TNA ADM 199 795

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8.
The two remaining signalmen of my party who had
accompanied me to ensure the embarkation of the Commander-
in-Chief, I employed to help in handling the boats on shore,
and then sent on to Bray Dunes to assist there.
L.
9.
On my return to La Panne, I gave orders for the
destruction of all squipment and confidential gear which was
not in actual use, and saw this carried cut.
10.
At 2030, two ships arrived and the boats, which had
already been filled, put off. As, however, no additional
boats had arrived, the rate of evacuation was only about
300 an hour and, as darkness set in this fell to about
150 an hour. With between 5 and 7 thousand men awaiting
embarkation before 0400, at which time the beach would
become exposed to the fire of, if not actually in the hands
of, the enemy, & rate of at least 1,000 an hour was requisite.
11.
Accordingly, urgent representations were made to V.A.
Dover, M.L.O. Bray Dunes, and ships in the vicinity for more
boats, but these never arrived.
12.
During the period of darkness, low flying enemy aircraft
patrolled continually overhead and all lights shown the were
bombed. This made communication with ships
difficult promptly but not impossible, although further interruptions
caused from time to time by as few, "spy hunting"
disorganised were troops, who suspected the flashing.
13.
By 2200, had been embarked and the few boats to
the situation had become serious, as available only about had
600 troops to three, principally owing, I believe,
mismanagement who were doing the naval duties of to and
dwindled in the darkness by the inexperienced rowing army
personnel, the boats. At this time as the telephone set, and Dover
turning atill working, I destroyed the wireless
despatched was the two operators to Bray.
14.
At about no boats, commenced to pile Panne up in
2300, the situation became critical, as on troops, the
for whom there withdrawal, were which would leave La in full
beach and the by 0400 the following morning, the enemy was battery
no-man' matters more awkward, which
swing. To make opened a slow fire on the must beach, have been caused very
casualties near Nieuport with almost every shell and
nerve racking to the waiting men.
15.
Finally, after at conversation whom I with had now General attached Johnston, myself,
any down was at was and commanding La more reached decided after the Panne, ships seaport, he 1Vth question after to had on or march Dunkirk, Division, conferred boats, above I had that the made and and by 6,000 I to with below thought way had a personal odd of the informed the Bray that men, Duty that beaches, Dunes. reconnaisance they who Captain the I remained was would G.O.C. without This closing at not Dover, in to up decision arrive. finding reply embark down and it
I the to therefore # telephone direct informed line as Dover the headquarters about 0050 were now being abandoned. batteries
being taken, further enemy on the
16. had come Whilst into this action decision on the was town, and the rate of fire
beach was increased.