TNA ADM 199 792

COPY.
HOME OFFICE,
9
WHITEHALL.
URGENT AND CONFIDENTIAL.
20th January, 1940.
S
929
dam he
1940
Dear Cadogen,
I had a conference this morning with representatives of the Admiralty, the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Food on the question of what provisional arrangements can be made for a to situation which would arise If large numbers of en
Dutch and Belgian refugees came to this country
3
owing to the invasion of Holland and Belgium. The view of the Admiralty is that their representatives in Antwerp, Amsterdam and Rotterdam ought to have instructions which would enable them to tell the captains of Dutch and Belgian ships where they must go if they are bringing refugees to the United Kingdom.
Moreover, It appears from the discussion with the
Admiralty that there are insupurable difficulties about bringing these ships into London or ports on the South and Best coast. We urged upon the Admiralty being nad for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

of
10
or representatives that in such an emergency 10 would be most desirable to bring the refugees to the nearest port, and that from our point of view there would be
S
many advantages in bringing a large proportion of them dam to London; but the dmiralty pointed out the objections he to this course, and after prolonged discussion we all felt bound to accept the Admiralty view, which is this:
that about 100 small ships should be sent to Poole but that all the larger shipe ought to be sent round the
West
Best cosst to Belfast Looh and to the Clyde.
The to journey to Belfast Looh or the Clyde will take about en three days. It is therefore essential that the ships carrying m
which are to make such a journey crowded with refugees
(a) shall be properly equipped with food and water, and (b) shall know that they have to make this journey y
and shall limit the number of passengers accordingly.
Captains who might take 8. large number of passengers on board if they were only about to make a short journey would have to limit the numbers very severely in many cases if they knew they had to make a two or three days journey.
The problem then is:is there any means of telling being naa for their safety and health during a 3 to 4 days winter voyage.
This estimate is offered with the greatest reserve, and should be subject to improvement in the light of fuller information.
4./

112
CONFIDENTIAL
110
Office of
The Flag DOVER. Officer Commanding,
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an
Naval definitely committed to provide for the extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
50,000. evacuation or French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French
Secretary as/
London,,Salty, 1.

CONFIDENTIAL.
153
Page 32.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
151
4/6
Tuesday, 4th June (continued).
have an air reconnaissance over the Channel.
It was reported that a Transport was lying on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines and also a barge east of the Goodwins with survivors on board.
C. in C. Nore, despatched 2 M.T.B.'s to find the
Transport with no avail. On the 5th the R.A.F. speedboat
$
did a sweep south of a line Goodwin/Boulogne and recovered 33
French troops and two naval ratings. In addition French troops were picked up by patrols and brought in to Dover,
Margate and Ramsgate. Troops also arrived in French and
Belgian Trawlers totalling in all some additional 1,100.
Air reconnaissance was also carried out on the morning of the 5th but nothing was reported.
REMARKS ON THE INSHORE FLOTILLAS
and
NAVAL SHORE PARTIES.
98. About 400 small craft, ranging from Dutch skoots to 30 ft. Motor boats, set out at various times to the
Flanders Coast. In addition scores of pulling boats, merchant ship life-boats, Naval cutters and whalers, were sent off in tow. Only a proportion - particularly of the pulling boats - succeeded in reaching the coast and taking active part in the evacuation. Fewer still were able to remain off the coast for more than one period. Nevertheless, these small craft, in conjunction with the pulling and power boats of H. M. ships off the coast, were responsible for lifting more than 100, Allied troops direct off a stretch of open beach in shoal waters between 1600/27/5 and 0400/2/6.
Further, a large number of the power boats operated within
Dunkirk harbour on the last three nights, working principally in the inner harbour, which was continually under artillery fire, ferrying a further large uncounted number out to the comparative safety of ships lying off.
99. Throughout the period all these craft of the inshore flotillas were subjected at one time or another to intense attack from the air, both by bombing and machine gun, and a large proportion also to sporadic bombardment by German artillery. Under this fire no case occurred of boats ceasing work as long as troops were in sight on shore, and movements of boats westward away from the fire zone only occurred as dictated by the military situation ashore.
100. The initial despatch of requisitioned and volunteer small craft was controlled from -
1
Naval Control Service, London,
Westminster Pier,
Ramsgate,
Gravesend,
Dover,
Southend,
Newhaven,
Sheerness,
Portsmouth, preliminary/

154
152
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 33.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
preliminary action in most cases having originated in the
Admiralty Small Vessels Pool. As the operation proceeded,
Ramsgate was used as the main base for such craft, as being nearest to Dunkirk, but a small number of motor boats and skoots continued to work from Dover.
101. The work of servicing this multitude of small craft entailed an enormous amount of work by the base organisation at
Ramsgate, and to a lesser extent at Dover, Items typical of the work of the Ramsgate organisation are as follows:-
(a) Approximately 1,000 charts were issued by the Naval
Control Service, Ramsgate, to the various vessels taking part, some 600 of which had the routes laid off on them for those Commanding Officers who had neither parallel rules nor dividers, together with approximately 500 sets of routeing instructions.
(b) During the period 26th May to 4th June the number of vessels dealt with for defects of all kinds, including power, engine and electrical, at Ramsgate, was 170.
Included in this number were Dutch skoots, tugs, drifters, trawlers, motor lighters, ferry floats and motor boats of every conceivable type.
(c) All the small craft were initially without armament.
75 of the larger motor boats, skoots and tugs were armed with A.A. Lewis guns at Ramsgate, this armament being transferred from vessel to vessel as requisite during the operation. 23 Lewis gunners arrived from London and
2 officers with 12 R.A.S.C. cadets were also accepted for this service at Ramsgate. When British fighting troops were being evacuated in the later stages, the soldiers invariably mounted and fought their Bren guns as A.A.
armament for the ship they were in.
102, A large number of boats were quite unsuitable for work off an open beach. For example, a convoy of 6 Thames
Bawley boats were shepherded over from Southend and arrived off
Dunkirk beach at 1930/31, but owing to ground swell and the many offshore obstacles, such as semi-submerged lorries, it was considered impracticable to beach these craft. Bawley boats accordingly went along the outside of the East Pier of
Dunkirk harbour and started ferrying service to the skoots lying empty outside the harbour entrance. The swell alongside made embarkation duties from outside the jetty too difficult, so Bawley boats proceeded inside Dunkirk harbour working mainly from the inner harbour which was under heavy shell fire. All Bawley boats were loaded up and left harbour about 0300/1. On reaching Ramsgate at 0930/1 the boats were so much damaged as not to be fit for further service.
The conduct of the crows of those cockle boats was exemplary. They were all volunteers who wore rushed over to
Dunkirk in one day, probably none of thom had boon under gun fire before and cortainly none of them had ever been under Naval discipline. Those boats were Thamos estuary fishing boats/

CONFIDENTIAL.
154
Page 35.
156
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillæsand Naval Shore Parties (continued)
boats which had been cast away by the soldiers on disembarkation.
106. By the night of the 30th/31st a considerable number of collapsible boats and pontoons had been received from the Royal Engineers of the B.E.F. These were of great assistance and paddled off about 10 men in each trip, but again, in spite of all efforts, in the vast majority of cases, the soldiers left these craft when they arrived at the offshore ship.
107. Much of the most meritorious work of lifting off the beaches was done by the offshore warships' own boats, who were tireless in their efforts. All small pulling boats and small power boats were lowered and were lent from ship to ship when their own parent ship left the coast to unload at a United Kingdom port. In addition, H.M. ships seized drifting and abandoned boats as opportunity offered and manned them up with boat keepers. Owing to the physical exhaustion of these boats' crews after hours of work, relief crews of stokers were frequently provided from amongst the many volunteers that came forth.
108. A typical example of dogged work by a ship's boat was afforded by the action of JAVELIN's and JAGUAR's boats off Bray beach in the afternoon of 28/5. When their two motor cutters and two whalers first grounded offshore they were rushed and swamped by soldiers. Order being restored the boats had to be baled out and the wet engines restarted, following which) 700 troops were embarked by these few boats in a short time during continuous bombing attacks.
109. Of the power boats available by far the most useful and suitable were the A.L.Cs., M.L.Cs. and the small type of R.N.L.I. life-boat. The high speed service motor boats such as DOLPHIN's and EXCELLENT's boats and the R.A.F.
Seaplane tenders proved unsuitable for work in shallow waters on a lee shore owing to the vulnerability of their propellers and rudders and their poor manoeuvring powers at low speeds.
110. Of the civilian manned craft one of the best performances was that of the London Fire Brigade fire float
MASSEY SHAW. All the volunteer crew were members of the
London Fire Brigade or Auxiliary Fire Service and succeeded in doing 4 round trips to the beaches in their well-found craft. In contrast to this performance and that also of the R.N.L.I. crews of the Ramsgate and Margate life-boats, who took their boats over to Dunkirk, no volunteers, except for the coxswain and engineer of the Dover life-boat, were forthcoming from the R.N.L.I. crews of the other life-boats, which were accordingly manned by R.N. crews. Also it must be noted that civilian craft of such flotillas as the Rye fishing fleet did not relish the idea of carrying out ferrying work off the Flanders coast. Fishing boats and pleasure boats from as far along the south coast as Brixham and
Dartmouth arrived at various times up to p.m. 30/5, but again the civilian crews were not prepared to proceed to Dunkirk.
Accordingly, the most suitable of such boats as could be manned by the Naval personnel available were taken up, but the remainder took no part in the operations.
111./

11
303
300
reluctance when bombing was probable, especially several would only go into Dunkerque in daylight. as This now considered too dangerous, and Naval Officers were put on board to act as advisers to the masters and crews were stiffened with seamen. They went in every night and did
(32)
magnificent work. Other craft, also, including French destroyers, were to go in and load alongside: British at
East Pier, French at West Quay.
Gap in pier had been bridged, but I feared that Germans would now shell pier heavily and make it impossible for ships to be kept alongside. Asked RAF to reconnoitre:
report gave accurate account of gap, but no word as to whether pier was being shelled.
1700
Arranged to leave Dover at 1700. Picked up Wynne-Edwards and Norfolk and embarked in MA/SB 10, in which a portable loud-speaker was fitted (similar sets found very useful in
(29)
HEBE and EXPRESS). A flag had been made for me out of a piece of cleaning cloth - the red stripe made one half of the cross, and the other half and the balls had been added in red paint. Harbour was full of destroyers, sloops, etc., many showing signs of minor damage. Some were out of action all together, and all were enjoying a short, well-earned rest. I had an hour's sleep on way over; up till then had had about 7 hours in short snatches, but felt quite fresh and fit.
When some miles away from Dunkerque sighted 2 MTBs approach ing on port bow. They did not make contact and were
(38)
probably French.
1900
Arrived at Dunkerque and made fast alongside shore end of pier. Went to the "Bastion" (H.Q. of Army and the local
(34)
French Naval and Military Command) - 10 minutes' walk.
Many buildings and sheds damaged. A French field gun was firing back over the town. Road fairly clear, but litter-
(30)
ed with vehicles the whole way. Men straggling along the road, but very few troops seen as they were kept away on beach behind shelter of wall except when ships came along-
Found side. Tennant and Alexander at the "Bastion. Heard that
French were holding a line in rear of ours and that rear would continue to hold. Joined by my proper Flag-Lieut. with guard were to withdraw through this line which the French
(Balfour): he had come over the day after I left, a
Returned to the pier. A Lysander Army Co-op plane, which
W/T set.
had been flying over pier all day, was fired at by several
Bofors guns - not hit. Explained it was probably the reconnaissance plane I had asked for.
(31)
While having some food in the MA/SB, the Navigating Officer He of KEITH appeared, saying he was the only survivor.
had swum ashore and reached a battery on the dunes some distance outside Dunkerque, and had then walkked in.
(Actually, only 3 Officers and 33 mon were lost, and 16
wounded.) Close by my boat was Tennant's drifter; he also had 2 old steamboats. Next day the drifter was sunk by a shell.
Naval Party ashore = about 6 Officers and a number of men messengers, signalmen, etc. Arranged to collect some of them at 0200/2, but Tennant would not leave then.
"Tomorrow we'll either be back in London, in a German prison or done for.
went outside harbour to meet the first ships arriving.
2100
Beginning to get dark. First ship was a sloop, followed off
(35)
by beaches to the east of the pier and boats ferried men minesweepers, destroyers and tugs. They anchored the off. Noticed 3 or 4 Thames barges anchored off them beach; and they seemed to be deserted, but men got off to full of away. soldiers who were trying to sail her home: a Officer
One barge was met later in mid-Channel Naval was put on board and she got back safely.
During

15
307
F
0245
At the East Pier MALCOLM left with 1,000 men at 0245, 301 and
6
0300
EXPRESS left at 0300 after I had taken off Buchanan and the berthing party who were in her. When she left there were still about 200 men on the East Pier, who were brought blockships. off by SHIKARI which came in later escorting the last two
Of all the ships sent over, only 1 paddler and KELLETT
were not used. The French Admiral could not be found by the MTB sent for him, and he finally came away in one of his own MTBs.
I don't know the exact figure, but think that at least
30,000 men were embarked on this night in about 3 /2 hours.
Heard there were still 30,000 French there.
Returned to London in the afternoon.
@@@@@Q0000000000000000000000000
Note. +
The chatty bits (borrowing a pair of trousers, sharing
Gort's last bottle of champagne, etc.) have been omitted.
DUNKIRK
2 Enclos: Chart of coast and plan of Dunkerque.
20th May - 4th June
1940

336
23,
- 28
1/6
alongside the pier. They could carry large numbers, some as many 08 3,000
mon, and so were very valuable, but they Were also large targets and were
X
used with reluctance when bombing was probable, especially as several would only go into Dunkirk in daylight. This WAB now considered too dangerous, and in consequence Naval Officers were put on board to act as advisors to the masters and the crews were stiffened with seamon. For the rest of the ovacuation they went in every night and did magnificent work.
Besides the personnel ships various other craft were to go into the harbour to load alongside, including French destroyors, The British ships were to use the East Pier where the British troops were and the French the Foot quay, where the French were.
If any large numbers were to come off from Dunkirk itself it WCG covential to be able to use the East Pier. This already had one gap in it made by the
"KING ORRY", but the gap had been bridged. I feared that the Germans would now shell this pier heavily and perhaps damage it or at any rate make it impossible to keep ships alongside. I accordingly asked if the P.A.F. could reconnoitre and report what the state of the pier was and whother It was being sholled. This was arranged and had an amusing seque]. as will be told later.
Before I returned to Dunkirk a report came back from the air reconnaissance giving an accurate description of the gap in the pior which we alroady know about, but not a word as to whether 3.t was being shelled.
It was arranged that I should go over in N.A.S.B.10, one of the Motor
Anti-Submarino Boats. These are large fast motor hosts, enthor like M.T.B.to, with a speed of 25 knots and armed with two twin mochine guns and depth charges.
A portable Loud-spockor act was to be fitted in her. as I had found cirilar
X
set very useful in "HEBE" and "EXPRESS."
In the afternoon my Secretary, Paymaster Commander Batloy, srrived down bringing with him some clothing which was very welcome, and I VIOB able to feel respectable once more. I sent him back to London 85 there WOD nothing there
1/6
for him to do.
I had arranged to leave Dover at 1700 and on my way down to the Naval
Horbour I stopped in the own to buy & pair of pants and SOMO food to take bed over with UD. I picked up Wynne-Edwards and Norfolk at the hotsol where they

338
335
- 50 **
1/6
very fow troops to be seen as they were kept away on the boach behind the shelter of the vall except when ships were coming alongside,
The "Bastion" comprised several large earthworks and on open space, rest of which was takon up with parked and battered cars. French soldiers and marines stood about and guarded the entrances to various chembors inside the carthworks.
In one of those was the room which was Tonnent's hoadquarters, and there
I found him with General Alexander. It opened off a narrow dark passage and was lit by a single lamp - a bare small room about 10 feet by 8 feet. While
I was there the lights went out and WD waited in darkness for an air raid to pass. Thon we discussed the situation. I told them what was arranged and heard with great relief that the Fronch were holding a line in real of ours and that the rearguard were to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold. After a drink with them I persuaded Tennant and Maund to come ond have supper with me in the M.T.B. As I came out of the door into daylight again I
found my staff talking to Balfour, my proper Flag Lieutenant, who had been in
Newcastle when I left London. He had followed no down to Dover and had then been sent off to Dunkirk the day after I left, with a W/T not and was looking out for the W/T and signal work there.
Back on the pier again I waited for Tennant who prosently walked down,
His tin hat had been decorated with the letters "S.N.O." otri: out of silver paper and stuck Oil with sardine oil... It looked very distinguisked all the same. As we stood talking there a Lysender Army Co-operation plane came over very low and flow down the pier. It WSS fired at by several Bofors guno and
Tennant said "I'm sure that damned follow is a Eun he has been flying over here all day." I then realised it was the plano sent over at my request to
See if the pier was being shelled and felt wather sorry for the poor charg, though he seemed none the worse, I explained the situation and hopell I had calmed their fears.
After this excitement we returned to the M.A.S.D. and had some food.
The party ashore had not had much to call: and 0.00 been fruid, some raisins one chocolate which I Had brought over besiden more ordinary food WEB such appreciated.

NL
$
14
NTRAL 8060
SECRET
OFFICE OF THE
FLAG OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, LIVERPOOL,
FERENCE
420/1
ROYAL LIVER BUILDING,
LIVERPOOL, 3.
To:- Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.1.
4th June 1940.
H.M.S."BRIGHTON QUEEN".
The attached report from the Commanding Officer of the forwarded. above vessel was handed to my office this morning, and is
A report that Confidential Books have been left on Board
X".
was forwarded in my Message 1229/4/6 Thore
MAINTENANCE CAPTAIN
VICE ADMIRAL,
FLAG OFFICER IN CHARGE, LIVERPOOL.
*
ADMIRAS
ces of determination, H.M.S. "SALTASH" being laid alongside the wreck until the tast man was taken off.
All confidential books remain in the ship. They were placed in a weighted sack ready to be jettisoned in the Commanding Officer's cabin, but this cabin was flooded before it could be reached. The more important books werelanded at Harwich on May 30th, 1940.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Obedient Secrant,
The Secretary of the
Lieut,
Admiralty, a Stabbs
Second Sea Lord's Department, see R.N.R. 1.10932/40 40
Rex House, Regent Street, LONDON.
(below)
I regret that probably 50% of the French Colonial troops must have been lost, as a result of the explosion by drowning.

SECRET
COPY
58 Allerton Road,
15
Liverpool, 18.
4th June, 1940.
Sir,
Original foreunder.
I have the honour to submit this report of the loss of H.M.S.
"BRIGHTON QUEEN" by enemy action.
2.
At 7.30 a.m. B.S.T. 1.6.40, the ship was got under way and proceeded from Margate Roads towards Dunkirk by route "X". At about 9.30
a.m. when in position 4 miles North of Calais No. 5 buoy H.M.S. "BRIGHTON QUEEN"
engaged enemy aircraft with 12-pounder and Lewis gun fire, action continuing until arrival at Dunkirk. The fire was accurate, keeping aircraft to a height from which bomb aiming was difficult. In the vicinity of Calais No. 4 buoy three salvoes of 4 bombs were aimed at "BRIGHTON QUEEN", the nearest dropping
100 feet from the starboard quarter.
3.
The ship entered the breakwater at Dunkirk at 10.35 a.m. and berthed at the West Lock at 10.45 a.m. 700 French Moroccan troops were embarked and at
11.10 a.m. H.M.S. "BRIGHTON QUEEN" left her berth and proceeded towards Margate.
Calais No. 5 buoy was rounded at 11.50 a.m. and the ship proceeded along route "X".
4.
At 11.05 a.m. a formation of seven single engined aircraft were seen delivering a dive bombing attack to the Southward, after which they reformed and entered clouds at about 5,000 feet. Their engines were heard approaching and the ship's guns were trained in their direction. As they appeared from the cloud they were engaged with 12-pounder and Lewis gun fire, whilst the helm was put hard to starboard.
The formation broke up to attack, by dive bombing, H.M.S. "BRIGHTON
QUEEN", and the transport "SEOLIA" which was two cables distant at Red 50°.
"SCOTIA"
"SCOTIA"
The main attack was directed against leaving her on fire and in a sinking condition. One bomb estimated 200 lbs. exploded very close to H.M.S. "BRIGHTON QUEEN" causing severe damage to the starboard side of the ship abaft the paddle box. The one lifeboat remaining from the previous day's operation at La Panne was blown inboard, causing many casualties amongst the troops on the after deck. The ship began to settle by the stem immediately and after two minutes began to heel to port until she had a list of 50°. The ship was laid over at this angle until she filled forward and sank about 5 minutes after the explosion to rest on the bottom on an even keel in about five fathoms of water.
In this short time my crew worked quickly and efficiently in getting liferafts and all floating material over the side to troops who were struggling in the sea. The French troops were splendidly steady, and although no orders could be given to them except by signs, they acted cooly and intelligently in making use of the life saving material available.
H.M.S. "SALTASH" and several small craft were soon on the scene carrying out the difficult operation of rescuing the survivors with speed and determination, H.M.S. "SALTASH" being laid alongside the wreck until the last man was taken off.
All confidential books remain in the ship. They were placed in a weighted sack ready to be jettisoned in the Commanding Officer's cabin, but this cabin was flooded before it could be reached. The more important books werelanded at Harwich on May 30th, 1940.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Obedient Seevant,
The Secretary of the
Admiralty, a. Stabbs
Second Sea Lord's Department,
Lieut, see NiL
Rex House, Regent Street, LONDON.
(below) R.N.R. L.10932/40
I regret that probably 50% of the French Colonial troops must have been lost, as a result of the explosion by drowning.

MYDNE 673/40
to ASR 1918
N.L.
w11388
9339
40
Confidential
D-51.
(Revised-June, 1933.)
1940
45
FROM WHOM
Vice-Addrial Bedford
DATE
9.8.40
1/1 A.B./40, 2/2 A.B.40 SUBJECT. of 3/3 A.B/40
410.8.40
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
rears hoss of H. shifs Grenade,
21 Seator
Walseful of Amiliee
7
43
N.L. Branch,
Admiralty, S.W.1.
11th September, 1940.
Dear Richardson,
I don't know if you are back yet or whether Winter is still deputising for you.
This is to let you know our movements for next ten days which are as follows:-
Date
From
To
Depart
Arrive
Remarks.
hursday 12th Sept.
London
Portland
1200
1800
riday 13th Sept.
At Portland aturday 14th Sept.
Portland London
1000
1600
onday 16th Sept.
London
Liverpool
0900
1700
uesday 17th Sept.
At Liverpool ednesday 18th Sept.
Liverpool Glasgow
A.M.
P.M.
hursday 19th Sept.
At Glasgow.
riday 20th Sept.
r Sat 21st Sept.
Glasgow
Firth of
Forth.
I shall call at Admiralty or ring you up a.m. Thursday 12th, and p.m. Saturday 14th or on Sunday 15th.
Yours sincerely,
Dilanda
Paymaster Lieutenant Commander R.N.
Secretary to Vice Admiral A.E.F. Bedford.
478.

7. I was assisted in my enquiry by
Commander A.J. Cubison, D.S.C., R.N., and
Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H. Nicholson, R.1
I am, Sir,
20
8301
Your obedient Servant,
At a Beaford
Vice Admiral.
od ed,0001
univollo?
Efod
PVOX 20
LODGE
to Entropenque you"
SI Twode benego because
Drin
Scients and one GA
20 duo toods Bohmony produc Woodse contist
The Whitehall, Secretary 18.0 of the Admiralty,
London',
S.W.1.
epboow wacode 0 now at
Lour

Noted.
useless a and would not prevent the vessel practically the bulkhead Re para. fitted 6 of the in letter mentioned. the compartments the event of the flooding of either of sinking occasions. converted been on previous of
The practicability fishing trawlers of reducing has the Vulnerability
W.T. to a reconstruction, of is which would be necessary the
In bulkheads wartime both the repositioning of the boiler and shortages. prohibite ___???___ due to docks amounting
Insteed fore
3/3/41
MAR 1941
Concur with D.N.C. The conversion of Trawlers Drifte etc., to MS. craft already takes between 3 and 4 months, which is an additional reason for not adopting V.A. Bedford's suggestion.
for D. T. M.
AAS.
10/3/41.
Aam with DNC
he BAlow /4.3.41
The Secretary of the Admir
Whitehall,
London,
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL
11131
83
From.
Vice Admiral A.E. Bedford.
1940
Date
17th September, 1940.
No.22/21. AB/40.
To
The Secretary of the Admiralty, London, S.W.1.
REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO LOSS OF H.M. TRAWLER
"ARGYLLSHIRE" IN OPERATION "DYNAMO".
Sir,
With reference to A.L. M.L. 6245/40 dated 1st August,
1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry into the loss of H.M.A/S
Trawler "Argyllshire" on 1st June, 1940.
2. Sub. Lieut. J.S. Weddle, R.N.R., who was in command of "Argyllshire" was examined on 17th September, 1940.
3. At about 0245 on 1st June "Argyllshire" was about
2 miles E. of "S" Buoy in company with trawlers "Lord Melchett"
and "Stella Rigel. Many trawlers and other small craft were in the vicinity.
"Argyllshire" commenced an attack on what appeared to be a submarine. At 0250 "Stella Rigel" crossed "Argyllshire's"
bows and the latter reduced speed, the target then being about
1800 yards on her starboard beam. Shortly afterwards there was an explosion aft in "Argyllshire" due, it is believed, to a torpedo which struck her on the starboard quarter. The bows
40
stood up at about 45°, all fittings on bridge broke loose and ship went down stern first. Two to three minutes later she was seen with bows to the break of forecastle protruding vertically out of the water. She then sank and disappeared in about 20
fathoms.
4. Asdic gear was intact when ship sank; 5 depth charges set to 200 feet went down with her.
5. Confidential Books and SPs, except two or three in
Wireless Cabinet, and one Secret Mine Chart which was on bridge, were in steel chest in Commanding Officer's Cabin and went down with the ship.
6. The imperceptible time during which this ship remained afloat after the explosion precludes the possibility of learning anything as to the behaviour of material generally, but it is
2/10)
thought that if this class of vessel were fitted with & watertight bulkhead between the Boiler and Engine Rooms there is likelihood of their remaining afloat considerably longer in the
4/11
event of the fore or after compartments being flooded.
7. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander C.B. Land, R.N.
and Lieutenant (E) R.Haynes, R.N.
I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant, a Biaford Vice Admiral

CONFIDENTIAL
NL
phone: CENTRAL 8700.
90
NAVAL OFFICES, grams: "NAVYCHARGE," GLASGOW.
ST. ENOCH HOTEL,
GLASGOW, C.I.
No. 23/22 A.B./40.
11166
17th September
1940.
1940
MILITERY
REPORT OF ENQUIRY INTO THE LOSS OF H.M.
TRAWLER "WESTELLA" IN OPERATION "DYNAMO
ADMIRALTY 22SEP 1940
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter L.6245/40 dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of H.M.A/S Trawler WESTELLA on 2nd June, 1940.
2. Chief Skipper A. Gove, R.N.R. who was in command of WESTELLA was examined on 13th September, 1940.
3. At about 1600 on 2nd June when patrolling in the vicinity of "I" buoy in company with BLACKBURN ROVERS the latter was blown up by a mine or torpedo, and sank instantly. WESTELLA went full speed ahead towards the position where
BLACKBURN ROVERS had sunk. As she neared the position explosions from BLACKBURN
ROVERS' depth charges shook and lifted the ship out of the water and put her asdic installation and pumps out of action.
4. Shortly afterwards whilst "WESTELLA" was in about the same position a heavy explosion underneath the ship's port bow opened up the bow and blew in the foremost bulkhead. Cables fell through the bottom and the gun platform on the forecastle deck was bent upwards about 2 feet. She was flooded to the engine room fore bulkhead and took a heavy list to port. About 10 minutes later, Depth Charges having been set to 'Safe', the sinking ship was abandoned survivors being taken onboard GRIMSBY TOWN.
5. As WESTELLA was a danger to navigation GRIMSBY TOWN was ordered by SAON to sink her. Chief Skipper Gove states that he understands that this was done.
6. The ship was probably sunk in about 12/15 fathoms. Except for a few books which were loose, and in use, the Confidential Books and Secret Publications went down with the ship in a weighted perforated bag.
7. Asdic installation was not destroyed before ship was abandoned, but may have been badly damaged by gunfire which sank the ship.
8. It has not been possible to establish definitely what caused the explosion, but all the evidence available points to the probability of it being due to a moored wire. mine D
9. In the circumstances in which this Trawler was lost no useful information was elicited as to the behaviour of material.
10. I was assisted in my Enquiry by Lieutenant Commander S.J. Hunt, R.N. and
Commissioned Engineer G.W. Feast, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, aisedford
VICE-ADMIRAL
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Whitehall,
London, S.W. 1.

101
3.
11388
11. General.
11940
(i) Boats and Life Saving Appliances.
class
DNC
Near misses cause damage to boats at the davits, and it is recommended that more cork floats or rafts should be provided in small ships.
(ii) Dastruction of S.P.'s and C.B.'s.
In a number of cases ships sank so quickly that it was impossible to get to the steel chests containing sel
DNI
C.B.'s etc.
As these sinkings often occurred in shallow water, arate DSR
it is thought that an additional safeguard would be vent d the insertion in the chests of some form of acid which would ignite on contact with salt water and destroy the books if the production of such an acid is a practical proposition.
(iii) Destruction of Asdic Installation.
Although in some ships provision was made for the destruction of the Asdic dome and oscillator, this has could not always be carried out as it was not aced comments
DTM
possible, before the ship sank, to gain access to the Bickford's fuze to fire the charge.
they ut the
It would appear that a means of firing the charge electrically, using batteries from say two positions on the upper deck, would render the destruction of the Asdic gear more sure.
positis tive,
(iv) Escape Scuttles.
orches
DNC
The provision of "Escape Scuttles" in the fore and after ends of mess decks is recommended.
SD.1.
(v) Cast Iron Supports of bedplates.
me plan ore ent
Supports to Engines, fans, etc. made of cast iron baft #
E.m.C.
are easily fractured by shock from "near misses"
etc.
12. An enclosure with this report summarises in tabulated form as ear miss the chief points brought out by my enquiries.
13. Although I am aware that some of the points detailed are ones which are, both in present and new construction, receiving attention,
Redford's No. 24/23. AB/40 dated 19th September, 1940.
ck in
I think it desirable, in order that this report be comprehensive, that king nothing be omitted which was revealed in these enquiries.
port.
14. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Assistant Controller
S
of the Navy, Bath.
iffered
I am, Sir, oil fue
.heavy ns
Your obedient a Bedforg Servant, ct on
VICE-ADMIRAL.
cretary of the Admiralty, itehall,
London, S.W.1.

Any further communication
CONFIDENTIAL.
d be addressed to:-:-
-M
Secretary of the Admiralty,
London, S.W.I.
ILITARY BRAN
108
quoting.. 28/27.A.B/40.
OCT
1940
Admiralty,
S.W.1.
on the outside of the
67
envelope as well as lin TN.L.
4th October, 1940.
the text.
11797
1940
Report of enquiry into the loss of H.M. Trawler BLACKBURN ROVERS
in operation "Dynamo".
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their
Lordships the following report on the loss of H.M. A/S Trawler
BLACKBURN ROVERS on 2nd June, 1940.
2.
At about 1600 on 2nd June, in the vicinity of
"T" buoy BLACKBURN ROVERS was hit by a torpedo, or struck a mine, and sank instantly (videreport on WESTELLA No. 23/22
A.B/40 of 17th September, 1940).
11116G
3.
Commander R.W. English, R.N. who was in
BLACKBURN ROVERS, and was severely wounded, has informed me by letter - - whilst on sick leave - that, although he is now well enough to be interviewed, his recollection of the event is not very clear.
It has not, up to the present, been possible to see Skipper W. Martin, R.N.R. who was in command of the ship.
4.
In view of the very clear account given to me by Chief Skipper Grove, R.N.R. of WESTELLA who witnessed the sinking of BLACKBURN ROVERS, and on board whose ship
Commander English and Skipper Martin were taken, I do not consider that there is anything to be gained by interviewing either of these Officers.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, above 11166/40 aBeatord
VICE ADMIRAL.
1941
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Any further communication
CONFIDENTIAL.
NL
d be addressed to:-
Secretary of the Admiralty,
11798
London, S.W.I.
110
quoting " 29/28 A.B/40
1940
Admiralty, S.W.1.
1 the outside of the velope as well as in
4th October, 1940
e text.
Report of Enquiry into the loss of H.M. M/S Trawler POLLY JOHNSON
MILITARY
BRAN
in operation "Dynamo".
6F OCT 1940
Sir,
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40
dated 1st August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report arising from an enquiry into the loss of
H.M. M/S Trawler POLLY JOHNSON on 29th May, 1940.
2.
Skipper Lieutenant L. Lake, R.N.R. who was in command of POLLY JOHNSON was examined on 1st October, 1940.
3.
At about 1500 on 29th May when POLLY JOHNSON was secured to CALVI which was alongside the pier at Dunkirk and astern of GRENADE, she was subjected to a heavy bombing attack.
Splinters from near misses perforated the ship's port side with small holes just above the water line and put the 12 pdr. gun out of action.
4.
The ship was subjected to further bombing attacks during the next two hours but at 1700, with about 50 troops and some survivors from GRENADE on board, she proceeded out of harbour, being able to make only very slow speed.
5.
Engine and Boiler rooms were making water steadily and ship's pumps were unable to cope with the rate of flooding.
6.
At about 1830 midway between Middlekerk and Nieuport
Buoys when it was obvious that POLLY JOHNSON would not remain afloat much longer, Trawler ARLEY came alongside and took all hands on board.
7.
ARLEY then endeavoured to destroy POLLY JOHNSON by gunfire but failed and left her in a sinking condition in about
7/8 fathoms. It is considered, however, that she was unlikely to remain afloat for long.
8.
Although it was not possible to elicit full particulars of the damage sustained by this ship it seems, from the evidence, in view of the fact that water was fast entering the Engine and Boiler room that this compartment was flooding below the waterline as result of heavy underwater explosions.
The flooding was accentuated when draught increased to admit water through holes already made above the waterline.
9.
Secret Charts were burnt in the stokehold before ship was abandoned and all S.P's and C.B's were transferred to ARLEY
and landed at Dover.
10, is the desirability of these craft carrying a number of varying
The only point brought out in the loss of this vessel size wooden plugs for stopping shot holes.
11./
Secretary of the Admiralty.

C.W FORM-F.6.
ADMIRALTY,
LONDON, S.W.1.
NFIDENTIAL.
ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE
I
am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to inform you
Mr candidate for an appointment in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. He has your name as a reference and I am accordingly to ask you to be good enough ply, in confidence, to the questions on the attached form of enquiry regarding and return the form as early as possible in the enclosed envelope.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
R.H.Hanta
Please return Part II of this form to
THE SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY
(C.W. Branch),
GROSVENOR GARDENS HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.
G/9600 100M 6/39 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671.

CONFIDENTIAL
Office of
The Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
Naval authority was definitely committed to provide for the evacuation of French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
50,000.
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French e Secretary as/
of the Admiralty,
London, S. W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 32.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Tuesday, 4th June (continued).
have an air reconnaissance over the Channel.
It was reported that a Transport was lying on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines and also a barge east of the Goodwins with survivors on board.
C. in C. Nore, despatched 2 M.T.B.'s to find the
Transport with no avail. On the 5th the R.A.F. speedboat did a sweep south of a line Goodwin/Boulogne and recovered 33
French troops and two naval ratings. In addition French troops were picked up by patrols and brought in to Dover,
Margate and Ramsgate. Troops also arrived in French and ots
Belgian Trawlers totalling in all some additional 1,100.
Air reconnaissance was also carried out on the it morning of the 5th but nothing was reported.
at
:
1g n
ts
REMARKS ON THE INSHORE FLOTILLAS
NAVAL SHORE PARTIES.
ers,
98. About 400 small craft, ranging from Dutch skoots of to 30 ft. Motor boats, set out at various times to the
Flanders Coast. In addition scores of pulling boats, merchant ship life-boats, Naval cutters and whalers, were sent off in tow. Only a proportion - particularly of the ed pulling boats - succeeded in reaching the coast and taking active part in the evacuation. Fewer still were able to the remain off the coast for more than one period. Nevertheless these small craft, in conjunction with the pulling and power for boats of H. M. ships off the coast, were responsible for ps lifting more than 100,000 Allied troops direct off a stretch of open beach in shoal waters between 1600/27/5 and 0400/2/6.
Further, a large number of the power boats operated within
Dunkirk harbour on the last three nights, working principally in the inner harbour, which was continually under artillery fire, ferrying a further large uncounted number out to the 168
comparative safety of ships lying off.
off
99. Throughout the period all these craft of the inshore flotillas were subjected at one time or another to intense attack from the air, both by bombing and machine gun, and a large proportion also to sporadic bombardment by German artillery. Under this fire no case occurred of boats ceasing work as long as troops were in sight on shore, and movements of boats westward away from the fire zone only occurred as dictated by the military situation ashore.
100. The initial despatch of requisitioned and volunteer small craft was controlled from -
Naval Control Service, London,
S
Westminster Pier,
Ramsgate,
Gravesend,
Dover,
Southend,
Newhaven,
¡aval
Sheerness,
Portsmouth, preliminary/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 33.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Inshore Flotillas and Naval Shore Parties (continued).
preliminary action in most cases having originated in the
Admiralty Small Vessels Pool. As the operation proceeded,
Ramsgate was used as the main base for such craft, as being nearest to Dunkirk, but a small number of motor boats and skoots continued to work from Dover.
101. The work of servicing this multitude of small craft entailed an enormous amount of work by the base organisation at
Ramsgate, and to a lesser extent at Dover. Items typical of the work of the Ramsgate organisation are as follows:-
(a) Approximately 1,000 charts were issued by the Naval
Control Service, Ramsgate, to the various vessels taking part, some 600 of which had the routes laid off on them for those Commanding Officers who had neither parallel rules nor dividers, together with approximately 500 sets of routeing instructions.
(b) During the period 26th May to 4th June the number of vessels dealt with for defects of all kinds, including power, engine and electrical, at Ramsgate, was 170.
Included in this number were Dutch skoots, tugs, drifters, trawlers, motor lighters, ferry floats and motor boats of every conceivable type.
(c) All the small craft were initially without armament.
75 of the larger motor boats, skoots and tugs were armed with A.A. Lewis guns at Ramsgate, this armament being transferred from vessel to vessel as requisite during the operation. 23 Lewis gunners arrived from London and
2 officers with 12 R.A.S.C. cadets were also accepted for this service at Ramsgate. When British fighting troops were being evacuated in the later stages, the soldiers invariably mounted and fought their Bren guns as A.A.
armament for the ship they were in.
102. A large number of boats were quite unsuitable for work off an open beach. For example, a convoy of 6 Thames
Bawley boats were shepherded over from Southend and arrived off
Dunkirk beach at 1930/31, but owing to ground swell and the many offshore obstacles, such as semi-submerged lorries, it was considered impracticable to beach these craft. Bawley boats accordingly went along the outside of the East Pier of
Dunkirk harbour and started ferrying service to the skoots lying empty outside the harbour entrance. The swell alongside made embarkation duties from outside the jetty too difficult, so Bawley boats proceeded inside Dunkirk harbour working mainly from the inner harbour which was under heavy shell fire. All Bawley boats were loaded up and left harbour about 0300/1. On reaching Ramsgate at 0930/1 the boats were so much damaged as not to be fit for further service.
The conduct of the CROWS of those cockle boats was exemplary. They were all volunteers who wore rushed over to
Dunkirk in one day, probably none of thom had been under gun fire before and cortainly none of thom had ever been under Naval discipline. Those boats were Thames ostuary fishing boats/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 35,
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Inshore Flotillasand Naval Shore Parties (continued)
boats which had been cast away by the soldiers on disembarkation.
106. By the night of the 30th/31st a considerable number of collapsible boats and pontoons had been received from the Royal Engineers of the B.E.F. These were of great assistance and paddled off about 10 men in each trip, but again, in spite of all efforts, in the vast majority of cases, the soldiers left these craft when they arrived at the offshore ship.
107. Much of the most meritorious work of lifting off the beaches was done by the offshore warships' own boats, who were tireless in their efforts. All small pulling boats and small power boats were lowered and were lent from ship to ship when their own parent ship left the coast to unload at a United Kingdom port. In addition, H.M. ships seized drifting and abandoned boats as opportunity offered and manned them up with boat keepers. Owing to the physical exhaustion of these boats' crews after hours of work, relief crews of stokers were frequently provided from amongst the many volunteers that came forth.
108. A typical example of dogged work by a ship's boat was afforded by the action of JAVELIN's and JAGUAR's boats off Bray beach in the afternoon of 28/5. When their two motor cutters and two whalers first grounded offshore they were rushed and swamped by soldiers. Order being restored the boats had to be baled out and the wet engines restarted, following which 700 troops were embarked by these few boats in a short time during continuous bombing attacks.
109. Of the power boats available by far the most useful and suitable were the A.L.Cs., M.L.Cs. and the small type of R.N.L.I. life-boat. The high speed service motor boats such as DOLPHIN's and EXCELLENT's boats and the R.A.F.
Seaplane tenders proved unsuitable for work in shallow waters on a lee shore owing to the vulnerability of their propellers and rudders and their poor manoeuvring powers at low speeds.
110. Of the civilian manned craft one of the best performances was that of the London Fire Brigade fire float
MASSEY SHAW. All the volunteer crew were members of the
London Fire Brigade or Auxiliary Fire Service and succeeded in doing 4 round trips to the beaches in their well-found craft. In contrast to this performance and that also of the R.N.L.I. crews of the Ramsgate and Margate life-boats, who took their boats over to Dunkirk, no volunteers, except for the coxswain and engineer of the Dover life-boat, were forthcoming from the R.N.L.I. crews of the other life-boats, which were accordingly manned by R.N. crews. Also it must be noted that civilian craft of such flotillas as the Rye fishing fleet did not relish the idea of carrying out ferrying work off the Flanders coast. Fishing boats and pleasure boats from as far along the south coast as Brixham and
Dartmouth arrived at various times up to p.m. 30/5, but again the civilian crews were not prepared to proceed to Dunkirk.
Accordingly, the most suitable of such boats as could be manned by the Naval personnel available were taken up, but the remainder took no part in the operations.
111./

SECRET.
Meet Friday 3.
Office of
Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No.A.14/0/1015/40.
5th July, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report and enclosures containing my recommendations of personnel who took part in Operation Dynamo, namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between the 26th May and 4th June, 1940.
2.
The special features of this Operation were the air attacks on ships and embarkation points, unparalleled for duration and intensity.
Unlike a naval engagement, the majority of ships and vessels operated over a prolonged period, having to return again and again to face most difficult conditions of navigation and strong enemy activity. These conditions demanded a high degree of physical and mental endurance, apart from courage and determination in the face of enemy action.
3.
The roll of officers and men considered to be deserving of special recognition for their services in this
Operation has been divided into two parts - List 'A' and List
"B".
List "A" comprises those recommended for decoration, for advancement, or for mention.
List 'B' contains recommendations for mention only.
The reason for making a sub-division is that I believe the total number of officers and men recommended is somewhat high, judged by normal standards of naval actions in the past, but at the same time, I should not be doing justice to the deeds of officers and men on this occasion if I did not bring to notice all those whose services I consider to be thoroughly deserving of recognition.
List 'B', therefore, has been formed by taking from the original single list:-
(1) a large number of officers who are undoubtedly
P
deserving of recognition, but whose presence in
List A' would make the proportion of officers to men on that list considerably greater than Admiralty policy hitherto has directed. Some of these
)
officers, were the whole truth known, would undoubtedly fully merit decoration. As it is, thisy still leaves the proportion of officers to men on
List 'A' at 1 to 2.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Admiralty,
London, 8.W.1.

SECRET
Page 18, eration "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel - List 'B'
STAFF OF
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING, DOVER.
Officers.
5th
Acting Lieutenant John Herbert Toon, R.N.
Warrant Telegraphist Walter Arthur Frederick Maybourn,R.N.
Ratings.
Chief Petty Officer Telegraphist Richard Arthur Webb,P.21808
Signalman Eric Joseph Bence, R.N.V.R., L.D./9X 4289
Signalman Desmond Wilson Jeffery, R.N.V.R., LD/9X 4277
some
BASE STAFFS (H.M.S. LYNX).
th
Officers.
tion
B
Warrant Supply Officer Fred Buckley, R.N. (Retd.)
Rating.
espatch
Supply Chief Petty Officer C. F. McCoy, C/MX.50984
COMMODORE SUPERINTENDENT, H.M.S. SANDHURST
and
BASE REPAIR STAFF.
Officers.
Lieutenant-Commander Cecil Graham Lawson, R.N.
Surgeon-Commander John Alfred Cusack, R.N.
Lieutenant-Commander (E) Edward Crossen, R.N. (Retd.)
atto in
Admiralty,
London. S.W.1.

SECRET
Office of
Flag Officer Commanding Dover.
No. A/14/0/1038/40
9th July,1940
Sir,
With reference to Dover Despatch No. A14/0/1015/40 of 5th
July, 1940, forwarding recommendations of personnel who took part in Operation "Dynamo", be pleased to inform Their Lordships that
I have just received a list of recommendations from Captain E.L.
Berthon, D.S.C.,R.N,, Captain (D) 19th D.F. and Commanding H.M.S.
"Keith" at the time of her loss, which brings to notice for the first time several acts of gallantry and courageous conduct by personnel of the ship.
Captain Berthon himself was wounded and has been for some time in the R.N. Hospital, Chatham, but in spite of this he has clearly spared no pains to collect evidence and render his recommendations as soon as possible.
2.
In the original despatch H.M.S. "Keith" is dealt with on page 21 of List A. It is now submitted for the consideration of Their Lordships that the accompanying pages 21, 21A and 21B
may be substituted for that previously forwarded.
3.
The figures given in paragraph 5 of the original despatch will require amendment as follows:-
List "A" contains the names of -
227 Officers
457 Men of these, recommendations are made for:-
327 for decoration,
347 for mention,
10 for advancement.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant.
(Signed) B. H. RAMSAY.
VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty,
Admiralty,
London. S.W.1.

a
694
i
Chairman
NAVAL OFFICERS RELATIVES
Deputy pay
566. Woodchurch Road,
*
28 SEP 1940
Oxton, Secretary
INFORMATION BUREAU
Birkenhead.
25th, Septr. I940.
The Relatives of Officers Infor.Bureau.
Admiralty,
LONDON.S.W.
Sirs, the C.O. of the
I have been advised by my has -
Allied services rendered in the withdrawal of
Armies from the beaches at Dunkirk. the been the above no intimation from the Admiralty
Up to the present there has the matter so perhaps you can advise of as to what the 'mention' me means. on
Yours faithfully

C.W./40.
5th October,
40.
Sir, addressed to the Relatives of Officers Information
In reply to your letter of the 25th September
Bureau, I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the award of a posthumous Mention in Despatches to the Admiralty to inform you that the King approved your son, the late Sub. Lieutenant Humphreys, R.N.,
"for good services in the withdrawal of the Allied
Armies from the beaches at Dunkirk". This award was published in the Second Supplement to the London
Gazette of Friday, 16th August, 1940, Number 34925, p.5068, of which I enclose a copy.
It is His Majesty's desire that in due course all officers and men who have been mentioned in despatches should receive a certificate to that effect, the design of which is now under consideration. In the case of deceased officers this certificate will be sent to their next of kin.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
Birkenhead.

Lieutenant Derek Peel Willan. Rovel
H
:
you publication in next authorised for press
H.I
Landa Subtemant
3
he admiralty
REGIST
15, Sunningdale Drive which
S.W.1. 1.
Oakwood
August,
The Sicretary of the Admirally.
Sun. Salford. Oct13/40
I that
Dear Sir
I big to acknowledge receive with
Ks, for the Copy of The Second supplement to The insus /40 m
9 of my award-
8th October,
0
CW.19295/40
edging same as I
Sir, rs Daythfully
I am commanded by My Lords b.. mason
Commissioners of the Admiralty to thank you for your letter WHC/EF/JS 10607 of the 14th June, 1940, concerning the
Radio offices services of Captain Mallory, Master of the S.S. MALINES in the Dunkirk withdrawal, and I am to say that Their
Lordships have given full consideration to all reports that have been received of the Services of Officers in this operation.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, rean Cowley not only
It is hoped that
"Iuence in the Isle good name.
The General Secretary,
The Officers (Merchant
Navy) Federation,
23 Leadenhall Street,
London, E.C.3.
retry
AD
S AXOMENT ALLEEMO 77239
BICO DIO SEX Group n
Lieutenant Artnur Alan whitshed POLICE TEEMS go CAHOJ 0 LEARTS (1) RESEER
Captain
Roval Navy, H.M.S. Codrington.
YES
Transport Levenwood.

Lieutenant Derek Peel Willan
H.M.S.
you publication in next authorised for press eutenant
Navy, H
Lieut
London gayelte Supplement
H
Me wahicdrow čorrectionsindicated below are made in the notification which appeared The in Supplementary London Gazette No 34925, dated 16th August, 19
1940:-
0
Page 5064.
the heading To be Companions of the Distinguished Service Order.
I Hall
Havy should
3
Second Sea Lord.
On reading F.O.C.Dover's report quoted in the letter from the Governor of the Isle of Man, the Admiralty shared the view of the Governor and no award was made to "Manxman" at the time (Gasette 16.8.40). Early in January however the abbed X.
Admirality received from the Ministry of Shipping a copy of a letter addressed to the Ministry, on 31st December 194.0, by the Mercantile Marine Service Association. In the light of this letter it appeared that an injustice might have been done, possibly through misunderstanding on the part of the Sea Transport Officer, and F. O.C. Dover was asked to abbed T.
enquire and report.
abbed 2.
His reply exonerated Captain Cowley and he was avarded a
Mention in Despatches and sent a letter informing him of this and expressing regret at the misunderstanding. A certificate of his Mention WD.S also sent to him.
For come months the mistake cost Cantain Cowley not only his employment but also his reputation. It is hoped that
Lord Granville will now use his great influence in the Isle of Man to help restore Captain Cowley's good name.
12th May, 1941.
Captain
Transport LevenwoRd.val Navy, H.M.S. Codrington.
Lieutenant Arthur Alan Whitshed Pollard,

19.
"
which
Mr. Engineer, Launch Haig.
Mr. Norman Regisald >mith, Walter, Chief First Engineer, Hospital Carrier Dinard.
Mr. Donald Brewer, Yacht Engineer, H.M.Y.Lahloo.
Mr. Thomas McDermott Weir, Yacht Engineer, H.M.Y. Eila II.
Mr. C
Coggins, Engineer, M.Y. Masayru.
Mr. Raymond Crane, Engineer, M.V. Laroc.
/Mr. / William Leonard Evans, Second Engineer, Royal Daffodil
Mr. James Steward, Second Engineer, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
'Mr. Frank Cherry, Third Engineer, (Able Seaman), Launch Swallow.
VMr. James Henry Edward Spain, Third Engineer, Launch Kestrel.
Mr. W StamLister, Lister, Purser, 58 Tynwald.
Mr. Paddy McFadden, Beatswain, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Mr. Douglas Kirkaldie, Coxswain, Motor Boat Fervent.
Able Seaman T
Bassett, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Able Seaman John Fowles, Hospital Carrier Isle of Guernsey.
Able Seaman Henry Charles Herring Hay, Launch Swallow.
Able Seaman John Upperton, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Ordinary Seaman Clifford Barrett, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Fireman Ali Khan, S.S. Dorrien Rose.
Fireman Abdul Mohand, S.S Dorrien Rose.
Fireman Rbet Phillips, S.S. Biarritz.
wre
Carpenter J
Gaste, S.STynwald.
S.S.
Donkeyman A
Allen,,Tynwald.
Deckhand Leonard Lynn, M.V. Daroc.
Steward H
A
E
Frost, M.V. Laroc.
Mrs. A. Goodrich, Stewardess, Hospital Carrier Dinard.
Mr. William Ferguson, Acting Naval Store Officer.
/1 Mr. Robert William Whidby Corbutt, Acting Deputy Naval Store Officer.
Mr. Donald John Woods, Deputy Armament Supply Officer.
Mr. Archibald Armytage Bakewell, Deputy Victualling Store Officer.
Lance Corporal Chapman, 6208138, 1/8th Middlesex Regiment.
21
William Cecil Ernest Smith, R.A.M.C., 7520070.
Fireman EAMMMAXGX Henry Albert William Ray, Auxiliary Fire Service,
London Fire Brigade Fire Fleat Massey Shaw
Fireman Edmund Gordon Wright, Auxiliary Fire Service, London Fire
Brigade Wire Fle

18.
Han
Ordinary Seaman Bert Marston, P/JX.175182, H.M.S. Worcester.
Ordinary Seaman John Philip Charles Mead, LT/JX.193106, H.M.Y.Christock
Ordinary Seaman Hugh Watson Miller, C/JX.170010, H.M.S. Royal Eagle.
Ordinary Seaman Frank Arthur Victor Patrick, C/JX.171302, H.M.S.Crest
Eagle.
Ordinary Seaman Thomas Edgar Whyte, R.N.V.R., CD/X.133, Newhaven
Life Boat Rosa Wood and Phyll
Lund.
Seaman Arthur George Farrow, LT/JX.179655, H.M.S. Glenavon.
Seaman George Fred Mathews, R.N.P.S., LT/JX.185264, H.M.D.The Boys.
Seaman Raymond Allenby Stone, R.M.R., X.19746A, H.M.S. Jaguar.
Ordinary Signalman Victor Albert Leslie Shallis, LD/X.4505, H.M.
Danlayer Gulzar.
Stoker Second Class Ralph Kearvell, P/KX,87052,H.M.S. Worcester
Stoker John Pirie, R.N.R., X.10415,S., H.M.D. Dorienta.
Second Hand John Malcolm Fenwick, LT/JX.185753, H.M.Y. Alouette 1.
Engineman James Smith, H.M. H Drifter Douenta.
Fireman John Develand Connell, T.124, H.M.S. Medway Queen.
Cook George Henry Cliefe, T.124, H.M.Danlayer Gulzar.
Deckhand Charles
E
Baldry, T.124, H.M.Danlayer Gulzar.
Captain William Hay Baker, Master, S.S. Biarritz.
Captain Herbert Cecil Bond, Master, S.S. St. Andrew.
Captain II
F
Boyce, Master, Hopper Barge 24,
Captain George Beaumont Butler, Master, M.V.Laroc.
Captain John Willimm Dickinson, Master, Ngorama.
Captain Henry Clarke, Master, Princess Maud.
Captain RederickJohn Hopwood, Master, Tug Lady Brassey.
Captain Eyril Glad west Hughes, O.B.E., S.S. Master, S.S. Nephrite.
Captain R chard Hughes, Master, Killarney.
Captain Welfred # yvon Larbalestier, Master, S.S Roebuck.
Captain Ewen Mackinnon, Master, Loch Garry.
Captain William Josiah Penny, Master,
Lord Rodney.
Captain
A
M
Pooke, Master,
Lady Southborough.
Captain Thomas C
Woods, Master,
Lady of Mann.
Captain R
G
Banks, Acting Master, Lighter X.209.
Mr. John William Ailwyn Jones, Chief Officer, Hospital Carrier Vinard
Mr. Reginald Frederick Pembry, Chief Officer, Hospital Carrier Isle
Mn Arthur Patrick Joseph Paterson, First Officer, M.
Mr. Jack Lynn, Mate, M.V.Laroc.
Mr. Victor Smith, Mate, Java.
Service,
Mr. John Bingham Woodhouse, Second Officer, S.S. Prague it Massey Shaw
London Fire
Brigade Wire Flo

C.W.19295
(Revised-June, 1983.)
D-51.
1940
FROM WHOM
DATE
Merchant Service Vessels employed in Operation "Dynamo".
/
(Extracted from Case 5458).
Personnel Ships
Case 5458 Vol. III. 7.)
29.
QUEEN OF THE CHANNEL
"
III. 6.
sunk
1.
"
DORRIEN ROSE
"
1.
NEW PRINCE OF WALES
"
III. 6.)
sunk
1.
SCOTTISH CORPORATION
"
III. 6.)
1.
MASSEY SHAW
"
III. 6 & 8)
1.
LIGHTER X 209
"
III. 6.)
1.
C.E.in C. TUG PRIMA
)
"
III. 6.)
1.
"
HOPPER BARGE W.24)
1.
"
"
"
W.26)
1.
"
"
"
W.95)
1.
THYRA
1.
PUDGE
London and Rochester ( "
II.5.)
1.
CABBY
Trading Company,
1.
SEINE
)
Limited.
1.
BEFENDER
1.
RELIANCE
1.
LETITIA
Bawley Boats
III 8
1.
ENDEAVOUR
"
Civilian crews.
1.
RESOLUTE
1.
RENOWN (Sunk)
1.
QUEENSLAND,
Tilbury Dredging Company.
(Case 5458.Vol.III.8.)
1.
JOHANNA
"
(Dutch eel boat)
III.8. 1.
River M/L "MADAME SANS GENE" (sunk)
"
III.8.) 1.
M/V "SEA ROAMER"
"
III.8.) 1.
"FAAR BREEZE" Drifter
1.
Votor Boat "KIT CAT"
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Southend Lifeboat "GREATER LONDON"
1.
Launch belonging to Skylark Shipbuilding
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Co. Poole.
opper " Barge "Lady Southborough"
1.
"
1.
QUEEN'S CHANNEL
"
"
GALLIONS RANCH
Tilbury l.
"
(
"
"
FOREMOST 101.
Contracting
III.8.) 1.
"
"
FOREMOST 102.
& Dredging
1.
"
"
1.
JAMES 67.
Company.
Dutch eel boat "CHANTECLER"
(
"
III.8.) 1.
Motor Life Boat unnamed,
#
(S.Lt.Amos, R.N.V.R.)
III.8.) 1.
Motor Yacht "RYGATE II"
"
III.8. 1.
M/B "QUICKSILVER"
"
III.8. 1.
Motor Cruiser "BOBELI"
"
III.8.) 1.
M/B "RAPIDE"
"
III.8.) 1.
"NAID ERRANT"
"
III.8.) 1.
M/B "THARK"
#
III.8.) 1.
Total. 71.
Mainly civilian crew, but R.N. or R.N.R.Officer in command.

Wt. 47238/0555 40M 2/40 S.E.R. Ltd. Gp. 671.
ADMIRALTY.
REFERENCE SHEET.
g, rom The Head of Military Branch
To The First Lord
THE
CW
OFFICERS
MERCHANT
NAVY
FEDERATION LTD.
Representing Navigating and Engineer Officers of the British Merchant Navy.
MEMBER OF
Registered Office: 23, LEADENHALL STREET, LONDON, E.C.3.
THE NATIONAL
MARITIME BOARD
All correspondence to
Our Ref.
WHC/EF/JS.10607
TELEPHONE: MANSION HOUSE 0455 (3 LINES)
be addressed to the
Your Ref.
TELEGRAMS: "PULONEROPE. FEN. LONDON."
General Secretary.
Branch Offices in Liverpool, Glasgow, Cardiff, Southampton
Representatives in all principal Ports at Home and Abroad
19295
June 1940.
he Federation is governed by a epresentative Council of
The Secretary,
The Admiralty,
19401
Ls avigating and Engineer Officers,
S. W.
ected by its Constituent
Associations.
16JUNE4A
Sir,
PRESIDENT
re: Captain G. Mallory of REGIST
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR EDWARD
HEATON ELLIS, K.B.E., C.B., M.V.O.
S.S. "MALINES".
GENERAL MANAGER:
WILLIAM H. COOMBS
We are given to understand that the Masters of
(MASTER MARINER)
the ships engaged in the Dunkirk evacuation have been asked to report on services of special merit rendered
Federated Organisations:
by their officers and crews.
UNITED KINGDOM.
We are quite certain that Masters will refrain
Navigators & Engineer Officers Union.
Navigators 8 General Insurance Co., Ltd.
from making any reference to their own particular
Radio Officers Union.
service, and it is for this reason that we venture
AUSTRALIA.
to inform you that we have been asked by some of the
Merchant Service Guild of Australasia.
officers concerned, to venture to direct your
CHINA AND HONG KONG.
attention to the work of Captain Mallory, Master of
China Coast Officers Guild.
the S.S. "MALINES" owned by the L.N.E.R.
Marine Engineers Guild of China.
NEW ZEALAND.
You will be aware that he answered distress
New Zealand Merchant Service Guild.
signals from H.M.S. "GRAFTON" and we understand he
STRAITS SETTLEMENTS.
put his ship alongside the "GRAFTON" and was
Straits Merchant Service Guild.
instrumental in saving approximately 1000 lives and subsequently picked up survivors from H.M.S. "WAKEFUL"
Canadian Merchant CANADA. Service Guild.
I understand that the officers of his ship,
Parliamentary Committee:
both deck and engine-room officers, were greatly immodore The Rt. Hon, The Earl Howe, impressed by the fine seamanship and cool courage
Lord Churston.
[P.C., C.B.R., R.N.V.R.
ement leut Davies, Esq., K.C., shown by their Captain.
P. -Commdr. R.T.H. Fletcher, M.P. R.N., M.P.
dmiralof the Bart., Fleet, Sir Roger J.B. Keyes,
Herbert, Esq., M.P.
We trust that it will be possible for Captain
Mallory's name to be considered if awards are in ommander -Col, Stephen King-Hall, M.P., M.P. etc.
G.C.B., K.C.V.O.
contemplation.
J. T. C, Moore-Brabazon, R.N., leut.-Col. M. Pickthorn, Esq., M M.P. C.,
M.P
D, Smiles, M.A.,
C.I.E., D.S. O., M.P.

CONFIDENTIAL.
Office of
The Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No. B. 14/0/1316.
18th June, 1940.
The Secretary of the Admiralty, London, S.W.1.
Copies to: The Ministry of Shipping.
The Permanent Under Secretary of State for War.
The Director of Sea Transport, Admiralty.
The Principal Sea Transport Officer,
Southampton.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Work of Personnel Vessels.
I have deemed it desirable, in drawing up my report on Operation DYNAMO, namely the evacuation of the Allied
Armies from Dunkirk between 26th May and 4th June, to deal separately with the work carried out by the "Personnel" vessels
(or transports) in order that copies may be sent to other authorities concerned, without the necessity for sending them the full report.
2. The work of these vessels has accordingly been summarised in the accompanying report, which it is requested may be placed before Their Lordships for their information.
3. I have already transmitted (Dover Letter 4th June,
1940 - No.B.23/862/40) a brief list of personnel recommended for immediate award or decoration (which His Majesty has been pleased to accept), and I will forward a further list at a later date when time has permitted a full examination of all the reports.
Vice Admiral.

22953
Captain G. Mallony. SS Malines.
cw 19295/40. (alto)
Capt: Mallory very well reported on by the officers [Mercht havy] tederation.
But VA Davis Report (attache) an " Dynams"
Personnel fessels
(= Manapata
P3 §10 =
The Malines who had completed two tipo repused to sail on the 1ˢᵗ, left Doner at 1600 without order + was subsequently found to have proceeded the
23
The General Secretary,
The Officers (Merchant
Navy) Federation,
23 Leadenhall Street,
London, E.C.3.
AD
Wt.48364/D6526 1,000,000 6/40 S.P. Co., Ltd. 51-6446

22953
(Revised "June, 1933.)
1940
51.
FROM WHOM
DATE
hilitary secretary BEF.
7. 7.40.
MARKINGS TO BOARD.
SUBJECT.
Worcester
Second Sea " Lord.
appreciation of services in evacuating trops from Dunkirk.
cdove. W.P. Gandell R.N.
Caps. H.A.B. Digley. Beore R.I.N.
FORMER
Cape. w.e. G. Jennet R.N
call hewis. R.N.
CNX 154411. A.B. Burrows.
appreciation of services
NOTATION ONLY
Referred
Referred
Date
Date to
Referred to
Date to
CW. 19295/40 8th October,
0
Sir,
I am commanded by My Lords
Comissioners of the Admiralty to thank you for your letter WHC/EF/JS 10607 of the 14th June, 1940, concerning the services of Captain Mallory, Master of
23
the S.S. MALINES in the Dunkirk withdrawal, and I am to say that Their
Ardships have given full consideration to all reports that have been received of the Services of Officers in this operation.
RO
2/5/44
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
The General
23 Leadenhall Street,
London, E.C.3.
AD
Wt. 48364/D6526 1,000,000 6/40 & Co., Ltd. 51-6446

&
C.W.22953
THE SECRETARY,
ADMIRALTY,
1940
LONDON, S.W.l.
Reference attached copy of a letter received from the General Officer Commanding,
1st Division.
General the Viscount Gort, V.C., G.C.B.,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., wishes me to convey his thanks and appreciation for the gallant aid given by all ranks of H.M.S.WORCESTER.
C.A. Jondane to
58 Cadogan Square,
Brigadier,
London, S.W.1.
Military Secretary,
British Expeditionary Force.
17th July 1940.
YTT anougha crm9 TTAUS non TOO OTTM SMOTO arm? am TO
spite of suffering continual casualties among the crews was the admiration of all. The Army owes a debt to this gallant ship's company for the large number of lives saved and brought safely into the home port.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) J.C. Currio, Lt.Col. R.A.

The Secretary,
Admiralty,
London, S.W.1.
COPY.
TO:- Commander, Royal Artillery,
1st Division.
FROM:- Commanding Officer
2nd Field Regt., R.A.
Sir,
I have the honour to request that the gallant action of the Captain and crew of H.M.S. Worcester on Saturday
June 1st, may be recorded and reported to the Lords of the
Admiralty. A considerable number of officers and men of this Regiment embarked in H.M.S. Worcester at approximately
1600 hours at Dunkirke on 1st June.
Bombs were being dropped in the harbour at the time though no attack was actually made on the ship at this period. No attempt was made to leave until the ship had as full a load as possible, and during the period of loading the officers and crow were a. splendid example of coolness, and continued to assist the troops in embarking as though nothing was happening. Shortly after leaving the harbour H.M.S. Worcester was twice attacked by numbers of dive bombers, at least 8 aeroplanes taking part in the second attack.
A very large number of bombs were dropped. Considerable damage was done to the ship and a large number of casualties were caused, and it was a general opinion among all ranks on board that it was only the cool and brilliant handling of the ship, already only able to proceed at half speed, that saved the lives of all on board.
Added to this, the magnificent performance of the guns' crews who served their guns throughout in spite of suffering continual casualties among the crews was the admiration of all. The Army owes a debt to this gallant ship's company for the large number of lives saved and brought safely into the home port.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(signed) J.C. Currio, Lt.Col. R.A.

The Secretary,
Admiralty,
London, S.W.1.
General the Viscount Gort, V.C., G.C.B.,
C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O., M.C., wishes to bring to the notice of the Lords of the Admiralty, the following officers of the Royal Navy, and to convey his thanks for their services:-
OMIT.
COMMODORE W.P. GANDELL, R.N., who was P.S.T.O. with the B.E.F. from its inception. The greatest
PSTO
assistance was given by this officer throughout,
Clyde and it is due to his loyal co-operation that arrangements in regard to naval transport worked
79 Newanks with such efficiency.
Greense
CAPTAIN H.A.B. DIGBY-BESTE, C.I.E., O.B.E., R.I.N.
to who was assistant to the P.S.T.O., and to whom the B.E.F. are greatly indebted for his
H.M.S. Victory Fore unfailing co-operation and help, especially in respect of the embarkation of the B.E.F. from
France.
Divisional Luwich Sea Transport
CAPTAIN TENNENT, R.N. and the Naval Officers and ratings under his Command. The Royal Navy assisting the Army in the evacuation of the troops from Dunkirke displayed throughout
A
77n this very difficult operation, skill, determination, and devotion to duty worthy
2684
of the highest tradition of the Royal Navy.
COMMANDER LEWIS, R.N. who, in conjunction with other officers, organised the docks and the shipping and unloading of ships and was always to be found in the docks area - the most unpleasant and dangerous area in Dunkirke.
C.J.X.154411, ABLE SEAMAN BURROWS, R.N., H.M.S." PEMBROKE"
(ex "ESQUIMO"), whose name was forwarded under cover of my letter dated 1st July 1940.
C A Jandane
58 Cadogan Square,
Brigadier,
London, S.W.1.
Military Secretary,
British Expeditionary Force.
17th July 1940.

30th July, 40.
C.W.22953/40.
H.M.S. WORCESTER: Aid given to the Royal
Artillery at Dunkerque,
Tune
Copies sent to the five names mentiohedoin the ext.
the Secretary,
Admiralty, London, S.W.1.
General the Viscount Gort, V.C., G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.,M.V.O.
M.C., wishes to bring to the notice of the Lords of the Admiralty, the following officers of the Royal Navy, and to convey his thanks for their services:-
COMMODORE W.P.GANDELL. R.N., who was P.S.T.O. with the B.E.F. from its inception. The greatest assistance was given by this officer throughout, and it is due to his loyal co-operation that arrangements in regard to naval transport worked with such efficiency.
CAPTAIN H.A.B. DIGBY-BESTE. C.I.E., O.B.E. R.I.N. who was msistant to the P.S.T.O., and to whom the B.E.F. are greatly indebted for his unfailing co-operation and help, especially in respect of the embarkation of the B.E.F. from France.
CALTAIN TENNENT. R.N. and the Naval Officers and ratings under his
Command. The Royal Navy assisting the Army in the evacuation of the troops from Dunkirke displayed throughout this very difficult operation, skill, determination, and devotion to duty worthy of the highest tradition of the Royal Navy.
COMMANDER LEWIS. R.N. who, in conjunction with other officers, organised the docks and the shipping and unloading most of ships and was always to be found in the docks area - the unpleasant and dangerous area in Dunkirke.
C.J.X. 154411, ABLE SEAMAN BURROWS, R.N., H.M.S. letter PEMBROKE (ex ESQUIMO)
whose name was forwarded under cover of my dated 1st July,
1940.
(signed) C.A. Jardine,
Brigadier,
Military Secretary,
58 Cadogan Square,
British Expeditionary Force.
London, S.W.1.
17th July, 1940.
51-6446