braye & St.Malo. French were using other beaches between St. Malo & Dunkerque.
Dunkerque had been heavily bombed: GRENADE and other ships sunk there. One Eastern approach to Dunkerque could not be used at night as E-boats had sunk a destroyer there: Western one being shelled from shore in daylight:
centre one difficult for navigational reasons.
Captain Bush (HEBE) i/c offshore until my arrival.
Arrangements:-
2 destroyers ready to sail from Dover to Dunkerque to take over 2 lots of beach parties. One of 80 officers and men
(G. & T. Long Courses) was for disciplinary purposes on the beaches. In the earlier stages the troops were completely disorganised, discarding their rifles, lying down on the beaches and refusing to get into the boats:
it was intended that men would not be taken off unless they had their rifles. By the time I arrived things had improved very considerably in this respect.
(3)
Another party of 200 were intended to act as beach parties to assist the embarkation, but these never materialised.
I
Commodores Stevenson and Hallett arrived at Dover by train after I did - thought they were already at Dunkerque.
2000
Sailed in ESK with all the above, except the 200 men of the beach parties. Stevenson to take charge off La Panne
Hallett off Braye. Intended myself to be off St. Malo and
Dunkerque, or to put Bush i/c there.
ore
Warned officers of beach parties not to get caught, and that it møght be impossible to give them any order as to when to come off.
Had no clear idea of what might be possible or how to set about it, nor any idea of local conditions, communications, I
General etc. plan was to put an officer in some small ship i/c hit offshore at each of the main beaches and try to organise ore the flow of ships to beaches myself from some central and position.
que al
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Dark
0
isi

2
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291
Dark oil tanks when we arrived near Dunkerque. burnin above. lighted up the sky, with Flames from smoke at anchor Saw a ship (CLAN MACALLISTER) a black pall of provided a off Braye: burning until the on fire offshore but plight. Another deserted merchant ship was in similar and guns. useful diversion for German bombers end, deserted, shore
0400 30th May. time, parties in destroyer's boats. South, All landing the We approached beach Dunkerque beaches from the
Cdr. and it was not until 0400 that we found HEBE this took (Lieut.-
the John Temple) off Braye and transferred to her. At
Flat same time the 2 Commodores were put into drifters.
to boats off the beaches. Bush (who was in HEBE) seemed and calm: difficult to see in dark; many ships, drifters be rather despondent, having seen the shore black with men standing up to their waists in water; embarkation process being extremely slow.
Dawn
Arrived ahead. in HEBE off La Panne and got some idea of the task
(5)
Physical description of the beach. Long stretch of sand dunes rising fairly steeply in places from a gently shelving beach which dries for 200 yards or more at L.W.
Offshore the water deepens very gradually and a destroyer cannot get nearer than half a mile, etc.
Large groups of men all over the beaches and a dark line of men at the water's edge. Off Braye BIDEFORD was ashore with her stern completely blown off by a bomb: LOCUST -
river g.b. - trying to tow her off, which she eventually did and got her back to England. Farther towards Dunkerque another ship (CRESTED EAGLE?) was high and dry and burnt out; also many boats broached to on the beach. Lying off were destroyers, sloops, drifters, etc., and men making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft.
A slight swell made landing difficult, and many boats broached to and were stranded on a falling tide. The visibility was not good, with low-lying clouds: very thankful for this, a blessing we were not always to enjoy.
Daylight
Could now get a clearer idea of situation and conditions.
Beaches were packed with troops, but they appeared to be orderly and under proper control. A few ships were lying as close in as possible and were being slowly filled up by their own boats and a few local craft. Ships' motor boats were towing off the whalers assisted by motor launchen but these could not get very close in; pontoon craft were being paddled off by soldiers, but it was not easy to get them back ashore again and often they were left to float away empty. As soon as a sloop or destroyer was full up
I
she left and took her boats with her - the boats' crews were guns' crews and no one wanted to be without them.
To anyone with the appreciation of the practical difficult-l ies of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward'
the sight of that beach black with troops was dismaying.
The number steadily increased and at back of our minds all ore the time was question and fear of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair.
(6) 0630
Crux of matter was boats, boats' crews and towage; and at
0630 I signalled the urgent need of these. By about 0730
0730
most of the ships had loaded up and were leaving: I asked r for more ships and again stressed need of boats.
I now moved down to Dunkerque to get in communication with hit.
Tennant and went alongside pier in response to a signal.
nore
Description of Dunkerque (see plan). Outer harbour is formed by 2 breakwaters approx at right angles, leaving a and narrow entrance between. Western Arm of solid stone:
que
Eastern Arm (called here East Pier) only solid for short al part of inshore end, the rest being built of concrete piles.o wide enough for 4 men walking abreast. Alongside short through which tide flows and on which is a narrow pathway East isi
Pier is channel to inner harbour and docks. A
length

length of piling runs out parallel to East Pier 295
292
wide. encloses the entrance to this channel - about 150 and
A new series of docks under construction has yards into the harbour by this entrance is the West Quay.
entrance opening off the inner harbour, and jutting out an
93
West Quay was used entirely by the French; luckily for us they did not consider East Pier suitable for embarkation. to
All British troops were embarked from East Pier, and on se last 2 days a large number of French troops also.
Bi g rise and fall of tide: at H.W. can step straight on a destroyer's deck, but at L.W. it was a 15 ft. drop.
Many ladders were sent over and secured to sides of pier,
O
but sobdiers with rifles and packs took a long time to get down ladders.
When I first went in (30th) there was a trawler (c) sunk alongside pier and another ship (A) sunk outside the end.
The trawler and drifter shown sank later, as also the
(9
blockships.
4 berths alongside East Pier could be used. Inner one (F)
only by small ships at L.W., but at H.W. personnel ships
(7
could get into B, D and E.
On 24th May, KING ORRY had rammed the pier during a bombing raid and made a large gap in it abreast E berth: until this was bridged outer berths could not be used as roadway along pier was cut. Harbour very shallow to the west of
West Quay, and place where ROUEN went ashore on night of
2nd June when leaving the quay is shown - also where
KELLETT grounded on night of 3rd June.
As soon as HEBE got alongside East Pier I went to local
Naval H. Q., while she was quickly filled up with 6-700
some of them wounded.
men, Naval H.Q. were established in a dug-out at shore end of
East Pier. This area was not large and was separated from mainland by a bridge over a cabal. Surface was uneven and covered with heaps of rubble; there was a and a few ambulances, cars and wounded men.
Bofors small gun staff of the SNO, Captain Tennant, did wonderful the
The controlling the embarkation and dealing with shell work ashore: they worked under constant Tennant fire and were was away with the General, but was and that situation short of sleep and food. Did not informed see that as he of troops were ready to embark at sent pier in.
plenty would take all ships that could be East
At this cut off the end, so that the only Later, accessible this they time gap in roadway halfway along Pier completely points were inside this point. along its embarkation bridged so that pier could be alongside. used whole
Had intended to keep HEBE as my headquarters, so she had length gap was except where ships were sunk not been used to embark any troops from beaches. Felt this I
could not refuse to do this at Dunkerque, and once done the question of their disposal arose.
was returned to beaches and sent any surplus ships to load to
(8)
I Dunkerque, and from then on had continually to and try needs hold beaches and Dunkerque. Also reported that, essential to more at the balance between the respective claims until boats of were available for ferrying, it was itself.
Explanation why Dunkerque was then being so little used concentrate on evacuation from Dunkerque and 25th so May, Dunkerque was heavily attacked from sunk, the and air much effort expended on beaches:-
On harbour was full of ships. GRENADE was when ORRY and several other ships alongside piers Party were ashore hit.
KING result of this, a junior member of Naval of the day, whose off in a car to La Panne where he Dunkerque and a judgment had been affected by events saw Lord Gort dashed Admiralty that further embarkation from sending al phoned was impossible. Dover was, therefore, took 2 days to itself to beaches and none to Dunkerque: which had a ships overcome results of this indiscretion, consi erable temporary effect on the plans.

4
296
VA, A destroyer Dover, having reported that Dunkerque was
293
0830 I asked me if ships should be sent there. usable,
0830
signalled from HEBE that destroyers could At into
Dunkerque in succession and that troops were waiting come close to the pier. Loading off beaches was proceeding slowly:
conditions were not bad, but the slight swell running in was enough to render boats liable to broach to. At La
Panne and Braye, lorries were being driven into the sea to form a sort of breakwater.
Noon
About midday there was an air attack on ships and on La
Panne. Later, when it had cleared a bit overhead, there was an attack on Dunkerque. Several French destroyers came in by Y channel and were fired on from the north of
La Panne; some guns tried to shell beach between Braye and La Panne, but the steep dunes protected it.
On returning to La Panne met Stevenson who had transferred to a motor launch and was doing excellent work. He saw
(9)
Lord Gort who was anxious to see me. As conditions were getting worse and I did not want to get stranded, decided to go to Dunkerque and drive to La Panne from there.
HEBE could not be detained any longer, so sent her back to
Dover with troops and wounded and told Bush to explain the boat situation and point out vital necessity for sending out boats and crews.
1530
Transferred my staff to WINDSOR and went into Dunkerque in
MTB 102, sent at my request. Badly wanted some means of getting about quickly and a fast boat of light draught would have been invaluable: when I did get one its endurance was so low that it had to return almost at once to
Dover.
On getting to Dunkerque found Tennant was with Gort and that to drive there would take up more time than I cared to be away: decided to land from a boat after all.
The MTB had not enough fuel to reach La Panne and return to Døver, SO boarded GOSSAMER and took her to La Panne
1730
where I transferred to WORCESTER at about 1730.
La Panne was in telephonic communication with England;
also received W/T messages from Dover. One (1749) said ships were urgently wanted off La Panne: actually, at
1900, there were 4 destroyers and 1 minesweeper there and situation was constantly changing.
G.H.Q. was in touch with Admiralty and VA, Dover, and gave views and criticisisms of what was happening. This probably accounts for signal from 1st SL on this day asking if boats were distributed along beaches to best advantage.
Actually, only boats that could get inshore, except distri- pontoons bution depended on position of ships they belonged but and a few local craft, were the whalers, and their to.
(10)
badly So hampered by lack of quick transport: once ships had far as possible kept ships off all beaches, was boats away a re-distribution was impracticable.
1900
beaches; with ammunition. Told her to beach cleared at as La
Small and about this time the TINY puffer herself their numbers of aircraft attacked La Panne and arrived, ships off loaded tide being then high; did so and was of was
Panne, tide fell, though think that a good deal cargo finally on beach in slight swell (thied attempt visual to see Gort), dumped in the sea.
2000
Landed Flag-Lieut. and a few signalmen to and open General went with them to GHQ - last villa but one on communication taking with GHQ. Met by Tennant south edge Lees;
of La Panne. situation. Seemed obvious to me back that more the
(11)
Discussed felt they had successfully fallen it now or soldiers intact inn face of great odds and that was not making up to less the Navy to get them off, but that Navy were
Stressed of large scale embarkation from beaches; off said from any real difficulty, effort to do slowness so. and dependence on fine weather that bulk of any troops should move westward and come This
Dunkerque.

6
Destroyers, arriving, minesweepers and all manner of 298 205
were at one but there were often periods and when Dunkerque continuously, loading and leaving the beaches craft were
Bombing of place or another and embarkation had no shi wait. ps the ships and beaches had so far been to -
sound day of had been overcast and visibility was not spasmodic good;
freedom from air attack.
fighters overhead seemed to account for our
0400 31st May. Report received at 0400 of aircraft dropping mines 1 mile north of La Panne: planes frequently passed close overhead during dark hours.
Dawn
Light N. W. wind sprang up right on the beaches: many boats seen capsized, broached to or high and diry, including at least one of the local boats which carried a lot of men and could get close inshore. Not a cheering sight.
Sky cleared and visibility improved; absence of haze all day.
0730
Made contact with KEITH. EXPRESS now fully loaded and left for Dover as soon as I had transferred to KEITH, in which ship I now hoisted my flag - prior to this I had used a Red Ensign (no flag being available before) to indicate which ship I was in.
While I was in KEITH she did not embark any troops - same as for HEBE.
1035
To VA, Dover:- "Majority of boats broached to and have no crews. Conditions on beach very bad due to freshening onshore wind. Only small numbers being embarked even in daylight. Under present conditions any large scale embarkation from beach is quite impracticable; motor boats cannot get close in. Only hope of embarking any number is at Dunkerque. Will attempt to beach ship to form a lee to try to improve conditions."
Reply:- Urging importance of using beaches as long as
(15) 1105 To possible. VA, Dover:- "Dunkerque our only real hope. Can guns shelling pier from westward be bombed and silenced?"
Successful use of Dunkerque depended on being able to put ships alongside Eastern breakwater: my constant fear that this might be so accurately shelled as to render it untenable. Signalled to shore urging movement towards Dunkerque: troops seen moving slowly westward.
Beach events clearly visible from seaward. Bodies of men marched along - some in good order, others in groups and knots. Ond battalion in perfect order seen marching down through a winding road from dunes to shore - told later it was the Welsh Guards, but not certain if this was correct.
Embarkation going on all the time, with ships leaving as
Commencing of day before and continuing on form day, a the soon as filled; largest numbers came from Dunkerque. this
Army barricade and breakwater. At Braye the lorries R.E. planked that had been driving lorries down to beach to had and made a handrail on these so a gangway boats could go alongside. As line breakwater ran straight out motor to sea and wind was directly on shore, gave very forenoon sent Stevenson over to some paddle a break- minelittle shelter - still it helped.
During off Braye to get one beached to act as at sweepers Done; next day she was high and dry ship was daylight. long
Don't enough to cover distance tide ran out, so water. know to what extent she was used: no could only be
HEBE of returned with Bush, bringing plan for embarkation value for part of the tide.
1000
that night. numbers Was of boats as follows:- were now being sent over in to tow be of
Large etc. Due to start arriving at 1500; were scheme tugs, for use of rear guard for whom embarkation were being
(16)
kept planned. To take the troops, 11 sloops in company, was and were to rendezvous and proceed Given berths collected being timed for 0130 on 1st June. each of the arrival in which to anchor in 3 batches, 1 batch off embarkation beaches.
An

7
299
206
were An impracticable not feature of this plan was that craft inshore asking too much to think that when our crying need It was for to be used except for the rear guard. small boats, any such could be held idle while was men were on beaches with ships waiting to take them so many off.
Actual development of this plan was very different.
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HEBE sent up to La Panne, to be there at 1800 to receive
Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off.
Beaches shelled during the day, but in most cases shells landed on dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protected the beach. Shelling was principally to westward of
Braye; at one time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of
Dunkerque on top of dunes, but close to sea, received a lot of attention.
1330
As I was returning to eastward HEBE signalled she had been shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward a couple of miles.
1430
Went up in KEITH off La Panne to see if battery could be shelled, but had to withdraw - not essential to be so far to the eastward and battery was not visible. Its fore was directed by an observation balloon over Nieuport;
aircraft came out to shoot it down, but without result;
it was re-hoisted as soon as they left. Shell bursts appeared to be 6 or 8-inch, in salvoes of four.
(17)
Owing to the shelling of anchorage at La Panne urged Gort to embark as soon as possible, but he would not leave before the time arranged.
Soon after, I moved down to Dunkerque so as to be on spot when boats arrived. En route a terrific air battle overhead - 3 Spitfires shot down, 2 in the sea; onepilot killed, the other not found.
While waiting off Dunkerque signal from VA, Dover, to say
Army wanted to start embarkation at 2000 instead of 0100.
Replied: Boats had not arrived and sloops would not be there then, but would do my best. (This had an unfortunate effect: as sloops could not be there in time I had to keep destroyers, etc., off the beaches which would otherwise have been sent to Dunkerque during the night.
Result = though many were embarked from beaches, very few ships went into Dunkerque where men were waiting, and full use of it was not made.)
Always impossible for me to do more than deal with the situation of the moment. Did not know what ships were coming or when - except for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops; nor could Dover give me much information.
The stream of ships was constant, but irregular; not possible to see any way ahead. My policy was to keep only enough ships off the beaches and send all others into
Dunkerque, but situation changed continually. I wanted
(18)
to be in several places at once.
The first of the boat tows did not arrive until 1700 - a tug with what looked like 6 dinghies in tow: she was
Could not wait off Dunkerque as I wanted to get up to La preceded by some motor yachts which came in company.
Panne for Gort, so left Wynne-Edwards in a motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number of hoppers and other craft that were lying off the westwen beaches to beach themselves on the rising tide so that men could embark.
Gort's embarkation produced some odd incidents.
Dover had sent over 4 MTBs and MA/SBs to get him: the reached me. During the afternoon 2 MTBs came to me and signal informing me of this, like many others, never said they were to embark a party from a point 2 miles west of La Panne. Could not understand this; thought they must have been sent to fetch off some of Naval landing the H.
party, but realise now the party concerned was
Staff. While approaching La Panne, shortly before 1800, HEBE
1800
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you, and saw a group at water's edge with 2 cars and some KEITH'S gnalmen.

8
300
KEITH'S I learnt boats he sent in, but Gort was not in 207 and
No one his staff: heavy air attack trips necessary time.
to bring off was in HEBE already. Three first boat
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ships and was hit, though narrow escapes. Many during this on increase beaches; HEBE shot down a Heinkel. attacks
(19)
of shell fire off Braye, where CLAN Great was and a valuable decoy: she was hit and bombed MACALLISTER several times blindly into this area, as shells fell near CLAN MACALLIS-
started burning again. Enemy guns seemed to be firing
TER but not among ships loading which were some inshore of her. Later, these ships did come under fire, way and
VIVACIOUS was hit twice and had 11 casualties - 2-300
troops on board. Ordered her to go into Dunkerque and fill up there.
Lees was Senior Staff Officer of H. Q. Staff, and I thought it would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with me. As Gort was in HEBE I felt he was safe, and as
HEBE was doing good work embarking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Therein, perhaps, I
was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of Government to have him safe and sound at home, but felt he would
1st sooner the ship helped to bring off more men than he should land a few hours earlier in England.
During the day made signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the beach. Critical place likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated; intended to be there myself in KEITH
at daybreak next morning. Also kept BASILISK free of
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1700
Weather improved gradually. Signal = "Weather off beaches now good: many more boats should come into use again as tide rises. General movement of troops westward towards
Dunkerque. No petrol supply yet and many boats getting short off La Panne and Braye. Movement from Dunkerque continues. Great air activity. "
1815
Drifters with petrol arrived.
After embarking H. Q. Staff I returned to Dunkerque and found Wynne-Edwards had been doing good work. Saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become famous - small motor yachts, motor launches drifters, Dutch schuyts, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure steamers, tugs towing dinghies, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats.
(20)
As tows of boats appeared they were told to which beach be they should go; particularly anxious there should sufficient at La Panne which was farthest off. Directed 10
miles up the coast; and as light was beginning the remaining to fail, several tows to go on to La Panne, telling them it was
Motor I left and Wynne-Edwards went on up to in La a MA/SB Panne myself. to direct Off Panne Braye were I saw tows I had feared - that tows ordered to La stopping what at Braye: got there just in farther time to on. warn
CODRINGTON (off Braye) to send them out to Lees how easy it was to talk about ten-mile distribu-
Pointed boats and craft at certain places along different a ting of coast, but that it was a very craft which thing stretch it done in practice, in the dark, by to help to get not been there before and with no lights the first place them. they had inevitable tendency was to stop assembled. at
The where other craft were
In the (on a his return to me at about off was La Panne.
came to end pretty fair distribution was 2230) made, and able Wynne- to
Edwards report that it was there this were evening a number that of I boats saw 2 would transports be bombed. go into
Dunkerque and out was just as it was getting from dark, that direction.
I think very nervous that they and shortly
They moved heard very heavy bombing aircraft attacking off
Actually, afterwards bombing was from our NOW own dark and I remained batteries La Panne in down company the coast. with HEBE and several other Stayed ships.

9
may 301 208
by Stayed moving off La Panne during the night, as could do much
Shelling was continuous and by the sound anywhere. some were about after dark. No lights not falling among the ships at the anchorage. News shells
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no boats; ship message = boats found no one on beach.
conflicting: shore message = thousands of men waiting, very but
Probable truth was - Germans had range of lorry breakwater and beaches near it and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one, as troops had moved farther west clear of shell fire. Don't know what really took place. Off shore one felt helpless, etc.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway; MALCOLM off Braye reported a number of parachute mines dropped to westward of there, and suggested ships should leave by Zuidcoote Pass in the morning as passage to west was so heavily mined. Noise of MTB engines often heard to seaward and eastward:? our own patrol.
2300
Received urgent signal from Admiralty asking where Gort was and why I had detailed the MTBs sent for him to other work.
Gort had just left HEBE in a motor launch: after long search for him in the dark, at last found him, transferred
1st (24) June. As a result of the bombing the day before, asked for him to the MA/SB and sent him off to Dover with Lees.
fighter protection at dawn.
0215
Heard that troops were moving westward and decided that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. MALCOLM
and HARVESTER ordered from La Panne to Dunkerque. Also told ships to keep close to fairway buoys to avoid mines in the channel.
0235 (22) To Admiralty and VA, Dover:- "Yesterday ships off Braye under fire. Today's shorter front will bring dangerous area westward. Consider beach work too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkerque. Small craft will be moved westward at dawn.
VA, Dover, reply = "While leaving this to your discretion, essential that beaches be used until found impossible.
0330
Growing light. BASILISK with me - kept empty for support- La fire against tanks or lorries along beach. Up by and ing beach was deserted except for lorry breakwater - boats
Panne scattered cars. Sea also seemed deserbed small to the westward. some of the boats adrift. Off Braye Ships were had One or two motor launches about: there them was to a vanished, a few empty ones drifting on tide told collect and a paddle minesweeper ashore. and men were minesweeper still loading off Braye and to the westward, moving down westward off Braye along and the hailed beaches. a tug which and was try on to its tow way
Moved some soldiers on board to go in was back with minesweeper. Master paid no attention; him and sent an only
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off the get away. Trained a gun on board anxious to to take charge, put the soldiers on
RNVR Sub-Lt. which was nearby, and go off to help the minesweeper with
SABRE, was that tugs had been told to regarded go over them-
Real trouble boats in tow and load up, and never they informed of this pulling transports only. I was tugs.
selves as them as tugs and for use as by
All the night, but the degaussing possible. and and regarded this time I was moving in waters mined proved effieient aircraft
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during to edge of fairway when of the
I kept low clouds. Most ships were though full.
0400 (23)
Misty with that were not I sent into Dunkerque, and some for of the
Those were still many men on beaches, of small craft there small gone back boats to for were England. the still night there, Did and not were majority then going realise back June. as they intended. Troops had had been
Reported are evacuating gradually directing to Dunkerque all boats as and eastern small beaches craft sent over "Situation report at 0600, 1st to
0625
are untenable. and loading Am all ships at Dunkerque. and fighter More attacks ships vicinity required. Heavy bombing on Dunkerque About
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on ships."

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reluctance when bombing was probable, especially several would only go into Dunkerque in daylight. as This now considered too dangerous, and Naval Officers were put on board to act as advisers to the masters and crews were stiffened with seamen. They went in every night and did
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magnificent work. Other craft, also, including French destroyers, were to go in and load alongside: British at
East Pier, French at West Quay.
Gap in pier had been bridged, but I feared that Germans would now shell pier heavily and make it impossible for ships to be kept alongside. Asked RAF to reconnoitre:
report gave accurate account of gap, but no word as to whether pier was being shelled.
1700
Arranged to leave Dover at 1700. Picked up Wynne-Edwards and Norfolk and embarked in MA/SB 10, in which a portable loud-speaker was fitted (similar sets found very useful in
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HEBE and EXPRESS). A flag had been made for me out of a piece of cleaning cloth - the red stripe made one half of the cross, and the other half and the balls had been added in red paint. Harbour was full of destroyers, sloops, etc., many showing signs of minor damage. Some were out of action all together, and all were enjoying a short, well-earned rest. I had an hour's sleep on way over; up till then had had about 7 hours in short snatches, but felt quite fresh and fit.
When some miles away from Dunkerque sighted 2 MTBs approach ing on port bow. They did not make contact and were
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probably French.
1900
Arrived at Dunkerque and made fast alongside shore end of pier. Went to the "Bastion" (H.Q. of Army and the local
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French Naval and Military Command) - 10 minutes' walk.
Many buildings and sheds damaged. A French field gun was firing back over the town. Road fairly clear, but litter-
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ed with vehicles the whole way. Men straggling along the road, but very few troops seen as they were kept away on beach behind shelter of wall except when ships came along-
Found side. Tennant and Alexander at the "Bastion. Heard that
French were holding a line in rear of ours and that rear would continue to hold. Joined by my proper Flag-Lieut. with guard were to withdraw through this line which the French
(Balfour): he had come over the day after I left, a
Returned to the pier. A Lysander Army Co-op plane, which
W/T set.
had been flying over pier all day, was fired at by several
Bofors guns - not hit. Explained it was probably the reconnaissance plane I had asked for.
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While having some food in the MA/SB, the Navigating Officer He of KEITH appeared, saying he was the only survivor.
had swum ashore and reached a battery on the dunes some distance outside Dunkerque, and had then walkked in.
(Actually, only 3 Officers and 33 mon were lost, and 16
wounded.) Close by my boat was Tennant's drifter; he also had 2 old steamboats. Next day the drifter was sunk by a shell.
Naval Party ashore = about 6 Officers and a number of men messengers, signalmen, etc. Arranged to collect some of them at 0200/2, but Tennant would not leave then.
"Tomorrow we'll either be back in London, in a German prison or done for.
went outside harbour to meet the first ships arriving.
2100
Beginning to get dark. First ship was a sloop, followed off
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by beaches to the east of the pier and boats ferried men minesweepers, destroyers and tugs. They anchored the off. Noticed 3 or 4 Thames barges anchored off them beach; and they seemed to be deserted, but men got off to full of away. soldiers who were trying to sail her home: a Officer
One barge was met later in mid-Channel Naval was put on board and she got back safely.
During

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bought a large supply of chocolates and cigarettes, and reached Dover about 6.0 p.m.
At the casemates in Vice Admiral, Dovor's offices I was given somo idea of the situation and shown a map of the coast to the Northward of
Dunkirk; on this three boaches off In Panne, Braye and St. Molo had been optimistically numbered for embarkation of British troops, each beach
?
being divided into three sections. I was told that the Army were coming down to these particular beaches and that certain others between St. Melo and Dunkirk were heing used by the French, I received very little other information except that Dunkirk harbour itself had been heavily bombed, and "GRENADE" and other ships had been sunk there,
I was also shown the three approaches to Dunkirk. One of them from the East could 120 longer be used at night as enemy H.T.B.' had sunk a dostroyer there.
The Western one was being sholled from the shore in daylight and the centre one was none too easy to make for navigational reasons,
Captain Bush was in the "HEBE" and was in charge off shore until my arrival.
Two destroyers were ready to sail from Dover for Dunkirk and were to take over two lots of beach parties. One of these parties amounting to about 80 was made up of Lieutenants from the Gunntory and Torpedo
Long Courses with Petty Officers and Mon; they were intended to not 08
disciplinary parties on the beaches. In the carlier stages of the embarkation many of the troops were completely disorganised and had become a rabble, some throwing away their riflee and others lying on the beaches refusing to get into the boats. These disciplinary beach pertics were intended to check this and an order vas contemplated that no man would be embarked unless he had his rifle.
Actually by the time I got there things had improved and the fina bearing of the men, their discipline, and the way they stuck to their equipment was most marked.
Another party of 200 mon were intended to not as beach parties to assist the embarkation.

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had hoped to get over to Dunkirk in daylight but the Various dolays in collecting men and BO on mode this impossible and it was dark whon we got near. From a long way off the flamos from burning oil tanks at
Dunkirk lighting up the sky, and a black pall of smoko above It, could be seen.
A3 we got nearor we could also see a ship on fire off shore, and this eventually proved to be the "CLAN MACALLISTER" at anchor off Erayo.
She continued to burn up till the end and there were accesional pops of small arm ammunition. She Was deserted but played a very useful part as a distraction for the Germans who sholled and bombed her continuously instead of the ships nearby who were embarking non. Often an I passed her later on I thought of getting her towed away but there was no ship to spare from the more important work of saving mon, and I expect she is still there.
you.
30
Another deserted Merchant ship off the entrance to Dunkirk played a similar useful role and was the target for many bombing attacks.
We approached the Dunkirk beaches from the South and stopping off each we sent the beach parties ashore in the Destroyer's boats. All this took time and it was not till 0400 that we found the "HEBE"
0400
(commanded by my old shipmate, Lieutonamt-Commender John Temple) off
Braye and tronsferred to her. At the same time the two Commodores were put into drifters. It was difficult to see in the daik what the situation was, except that there were many ships, drifters and boats off the beaches, end they were joined by the two destroyers. It was flat calm,
In the "HEHE" I found Captain Bush and heard more of the situation, and he spoke of the ghastly sight of the shore Week with mon standing in the water up to their waists. He had had to watch the terribly slow progress of embarkation which I had not then seen, but I as.d not feel that J. could accept the note of despair which I Becomed to detect in his voice.
In the "HEBE" we moved eastward to La Panne and there down Sound us and gave us some idea of the task ahead.
The coast here is a long stretch of Band dunes rining fairly steoply in places from a gently sholving beach which drice for 200 yards 03' more

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high tide personnel ships could get into B, D and E.
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The "KING ORRY" during a bombing attack on 24th May rammod the pier /29th and made a large gap in it abreast E borth; until this WO.ES bridged the outer berths could not be used as the roadway along the pier was cut. The harbour was very shallow to the west of the West quay, and the place where the "ROUEN" went ashore on the night of 2nd June when leaving the Quay is shown - also where the "KELLETT" grounded on the night of 3rd Juno.
As soon 2B "HEBIG" got alongside the East Pier I made my way up to the
Local Naval Headquarters while the "HEBE" was quickly filled up with six to seven hundred men - some of them wounded.
The Naval Headquarters were established in a dug-out at the shore end of the East Pier. This area was not large and VISA separated from the mainland by a bridge over a canal. The surface was uneven and covered with heaps of rubble. there was a Bofors gun and a fow ambulances, dust-stained dishevelled cars and wounded men. I was greeted by some of the staff of the
S.N.O., Captain Tennant. This small band of Officers with a party of ratings did wonderful work controlling the embarkation and doaling with the situation ashore. They worked under constant shellfire and were short of sleep and food. While I was waiting there, shelling of the area began and we retired to the dug-out entrance - but were urged by a French soldier to go further down and round the corner as he said the direction of the fire was straight into the entrance. I did not see Tonnant as he was away somewhere with the General, but I learnt that there were plenty of troops ready to embark at the pier and they would take all the ships that could be sent in.
At this time the gap in the roadway half way along the East Pier completely out off the end, so that the only berths where we could embark were inside this point. Later this hole was bridged DD that the whole pier could be used except where ships were sunk alongside.
It had been my intention to keep "HERE" as my headquarters, and for this reason she had not taken any troops on board from the beaches. I did not feel I could refuse to fill her up at Dunkirk, and onco this was done the question of their disposal inovitably arose. On leaving Dunkirk I

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no pants. Luckily it was fairly warm even at night, though at times I
did feel rather lightly clad about the legs.
It was about 2230 when I got aboard the "WORCESTER" which was slowly
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filling up with troops and I remained there till 0100. By that time she was full up and I sent her back to Dover and transferred to the "EXPRES."
Earlier in the day I had asked for a ship with two lines of W/T communication and had been told that "KETTH" was detailed and was due at 2000. She did not appear and I remainod for the rest of the night in "EXPRESS" which gradually filled with troops.
by this time I had been off the beaches for 24 hours and they had seemed very full ones. I don't know when I ate or slept though I have a recollection of lying down in the "HEBE" for an hour, and of trying to sloop sitting down on the bridge of the "EXPRESS" loaning against some instruments with very sharp corners.
The picture as I saw it then was briefly this: There were tens of thousands of men on or near the beaches and in and around Dunkirk - no-one
X
seemed able to say how many. The rearguard were to be withhlrawn at midnight the next night, i,e., 24 hours ahoad, they were the best troops and must be got off. Dunkirk itself was the only place where rapid embarkation could take place and D. large proportion of the troops were coming down to Is Panno and Braye, 10 and 5 miles away from Dunkirk,
At the beaches the only boats available except for pontoons and a very few local boats were ships' boats which went away with their ships 02' were r
crewless if left. In many cases they had to pull in DD ships' motor boats were often out of action, and towage was badly needed. Embarkation depended entirely on fair weather - an onshore wind of any force would have stopped embarkation completely.
I had stressed the vital necessity for more shallow drought boats and crews and knew that steps were being taken at home to do all that WSD possible.
During the day French destroyers had been coming in by the Northorn passage and channel and had been fired at from the shore. They went into
Dunkirk and loaded at the West quay. Otherwise no French ships sceemed to be there.

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Destroyers, minesweepors, paddlers and all manner of craft were arriving, loading and leaving the beaches and Dunkirk continuously, but there were often periods when no ships were at one place 02 another and loading had to wait,
Bombing of ships and beaches had so far been spasmodic - the day
X
had been overcast, visibility was not good and you could not SCO from La
Panne to Dunkirk. The sound of fighters out of sight overhead second to account for our freedom from air attack,
A report of aircraft dropping mines one mile north of Is Patine was received at 0400 and planes frequently passed close overhead during the dark hours. With the dawn 2. wind from the N.W. sprang up right on the
X
beaches, and when it was light many boats could be seen capsized or broached to and high and dry on the beach, including one at least of the local boats which carried a lot of men and could get close inshore, It: was not a cheering sight and as the day aged the sky overhead cleared and visibility improved. No watched the sky anxiously for the protection of hase but 16
remained clear all day.
At 0730 I made contact at last with "KEITH." "EXPRESS" was by that time fully londed and left for Dover as soon as I had transferred to "KETHI." Hero
I found that D. flag had been procured and it was flown on my arrivel on board; up till then I had used a red ensign to indicate which sitty I was in.
As had been my intention with "HEBE," "KETTH" did not embark any troops and I moved up and down the coast in her doing what I could to keep ships distributed off the beaches and a flow of ships into Dunkins. A signal made by me at 1035 gives a good picture of the conditions:-
11 To V.A. DOVER. Najority of boats broached to and have no Crows, Conditions on beach are very bad due to freshening on-shore wind. Only small numbers are boing embarked even in daylight. Under present conditions any largoscale embarkation from beach is quite imprecticable. Motor boats cennot get close in. Consider only hope of embarking any number to at Dunkinis.
Will attempt to beach ship to form a Ice to try and improve conditions.
From V.A. Dover coure a signal urging the importance of using the boochou
8.15 long AB possible, and to emphasise the situation made a Surther signal

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at 1105 to say:-
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" Dunkirk our only real hope. Can guns cholling pier from Westward be
FRID
bombed and silenced. 17
The successful use of Dunkirk depended on our being able to put ships alongside the Eastern breakwater and it was my constant fear that this might be so accurately shelled as to render it untenable.
I also signalled to the shore urging movement towards Dunkirk and 00 a result troops could be seen moving slowly westward,
From seaward, everything that happened on the beach could be clearly seen. Bodies of men marched along - some in good order, others in groups and knots. At one time a battalion in perfect order marched down through a winding road from the dunes to the shore and I was told later that it was the Welsh Guards, but I am not certain that this was no.
It must not be thought that embarkation from the beaches coased - all the time slowly men came off and ships filled and left, but the largest numbers came from Dunkirk itself.
Commencing the day before and continuing on this Friday the army had been driving lorries down the beach to form a sort of barricade and breakwater. At Brayo the R.E. had planked a. gangway and made D. handrail on these lorries so that motor boats could go alongside. Unfortunately the line ran straight out to sea and as the wind was directly on shore the broakwater gave very little shelter - still it did help.
During the forenoon I made contact again with Commodore Stevenson who by now had completely lost his voice. I sent him over to some paddle minesweepers which were off Erayo to got one beached to not 20 a broakwater.
This he eventually did and the next day she was high and day at daylight.
I do not know to what extent she was of use - the trouble boing that no ship was long enough to cover the distance the tide ran out, and so could only be of value for part of the tide.
The "HEBE" returned at 1000 with Captain Hush and the plan for the embarkation that might. Briefly the plan W&B this:-
Large numbers of boats were now being sent over in tow of tugo end oll manner of vessels. They vero due to stert arriving at 1500 and these boats

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were to be kept for the use of the rearguard for whom the ombaitation scheme was planned.
To take the troops II sloops were being collected and WO1'0 to rendesvous and proceed in company, their arrival boing timed for 0130 on the lot. They were given berths in which to anchor in three batches, one batch off each of the embarkation beaches.
A. feature of this plan which I folt to be impracticable was that the r small craft were not to be used except for the resrguard, It was asking too much to think that when our crying need WSS for inshore boats any such could possibly be held idle while so many men were on the beaches with chips ready waiting to bring them off.
The actual dovelopment of this plan WOB very different and the results will be told later,
After discussion with Captain Bush I sent "HEBE" up to In Panne with orders to be there at 1800 to receive Lord Gort whom Stevenson was to bring off. I intended to be there myself but was concerned to have 2. second string in case of mischance,
There was some shelling of the beaches during the day, but in most cases the shells landod on the dunes which had a fairly steep scarp and protocted the beach. This shelling was principally to the westward. of Braye one at ene time a French battery 2 or 3 miles out of Dunkirk on the top of the dunce but close to the sea received a lot of attention.
About 1330 as I was returning to the eastward "HEES" signalled that she had been shelled off La Panne at 1200 and had had to move westward & couple of miles. Later at 1430 I went up in "КЕТТИ" 02% In Panne to see 15 the battery could be shelled. As soon as we got there shells began to fall and got gradually closer until I judged 10 wisest to move out of range. It WAS
not essential be be so far east and there was nothing to be soon of the battery, The fire W8.8 being directed by 211 observation balloon away over by Nicupert which was plainly visible. I asked for It to be shote down, atroreft came over apparently for the purpose and at times ** was hauled down but always reappeared. The sholl bursts wore Entrly heavy and opported to be 6 02' 8-inch and they fell In salvoss of four.

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line - I wanted to be in several places at once.
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The first of the boat tows was due at 1500 but did not appear till a couple of hours later. I can well remember the first, a tuz with what looked like helf a dozen dinghies in tow. She was proceded by some useful motor yachts which came in company.
I could not wait off Dunkirk as I VAB anxious to get eway up to In
Panno for Lord Gort, so I left Wynne-Edwards in 2. motor yacht to direct the tows as they arrived, and to order a large number 0: hoppers and other craft that were lying off the Western beaches to beach themselves on the rising ride so that men could embark,
The embarkation of Lord Gort produced some odd incidents, As already related I had orranged with Stevenson to bring him off at six o' clock, If the weather was too bed he was to go into Dunkirk and emhark from there.
I had ordered "HEBE" to be off La Panne at that time and was going up there myself in "KNITH." In the meantime Dover had been busy and had sent over four M.T.B.'s and M.A.S.B's to get him. The signal informing me of this, like many others, never reached me. During the afternoon two N.T.B.'s came to me and said that they were to enbark a party from a point two miles west of La Panne. This quite baffled me and I thought that they must have been sent to fetch off some of the Naval lending party, but I realise now that the party concerned was the H.Q. Staff.
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Anyway, shortly before 1800 I was approaching La Panne when "HEBS"
signalled to me "General on beach abreast you," and there I saw a group etc the water's odge with a couple of cara and some signalmen. "XEXST"S"
boats were at once sent in, but to my surprise Lord Gort Y.O.D not in the first boat and I learnt that he was in "HERE" already. Three taxipo were necessary to bring off his staff and a heavy air attack book place while this was going on. One plane tried to bomb the boats and they had a mireculous escape. I saw one bomb burst between than 08 they 1701'0 loading up and the motor boat returned covered in grey mul.
Many air attacks were made at this time on the ships and baschos, and
"HEBE" shot down a Heinkel. There WRB also a great increase in sholl The off Brayo, where the "OLAN MACATI.TSWER" was a valuable docoy. She you 1:20

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and bombed several times and started burning again. I got the impression that these guns were firing blindly into this area, as sholls foll near the
Olan Macallistor" and over her but not among the ships loading which were some way inshore of her. Later, however, these chips did COMO under fire, and "VIVACIOUS" reported she had been hit twice and had eleven casualties, and two or three hundrod troops on board, I ordered her to 80 into Dunkirk and fill up there.
General Lees 172.S the Senior Officer of the H.Q. Staff and I thought it
2
would be a good education for him to see something of what the naval problem was, so I kept him on the bridge with ICC. As Lord Gort was in the "EdEE"
I felt that he WGB safe, and as the "HEBE" was doing good work caberking troops I did not send her back to Dover with him at once. Thorein perhaps
I was wrong, as I had not realized the anxiety of the Government to have him safe and sound at home but had felt he would soonor the ship helped to bring off more men rather than that he should land a few hours carlier in
England.
During the day I made a signal to all ships with instructions for supporting fire against enemy tanks and lorries on the boach. The critical place was likely to be at La Panne after the line was evacuated, and I intended to be there myself in "KETTH" at deybreak the noxt morning. I also kopt
"BASTLISK" free of troops for the same purpose.
The weather improved gradually and at 1700 I was able to signal:-
" Weather off beaches now good. Many more boats should come into use again
Q.B tido rises. General movement of troops westward towards Dunkirk. No petrol supply yet and many basts are getting short off La Panno and Braye,
Movement from Dunkirk continuos. Great air activity."
Actually drifters with petrol arrived not long after at 1815.
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After embarking the Headquarters Staff I returned to Dunkirk to DOG
how the boat situation was getting on. There I found Wynne-Invardo who had been doing good work, and I saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds that has become Pamous - tuge towing dinghise, lifeboats and all manner of pulling boats - small motor yachts, motor Isunchos, drifters, Dutch scoots, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure ateamoro,

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As the town of boats appeared they were told to which beach they should go, and I was particularly anxious that there should be sufficient at La Panno which was farthest off. I directed several town to 80 on to In Penno, tolling them it was ten miles up the coast, and shortly after, as the light WDD
failing, I decided to leave Wynne-Edwards in an M.A.S.B. to direct the remaining town and go Q11 up to La Panne myself. are Braye I saw what I had fourd, that the tows I had ordered to La Panne were stopping at Braye and I arrived there just in time to warn "CODRINGTON," who was off Braye, to send them on. further.
I had General Lees on the bridge and I remember pointing out to him how easy
Z
it was to talk about distributing boats and craft at certain places along a ten mile stretch of coast, but that it was a very different thing to get it done in practice, In the dark, by craft which had not been there before and with no lights to help them. The inovitable tendency was to stop at the first place they came to where other craft were assombled.
However, in the end a protty fair distribution vas made and Wynno-
Edwards, when he returned to me at about 2230, was able to tell no that there were a number of boats off LQ Panne.
It must have been on this evening that I saw two Transports go into
Dunkirk and I was very nervous that they would be bombed. Just as it was getting dark they moved out and shortly after there came the sounds of Very heavy bombing from that direction. I felt sick SC I thought that these two ships were being attacked, but I learnt later that 10 was not so, and this bombing, I think, was from our own aircraft attacking battorios down the posst.
It was now dark and I remained off La Panne in company with and
Hebe several other ships.
Once it was dark I ase not feel that much could be done by moving about, so I stayed off LA Panne during the night. I waited there wordoring how things were going. Everything was Back, ships and boats end shore showed no lights though I had asked for a light to be shown ssaward to guide boats inchore. So far as I know the rearguard was falling back and 1t was a question whother to could got off before the Germans found out and could follow up. Shelling was continuous and by the sound some shells were falling among the ships at the anchorage. what nows I had was conflicting - a message from shore to Day that

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thousands of men were waiting but no boats, messages from ships that thoir beats found no one on the beach. The truth of 1t was, I think, that the
Germans had the range of the lorry breakwator and the beaches nost 1t and they shelled them heavily. Boats went in there and found no one on the troops had moved further west clear of the shell firo. I do not know to this day what really took place there. Off shore one felt helpless, the ships and the boats were there and the troops ashoro and one could do no more.
Aircraft passed close overhead flying down the anchorages and fairway, and "MALCOLM" off Braye reported that a number of parachuto mines had been dropped to westward of there and suggested that ships ought to loavo by the uidcoote
Zudcote
Ruy pass in the morning, as the pasuage to the West WEB no heavily mined.
The noise of M.T.B. engines could often be hobrd to deaward and castward and added to my anxiety, though I thought they might possibly be our own patrol. About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where
Lord Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A.S.B. had just returned with Wynne-Edwards, I sent it off at once to "HEBE" to collect Lord Gort. To my horror it came back almost at otice to say that Lord Gort had just left "HEBE" in a motor launch. It was very dork and "НЫВЕ" could not; be seen though we knew where she was and I wellted anxiously for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and como alongside, still not the right one and I had a bad moment thinking of the possibilities of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge OF Stevenson once moro, found US at last. Apologizing to Lord Gort for keoping him walting 30 long,
I transferred him to the M.A.S.B. and sent him off to Dovor with Ceneral Iecs.
My experience of the bombing the day before led 100 to request fighter
June, protection at dawn though I had no doubt that this was alroady hoing arrenged.
At 0215 I heard that troops were moving Westward and case to the conclusion that embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. "MARCOLN" and "HARVISING"
which were off Lo Panne were ordered into Dunkirk in consoquence.
I also made D. signal telling ships to keep close to the buoyo as I hoped that they would thus avoid any minos which had boon Groy od in the channel. At 0235 I made the following signal to V.A. Dover and

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alongside the pier. They could carry large numbers, some as many 08 3,000
mon, and so were very valuable, but they Were also large targets and were
X
used with reluctance when bombing was probable, especially as several would only go into Dunkirk in daylight. This WAB now considered too dangerous, and in consequence Naval Officers were put on board to act as advisors to the masters and the crews were stiffened with seamon. For the rest of the ovacuation they went in every night and did magnificent work.
Besides the personnel ships various other craft were to go into the harbour to load alongside, including French destroyors, The British ships were to use the East Pier where the British troops were and the French the Foot quay, where the French were.
If any large numbers were to come off from Dunkirk itself it WCG covential to be able to use the East Pier. This already had one gap in it made by the
"KING ORRY", but the gap had been bridged. I feared that the Germans would now shell this pier heavily and perhaps damage it or at any rate make it impossible to keep ships alongside. I accordingly asked if the P.A.F. could reconnoitre and report what the state of the pier was and whother It was being sholled. This was arranged and had an amusing seque]. as will be told later.
Before I returned to Dunkirk a report came back from the air reconnaissance giving an accurate description of the gap in the pior which we alroady know about, but not a word as to whether 3.t was being shelled.
It was arranged that I should go over in N.A.S.B.10, one of the Motor
Anti-Submarino Boats. These are large fast motor hosts, enthor like M.T.B.to, with a speed of 25 knots and armed with two twin mochine guns and depth charges.
A portable Loud-spockor act was to be fitted in her. as I had found cirilar
X
set very useful in "HEBE" and "EXPRESS."
In the afternoon my Secretary, Paymaster Commander Batloy, srrived down bringing with him some clothing which was very welcome, and I VIOB able to feel respectable once more. I sent him back to London 85 there WOD nothing there
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for him to do.
I had arranged to leave Dover at 1700 and on my way down to the Naval
Horbour I stopped in the own to buy & pair of pants and SOMO food to take bed over with UD. I picked up Wynne-Edwards and Norfolk at the hotsol where they

Noted.
2. The 3" A.A. gun in KEITH was not primarily intended for close defence. For this purpose the ship had two converted Mk. II* pom pom equipm rang
3. Shields are being provided for all close range weapons.
not:
4. The multiple pom poms are/available for SKIPJACK class except at t)
expense of other services.
5. D.T.S.D. referred re 0.5 inch Mk. IV twin equipments.
CW
WSG
BJ
3.9.40.
for DIRECTOR OF NAVAL ORDNANCE.
4
September, 1940.
&
1.
Concur with D.N.O. (There appears to be a typing error in his paragraph 4.)
2.
0.5" Mark IV equipments cannot be made available for
SKIPJACK class as all are allocated to Auxiliary war vessels
None the less HALCYON class minesweepers are certainly underarmed. Subject to D.N.O's and D.N.C's remarks it is proposed to submit for approval in principle to alter their A.A.
armaments as follows, positions being prepared for the additional guns as opportunity offers and the guns to be allocated as and when available.
(A) GOSSAMER, LEDA, SEAGULL, HAZARD, HEBE, SHARPSHOOTER,
BRAMBLE, BRITOMART and SPEEDY:-
Add 1 - 0.5" Mark III and re-arange this and existing 0.5" Mark III in sided positions.
(B) GLEANER and JASON (A/S Patrol vessels of H ALCYON Class)
Add 1 - 0.5" Mark III as for GOSSAMER etc.
(C) NIGER and SALAMANDER
Remove forward 4" V in C.P. II and substitute
4" V on H.A. III or IV mounting.
Add 1 - 0.5" Mk. III as for GOSSAMER etc.
(D) HALCYON, HARRIER, HUSSAR and SPEEDWELL.
Remove 2 pdr. II and substitute 2 - 2 pdr on single mountings, sided. Priority for allocation
+1
to be after Corvettes.
requirement 3. for 11 additional 0.5" Mk. III equipments for Ships
Should it be clearly impossible to meet the shown in para. 2 (A) and (B), single 2 pdrs. (2 per ship)
should be allocated in lieu and the existing 0.5"s diverted to other services.
and w
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES
DIVISION.
14-9.40.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray,
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, nt only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end or X Route. These attacks vere to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers head of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them vith the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer head of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of
;he Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
RENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
in addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour ut further inside. This presented a very good target and the hips were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the ime being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in eaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed art of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
ANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops ut was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again n these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying longside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
RENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and he trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire ad to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the airway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, no witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by ombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having eased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and rawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a ink drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived o find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, th no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in the harbour/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 10.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
harbour. She was immediately subjected to heavy bombing attacks, having previously had her steering gear put out of action by a dive bombing attack when about - mile outside of the entrance. She remained in sole occupation of the harbour until shortly after midnight 29th/30th, when her Captain rightly decided to take the ship out of harbour before she also was sunk, thus freeing the berth and safeguarding the channel from being blocked.
Little information of these disasters filtered through to
Dover, except that it was known that Dunkirk was under heavy air bombardment, and that the destroyers there were being hit soon after 1600.
32. At 1906 the Vice Admiral promulgated the plan for the night by signal as follows: "Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained to Dunkirk
East Pier, destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except hospital carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of
La Panne. Whole length is divided into three equal parts referred to as LA PANNE, BRAY, MALO, from East to West with a mile gap between each part. LA PANNE and BRAY have troop concentration points each end and in Middle, MALO at each end.
These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass the message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T as opportunity offers".
33. About 1900 a telephone message was received from
La Panne Military Headquarters through the War Office and the
Admiralty to the effect that Dunkirk harbour was blocked by damaged ships, and that all evacuation must therefore be effected from the beaches.
About the same time a corrupt message from S.N.O., Dunkirk, was received stating continuous bombing, one destroyer sinking, one transport with troops on board damaged and impossible at present to embark more troops, though pier undamaged.
34. In this confused situation the Vice Admiral, Dover, at 2128, ordered all ships approaching Dunkirk not to close the harbour, but instead to remain off the Eastern beach to collect troops from the shore, and the drifters and minesweepers which were about to be despatched to Dunkirk harbour were also diverted to the beaches.
It appeared, therefore, at this time that the use of
Dunkirk harbour would be denied to us except possibly to the small ships.
Signals addressed to S.N.O., Dunkirk, HEBE, VERITY, who were known to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk, were sent requireing information as to the accessibility of the Eastern pier for personnel vessels. Admiral Nord was also informed that Dover was out of touch with Captain Tennant, and asked whether it was still possible for transports to enter harbour and berth alongside.
No reply to these enquiries could be expected until after midnight.
35.
In the event only 4 trawlers and a yacht entered
Dunkirk during the hours of darkness, and as enemy activity was much reduced only two bombing attacks being made, it subsequently transpired that a good opportunity had been missed. It is probable that ships to lift some 8000 to 10, 000 troops could have been made available for Dunkirk during the night at little loss to embarkation from the beaches.
36/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 13.
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
Thursday, 30th May.
40. As an example of the difficulty of any one man appreciating the situation at Dunkirk and the beaches during the night, at 0030/30 the S.N.O. on the French Coast reported that he had no destroyers. In fact, at that time, all available destroyers, namely 10, in the Dover Command, were either on, or on passage to or from, the coast, and the remaining 5 were at Dover discharging troops, embarking ammunitition, fuelling, etc. and were to sail within the next
+ hours.
Simultaneously the V.C.I.G.S. reported that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a great shortage of small craft - urgently required. This last fact was well known to the Vice Admiral, Dover.
41. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was requested to send as nuch grass hawser as possible to Ramsgate, as quickly as ossible, for supplying the skoots, to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work to compensate for the hortage of boats, which would continue for at least another
14 hours.
42. At 0500 the 7 modern destroyers remaining with Vice dmiral, Dover - ICARUS, IMPULSIVE, INTREPID, IVANHOE, HAR-
ESTER, HAVANT and JAVELIN - sailed to Sheerness in accordance ith Admiralty instructions. The MONTROSE and MACKAY sailed
'or repairs.
43. Meantime the Vice Admiral, Dover, had been much xercised regarding the possibility of the continued use of unkirk harbour for personnel vessels and was anxiously waiting the report from VANQUISHER, who had been sent to nvestigate the reported obstruction. VANQUISHER'S report as received at 0610 stating entrance was practicable but that bstruction exists towards outer inside end of the EASTERN ARM.
ending amplifying reports, the sailing of personnel vessels o Dunkirk was resumed, although at this time there were still personnel vessels presumed to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk arbour, whose movements and whereabouts throughout the night till remained obscure.
The Vice Admiral asked R.A. Dover, who was in HEBE, hether personnel ships could, in fact, still use Dunkirk. In he meantime a series of signals from Rear Admiral Dover, and estroyers off the coast, were received, stating that the eaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were rgently required there. Although it was known that the estroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared at this time that the est division of transport was to send the great majority of estroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be gnored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk Harbour, only an ccasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced umber now available for the operation.
44/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 22
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Friday 31st May (continued).
65. Casualties to H.M. Ships during 31st May,
M/S DEVONIA received damage from near miss bombs whilst off La Panne. About 1600 ship was ordered to be beached.
At 0600 on the 1st, after having destroyed all useful apparatus, and ammunition put overboard, ship was beached and abandoned.
M/S HEBE, whilst off Dunkirk, was damaged by enemy aircraft and returned under own power to Dover.
Destroyer EXPRESS. Damaged by enemy aircraft whilst off Dunkirk.
Saturday 1st June.
66. 2 Hospital Carriers which had sailed the previous evening returned shortly after dawn. Only one had succeeded in entering Dunkirk Harbour, the other had laid off 4 hours under heavy fire and returned to Dover. 4 personnel vessels failed to enter Dunkirk during the night, but succeeded in the early hours of the morning. One of these, the PRAGUE, was bombed and severely damaged half-way across on the return journey, but succeeded in making the Downs with the assistance of tugs, where troops transferred to other ships particularly
A/S trawlers LADY PHILOMENE and OLVINA. The supply of personnel vessels was maintained throughout the day, not without a series of setbacks caused by 3 ships refusing to sail and by
2 being turned back when on passage, by French Destroyers owing to heavy bombing and shelling of the approaches to Dunkirk.
Of those that operated during the 24 hours, 1 was sunk, 2
damaged by bombs and shell-fire and 1 by collision.
67. During the middle watch it transpired that no further troops were attempting to evacuate from La Panne off which were stationed one paddle minesweeper, a fleet sweeper and two destroyers, probably due to the heavy shelling from German guns eastward, and later information was received that the troops were marching from La Panne through Bray towards
Dunkirk. Accordingly, during the night the Rear Admiral,
Dover, instructed all small craft to move west, with boats in tow, towards Dunkirk, and the Vice Admiral directed all ships under orders for La Panne to other positions further west, concentrating the main effort on the beach immediately east of Dunkirk.
To a request from Dunkirk for Hospital Ships, the
Vice Admiral replied at 0715 that the large ship berths alongside at Dunkirk must be occupied by personnel ships and the wounded that could conveniently be embarked should go with personnel. This direction was in accordance with the Government policy previously communicated to the Vice Admiral.
68. Soon after dawn enemy aircraft were active and heavy bombing and machine gun attacks developed at 0500 over the whole area from Dunkirk to La Panne. A second series of attacks commenced at 0830 and lasted until 0900, during which time nearly every ship off the coast was subjected to intensive bombing and machine gunning, formations of 30 and 40
machines/

APPENDIX I.
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
RUISER:
CALCUTTA
YERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VILY
BIDEFORD
TS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
EEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
EL
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGOWER
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH
WESTWARD HO
ESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SARGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
AL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
LS:
ROYAL EAGLE
TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
RAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WISTELLA
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
ERS:
SILVER DAWN
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

19.
The Conspicuous Gallantry Medal.
4
Acting Leading Seaman Ronald Thirlwall, C/JX.159421, H.M.S.
mer.
Seaman Cook Jesse Harry Herbert Elton, LT/JX.180250, H.M.Y. Mosquito.
Bystander.
Bar to the Distinguished Service Medal.
WE
Able Seaman Arthur Victor Johnson, P/J.24734.
The Distinguished Service Medal.
Chief Petty Officer Albert William Cobley, C/J.22075, H.M.S.
Chief Petty Officer Ernest George Dewey, C/J.104364, H.M.S. Speedwell. SAbre.
Chief Petty Officer Arthur Henry Herbert Gutsell,P/J.28475,
H.M.Y. Thele
Chief Petty Officer Rowland Evan Lines, C/JX.142401, Pensioner
S.
e.
11254, H.M.S. Malcolm.
Chief Petty Officer Percy Simeon Thomas Munn, C/J.10033, H.M.S.
Royal Eagle.
Chief Petty Officer Stanley Freeman Piggott, P/J.15784, H.M.S.
Hebe.
Chief Petty Officer Francis Withington, C/J.8739, H.M.S. Worcester
Chief Petty Officer Reginald Frank Tupper, P/J.94060, H.M.S. Icaru
Chief Yeoman of Signals Fred Laister, C/J.69665, H.M.S. Keith.
Chief Engine Room Artificer ХИЛКАЙ Redvers Woodhead Atkinson,
C/MX.47004, H.M.S. Malcolm.
Chief Engine Room Artificer George Bertram Head, P/M.34498,
H.M.S. Leda.
Chief Engine Room Artificer Andrew Millar McOwan, C/M.18445, H.M.S
Sabre.
Chief Engine Room Artificer Francis Henry Patrick, C/M.14987,
H.M.S. Vanquisher.
Chief Engine Room Artificer Sidney Arthur Wilkins, P/M.18465,
H.M.S. Worcester.
Chief Mechanician Second Class Frederick Arthur Ford, P/K.21534,
H.M.S. Whippingham.
Chief Stoker Martin Gallon, P/K.59221, H.M.S. Havant.
Chief Stoker Horace Frederick Goddard, P/KX.95692, H.M.S. Icarus.
Engine Room Artificer First Class Charles Henry Andrew, D/M.28768,
H.M.S. Salamander.
Engine Room Artificer Third Class George William Hymas, P/MX.49826
Engine Room Artificer Fourth Class Eric Matt Horne, C/MX.62572, on,
H.M.Skoot Doggersbank.
Engine Room Artificer Fourth Class Joseph Edric Whitenstall,
P/MX.57728, H.M.S. Winchelsea.
Engine Room Artificer First Class James Barton, R.N.R., Portsmouth
32EE, H.M.S. Express.
Electrical Artificer First Class Kenneth Simpson, C/MX.45564,
H.M.S. Wolsey.
Petty Officer Hyacinth Alec George Adam, P/JX.131408, H.M.S. Express.
41.
Petty Officer Harold Beasley, C/J.93287, H.M.S. Sutton.
S.
Petty Officer Henry George Coalbran, P/JX.127274, Elizabeth. H.M.S. Princess
Petty Officer John Collins, P/J.90457, H.M.S. Leda.
Petty Officer George Albert Coussens, P/J.7788, H.M.S. Dward.
Petty Officer Maurice William Crisp, P/J.100655, H.M.S. Express.
Shaw
Petty Officer Alfred Ernest Crossley, C/J.103237, H.M.S. Queen. Medway.e

a
ENCLOSURE No.1 TO DOVER LETTER No.B23/862/40 dated 4 June 1940.
Page 2.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF OFFICERS FOR SERVICES IN CONNECTION WITH
THE EVACUATION OF THE ALLIED FORCES FROM DUNKIRK.
(contd.)
CAPTAIN THOMAS EDGAR HALSEY, ROYAL NAVY, H.M.S. "MALCOLM", D.So
50
D.S.O.Lay.
CAPTAIN GEORGE FREDERICK STEVENS-GUILLE, D.S.O., O.B.E., DSO
is the ROYAL NAVY, H.M.S. "CODRINGTON",
COMMANDER BRIAN DEAN, ROYAL NAVY, (RETIRED), H.M.S. "SABRE",D.S.O.
COMMANDER RALPH LINDSAY FISHER, ROYAL NAVY, H.M.S. "WAKEFUL",DSO
COMMANDER JOHN HAMILTON ALLISON, ROYAL NAVY, H.M.S. "WORCESTER"
D.S.O
COMMANDER RICHARD CYRIL VESY ROSS, ROYAL NAVY, H.M.S. "GOSSAMER"
ACTING COMMANDER KENNETH MORLAND GREIG, ROYAL NAVY, (RETIRED)
H.M.S. "SANDOWN",
DSC,
\
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER COLIN HENRY CAMPBELL, ROYAL NAVY,
DSC
H.M.S. "WOLSEY", sqs,DSOL
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN BRUCE GOODENOUGH TEMPLE, ROYAL NAVY,
H.M.S. "HEBE",
DSC
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAROLD UNWIN, ROYAL NAVY, H.M.S. "LEDA",
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN MARK SYMONDS COX, D.S.C., ROYAL NAVY,
? This should Ge Commander Hinton.
H.M.S. "HALCYON",
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CECIL JOHN WYNNE-EDWARDS, ROYAL NAVY,
H.M.S. "PRESIDENT",
D.S.C.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER REDVERS MICHAEL PRIOR, ROYAL NAVY, (RETIRED)
H.M.S. "LYNX",
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ARTHUR JELFS CUBISON, D.S.C.,
ROYAL NAVY (RETIRED),
D.S
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER NEVILLE LIONEL JOHN PISANI, D.S.C., D.S.O
ROYAL NAVY (RETIRED), H.M.S. "FERVENT",
D.SC
TEMPORARY LIEUTENANT CEDRIC VICTOR BRAMMELL, ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE
H.M.S. "GULZAR",
D.SC
D.S.C
TEMPORARY LIEUTENANT E. L. DAVIES, ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE
H.M.S. "ORIOLE",
D.S.C
PROBATIONARY TEMPORARY SUB. LIEUTENANT JACK MASON, ROYAL
NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE, H.M.S. "CHICO",
D.S.C.V
TEMPORARY SKIPPER JAMES HENRY MUGRIDGE, ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE,
SKIPPER,
W.S.3018,
TEMPORARY PROBATIONARY GEORGE WILLIAM ALDAN, ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE
D.S.C.
W.S.3014, H.M.TRAWLER "JOHN CATTLING",
PROBATIONARY TEMPORARY SKIPPER EDWARD FREDERICK DETTMAN,
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE, W.S.3306, H.M. DRIFTER "BOY ROY",
D.S.C.
PROBATIONARY TEMPORARY SKIPPER ALFRED MANNING LOVIS,
ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE, W.S. 3397, DRIFTER "PAXTON",
70
LIEUTENANT VAN HAMILEN, ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY.
For distinguished service while serving in His Majesty's
Ships carrying Troops from Dunkerque to Dover.
Ships were the target for continual attacks from enemy aircraft, submarines, and M. T. B'S.
They were required to berth under exceptionally difficult conditions in darkness, and in a confined harbour obstructed by wrecks and crowded with small craft under way.
: Commander Cronin of Nigu. Sevin officer 4 ᵃ Maicsweepoing Aistilla.
(Continued

Page 2.
HICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940.
WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART I - BRITISH SHIPS.
CRUISER.
TTTA
ROYERS.
ONY
INTREPID
VENOMOUS
LISK
IVANHOE
VERITY
INGTON
JAGUAR
VIMY
JAVELIN
VIVACIOUS
ESS
KEITH
WAKEFUL
ANT
MACKAY
WHITEHALL
TON
MALCOIM
WHITSHED
ADE
MONTROSE
WINCHELSEA
HOUND
SABRE
WINDSOR
ESTER
SALADIN
WOLFHOUND
NT
SCIMITAR
WOLSEY
US
SHIKARI
WORCESTER
LSIVE
VANQUISHER
P.
EFORD
VETTES.
LLEMOT
MALLARD
SHELDRAKE
GFISHER
SHEARWATER
WIDGEON
BOATS.
UST
#
MOSQUITO
ESWEEPERS.
ROSS
URY
HEBE
SALAMANDER
GHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALTASH
GHTON QUEEN
LEDA
SANDOWN
ONIA
LYDD
SHARPSHOOTER
HESS OF FIFE
MARMION
MEDWAY QUEEN
SKIPJACK
DALK
SNAEFELL
PEROR OF INDIA
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
CZROY
ORIOLE
SUTTON
ENAVON
PANGBOURNE
WAVERLEY
ENGOWER
PLINLIMMON
WESTWARD HO
SSAMER
PORTSDOWN
CIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH
WHIPPINGHAM
LCYON
QUEEN OF THANET
(Continued)
Sunk.

Page 3.
OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART I - BRITISH SHIPS (continued)
PORTSMOUTH A/P YACHTS
AHOLA
CARYANDA
NONETA
ANLAH
EILA II
SERIOLA
ANKH
LAHLOO
THELE
BOUNTY
MASAYRU
MISCELLANEOUS H.M. SHIPS (small craft)
A.L.C. 5
GREY MIST (Dan-laying
A.L.C. 15
Vessel)
-
A.L.C. 16
# GRIVE (F.A.A. Yacht)
A.L.C. 17
KINDRED STAR (Drifter)
ALOUETTE II
# KING ORRY (Armed Boarding
(Echo Sounding Yacht)
Vessel)
# AMULREE (Harbour Defence
LLANTHONY (Examination
Patrol Craft)
Service Vessel)
ARONIA (Yacht)
LORMONT (Armed Boarding
BEN AND LUCY (Drifter)
Vessel)
BLUEBIRD (M.B.)
MONARDA (Drifter)
BYSTANDER
MONA'S ISLE (Armed Boarding
(Echo Sounding Yacht)
Vessel)
CALETA (Harbour Defence
ST. OLAVES (Rescue Tug)
Patrol Craft)
TARRET (A/S Yacht)
CHRYSTOBEL II (Harbour
THRIFTY (Drifter)
Defence Patrol Craft )
V. 4 ("Vernon' s" pinnace)
"DOLPHIN'S" MOTOR-BOAT
VELIA (Armed Trawler)
EVELYN ROSE Trawler)
VERNON I
"EXCELLENT'S" A/A MOTOR-BOAT
VIVIANA (A/S Trawler)
GAVA (Trawler)
Ambleve.
Escaut.
transferred
GLALA (Harbour Defence Patrol
Meuse.
from
Craft)
Sambre.
Semoise.
page 9.
yser.
DUTCH SKOOTS (Commissioned with Naval Crews)
ABEL TASMAN
DOGGERSBANK
PACIFIC
PASCHOLL
AEGIR
FREDANJA
PATRIA
ALICE
FRISCO
PRINCESS JULIANA
AMAZONE
GORECHT
REIGER
ANTJE
HEBE
RIKA
ATLANTIC
HILDA
RUJA
BART
HONDSRUG
BORNRIF
HORST (Abandoned)
SAN ANTONIO
SURSUM CORDA
BRANDARIS
JAVA
TILLY
CARIBIA
JUTLAND
TINY
DELTA
KAAPFALGA
TUNG
DEMOK I
LENA
TWENTE
DENEB
ORANJE
VREDE
DESPATCH II
ORANGE YREESWIJH
ZEUS
(Continued)
# Sunk