← Document collections
TNA / ADM 199 795

TNA ADM 199 795

TNA ADM 199 795
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 795

Admiralty reports on naval operations off the Dutch, Belgian and French coasts during 1940.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 795
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/795. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only document page 592. Show all matching pages ×

1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 592–592 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
592 Page 592 Log in to enlarge

397
Account of 'G' section
Commodore Hallett explained the following organisal
3015
his officers before landing
The soldiers were on the whole easy to control we had been prepared to find a very bad situation
He was to be afloat approximately in that with French and English fighting among Themselves section of the beach Signals were decided
There was nothing like that at all.
as to how he would call us up and has
Any organisation for forming groups for the next communicate with him.
boat was constantly ruined by streams of
He informed us that we were to be the straggless coming down to the waters edge.
judges of when to evacuate the nowal part
At that time only junior army officers were present that if one party beach had to leave to community
They had little or no control over the men along the whole, so all would have the
Our orders and the orders given by the naval ratings about boats were ip alryed implicitly;
The section heirtenants decided that as the orders about forming groups and quars for the
2.
boats were very much more difficult to enforce were so very small, that all four section
- duefly due g think - that stragglus were remain close together in case there shall continually arriving and forming batches out of trouble with the soldiers over boats or their turn.
the food and water bottles of the sailous
May
30
The morale of the soldiers was very good. They two
3.
We landed at approximately 2330 in had experienced bitter disappointments in that
The Admiral and the Commodore decided to some of them had been waiting as long as two
29/5
until daylight in the destroyer from which days to be evacuated, and there had aty been only a few boat loads at very long intervals disembarked.
Considerable discontent was felt against the French sections (each covering a frontage of approximal
On landing we took up our positions
- not only as to their fighting ability which the British addiess described most fluently - but form hundred yards.
as they were mingling with our soldiers walting of
When we landed there were no signs within for evacuation
4.
A few wholesome lies to the French soldiers as to boats ashore or of any solders the position of their own ships soon cleared minutes of landing, approximately 5,000 and the area. They formed to the Eastward of left their cover in the sand dunes our sections but between ABCD sections and approached the boats ourselves. We discovered that a headquarters was established there

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 592.

397
Account of 'G' section
Commodore Hallett explained the following organisal
3015
his officers before landing
The soldiers were on the whole easy to control we
had been prepared to find a very bad situation
He was to be afloat approximately in that
with French and English fighting among Themselves
section of the beach Signals were decided
There was nothing like that at all.
as to how he would call us up and has
Any organisation for forming groups for the next
communicate with him.
boat was constantly ruined by streams of
He informed us that we were to be the
straggless coming down to the waters edge.
judges of when to evacuate the nowal part
At that time only junior army officers were present
that if one party beach had to leave to community
They had little or no control over the men
along the whole, so all would have the
Our orders and the orders given by the naval
ratings about boats were ip alryed implicitly;
The section heirtenants decided that as the
orders about forming groups and quars for the
2.
boats were very much more difficult to enforce
were so very small, that all four section
- duefly due g think - that stragglus were
remain close together in case there shall
continually arriving and forming batches out of
trouble with the soldiers over boats or
their turn.
the food and water bottles of the sailous
May
30
The morale of the soldiers was very good. They
two
3.
We landed at approximately 2330 in
had experienced bitter disappointments in that
The Admiral and the Commodore decided to
some of them had been waiting as long as two
29/5
until daylight in the destroyer from which
days to be evacuated, and there had aty been
only a few boat loads at very long intervals
disembarked.
Considerable discontent was felt against the French
sections (each covering a frontage of approximal
On landing we took up our positions
- not only as to their fighting ability which
the British addiess described most fluently - but
form hundred yards.
as they were mingling with our soldiers walting
of
When we landed there were no signs within
for evacuation
4.
A few wholesome lies to the French soldiers as to
boats ashore or of any solders
the position of their own ships soon cleared
minutes of landing, approximately 5,000 and
the area. They formed to the Eastward of
left their cover in the sand dunes
our sections but between ABCD sections and
approached the boats
ourselves. We discovered that a headquarters was established
there