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TNA / ADM 199 795

TNA ADM 199 795

TNA ADM 199 795
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 795

Admiralty reports on naval operations off the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts during 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 795
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/795. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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- 3 -
)
we then went to General GEORGES' Headquarters, at
BRIARE, where we continued the discussion. I pointed out that the length of the proposed line was some 150
kilometres which would require at least fifteen Divisions.
I gathered from both General WEYGAND and General GEORGES
that they did not consider the BRITTANY project to be &
feasible proposition with the forces that now remained available in the Tenth French Army including the B.B.F.
General WEYGAND referred to the project as "romantic", and said that it had been adopted without military advice.
General WEYGAND stated, however, that, since the Allied
Governments had issued instructions for the defence of
BRITTANY he must carry out their orders. Consequently, in consultation with General GEORGES, he had drawn up instructions for the participation of the B.B.F. in the scheme. Being under the impression that H.M. Government had approved this plan, I signed the document which prescribed the role of B.B.F. in it. (Copy attached at
Appendix 'A').
6. WEYGAND had described to me, I immediately sent a telegram
In view of the gravity of the situation which General to inform the C.I.G.S. I also requested Ma or-General Sir
Richard HOWARD-VYSE to proceed to the War Office as soon as possible to report more fully to the C.I.G.S., and to take to the C.I.G.S. a copy of the document reproduced in
Appendix A.
7. I then returned to my Headquarters at LE MANS, arriving at 1615 hours. I spoke to the C.I.C.S. by telephone at
1630 hours and explained the situation. I asked whether the BRITTANY scheme had H.M. Government's approval and told him that both Generals WEYGAND and GEORGES appeared to consider it impracticable with the force available. The
C.I.G.S. informed me that he knew nothing of the BRITTANY
Scheme, but said he would refer the matter to the Prime
Minister.
I told the C.I.G.S. that, in view of the general state
French Army, I considered that all further movement of of disintegration which was beginning to spread in the arrangements should be started for the evacuation of the troops and material to France should be stopped, and that
B.E.F. from available Ports. The C.I.G.S. informed ne that orders had already been issued to stop the dispatch of further troops and material to France.
8. say that the Prime Minister knew nothing of the BRITTANY
An hour later (1715 hours) the C.I.G.S. telephoned to plan, and that all arrangements were to start for the evacuation of those elements of the B.E.F. which were at that time not under the orders of the Tenth French Army.
/ As
FOOTNOTE: ( ) General Georges was C.-in-C., North-
Eastern Theatre of Operations.

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 195.

- 3 -
)
we then went to General GEORGES' Headquarters, at
BRIARE, where we continued the discussion. I pointed
out that the length of the proposed line was some 150
kilometres which would require at least fifteen Divisions.
I gathered from both General WEYGAND and General GEORGES
that they did not consider the BRITTANY project to be &
feasible proposition with the forces that now remained
available in the Tenth French Army including the B.B.F.
General WEYGAND referred to the project as "romantic",
and said that it had been adopted without military advice.
General WEYGAND stated, however, that, since the Allied
Governments had issued instructions for the defence of
BRITTANY he must carry out their orders. Consequently,
in consultation with General GEORGES, he had drawn up
instructions for the participation of the B.B.F. in the
scheme. Being under the impression that H.M. Government
had approved this plan, I signed the document which
prescribed the role of B.B.F. in it. (Copy attached at
Appendix 'A').
6. WEYGAND had described to me, I immediately sent a telegram
In view of the gravity of the situation which General
to inform the C.I.G.S. I also requested Ma or-General Sir
Richard HOWARD-VYSE to proceed to the War Office as soon
as possible to report more fully to the C.I.G.S., and to
take to the C.I.G.S. a copy of the document reproduced in
Appendix A.
7. I then returned to my Headquarters at LE MANS, arriving
at 1615 hours. I spoke to the C.I.C.S. by telephone at
1630 hours and explained the situation. I asked whether
the BRITTANY scheme had H.M. Government's approval and told
him that both Generals WEYGAND and GEORGES appeared to
consider it impracticable with the force available. The
C.I.G.S. informed me that he knew nothing of the BRITTANY
Scheme, but said he would refer the matter to the Prime
Minister.
I told the C.I.G.S. that, in view of the general state
French Army, I considered that all further movement of
of disintegration which was beginning to spread in the
arrangements should be started for the evacuation of the
troops and material to France should be stopped, and that
B.E.F. from available Ports. The C.I.G.S. informed ne
that orders had already been issued to stop the dispatch of
further troops and material to France.
8. say that the Prime Minister knew nothing of the BRITTANY
An hour later (1715 hours) the C.I.G.S. telephoned to
plan, and that all arrangements were to start for the
evacuation of those elements of the B.E.F. which were at
that time not under the orders of the Tenth French Army.
/ As
FOOTNOTE: ( ) General Georges was C.-in-C., North-
Eastern Theatre of Operations.