TNA ADM 199 792

112
CONFIDENTIAL
110
Office of
The Flag DOVER. Officer Commanding,
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an
Naval definitely committed to provide for the extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
50,000. evacuation or French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French
Secretary as/
London,,Salty, 1.

Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
CONFIDENTIAL18
Page 7.
Boulind
116
WAVERLEY. abandoned 600 in troops were on board before ship picked up.
sinking condition, but only 200-300 was were have through these and similar disasters on
In been all lost it is regretted that about 2,000 troops must the return voyages to England.
14.
CO-OPERATION OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
French warships and other vessels were employed evacuating French troops from Dunkirk harbour, and on the last three nights from the beach 1½ miles eastward from Dunkirk.
Details are given in Appendix V.
15.
BASE ORGANISATION.
An operation of this magnitude involving the maintenance and movements of close on 900 vessels and boats could not have been conducted without the wholehearted and unceasing efforts of the base establishments at Dover and
Ramsgate, as well as those at Sheerness and Harwich in the
Nore Command, At all these places officers and men, Naval and civilian, laboured unceasingly throughout the Operation.
In particular I wish to acknowledge the great assistance received from the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, who in many cases anticipated my requests for assistance through his constant watch on the progress of the Operation.
The prompt and unfailing assistance afforded by the Chatham Depot in providing personnel for the numerous small craft, working parties and beach parties, was a feature essential to the successful outcome of the Operation.
The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, by taking over the servicing and control of the great majority of the small craft of the inshore flotillas relieved Dover of an immense volume of work which it would otherwise have been impossible to handle.
It was also broughtto my notice that at Harwich an exceptional Naval and Military system was in being for assisting those ships which called there to make a quick turn round, relieving the tired ships' companies of the work of cleaning and clearing their vessels.
16.
SERVICES OF STAFF, INCLUDING OFFICERS
TEMPORARILY APPOINTED.
I was fortunate in having the services or
Rear Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker, C.B., O.B.E., as Flag Officer afloat off Dunkirk, and Captain W.G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O., as Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk on shore. Admiral Wake-
Walker was responsible for supervising the embarkation afloat and Captain Tennant for organising embarkation from the shore, keeping touch with the French Naval Authorities and the Staff of the British Commander-in-Chief.
Detailed particulars of their services were given in Dover Despatch No. B.23/862/40 of 4th June, 1940.
I cannot conclude this despatch without reference to the splendid work of my staff under the guidance of my Staff/ Chica

136
25
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 15.
134
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
30/5
Thursday, 30th May (continued).
48.
Arrangements for the final evacuation of the Rearguard of the B.E.F.
During the forenoon representatives of the
Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. and staff attended a conference with the Vice Admiral.
The Military officers explained the Commander-in-
Chief's plan and gave daylight on Saturday, 1st June, as the latest reasonable date up to which the B.E.F. might be expected to hold the castern porimeter, the size of the corrosponding force being about 4,000.
By that date and time the Vice Admiral knew that he should be in possession of ocean-going tugs, ships' lifeboats and ships' power lifeboats which he could specially reserve for the climax of this critical operation. Accordingly, agreement was reached on the following:-
(a) That evacuation should proceed with the utmost vigour to ensure that by 0130 on 1st June the
British Forces ashore should have been reduced to the rear guard of 4,000.
(b) That special boats and tugs. should be accumulated and held aside to ensure them being available in the early hours of 1st June.
(c) That the plan should provide for lifting the rear guard of 4,000, plus R.N. beach parties, in one or more flights between 0130 and 0300 on the 1st June.
(d) Final decision based on the progress of the evacuation of the main body to be made by the
Vice Admiral at 1400 on Friday, 31st May, as to the possibility of adhering to the plan.
Other technical details were settled at the meeting and the
Military staff were given the assurance that the ever increasing rate of lifting showed every promise of enabling an affirmative decision to be given at the critical hour of
1400/31st May. After the conference the Military officers communicated the plan both to the War Office and the
Commander-in-Chief ashore.
49. Remarks.
The organisation of traffic to and from the beaches was recovering from the setback it had recei ved when all resources had to be thrown upon the beaches and Dunkirk
Harbour when the outflanking and forcing back of the B.E.F.
was thought to be imminent consequent upon the surrender of the Belgian forces. Furthermore, a number of organised, and freelance groups of small power boats, were commencing to arrive off the coast, who, by seizing the abandoned and drifting pulling boats, were able to do much to increase the rate of lifting from the beaches.
50/

138
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17." 136
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM, however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however, continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed the previous evening and during the night, None of these ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night, but horwhereabouts was unknown and it was feared that she had refused to sail.
In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be used for some of the trips and short endurance necessitated coaling between trips which could not be done in the vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy during the evening and night, and operations were greatly hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

141
CONFIDENTIAL.
Page
20.
139
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
31/5
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and tugs, which were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been ear-marked for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time, the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were being thinned out by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B. would shepherd the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats, whalers, cutters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had
31MM
occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and was informed by a Staff Officer that no more troops would embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

SECRET.
Bage 2.
186
188
June
6.
A second attempt was now made to tow the ship clear but little progress had been made before a third attack noon developped at about noon, carried out by a squadron of HENSCHEL?
dive bombers. By this time nearly all ammunition was expended and the 4.7" guns were firing S.A.P. in the hope of keeping the enemy at a distance. The Germans, however, made a determined diving attack which was well pressed home to about 400 feet.
The ship was completely smothered by hits and near misses some of which were of the "B" bomb type. The ship immediately began to settle and I gave the order to abandon ship. Thanks to the adequate preparations made by my First Lieutenant, Lieutenant-
Commander W.G.BOAKS, R.N., there were plenty of boats and carley floats ready for survivors. After collecting all stray swimmers the boats and floats pulled out to sea. LE JOLIE MASCOTTE
picked up 6 officers and 71 ratings and H.M.S. "WHITEHALL" 2
officers and 52 ratings. One whaler and the motor boat had proceeded too far over the shoals which run parallel to the coast for H.M.S. "WHITEHALL" to pick them up.
noon
Sunk
7.
H.M.S. 'BASILISK" sank in about 4 fathoms of water in approximate position with her upper deck awash. Although the Asdic and V.C.-V.F.
gear and all important documents had been destroyed I was anxious to complete the destruction of the vessel. Accordingly
I requested the Captain of H.M.S. "WHITEHALL" to fire guns and torpedoes. This was done and the ship was left on fire forward.
It is not certain whether any of the torpedoes hit and I
consider further destruction advisable. I intimated this in a signal timed 2036/1 to the Flag Officer Commanding Dover despatched as a secret hand message.
8.
When the ship was rendered immobile after the first attack I ordered the destruction of all Signal
Publications except the Fleet Signal Book bridge copy, Syko machine and current naval Syko card. This was done by Sub-
Lieutenant W.H.ELLIS, R.N. who burnt them in the two galleys.
All Confidential Books prefixed '0' were dumped overboard in a weighted sack except those out on loan to officers as these could not be got at due to damage aft. The Asdic gear in the cabinet and on the bridge was dismantled where possible and thrown overboard and the remainder smashed. The oscillator was removed and brought on the upper deck amidships as the final attack developped. It is not known for certain whether the oscillator slid overboard when the ship sank. V.C.-V.F. lanterns were unshipped and thrown overboard.
9.
The following books and documents were left on the bridge: C.B. 1618 Q and certain charge documents in the
Captain's springback and the Fleet Signal Book. The bridge was burning fiercely when last seen and it can be confidently stated that these documents and papers were destroyed.
10.
I would like to emphasise that the older destroyers with pom poms using belted ammunition and 4.7" guns with only 30 degrees elevation are no match for a determined air attack. OurcLewis guns had also been recently surrendered.
When ships of this type are operating within range of enemy air attack losses must be expected unless adequate fighter protection is afforded. In all the enemy launched four big air attacks at about hourly intervals during the forenoon of the 1st June. The first, second and fourth of these were unopposed apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft

187
SECRET.
Page 3.
189
apparently unopposed by any British Aircraft. On the third occasion an intense air battle could be heard in progress above the clouds and no effective bombing took place. I would also like to state that from my observation the enemy aircraft even when opposedcwere always more numerous than our own and in the subsequent air battles our fighters although outnumbered fought most courageously and effectively but generally lost more planes than the enemy. From our point of view the B.B.C.
Bulletins describing the air actions off Dunkirk entirely misrepresent the true situation.
11.
The courage and behaviour of my officers and men was a great inspiration to me during the four hours while the ship drifted without help under the threat of destruction.
Their cheerfulness and efficiency under these trying conditions was extraordinary. That so few were lost was almost miraculous but may be put down to some extent to the trained courage of the ship's company who fought their guns where possible and took cover when they could not otherwise be of use. It is most difficult where all conducted themselves valiantly to choose those specially conspicuous for their behaviour, but these I
append a list of those specially worthy of mention.
12.
The following Appendices are attached:-
Appendix I:-
Verbatim statement by various officers and ratings
Appendix II:-
List of known survivors and known killed.
Appendix III-
List of officers and men specially mentioned.
Appendix IV:-
Copy of preliminary report sent to the Flag
Officer Commanding Dover.
I have the honour to be,
Sir, your obedient servant,
Whachmond
The Commander in Chief,
Commander,
Western Approaches,
Royal Navy.
Copies to:- The Flag Officer Commanding, Dover.
Captain (D), 19th Destroyer Flotilla.
Captain (D), Plymouth.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
3-JUN1940
*
*
WESTERN APPROACHIES

219
217
SECRET.
Appendix II. to report of sinking of H.M.S. GRENADE.
After the explosion aft I observed a large number of ratings blown into the oily water, several of whom were badly injured. With the aid of the Gunner T. I cut away the lashing of the after Carley float and launched it. I
swam after the drifting float and with the mutual help of one or two ratings we hauled each other on board. I then collected the seriously injured and one or two uninjured men.
The First Lieutenant was heard to order men to to remain in the ship and I took the float back to the ship collecting a steward en route. The ship lurched heavily to port as I reached the side and since the forecastle was blazing I ordered the raft to stand off. At this juncture another rating was observed in a patch of oil fuel about 40
yards from the ship. I rescued this man with the float and took in tow a T.S.D.S. float which was supporting two P.Os who had since abandoned ship. Two destroyers and two trawler passed without stopping and a French tug landed our party on the west side of the docks amid the blazing ruins. An ambulance picked up our party and proceeded towards the heart of the town. When the ambulance stopped for more casmalties the party disembarked, and were forced to leave one seriously injured seaman (Coates) who WELE then taken to the base military hospital. At this point a lost Bren gun crew joined forces and the idea of escaping to England in a small boat was formulated.
I took the whole party, eight sailors and eight soldiers, and proceeded on the carrier to the docks.
A
gendarme prevented our embarkation in a drifter, the captain of which had signified his willingness to take us. We then proceeded on the carrier towards the eastern jetty, but our progress was halted by a blazing ammunition lorry. The commencement of intense aerial bombardment forced us to seek shelter in the vaults where Army officers and men provided us with dry clothing etc.
I then reported the Naval party to the S.N.O.
Dunkirque and after suggesting we remained in the town he gave the party full permission to seek a boat and sail to
England. We made our way towards the pier and P.O. Emery and myself became detached from the main party. In the course of a talk with a French soldier I discovered he possessed a motor boat with which he was desirous of escaping to England.
P.O. Emery sought out and brought along the remainder of the party, including the Bren gun crew and with P.O. Bennion managed to embark the whole party, with equipment, and against the wishes of the Frenchman. Then after considerable tactful persuasion and adjustment of top weight, plus the encouragement of casting off the painter, the engine was started and the bows pointed towards England at 21.00/29.
P.O. Bennion took the wheel and I shaped a course for the harbour mouth and channel buoys. After darkness fell
I checked my compass on the stars and found it had a variation of about 10° W. I.was then able to set a course for the S.E.
coast of England. All lights were extinguished outside the small cabin and most of the party fell asleep after having eaten a little food. The boat was well equipped with fuel and stores and the small engine gave us an estimated speed of five knots.

Dynam 208.
B22/1111
CONFIDENTIAL
236
237
FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "BRIGHTON BELLE".
238
0
DATE: 28th May 1940.
39
TO: SENIOR OFFICER, 10TH M/S FLOTILLA.
BRIGHTON Bei
LOSS OF H.M.S. "BRIGHTON BELIE"
56
I regret to inform you that H,M.S. "Brighton Belle"
sank at 1300 on 28th May 1940 in a position South of the Gull
Buoy off Ramsgate as a result of damage caused by stricking a submerged object 3 cables 183° from the Gull Buoy at 1230.
The ship was taken in tow by an Examination Tug after the troops had been transferred to other vessels but the effort to save her was futile
"Brighton Belle" was returning from the French Coast in your company and had on board approximately 350 officers and men from the British Army evacuated earlier in the day.
At the time of the accident I was closing Ramsgate for orders re disembarkation of the troops, and as an air attack was like in progress was concerned about the number of army people about the upper deck. This caused relaxation on my part in the conning of the ship, the loss of which I can only state was due to an error of judgement.
Pame
There were no casualties.
LIEUT. R.N.V.R.
I.
H.M.S. "SANDOWN. "
4/6/40.
y
VICE ADMIRAL DOVER.
Y
Forwar ded.
is
K.m.frees on new
VICE ADMIRAL
COMMANDER.
6- JUN 1940
*
relieved
DOVER

254
1342
FROM:- Commander J. Elliott, R.N.R.
256
DATE:- 4th June 1940.
TO:- V.A. Dover.
KING ORRY
Sir,
I beg to report as follows on the loss of H.M.S.
"KING ORRY".
Proceeding in accordance with your orders on the afternoon of the 29th May, I arrived in Dunkirk Roads at
730.
The voyage was without incident.
On rounding No. 6 Buoy and approaching Dunkirk it was evident that considerable aerial activity was in progress, and one of H.M. Destroyers appeared to be making a smoke screen.
29/5
I proceeded along the channel and was subjected to a direct attack from a dive bomber when about half a mile
West of the West Breakwater end. Six bombs straddled the bow - two to Port and four to Starboard. My thought at that moment was that we were fortunate to be missed, especially as two bombs bounced off the water on Port side - but as it happened, all the bombs exploded under water at the time the ship had passed into their zone.
This shook the ship convulsively, but as no damage was reported or seemed evident at the time, I proceeded towards the harbour.
There was a continuous attack on the harbour and vicinity in progress. Two ships were in sight sunk at the East Pier on the inner and outer sides and one of
H.M. Destroyers was burning furiously in the Western Basin.
A Drifter was alongside about half way down the East Pier.
There was no sign of anyone on the pier, nor was any boat moving in the harbour.
I now
The
"my:- one V.U and 4 seamen wounded hilitary
:- 4 here killed / Officer and nt men nounded.
tomage the Ship was rus tained as follows
/. 55. coils severed
2. Two life loats badly holed
3. Boot back hiered Patside
4. are rentilator boled and Duady minor depects to wining etc

297
This included brought the from General Lees a disparaging which 204
At this no business or justification to Navy. talk Told he had words "ineptitude of the remark him were holding time British troops were acting as like that.
of La a line which came down to coast rear guard and
These at midnight on 31st May and fall back on the from line Panne. Intention was for them to withdraw a little north this
31st troops (about 5,000) were some of the best, beaches. and Gort
0400
was very anxious they should be got away. 1st SL said that the Navy would make a supreme effort to get off the remainder the next day (31st) and the rear guard the following night: details were being sent over to me by
Bush. Felt daunted at the prospect and the seeming impossibility of the task. Plan made by Admiralty and
VA, Dover, had every chance of success, but it did not fall out as planned.
Arranged for Gort to embark from La Panne at 1800 on 31st and that boats and ships would be there for the purpose:
if that was impossible he would go to Dunkerque. On returning to WORCESTER informed Stevenson of the arrangements and put him in charge of them: intended to be there myself also.
(12) 2200 Started back to ship; then getting dark. No boats at the
1035
beach - too precious to be kept hanging about. Tide was farther out and a number of boats and pontoons were stranded. Some of the 12th Royal Lancers were trying to get pontoons afloat, and it was good to see them trying to help themselves.
With some soldiers got an unused pontoon afloat and 8 men,
Flag-Lt. and myself got in, but soon found that the boat, which had only 3 inches of freeboard, would inevitably be swamped before we could get to the ship. Sea was calm, with a small swell coming in. It was still fairly shallow so we all jumped out and returned to the beach to empty the boat of water. Tennant and Lees were still there, watching our progress, and as we came ashore I remarked to the latter, "Another example of Naval ineptitude."
Had to reduce crew by 2 and then set off again. Soldiers
2230
(13)
WORCESTER was slowly filling up with troops and I remained paddled well and we got back on board WORCESTER at 2230.
there till 0100/31: she was then full and I sent her back
Earlier to on 30th I had asked for a ship with 2 lines of W/T
Dover, transferring to EXPRESS.
communication and was told that KEITH would arrive at 2000.
She did not appear and I remained for rest of night in
EXPRESS, which was gradually embarking troops.
There were tens of thousands of men on or near to know the beaches how
Picture as I saw it was as follows:-
and The rear guard were to be withdrawn and night, must in and around Dunkerque - no one seemed next many. 24 hours ahead: they were the best troops where i.e. off. Dunkerque itself was the only place be got embarkation could take place, and a large and Braye, proportion 10
rapid of the troops were coming down to La Panne and beaches the only boats available, except ships' for
5 miles away from Dunkerque.
At the and a very few local craft, were crewless boats if pontoons went away with their ships or were motor boats left.
which cases they had to pull in, as ships' needed.
In many often out of action, and towage was badly were depended entirely on fair weather - an entirely. onshore
Embarkation of any force would have stopped embarkation shallow wind stressed the vital necessity for more draught I had boats and crews, and knew that everything possible was being the day French destroyers had been coming fired at in from by the done at home.
During passage and channel and had been at the
Northern They went into Dunkerque and loaded to be the West shore. Quay: otherwise no French ships seemed there.
Destroyers,

312
309
had hoped to get over to Dunkirk in daylight but the Various dolays in collecting men and BO on mode this impossible and it was dark whon we got near. From a long way off the flamos from burning oil tanks at
Dunkirk lighting up the sky, and a black pall of smoko above It, could be seen.
A3 we got nearor we could also see a ship on fire off shore, and this eventually proved to be the "CLAN MACALLISTER" at anchor off Erayo.
She continued to burn up till the end and there were accesional pops of small arm ammunition. She Was deserted but played a very useful part as a distraction for the Germans who sholled and bombed her continuously instead of the ships nearby who were embarking non. Often an I passed her later on I thought of getting her towed away but there was no ship to spare from the more important work of saving mon, and I expect she is still there.
you.
30
Another deserted Merchant ship off the entrance to Dunkirk played a similar useful role and was the target for many bombing attacks.
We approached the Dunkirk beaches from the South and stopping off each we sent the beach parties ashore in the Destroyer's boats. All this took time and it was not till 0400 that we found the "HEBE"
0400
(commanded by my old shipmate, Lieutonamt-Commender John Temple) off
Braye and tronsferred to her. At the same time the two Commodores were put into drifters. It was difficult to see in the daik what the situation was, except that there were many ships, drifters and boats off the beaches, end they were joined by the two destroyers. It was flat calm,
In the "HEHE" I found Captain Bush and heard more of the situation, and he spoke of the ghastly sight of the shore Week with mon standing in the water up to their waists. He had had to watch the terribly slow progress of embarkation which I had not then seen, but I as.d not feel that J. could accept the note of despair which I Becomed to detect in his voice.
In the "HEBE" we moved eastward to La Panne and there down Sound us and gave us some idea of the task ahead.
The coast here is a long stretch of Band dunes rining fairly steoply in places from a gently sholving beach which drice for 200 yards 03' more

-
80
CONFIDENTIAL.
N.L.
10932
No.16/15.AB/40
Harwich.
1940
3rd September, 1940.
Sir,
Enquiry into the loss of.Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON BELLE" in operation "Dynamo".
With reference to Admiralty Letter N.L. 6245/40 dated bst
August, 1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an Enquiry into the loss of.Paddle Minesweeper
"BRIGHTON BELLE" on the 28th May, 1940:-
2.
Temporary Acting Lieutenant Commander L.K.Perrin, R.N.V.R.
who was in command of "BRIGHTON BELLE" was examined on 3rd September, 1940.
3.
At about 1300 on 28th May, the ship with about 350 troops on board was closing the Examination Vessel off Ramsgate for instructions when the Commanding Officer saw ahead what he thought to be shoal water or a submerged object and as he had been previously warned that there were in this vicinity two or three uncharted wrecks, he stopped engines immediately, ordered full speed astern, and as the ship was nearly stopped the stern struck a submerged object and the after part of the ship flooded rapidly.
4.
About 7 minutes later the engine room bulkend gave and the engine room was flooded. Engines were stopped and all troops and crew were transferred to "SANDOWN" and other craft. "SANDOWN" took "BRIGHTON
BELLE" in towbut had not proceeded more than about a quarter of a mile when the tow was cut off and the latter ship sank in 3 to 4 fathoms, the Commanding
Officer, First Lieutenant and two men being picked up by "SANDOWN".
5.
At the time the ship was holed aft there was an air battle in progress and bombs were-dropping all around her though none fell near enough to cause any damage. The ship was zigzagging before engines were stopped and her stern was still swinging when she was damaged.
6.
There is no evidence of any explosion and it seems almost certain that the loss of this ship was due to damage caused by striking a submerged object.
7.
All loose Books and Charts were brought ashore but Books in the Steel Chest went down in the ship.
8.
I was assisted in my Enquiry by Commander H.J.Cubison, D.S.C.,
R.N. and Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H.Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant, seening (above) 1's 6246/40 for report aBeatorg VICE ADMIRAL.
The Secretary of the Admiralty.

1
96
CONFIDENTIAL.
NL
Oa 27/26 AB/40
11387
25th September, 1940.
1940
Enquiry into the loss of
H.M. Armed Yacht PELLAG II
in Operation "Dynamo"
CENTRAL
(27 SEP 1940
Sir,
REGIS
In accordance with Admiralty Letter N.L.6245/40 dated 1st August,
1940, be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report resulting from an enquiry held into the loss of H.M. Armed Yacht PELLAG II
in Operation "Dynamo".
2. Temporary Lieutenant F.W.R. Martino, R.N.V.R. was interviewed on
3rd September, 1940.
3. When PELLAG II was approaching Dunkirk at about 1000 on 31st May,
1940, she went to the assistance of a trawler which was aground. In her efforts to tow the trawler off, the clutch of Diesel Engine burnt out and the wire cable of steering gear parted. Effort to tow was then abandoned.
4. The hand tiller was rigged but could not be efficiently operated on account of the depth charge davit which prevented it passing the midship position. The ship could only proceed very slowly and the
Commanding Officer asked WORCESTER to take her in tow.
5. WORCESTER was leaving Dunkirk heavily loaded with troops and as she was being subjected to bombing attack and PELLAG II's defective steering made towing very difficult, WORCESTER took the Commanding Officer and men on board and cast PELLAG II off. An effort to sink the yacht was unsuccessful on account of aerial bombardment.
6. PELLAG II was, at 0600 on the 2nd June, found adrift by a party of Royal Engineers which, under Major M.C.A. Henniker, R.E., was making its escape from the French Coast in rowing boats. They boarded the yacht and managed to get the engines running. PELLAG II was making slow progress when at 0515 on 2nd June H.M.S. LOCUST closed and examined her. As the engines and steering gear were found to be defective, officers and other ranks were taken on board LOCUST and PELLAG II was taken in tow. Shortly afterwards, the tow parted. Two further attempts were made to tow her but as enemy aircraft were in the vicinity the Commanding Officer of
LOCUST decided to abandon her. An attempt to sink her by gun-fire was not successful, and the Commanding Officer of the LOCUST, states, in a written report he has sent to me;-"with the prevailing set of wind and
"tide it is Klams that she may have subsequently fallen into the hands of"
"the enemy."
7. S.P.'s and Charts were transferred to WORCESTER.
8. I was assisted in my enquiry by Commander A.J. Cubison, D.S.C.,R.N., and Lieutenant Commander (E) W.G.H. Nicholson, R.N.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
SE
Secretary a Sesford of the Admiralty.
VICE-ADMIRAL.

CONFIDENTIAL
Office of
The Flag Officer Commanding,
DOVER.
No. A.14/0/876/40.
18th June, 1940.
Sir,
Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the following report on Operation "DYNAMO", namely the evacuation of the Allied Armies from Dunkirk and neighbouring beaches between 26th May and 4th June, 1940. The report takes the form of this covering letter, together with detailed narrative and appendices.
2. THE POLICY AND THE PROGRESS OF THE EVACUATION.
During the course of the operation 316,663 troops reached safety in England after being evacuated from Dunkirk, and from the beach stretching 10 miles eastward from the entrance to Dunkirk Harbour. To those on the French coast, when in the early stages anything up to 50,000 troops were waiting to embark on a 10 mile sea front, the presence of perhaps 20 small warships offshore, and 200 small boats spread along the length of coast at any given moment, must have appeared as a feeble effort to tackle this great task.
Furthermore, it was impossible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of the troop concentrations.
Broadly speaking, for the first 5 days of the movement, had more beaching craft been available to ferry from the beach to offshore vessels, it would have been possible to have evacuated a greater number. For the last 3 to 4 days, however, when the main bulk of the B.E.F. had already been evacuated, the rate of lifting was governed by the availability of the troops during the limited hours evacuation was possible.
3.
Throughout the operation one of the greatest difficulties was the ever changing situation presented.
Within 24 hours of the start, the operation took the shape of a forlorn hope to rescue the maximum number, say up to
45,000 before the whole force was to be overwhelmed by the enemy.
Next, the military situation became more stable, and it appeared that some three to four days would be available to complete evacuation of the B.E.F., estimated at some
175,000. During this stage evacuation by British resources of French troops was introduced, some 25,000 being mentioned.
During the course of the fifth day (30/5) a tentative decision to lift the rearguard of the B.E.F. off the beaches at a definite time, viz. 0130/1, was reached. 24 hours later this plan was altered by military considerations, involving an extension of the period of evacuation. At the same time, the
Naval authority was definitely committed to provide for the evacuation of French forces, then mentioned as about 40,000/
50,000.
Later, the French number rose and 150,000 or more was quoted. Finally no agreement could be reached with the French e Secretary as/
of the Admiralty,
London, S. W. 1.

CONFIDENTIAL
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
Page 7.
WAVERLEY. 600 troops were on board before ship was abandoned in sinking condition, but only 200-300 were picked up,
In all it is regretted that about 2,000 troops must have been lost through these and similar disasters on the return voyages to England.
14.
CO-OPERATION OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
French warships and other vessels were employed evacuating French troops from Dunkirk harbour, and on the last three nights from the beach 1½ miles eastward from Dunkirk.
Details are given in Appendix V.
15.
BASE ORGANISATION,
An operation of this magnitude involving the maintenance and movements of close on 900 vessels and boats could not have been conducted without the wholehearted and unceasing efforts of the base establishments at Dover and
Ramsgate, as well as those at Sheerness and Harwich in the
Nore Command. At all these places officers and men, Naval and civilian, laboured unceasingly throughout the Operation.
In particular I wish to acknowledge the great assistance received from the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, who in many cases anticipated my requests for assistance through his constant watch on the progress of the Operation.
The prompt and unfailing assistance afforded by the Chatham Depot in providing personnel for the numerous small craft, working parties and beach parties, was a feature essential to the successful outcome of the Operation.
The Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, by taking over the servicing and control of the great majority of the small craft of the inshore flotillas relieved Dover or an immense volume of work which it would otherwise have been impossible to handle.
It was also broughtto my notice that at Harwich an exceptional Naval and Military system was in being for assisting those ships which called there to make a quick turn round, relieving the tired ships' companies of the work of cleaning and clearing their vessels.
16.
SERVICES OF STAFF, INCLUDING OFFICERS
TEMPORALLY APPOINTED.
I was fortunate in having the services of
Rear Admiral W.F. Wake-Walker, C.B., O.B.E., as Flag Officer afloat off Dunkirk, and Captain W.G. Tennant, C.B., M.V.O., as Senior Naval Officer, Dunkirk on shore. Admiral Wake-
Walker was responsible for supervising the embarkation afloat and Captain Tennant for organising embarkation from the shore, keeping touch with the French Naval Authorities and the Staff of the British Commander-in-Chief.
Detailed particulars of their services were given in Dover Despatch No. B.23/862/40 of 4th June, 1940.
I cannot conclude this despatch without reference to the splendid work of my staff under the guidance of my Chica
Staff/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 15.
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events,
Thursday, 30th May (continued).
48.
Arrangements for the final evacuation of the Rearguard of the B.E.F.
During the forenoon representatives of the
Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. and staff attended a conference with the Vice Admiral.
The Military officers explained the Commander-in-
Chief's plan and gave daylight on Saturday, 1st June, as the latest reasonable date up to which the B.E.F. might be expected to hold the castern porimeter, the size of the corrosponding force being about 4,000.
by that date and time the Vice Admiral knew that he should be in possession of ocean-going tugs, ships' lifeboats and ships' power lifeboats which he could specially reserve for the climax of this critical operation. Accordingly, agreement was reached on the following:-
(a) That evacuation should proceed with the utmost vigour to ensure that by 0130 on 1st June the
British Forces ashore should have been reduced to the rear guard of 4,000.
(b) That special boats and tugs should be accumulated and held aside to ensure them being available in the early hours of 1st June.
(c) That the plan should provide for lifting the rear guard of 4,000, plus R.N. beach parties, in one or more flights between 0130 and 0300 on the 1st June.
(a) Final decision based on the progress of the evacuation of the main body to be made by the
Vice Admiral at 1400 on Friday, 31st May, as to the possibility of adhering to the plan.
Other technical details were settled at the meeting and the
Military staff were given the assurance that the ever increasing rate of lifting showed every promise of enabling an affirmative decision to be given at the critical hour of
1400/31st May. After the conference the Military officers communicated the plan both to the War Office and the
Commander-in-Chief ashore.
49. Remarks.
The organisation of traffic to and from the beaches was recovering from the setback it had recei ved when all resources had to be thrown upon the beaches and Dunkirk
Harbour when the outflanking and forcing back of the B.E.F.
was thought to be imminent consequent upon the surrender of the Belgian forces. Furthermore, a number of organised, and freelance groups of small power boats, were commencing to arrive off the coast, who, by seizing the abandoned and drifting pulling boats, were able to do much to increase the rate of lifting from the beaches.
50/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 17.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May.
51. The Admiralty informed the Vice Admiral that the policy of H. M. Government was that both British and French troops be given an equal opportunity of being evacuated in
British ships and boats.
52. Personnel ships had been sailed the previous evening and throughout the night of the 30th/31st to provide for a continuous flow into Dunkirk harbour. But at 0320 the S.N.O.
reported that once again the majority of these Personnel ships had failed to enter the harbour during the dark hours. MALCOLM, however, left Dunkirk with 1,200 troops at 0300, during heavy shelling, on relief by IVANHOE. S.N.O. Dunkirk, however, continued to call for more ships. No more destroyers were available and there were no means of accelerating the arrival of the vessels despatched there. By 0700 the Vice Admiral had no news of the fate of the personnel ships that had sailed the previous evening and during the night. None of these ships had reached the U.K. to unload, and it appeared probable that these ships may have concentrated in the narrow waters close to Dunkirk, inviting a repetition of the heavy air attacks with consequent damage and loss to transports which had occurred on the two previous occasions when personnel vessels, together with other ships, had been concentrated in large numbers in the approaches to Dunkirk.
At this time there were no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip
U.K. - Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night, but herwhereabouts was unknown, and it was feared that she had refused to sail. In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030. Pending the return of the ships en passage, and while the coal-burners were being rebunkered, the further sailing of personnel vessels was in suspense.
Note: Owing to the casualties to Personnel vessels at this stage, coal burning cross channel steamers had to be used for some of the trips and short endurance necessitated coaling between trips which could not be done in the vicinity of Dover, thus preventing a quick turn round.
53. During the night a considerable amount of enemy minelaying activity by air was reported. Shelling was heavy during the evening and night, and operations were greatly hampered. Nevertheless, with the cessation of shelling at about 0300, very good progress was made and by full dawn the beaches were very nearly clear of troops. At 0530 attacks on
Dunkirk harbour and the beach from Dunkirk to Bray developed more strength and the bombardment of Dunkirk continued.
Nevertheless, the S.N.O. reported that the embarkation there was proceeding satisfactorily but stressed the need for more ships and constant fighter protection. At this time French troops began to appear at Dunkirk pier and on the beaches, and were embarked with the British troops.
54. At 0600 VIMY sighted submarine off the N.W.
Goodwins/

Page 20.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Friday, 31st May (continued).
effective quantities direct from the beaches, and to use the special tows, ships lifeboats, power lifeboats and ear-marked tugs, which were on passage from Ramsgate, and which had been for lifting the final covering force.
In the afternoon, however, it was learned that the
Military plan had been changed, and that it was no longer possible for the original covering position, as planned, to be held by 4,000 troops who were then to withdraw to the beaches for embarkation by boat. Instead, it was learned that the
Eastern-most Division was to be withdrawn Westward from the
La Panne area, and that the special flight of boats was to be used to lift this force from the beaches. At the same time, the troops in the Bray and Malo sectors were boing thinned out by movements Westward towards Dunkirk itself. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers - to which they were to transfer the troops - into the stretch opposite the beach between Bray and one mile East of La Panne, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour. The risk of this change of plan was obvious as the boat tows were not in communication with the
Vice Admiral, and reliance had to be placed on the Minesweepers to inform and see that the escorting M.A.S.B.'s would shepherd the tows to the new positions. The minesweepers had anchored so as to serve as guiding marks, as had been explained to the
Naval Officers in each tow.
Apart from the special tow, a very large number of small power boats despatched, in most cases direct, from the
South East Ports, Newhaven to Sheerness, were arriving off the beaches, and compensated in a large measure for the heavy losses that had occurred amongst the original towing boats, whalers, outters, lifeboats and ships' boats, which had occurred on the beaches during the preceding 3 days.
On the La Panne beaches after 1600 very good progress was made. The piers of pontoons built by the Military the previous day were extremely useful, and were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops. All the troops that could be found were embarked by midnight and ferried off to the ships. The local Beach-master (Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R.)
searched the adjacent beaches for stragglers at midnight, and was informed by a Starf Officer that no more troops would embark from the La Panne beaches, but would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated that these beaches would be shelled and probably be in German hands the following day. This, as it turned out, was a correct forecast. The Beach-master estimates that 5,000 men were lifted from the La Panne beaches during the evening and up to midnight.
62. At 1920 all ships in the fleets were informed by the Vice Admiral that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expedted on the night lst/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from
1st June by both British and French ships.
63/

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove,R.N., Sub.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect
& lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with H.M.D. "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2014 with 200
sets of lethal kite year.,Lieut, Field and ub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P Dover,.Lieut. Field took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoes were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
ratings, we reported to Cdr.
La Rentaul" to keep clear of the nent which had recommenced. We emolition party that we had afterwards made contact with
OFFICE OF
portion of a demolition party.
FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER.
re-enter the harbour and took threatening to block completely a done at once it would have
32" the hospital and personnel
18th June, 1940.
7. The, "Gervaise" was man-
1 side to avoid the risk of her ion in the fairway. Ammunition nd handed over to Cdr Banks who
Dear Gleadowe, y primersor detonators for the
The attached papers have been a two hospital ships which were seen by the Vice Admiral, Dover, and note made ng these was just put in hand for his list of personnel recommendations.
* available at any time during himself and with help of his the necessary work. Now the
Yours sincerely, ble for further hospital and
During these operations Cdr.
8 situation in Dunkirk was so he opportunity nor the facilitie hadch Cres rk. Furthermore there was a re-
1" dive bombing until Monday 27th old Cdr.Dove that there was no ommandeered a car and bought
SECRETARY to rom estaminets which were still
VICE ADMIRAL.
de tour of inspection and found property and personnel was il tanks on the south side of th atening the railway and timber
S. to S.W. which blew a pall of scene appear far worse than evening the work of loading shi eady a large number of noncomour besides an increasing number quay. The night was quiet planes circledthe town for over*
ely small number of bombs. Early ho had been instructed by Odr.
for safety, reported that magnet mines nad been 1810 near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
ore dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'

Statement of the operations of Commander
Dove's party at Dunkirk.
Prefatory Note.
The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant
Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200
sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from
Captain A/P took command of the Drifter
(skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R)
Report.
Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday
May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4
tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay.
Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr.
Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with
Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party.
Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was maneeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the depth charges.
Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the
South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr.
Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a regrettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th
At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncombatant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number*
of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over
(ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr.
Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up.
dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'