TNA ADM 199 792

124
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
126
125
Tuesday, 28th May (continued).
to S.N.O., Dunkirk by signal - timed 1555/28 - and provided for the use of 3 Hospital Carriers, 7 personnel steamers and
2 destroyers at the East Pier, Dunkirk, while some 20
destroyers, 19 paddle and fleet sweepers, 17 drifters, 20 to
40 skoots, 5 coasters, 12 motor boats, 2 tugs, 28 pulling cutters and life-boats were to be distributed between La
Panne and point 1½ miles East of Dunkirk, on the beaches; the destroyers running continuous round trips.
It was estimated that the personnel vessels and hospital:o carriers would be clear of the danger area by 0630. As regards the beaching and other small craft which had not yet reached the Dover Straits, arrangements were made with other authorities to route all small craft, which had not already been despatched, direct to the beaches East of Dunkirk, provided they had charts, food, fuel, etc.
At this time some difficulty was experienced in having at hand the large number of charts required for these additional vessels.
17,
Owing to the suspension of daylight work by personne vessels it was necessary to increase the number handled in
Dunkirk during the dark hours as the attempt to use the surplus personnel vessels off the beaches by night seemed unlikely to bear fruit. Accordingly, Dunkirk, was asked whether personnel vessels could be berthed inside
Dunkirk harbour, the only information in Vice Admiral's k.
possession having indicated that the East Pier of the harbour entrance was the only suitable berth for such ships to which
British troops could have access. To increase the off-shore forces, Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was asked to sail CALCUTTA
to be opposite La Panne at 2200 to embark troops using own boats.
Orders were issued that all ships proceeding to Dunkirk from Dover were to use the southern route Z provided that the passage from No. 6 Calais Buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
S
18.
At 1830 GRAFTON reported that several thousand troops remained on beaches at Bray and that more were arriving. At that time there were off Bray, one tow of pulling boats, number uncertain, 2 power boats, at least
2 skoots, CALCUTTA, GALLANT, WAKEFUL, VERITY and GRAFTON, using what survived of their own whalers and motor boats.
This force was reinforced by 2 minesweepers at 2115. Later reports of concentrations of troops on the beaches were received, particularly at La Panne and Bray. Craft approaching the coast were directed accordingly. Naval Officer-in-
Charge, Ramsgate, was requested to maintain a continuous evacuation service by skoots between Margate and Ramsgate and the beach, and take over responsibility for servicing those vessels. Meantime CALCUTTA, who was off La Panne, reported that conditions for embarkation there were very bad owing to heavy surf, but that they might improve with the rising tide.
Shortly after midnight CALCUTTA was informed that the third corps of the B.E.F. and the Commander-in-Chief were all now at La Panne. She was directed to make every endeavour to concentrate all destroyers and light craft at that end of the beach/

127
126
128
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29/
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the dayligh passage through coastal waters, was obvious, Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
3
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, ed and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26. At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the k
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But e
emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary le if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss or H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buo the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 degrees every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship smidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 secends, each remaining standing midship/ with the

131
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CONFIDENTIAL.
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Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
128
7/5
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray.
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, not only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end of x Route. These attacks were to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers ahead of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them with the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer ahead of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of the Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
GRENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
In addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour but further inside. This presented a very good target and the ships were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the time being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in leaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed part of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
CANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops but was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again in these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying alongside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
GRENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and the trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire had to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the fairway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, who witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by bombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having ceased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and trawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a sunk drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived to find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, was with no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in thantly harbour uld little
36

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29/5
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
harbour. She was immediately subjected to heavy bombing attacks, having previously had her steering gear put out of action by a dive bombing attack when about mile outside of the entrance. She remained in sole occupation of the harbour until shortly after midnight 29th/30th, when her Captain rightly decided to take the ship out of harbour before she also was sunk, thus freeing the berth and safeguarding the channel from being blocked.
Little information of these disasters filtered through to
Dover, except that it was known that Dunkirk was under heavy air bombardment, and that the destroyers there were being hit soon after 1600.
32.
At 1.906 the Vice Admiral promulgated the plan for the night by signal as follows: "Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained to Dunkirk
East Pier, destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except hospital carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of
La Panne. Whole length is divided into three equal parts referred to as LA PANNE, BRAY, MALO, from East to West with a mile gap between each part. LA PANNE and BRAY have troop concentration points each end and in Middle, MALO at each end.
These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass the message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T as opportunity offers".
33,
About 1900 a telephone message was received from
La Panne Military Headquarters through the War Office and the
Admiralty to the effect that Dunkirk harbour was blocked by damaged ships, and that all evacuation must therefore be effected from the beaches.
About the same time a corrupt message from S.N.O.,,Dunkirk, was received stating continuous bombing, one destroyer sinking, one transport with troops on board damaged and impossible at present to embark more troops, though pier undamaged.
34. In this confused situation the Vice Admiral, Dover, at 2128, ordered all ships approaching Dunkirk not to close the harbour, but instead to remain off the Eastern beach to collect troops from the shore, and the drifters and minesweepers which were about to be despatched to Dunkirk harbour were also diverted to the beaches.
It appeared, therefore, at this time that the use of
Dunkirk harbour would be denied to us except possibly to the small ships.
Signals addressed to S.N.O., Dunkirk, HEBE, VERITY, who were known to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk, were sent requireing information as to the accessibility of the Eastern pier for personnel vessels. Admiral Nord was also informed that Dover was out of touch with Captain Tennant, and asked whether it was still possible for transports to enter harbour and berth alongside.
No reply to these enquiries could be expected until after midnight.
35, In the event only 4 trawlers and a yacht entered
Dunkirk during the hours of darkness, and as enemy activity was much reduced only two bombing attacks being made, it subsequently transpired that a good opportunity had been missed, It is probable that ships to lift some 8000 to 10, 000 troops could have been made available for Dunkirk during the night at little loss to embarkation from the beaches.
36,

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CONFIDENTIAL.
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Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
29/5
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

APPENDIX I.
160
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
Narrative of Events.
162
-
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
A.A. CRUISER:
CALCUTTA
DESTROYERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VIMY
(40)
SLOOPS:
BIDEFORD
GUNBOATS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
UNESWEEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
EL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGO
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH WESTWARD HO
A/S VESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SANGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
re
SPECIAL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
ROYAL EAGLE
ESSELS:
"LL" TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
it
A/S TRAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
ore
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WESTELLA
an
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
ue
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
all
INE RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
SILVER DAWN
RIFTERS:
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 5.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Tuesday, 28th May (continued).
to S.N.O., Dunkirk by signal - timed 1555/28 - and provided for the use of 3 Hospital Carriers, 7 personnel steamers and
2 destroyers at the East Pier, Dunkirk, while some 20
destroyers, 19 paddle and fleet sweepers, 17 drifters, 20 to
40 skoots, 5 coasters, 12 motor boats, 2 tugs, 28 pulling cutters and life-boats were to be distributed between La
Panne and point 1½ miles East of Dunkirk, on the beaches; the destroyers running continuous round trips.
It was estimated that the personnel vessels and hospital carriers would be clear of the danger area by 0630. As regards the beaching and other small craft which had not yet reached the Dover Straits, arrangements were made with other authorities to route all small craft, which had not already been despatched, direct to the beaches East of Dunkirk, provided they had charts, food, fuel, etc.
At this time some difficulty was experienced in having at hand the large number of charts required for these additional vessels.
17, Owing to the suspension of daylight work by personnel vessels it was necessary to increase the number handled in
Dunkirk during the dark hours as the attempt to use the surplus personnel vessels off the beaches by night seemed unlikely to bear fruit. Accordingly, S.N.O., Dunkirk, was asked whether personnel vessels could be berthed inside
Dunkirk harbour, the only information in Vice Admiral's possession having indicated that the East Pier of the harbour entrance was the only suitable berth for such ships to which
British troops could have access. To increase the off-shore forces, Commander-in-Chief, Nore, was asked to sail CALCUTTA
to be opposite La Panne at 2200 to embark troops using own boats.
Orders were issued that all ships proceeding to Dunkirk from Dover were to use the southern route Z provided that the passage from No. 6 Calais Buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
18. At 1830 GRAFTON reported that several thousand troops remained on beaches at Bray and that more were arriving. At that time there were off Bray, one tow of pulling boats, number uncertain, 2 power boats, at least
2 skoots, CALCUTTA, GALLANT, WAKEFUL, VERITY and GRAFTON, using what survived of their own whalers and motor boats.
This force was reinforced by 2 minesweepers at 2115. Later reports of concentrations of troops on the beaches were received, particularly at La Panne and Bray. Craft approaching the coast were directed accordingly. Naval Officer-in-
Charge, Ramsgate, was requested to maintain a continuous evacuation service by skoots between Margate and Ramsgate and the beach, and take over responsibility for servicing those vessels. Meantime CALCUTTA, who was off La Panne, reported that conditions for embarkation there were very bad owing to heavy surf, but that they might improve with the rising tide.
Shortly after midnight CALCUTTA was informed that the third corps of the B.E.F. and the Commander-in-Chief were all now at La Panne. She was directed to make every endeavour to concentrate all destroyers and light craft at that end of the beach/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 7.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events,
Wednesday, 29th May (continued)
well as from Dunkirk harbour, both from the aspect of the military situation and from the fact that Dunkirk was limited by a bottle-neck, formed by the narrow gangway along the East
Pier to the points of embarkation. Furthermore, there was every prospect of the weather improving and the surf reducing as the tide rose. Nevertheless, an increased number of
H.M. ships was ordered to Dunkirk to augment the personnel vessels, though it was feared that an accumulation of ships alongside the East Pier at Dunkirk by day might well invite intensive air attack,
Subsequently, this fear was fully to be justified.
25. Meantime, considerable anxiety was felt as to the fate of the personnel vessels which had been despatched in a steady stream to Dunkirk commencing the previous evening. The first of these was due back at Dover about 0300, but by 0900
nothing had been sighted or reported. But at 0700, S.N.O.,
Dunkirk, had reported that the embarkation there was going on at the rate of 2000 an hour, so it was presumed that the transports had failed to enter the harbour during darkness, had waited outside, and had commenced to enter in succession at dawn. The necessity for continuous fighter protection in view of the exposure of these unarmed ships while at Dunkirk and during the daylight passage through coastal waters, was obvious. Constant touch was maintained with R.A.F. Commands to obtain continuous fighter protection during the hours when the Vice Admiral, Dover, estimated the largest concentration of vessels would be present, it being realised that the R.A.F.
resources were not sufficient to provide continuous air cover, and to dispense with full cover at less important periods.
26.
At 0930 the belated return of the personnel vessels from Dunkirk commenced, and proceeded steadily through the day. In addition to the personnel vessels using Dunkirk the
Admiralty were informed of the necessity for X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters to increase the facilities for beach evacuation. A Medical Party was shipped in VERITY for use on the beaches, and a Naval Medical Party was sent to
Dunkirk.
27. The considerable alarm as to the immediate safety of the B.E.F. felt during the evening and early night of the
28th, which caused all available resources to be immediately concentrated on the French Coast, eased during the 29th. But emergency measures taken late on the 28th had an adverse effect on the orderly organisation for evacuation so necessary if effective measures were to be devised and put in force.
28. Meantime, in the early hours of' the 29th, an unfortunate disaster occurred involving the loss of H.M.
destroyers WAKEFUL and GRAFTON, and the danlayer COMFORT.
WAKEFUL, after embarking troops at Bray, sailed for Dover at
2300/28 by the Zuydecoote Pass and North Channel. Approaching the Kwinte Whistle Buoy the speed of the ships was 20 knots, and a zigzag of 40 deg es every 4 minutes was started. At
0045 two torpedo tracks were observed, one torpedo missed, the other hit ship amidships. WAKEFUL broke in half and the two portions sank in 15 seconds, each remaining standing with the midship/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 9.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
route provided the passage between Calais Bell Buoy and
Dunkirk be made in darkness.
Route X passed some 26 miles to the South-westward of the extreme N.E. point of the Northern Route Y, the locality in which enemy M.T.B. attack threatened, and was shielded by the
French minefields in the Ruytingen and Dyck channels. It appears that the enemy M.T.B. command failed to appreciate the withdrawal of traffic to the S.W. and did not follow up.
In the evening it was reported that there was no congestion anywhere on the coast, except at La Panne. The force at La
Panne was accordingly reinforced as ships became available.
30. An additional beach party of 7 officers and a number of ratings under Captain J. Howson was sailed in SABRE at
1600 for Dunkirk, and Captain E. Bush, who had already visited
Dunkirk and was aware of the general conditions, was sent to
HEBE as S.N.O. afloat off the beaches. An M.T.B. was placed at the disposal of the S.N.O. on the coast.
31. At about 1600 a heavy air attack commenced on the
East Mole Pier, Dunkirk harbour, mainly by dive bombing, which lasted continuously for more than 2 hours. At the same time, other air attacks took place on ships lying off Bray,
Attacks were renewed from time to time up till after 2000, nt only on Dunkirk, but on ships off Bray, in the Zuydecoote
Pass and those in the Southern end or X Route. These attacks vere to have a disastrous result on the evacuation arrangements at Dunkirk. There were present alongside the inner side of the Eastern Arm 2 destroyers GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 Trawlers head of the GRENADE and JAGUAR, 3 more trawlers ahead of them vith the CANTERBURY in the next berth, and a French destroyer head of the CANTERBURY. Outside the harbour on the outside of
;he Eastern Arm the Transport FENELLA was berthed opposite the
RENADE and JAGUAR and the CRESTED EAGLE opposite the 6 trawlers.
in addition, the MALCOLM and VERITY were also in the harbour ut further inside. This presented a very good target and the hips were soon hit and embarkation of troops ceased for the ime being. CANTERBURY, accompanied by JAGUAR, succeeded in eaving harbour, but both were hit by bombs and damaged. Both succeeded in reaching Dover, though JAGUAR had to be towed art of the way and was subjected to many attacks on passage.
ANTERBURY reached harbour at 2115 and disembarked 1950 troops ut was sufficiently damaged to prevent her being used again n these operations. To return to Dunkirk - FENELLA was lying longside on the outside of the pier, and was hit and sunk.
RENADE and one of the trawlers on the East side were hit and he trawler sank in the fairway. GRENADE sinking and on fire ad to be abandoned and appeared to be about to sink in the airway. A trawler was detailed to tow her clear. VERITY, no witnessed this occurrence was continuously straddled by ombs for 35 minutes. Passage all along the pier having eased, she cast off, and skirting the burning GRENADE and rawler, proceeded out of harbour, grounding slightly on a ink drifter in the entrance. At about 1800 KING ORRY arrived o find the harbour occupied only by burning and sinking ships, th no sign of any one on the pier nor any boat moving in the harbour/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 10.
Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May (continued).
harbour. She was immediately subjected to heavy bombing attacks, having previously had her steering gear put out of action by a dive bombing attack when about - mile outside of the entrance. She remained in sole occupation of the harbour until shortly after midnight 29th/30th, when her Captain rightly decided to take the ship out of harbour before she also was sunk, thus freeing the berth and safeguarding the channel from being blocked.
Little information of these disasters filtered through to
Dover, except that it was known that Dunkirk was under heavy air bombardment, and that the destroyers there were being hit soon after 1600.
32. At 1906 the Vice Admiral promulgated the plan for the night by signal as follows: "Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night. If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained to Dunkirk
East Pier, destroyers will be sent there as well. All other craft except hospital carriers to embark from beach which is extended from one mile East of Dunkirk to one mile East of
La Panne. Whole length is divided into three equal parts referred to as LA PANNE, BRAY, MALO, from East to West with a mile gap between each part. LA PANNE and BRAY have troop concentration points each end and in Middle, MALO at each end.
These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass the message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T as opportunity offers".
33. About 1900 a telephone message was received from
La Panne Military Headquarters through the War Office and the
Admiralty to the effect that Dunkirk harbour was blocked by damaged ships, and that all evacuation must therefore be effected from the beaches.
About the same time a corrupt message from S.N.O., Dunkirk, was received stating continuous bombing, one destroyer sinking, one transport with troops on board damaged and impossible at present to embark more troops, though pier undamaged.
34. In this confused situation the Vice Admiral, Dover, at 2128, ordered all ships approaching Dunkirk not to close the harbour, but instead to remain off the Eastern beach to collect troops from the shore, and the drifters and minesweepers which were about to be despatched to Dunkirk harbour were also diverted to the beaches.
It appeared, therefore, at this time that the use of
Dunkirk harbour would be denied to us except possibly to the small ships.
Signals addressed to S.N.O., Dunkirk, HEBE, VERITY, who were known to be in the vicinity of Dunkirk, were sent requireing information as to the accessibility of the Eastern pier for personnel vessels. Admiral Nord was also informed that Dover was out of touch with Captain Tennant, and asked whether it was still possible for transports to enter harbour and berth alongside.
No reply to these enquiries could be expected until after midnight.
35.
In the event only 4 trawlers and a yacht entered
Dunkirk during the hours of darkness, and as enemy activity was much reduced only two bombing attacks being made, it subsequently transpired that a good opportunity had been missed. It is probable that ships to lift some 8000 to 10, 000 troops could have been made available for Dunkirk during the night at little loss to embarkation from the beaches.
36/

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL.
Page 11.
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
Wednesday, 29th May(continued).
36. Rear Admiral Wake-Walker proceeded from Dover in ESK
at about 1900 for passage to HEBE off the coast where he was to carry out the duties of S.N.O., Dunkirk in charge of all embarkation arrangements, taking over from Captain Bush who had been working in HEBE under the orders of S.N.O., Dunkirk.
He expected to arrive at Dunkirk at 2330.
37. As a result of the heavy casualties and losses amongst the destroyer force, particularly the misfortunes which befell those of the larger and more modern types, a consultation was held between the Admiralty and the Vice Admiral which led to a decision to withdraw destroyers of the 'H', 'I' and 'J' classes from DYNAMO. All destroyers of the 'G' class were already out of action.
There remained available for DYNAMO 15 destroyers:-
ESK
MALCOLM
VERITY
EXPRESS
WHITEHALL
VANQUISHER
ANTHONY
WINCHELSEA
SABRE
KEITH
WORCESTER
SCIMITAR
CODRINGTON
WINDSOR
SHIKARI
Excluding any casualties, this number of destroyers might be expected to maintain a flow of one destroyer per hour to the coast and would lift 17,000 troops in 24 hours.
38. The day closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve the high rate of evacuation hoped for. Some 38,000 were landed in England during the 24 hours, but the effect of the day's occurrences was to be more marked next day when instead of some 50,000 to
60,000 which had been calculated as the probable achievement only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.
39.
Casualties to H.M. Ships - 29th May.
Destroyer WAKEFUL torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Destroyer GRAFTON torpedoed and sunk by M.T.B. off
Kwinte Whistle buoy.
Special Service Vessel CRESTED EAGLE, whilst off the beaches at Dunkirk, was bombed and set on fire. Ship was beached and gutted.
Personnel Vessel NORMANIA attacked by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel Vessel LORINIA attacked off Dunkirk by enemy aircraft and sunk.
Personnel

APPENDIX I.
to
Operation "DYNAMO"
-
Narrative of Events.
LIST OF H.M. SHIPS, PERSONNEL SHIPS AND HOSPITAL CARRIERS
TAKING. PART.
RUISER:
CALCUTTA
YERS:
ANTHONY
HARVESTER
MALCOLM
VIVACIOUS
BASILISK
HAVANT
MONTROSE
WAKEFUL
BLYSKAWICA
ICARUS
SABRE
WHITEHALL
CODRINGTON
IMPULSIVE
SALADIN
WHITSHED
ESK
INTREPID
SCIMITAR
WINCHELSEA
EXPRESS
IVANHOE
SHIKARI
WINDSOR
GALLANT
JAGUAR
VENOMOUS
WOLFHOUND
GRAFTON
JAVELIN
VANQUISHER
WOLSEY
GRENADE
KEITH
VERITY
WORCESTER
GREYHOUND
MACKAY
VILY
BIDEFORD
TS:
LOCUST
MOSQUITO
EEPERS:
ALBURY
HEBE
QUEEN OF THANET
BRIGHTON QUEEN
HALCYON
ROSS
BRIGHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALAMANDER
EL
DEVONIA
LEDA
SALTASH
DUNDALK
LYDD
SKIPJACK
DUCHESS OF FIFE
MARMION
SANDOWN
EMPEROR OF INDIA
MEDWAY QUEEN
SNAEFELL
FITZROY
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
GLENAVON
ORIOLE
SUTTON
GLENGOWER
PANGBOURNE
SHARPSHOOTER
GOSSAMER
PLYNLIMMON
WAVERLEY
GRACIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH
WESTWARD HO
ESSELS:
ARLEY
COMFORT
MARETTA
BOTANIC
CONIDAW
NAUTILUS
BROCK
FYLDEA
POLLY JOHNSON
CALVI
GULZAR
SARGASSO
CHICO
JOHN CATLING
STARLIGHT RAYS
AL SERVICE CRESTED EAGLE
GOLDEN EAGLE
LS:
ROYAL EAGLE
TRAWLERS: INVERFORTH LORD INCHCAPE OUR BAIRNS THOMAS BARTLETT
RAWLERS:
ARGYLLSHIRE
KINGSTON ANDALUSITE STELLA DORADO
BLACKBURN ROVERS
KINGSTON OLIVINE
THURINGIA
CAYTON WYKE
LADY PHILOMENA
WISTELLA
GRIMSBY TOWN
SAON
WOLVES
KINGSTON ALALITE
SPURS
OLVINA
RECOVERY
FIDGET
JACKETA
ERS:
SILVER DAWN
FISHER BOY
LORD CAVAN

Page 2.
HICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940.
WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART I - BRITISH SHIPS.
CRUISER.
TTTA
ROYERS.
ONY
INTREPID
VENOMOUS
LISK
IVANHOE
VERITY
INGTON
JAGUAR
VIMY
JAVELIN
VIVACIOUS
ESS
KEITH
WAKEFUL
ANT
MACKAY
WHITEHALL
TON
MALCOIM
WHITSHED
ADE
MONTROSE
WINCHELSEA
HOUND
SABRE
WINDSOR
ESTER
SALADIN
WOLFHOUND
NT
SCIMITAR
WOLSEY
US
SHIKARI
WORCESTER
LSIVE
VANQUISHER
P.
EFORD
VETTES.
LLEMOT
MALLARD
SHELDRAKE
GFISHER
SHEARWATER
WIDGEON
BOATS.
UST
#
MOSQUITO
ESWEEPERS.
ROSS
URY
HEBE
SALAMANDER
GHTON BELLE
KELLETT
SALTASH
GHTON QUEEN
LEDA
SANDOWN
ONIA
LYDD
SHARPSHOOTER
HESS OF FIFE
MARMION
MEDWAY QUEEN
SKIPJACK
DALK
SNAEFELL
PEROR OF INDIA
NIGER
SPEEDWELL
CZROY
ORIOLE
SUTTON
ENAVON
PANGBOURNE
WAVERLEY
ENGOWER
PLINLIMMON
WESTWARD HO
SSAMER
PORTSDOWN
CIE FIELDS
PRINCESS ELIZABETH
WHIPPINGHAM
LCYON
QUEEN OF THANET
(Continued)
Sunk.