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TNA / ADM 199 795

TNA ADM 199 795

TNA ADM 199 795
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 795

Admiralty reports on naval operations off the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts during 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 795
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/795. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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6
15. At 0810 hours I considered that my position at LE MANS
was too exposed, since there was no known body of troops covering that area. I therefore moved my Headquarters back to VITRE, just west of LAVAL. I took with me the G.O.C.
L. of C. Area, a part of whose Staff I had amalgamated with my own since I was entirely dependent of L. of C. Signals for my communications. My own staff consisted only of 4
officers and 2 clerks, the remainder having been stopped at
ST. MALO and sent back to England.
16. At 1230 hours the C.I.G.S. telephoned to say that the Prime Minister was anxious about the withdrawal of the
52nd Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army).
The Prime Minister wished the embarkation to be cancelled, as he feared the effect of such a withdrawal on the morale of the French.
I pointed out that my plans had already received approval, that orders had been issued for the move, and that
CHERBOURG and might well endanger it. The C.I.G.S., however, any alterations now would complicate the embarkation of at said that the Prime Minister did not wish the division to be embarked without the approval of His Majosty's Government.
of At whereabouts of the enemy on the LE MANS front towards caused
17. this time the complete absence of any information me the as any penatration of enemy troops safety
LAVAL some and anxiety, RENNES would have seriously endangered the of the B.E.F.
18. again to the C.I.G.S. at 2150 hours. and I I
more explained to on him the need to evacuate 52nd The
I spoke him the situation as I knew it, Division once
(less impressed with Tenth French Army).
necessary kept idle. The air situation was also at the detachment shipping was available at CHEREOURG that and time was being favourable.
half later the C.I.G.S. gave and permission other details the infantry of 52nd of the Division. Orders implementing to embark one Division which were not needed these
An hour and Field a Regiment, one Field Company to support instructions were at once issued.
CORNWALL'S tank Guns from orders for the protection of
19. Later that 52nd Division were put under the CHERBOURG
night another battalion and General a troop MARSHALL- of Antipeninsula at ST. SAUVEUR.
of the enemy's movements moment could to have be obtained, No information but he did not appear at the exploited the gap at LE MANS.
were 20. During reported the to have been avacuated from preceding 24 hours just over the 12,000 different troops ports.
/ 16 JUNE

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 198.

6
15. At 0810 hours I considered that my position at LE MANS
was too exposed, since there was no known body of troops
covering that area. I therefore moved my Headquarters back
to VITRE, just west of LAVAL. I took with me the G.O.C.
L. of C. Area, a part of whose Staff I had amalgamated with
my own since I was entirely dependent of L. of C. Signals
for my communications. My own staff consisted only of 4
officers and 2 clerks, the remainder having been stopped at
ST. MALO and sent back to England.
16. At 1230 hours the C.I.G.S. telephoned to say that
the Prime Minister was anxious about the withdrawal of the
52nd Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army).
The Prime Minister wished the embarkation to be cancelled,
as he feared the effect of such a withdrawal on the morale
of the French.
I pointed out that my plans had already received
approval, that orders had been issued for the move, and that
CHERBOURG and might well endanger it. The C.I.G.S., however,
any alterations now would complicate the embarkation of at
said that the Prime Minister did not wish the division to be
embarked without the approval of His Majosty's Government.
of At whereabouts of the enemy on the LE MANS front towards caused
17. this time the complete absence of any information
me the as any penatration of enemy troops safety
LAVAL some and anxiety, RENNES would have seriously endangered the
of the B.E.F.
18. again to the C.I.G.S. at 2150 hours. and I I
more explained to on him the need to evacuate 52nd The
I spoke him the situation as I knew it, Division once
(less impressed with Tenth French Army).
necessary kept idle. The air situation was also at
the detachment shipping was available at CHEREOURG that and time was being
favourable.
half later the C.I.G.S. gave and permission other
details the infantry of 52nd of the Division. Orders implementing
to embark one Division which were not needed these
An hour and Field a Regiment, one Field Company to support
instructions were at once issued.
CORNWALL'S tank Guns from orders for the protection of
19. Later that 52nd Division were put under the CHERBOURG
night another battalion and General a troop MARSHALL- of Anti-
peninsula at ST. SAUVEUR.
of the enemy's movements moment could to have be
obtained, No information but he did not appear at the
exploited the gap at LE MANS.
were 20. During reported the to have been avacuated from
preceding 24 hours just over the 12,000 different troops
ports.
/ 16 JUNE