TNA ADM 234 360

CHAP. XI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
79, Of these 808 and 211,137 casualties were 1,129. Allied fit numbered 305,078.
At noon on the 3rd June British the fit total and of 13,004 troops casualties. evacuated had reached
Naval losses 2nd June harbour at from motor boat sunk off Malo, and by enemy action,
The brightest Dunkirk feature had been of the carried night out was without that embarkation disturbance in the and apart one losses off by enemy act from small craft from collision or other misadventure, sinkings were confined to
In marked contradistinction attack the from 2nd. the heavy This losses of the 1st June only ship was sunk from by air Calshot R.A.F. on station, which was the fast motor boat Seaplane one at 1500 with Commander from J. C. the Clouston, situation R.N., pier master of the mole,
Tender 243, sailed from Dover for Dunkirk was returning discussing with the staff at Dover, and a who embarkation that the party; boats should she was be in used company with S.T. 276, the intention naval being
Walker during the night's work. At 1855, about 6 miles from Gravelines, 4
two as runners" for Rear-Admiral Wakeenemy aircraft attacked S.T. 243, which received severe damage from a miss and was abandoned in a sinking condition. Commander Clouston ordered near
S.T. 276 to proceed as the enemy aircraft were still continuing to attack, and she subsequently arrived at Dunkirk though too badly damaged to be of service.
rating from S.T. 243 were picked up and saved.
Commander Clouston was seen later, drowned, and only one officer and one
The transport Royal Daffodil nearing Dunkirk from England was attacked all movable gear to port and filling boats with water she was listed to bring by aircraft about an hour after S.T. 243. The ship was holed but by shifting the damage above water. The engineers, J. W. Coulthard and W. L. Evans kept the motors running although the water had risen in the engine room, and the ship returned to Margate under her own steam. Another personnel ship, the Ben-My-Chree, was in collision on the evening of the 2nd shortly after leaving Folkestone for Dunkirk, and took no further part in the operation.
Two further ships were sunk by mines on Route Y on the 2nd June, although it was at first thought they had been torpedoed. At about 1600 the trawlers
Blackburn Rovers and Westella were on patrol near T buoy, when the former blew up on a mine and sank instantly. As the Westella closed the position, explosions from the Blackburn Rovers' depth charges lifted the ship out of the water and put her asdic installation and pumps out of action. About 40
minutes later the Westella was herself blown up by a mine between S and T
buoys, and commenced to sink. Her depth charges were set to 'safe', and the trawlers Saon and Grimsby Town sank her and picked up her survivors and those of the Blackburn Rovers, some badly injured. (Appendix J.9, J.10).
Two other trawlers met with misadventure on the 2nd, but neither was sunk.
Details are lacking but it is known that the Spurs and another trawler, probably either the Kingston Alalite or Kingston Olivine, were both damaged by gunfire.
The Spurs was on the patrol line, and it is not known how she came close enough to the coast to be damaged by shore gunfire. Gunfire also sank the
Gallant's motor boat off Malo at 0210.
known. These were the Getuigt Vor Christus, the O.L.V. van Vlaandaren,
Three Belgian trawlers were lost on th 2nd June, though no details are and the Sunny Isle.
Air co-operation, night 2nd-3rd June
The R.A.F. flew a patrol over the approaches to Dunkirk from about 2010
110

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XI
The Admiralty had already continued (2312/2) for the undertaken evacuation that ships would be night the evacuation 3rd to 4th on June, this and night. they To this the French agreed. complete on the vided and air protection now urged the French of Admiralty trops pro-
Plan for the night embarkation, the hours of 2230/3 and with such ships for
For this last and night the maximum it was decided effort to was cut to down be made, by one hour the time mained available, between to be made by personnel 0230/4. From the as re-
Pier, liftings were to be sent to the entire vessels, destroyers, and East minesweepers; be ships received, were and it was estimated that length of the pier as paddle as they could Drifters and fast thus be provided and for docks 14,000 of men. the inner harbour. small craft were to go would up to the quays be French ships, for which right latter pier the remaining would also lift ships (minesweepers the other than paddle, the beach, the Quai Félix Faure, British Avant Port (West Pier); from numbers could be estimated, were and the to New responsible for evacuation from Malo no boats. Locust was to remain loads ferried out to her by small vettes and skoots) outside and troops, receive to number of 5,000. The gunboat cor-
It was intended to employ on the work a force of 9 personnel vessels, 9
destroyers (all that were available), 4 paddle minesweepers, 7 fleet minesweepers,
9 drifters, the Locust, 2 corvettes, 4 French torpedo boats, and a number of organised motor boats flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. Eleven small French ships and 3 small tugs left Cherbourg for Dover on the night
2nd-3rd June; Le Havre was scheduled to send 8 trawlers, 2 minesweepers,
1 tug, and 20 small dinghies; and Fécamp sent 14 trawlers.
During the afternoon of the 3rd the French authorities transmitted the figure of French troops still remaining in Dunkirk. This was about 30,000, a proportion of whom belonged to other than combatant units. The total capacity of the lifting force, if used to the full, was 30,000, but this was about 5,000 more than the facilities within the port would permit of being embarked in 4 hours, even if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. On previous occasions there had been some instances of difficulty in persuading French troops to embark otherwise than as complete units.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay consequently impressed on the French liaison officers the necessity of speed, and he added a number of French officers and ratings to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200, in
I The following ships landed troops in England on 4th June (numbers landed in brackets)
British - destroyers Express (611), Malcolm (736), Sabre (592), Shikari (383), Vanquisher
Minesweepers Albury (400), Halcyon (501), Kellett (30), Leda (500), Medway Queen (266), ferred to trawler off Dunkirk on account of collision damage) Gunboat Locust (196)
(414), Venomous (1200), Whitshed (444); Corvettes Guillemot (460), Kingfisher (200, trans-
Princess Elizabeth (329), Queen of Thanet (150), Speedwell (396) Trawler Saturn (418)
Drifters Forecast (123), "L.H.W.D." (90) Skoots Bornrif (96), Hondsrug (308), Pascholl
(255), Ruja (300); Yacht Gulzar (140); Personnel vessels Autocarrier (712), Canterbury
Princess (659), Côte d'Argent (1349), King George V (817), Lady of Mann (1244), Newhaven (729),
(1350), Tynwald (3000); Tugs Racia (123), Sun XV (37) War Dept. M.Ls.
Maud (1270), Royal Sovereign (took the place of Manxman which refused to sail)
Pigeon (23), Swallow (23); Sailing Barge Beatrice Maud (31), Tanga not reach England until 5th and June) launches (260); R.N.L.I. lifeboats Edward Z. Dresden (50), Greater (did London (48); Motor boats
Nayland Bonny Heather (210), Diana Mary (28), Elizabeth Green (10), Meuse (50),
Coliath trawlers (355), 3 patrol vessels (836), 13 trawlers and M.F.Vs. (1416), 1104. Belgian Tug
3 M/S (55), Walker II (76). French 5 Torpedo boats 2 S/M chasers (127),
(183), 5 trawlers (554).
114

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
advance of the evacuation force. Captain de Revoir, the French Naval Attaché, also crossed over to assist.
There were still many British wounded in Dunkirk, and Admiral Nord was asked to make special arranagements to evacuate as many as possible in return for the effort the British were making on behalf of the French Army.
Air Protection
Coastal Command were to provide protection for shipping between Dover and Dunkirk during the period from 1930 on the 3rd until dark.
Fighter Command was to maintain a continuous patrol by one Blenheim over the Dunkirk area during the dark hours. Fighter protection over the
Dunkirk area and shipping in the Channel was arranged for first light, the intention being that Fighter Command should patrol from 0345 to 0600 on
June 4th, and Coastal Command from 0600 to 0800. The execution of the first part of this programme was hindered, and that of the second part prohibited by fog which, however, no doubt supplied an even more thorough form of protection for the ships.
From 0430 to 0615 four Spitfires squadrons were on the line, but encountered no enemy aircraft. Fog rendered their landing in England difficult on their return. Hurricane squadrons continued the patrol, reaching the Dunkirk area about 0530 again no enemy aircraft were encountered, and again great difficulty was experienced in landing, one squadron losing 4 aircraft. With this unfortunate anti-climax, the fighter patrols over Dunkirk came to an end.
The scene at Dunkirk 2200, 3rd June
Movements from England of the 50 or so ships and numerous small craft for the night's evacuation commenced according to plan. Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker, who had come over to Dover earlier in the day for consultation, returned to Dunkirk, arriving at 2200 in M.T.B. 102 " to find the harbour swarming with French fishing craft and vessels of all sorts. They were yelling and crowding alongside the East Pier which was already thick with French troops. At one time it looked as if they would get in the way of the transports and destroyers which were on their way, but I managed to get them to go on up the inner harbour and out of the way in time."¹
"The congestion", said Lieutenant J. N. Wise, R.N.V.R., one of the officers of the skoot Pascholl which arrived at Dunkirk at 2300, was chaotic, ships going astern into others coming ahead. French destroyers shrieking on their sirens, small craft nipping here and there, rendering the exit most dangerous."
The numerous wrecks in the harbour and its approaches increased the difficulty and danger of entering. In addition to old wrecks marked on the charts there were now a dozen or more new ones, 3 to the west, and 9 to the east, half of them in the fairway; and more wrecks lay in the harbour. One lay alongside the East Pier; there was a wrecked trawler off the end of the piling on the west side of the Channel leading up harbour and blockships in the Channel, though luckily the tide was high.
Off the Thanet Coast and in mid-Channel there was thick fog (the Royal
Sovereign, 40 minutes out from Margate, reported visibility nil), though the ships were spared this added difficulty at Dunkirk where a fresh easterly wind was blowing and there was a choppy sea at the entrance.
M.017978/41 Report of R. A. Wake-Walker, p.37.
115

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XII
Casualties from collison and grounding had It embarked was under 200 conditions French such troops of as the at these harbour the West that per which was rammed when just clear 20 feet from the stern, 2319, line, Edmond cutting René; her her degaussing port bow, circuits. and the The troops collision was caused opened the up two to the wawler water which was undamaged. eventually joining a water, trawler, swing alongside one another, The Kingfisher, making trans-shipped little to the ships to towards England at 7 knots, casualty. company with the minesweeper proceeded
Leda, another collision
West Pier about an hour into the prevailing fog, and off 0300, the on the way back the
The Leda, having embarked after the 484 Kingfisher. French troops, At had pushed off from she ran down the Belgian The Leda's bows
Margate, the ship ran trawler Maréchal Foch. Goodwin Light Buoy to damaged, and for a while the minesweeper the Albury, which had sailed from were
West Pier at about the same time as Leda, with 400 troops, stood by her; the but the Leda's forward bulkhead held, so the ship continued on her way to
Margate, escorted for a while by the Kellett until the latter had to break off assist a ship in greater trouble and left her with the Kingfisher as companion to in misfortune. The fog was thick at Margate, and in the roads the Kingfisher was rammed once more, the personnel vessel King George V hitting her on the starboard bow, though only minor damage was caused.
Meanwhile, the Maréchal Foch had sunk. In economy of operation this
Belgian trawler seems to have been unequalled, for despite the fact that her entire complement consisted only of the Master, Captain P. Lusyne, and one man, (F. Decoster), she had embarked no less than 300 troops. To accomplish this, the ship had lain alongside the quay at Dunkirk since the 2nd of June, for she had grounded on the falling tide and did not get away until the night of the 3rd-4th. It is satisfactory to know that the Captain and his crew were picked up and landed at Dover; but half of the 300 troops she was carrying were drowned. The French M.T.B. V.T.B 25 which was bringing Admiral
Abrial from Dunkirk picked up some but was hampered by a propeller disabled by wreckage, and some were rescued by the destroyer Malcolm, which left
Dunkirk at 0245 and reported picking up, in fog near the North Goodwin, survivors of an unknown schuyt' which had been sunk in collision with a minesweeper.
Another ship that grounded in Dunkirk and was lost in consequence, was the
Skoot Lena. This vessel had sailed from England at 1530 on the 3rd June, in company with four other skoots, the Pascholl (S.O.), Hondsrug, Bornrif, and
Reiger. The latter ran aground on the Quern Sand soon after leaving Ramsgate, and was left behind. Going alongside the middle pier of Avant Port"
at Dunkirk (probably the West Quay or Guiding Jetty, or possibly the Inner but
Western high none British water, was drifter Pier) available orders were the having Lena and unsuccessful. attempts grounded been given made At at that about 1045 to no tow on 2300. further the her 4th off A embarkation tug June, by was the two asked Bornrif was hours crew for, to and after take em- a place after daylight, it was decided to abandon ship. Part of remainder, the inbarked in a British drifter, part in a French drifter, and the cluding the officers, were ferried to the Locust outside the harbour.
forthcoming to tow off owing the difficulty for minutes
It was presumably to of tug was considerable convoy of tugs Lena, arrived off within the entrance a to the
116

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
on motor boats, sailed the Thark with the motor boats, the 3rd the tugs Sun from IV, Tanga, Ramsgate Sun to XV, Dunkirk. and Racia, Two towing of between them were on account of water trouble petrol; the Diana Mary was
14 abandoned on the way across: in the while foul propeller and rudder, mouth, to piled up 28 Dunkirk troops), on some with and submerged engine the barge masonry of the (though Admiral in Dunkirk she Superintendent, eventually harbour and returned Ports- was abandoned. After waiting off Dunkirk since 2300 on the 3rd, the four tugs ordered at about 0200 on the 4th to go alongside the (East) Pier and embark were as many troops as possible, and by the time they were ordered to out they had collected 203 between them. Of the 14 motor boats which started clear from Ramsgate with the tugs only 5 or 6 found their way back; all the remainder were abandoned for one reason or another.
Embarkations at the West Pier (see Plan 4)
Owing to confusion of nomenclature it is impossible in every case to specify definitely at which of the west piers or jetties the ships (other than destroyers and personnel vessels which berthed at the east pier) embarked their troops.
In the western part of the port, reading from west to east, were (1) the West
Pier (termed western jetty in the Sailing Directions), (2) the West Quay or
Guiding Jetty, and (3) the Inner Western Pier (the inner or old western jetty of the Sailing Directions). Of the other three skoots that came over with the
Lena, the Bornrif stated that she embarked 96 troops at the West Mole"
between 2230 on the 3rd and 0100 on the 4th, and the Hondsrug 308 at the
"West Pier' between 2245 and 0000; while the Pascholl, which had been commanded by four different captains in 8 days, does not specify from which part of the port she lifted the 255 troops with which she sailed at 0030. Another skoot, the Rina, which had spent 24 hours at Dunkirk, sailed about this time with 300 troops.
The corvette Guillemot, which had come over with the Kingfisher, went to the Western mole" and secured ahead of the minesweeper Speedwell at 2355, leaving again at 0154 with French troops embarked to capacity" (460).
This was her first and only trip, her previous service having been as base ship at Margate. The Speedwell which had berthed nearly an hour earlier than the
Guillemot, took off 396 French troops, and the Halcyon, which had sailed from
Dover in her company, 501.
The minesweeper Kellett grounded forward against the western breakwater on a falling tide when she attempted to go alongside at 0100. It was an anxious moment, for almost simultaneously there same a report that 6 enemy
T.B.Ds. were proceeding south-westward from off Ostend; but the motor lifeboat Greater London towed the Kellett's stern away from the wall and enabled her to back away. She embarked a few troops from motor boats and sailed for Margate at 0220 by orders of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, for the West
Pier was occupied and it would be some time before she could be loaded, and the Rear-Admiral feared that so slow a ship might not be able to reach England while our fighter patrols were operating. Two of the personnel ships were sent by Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to the West Pier instead of to the East Pier, since the former was continuously crowded with French troops, whereas at the East Pier there were gaps in the flow of men. One of the two, the Royal
Sovereign, embarked 1,350 men and sailed overladen half an hour after she should have been clear.
Among the many ships and craft of which few or no details are recorded
117

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XII
were the trawler Saturn which An brought unknown 418 drifter troops to England, and the
Gulzar which brought 140. Maud, while brought 90, and abandoned Dover by a destroyer by her crew, on the and 5th were June. up mid-Channel and towed to boarded the sailing barge Beatrice picked in she was lying at the staff of Rear-Admiral Pier at 2230, Maintenance on
Pier for the embarkation on A. H. Taylor, "Dynamo" R.N., West
The Leda paid tribute in her this report night. to the Commander excellent arrangements at him assumed number of charge men they at the could Centre take quickly. and then Commander getting making the Troup ships French fast, officers finding to out Officer, assist the embarked at least 10,000 troops.
to embark the troops estimated that he
Embarkations at the East Pier despite a hold up which threw out the programme of ships entering the harbour
Meanwhile, there had been some heavy liftings of troops from the East Pier and caused great congestion in the entrance. The flow of French troops to the East Pier was better than on the preceding night, though there were some bad pauses.
The first ship to arrive off the pier was the destroyer Whitshed at 2215, with
Commander H. J. Buchanan, R.A.N. and pier party on board. In consequence of the fresh easterly wind and the westgoing tide the ship could not get alongside the East Pier, where there was nobody who could be persuaded to take a line.
However, after disembarking part of her pier party into Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker's M.T.B. for transfer to the pier, she got her bows alongside the personnel ship Autocarrier and her stern alongside the Sabre and commenced embarking troops. The Sabre had been working since 30th May with a compass damaged and rendered unreliable by a shell splinter, and had been led across by the Venomous. She got away from the East Pier at 0025 with 592
troops and followed other ships towards England until they were lost to sight near U buoy at the south end of the South Falls. This was within hearing of the North Goodwin Light Vessel, which the Sabre located by sound, subsequently proceeding from buoy to buoy until she reached Dover at 0500.
When the Autocarrier left in her turn at 0035 she carried 712 French troops.
The Canterbury left ten minutes later with 659, while the Côte Argent had shoved off from the pier five minutes earlier with 1,349 troops. After these three practically simultaneous sailings of personnel ships some time elapsed before another bunch got away. The Princess Maud had berthed at the extreme end of the pier, and sailed at 0150 with 1,270 troops and dogs of all kinds" that managed to get aboard. The Lady of Mann which berthed about the time when the first three personnel vessels left, took 1,244 troops at 0200.
The Tynwald seems to have been the last to leave the East Pier. She sailed at 0305 with the record lift, only equalled by the Scotia on 29th May, of 3,000
French troops: in 4 trips she had evacuated 8,953 men. With a single exception all destroyers had now gone; the Malcolm went at 0245 with 736
troops, Vanquisher at 0240 with 414, and the Venomous, which had arrived at
0245 to find the harbour very congested and ordered to wait outside until
0130, 5 took out no less than 1,200 troops. In four was days the Venomous had made trips, evacuating 4,410 men in all, to fog, did not arrive at Dunkirk until 0230 on the 4th. She left half an hour
The British pier party was taken off by the destroyer Express which, owing later, having embarked 611 troops.
118

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
The Locust also, after embarking troops ferried out to her from 2300, came alongside the East Pier at 0225, and when she sailed ten minutes later had on board 196 troops.
Mining of the Emile Deschamps
The personnel vessel King George V which left the East Pier about 0300 with
817 troops, ran into thick fog off the English coast. About 0615, near the
Elbow Buoy 21/2 miles east of the North Foreland, she passed a "small French naval vessel." Suddenly there was a heavy explosion astern of her, and within a minute the vessel had sunk.
The small French ship was the Fleet Auxiliary Emile Deschamps which had sailed from Dunkirk for England at about 2100 on 3rd June, crowded with troops and refugees. About 0558 the minesweeper Albury, 5 cables ahead of her, gave her a course for the North Goodwin Light Vessel, which the French ship had missed. A quarter of an hour later the Emile Deschamps struck the magnetic mine which sank her.
Several vessels were near and hastened to rescue the survivors. The firefloat Massey Shaw, on passage from Ramsgate to London, was only 200 yards away at the time and picked up 40, reported to be all sailors, which she transferred to the Albury. The King George V lowered four boats and picked up
67. The minesweeper Kellett, called up by signal from the Albury, rescued some very badly injured people as did also H.M.S. Nelson's motor boat, whose log contains the apparently, but no doubt unintentionally, casual entry
' 2400. L/Sea. Eggington lost overboard with candle-lantern." Fog came down again as the rescue operations were completed. Among the survivors landed at Margate were 7 French women and a boy.
Blocking Operation repeated night 3rd-4th June
Owing to the failure of the blocking operation of the previous night to close the port, the Admiralty, during the forenoon of the 3rd June, ordered it to be repeated on this night with Admiral Abrial's concurrence. Captain E. Dangerfield, R.N. was again in charge. The ships employed were as follows:-
destroyer:
Shikari;
coastal craft: M. A./S. B. 10,
M.T.B. 107
blockships
Gourko, 1975 tons, built 1911,
Moyle, 1761 tons, built 1907,
Pacifico, 687 tons, built 1905.
The force sailed from the Downs at 2030 on the 3rd by Route Z, M.T.B. 107
being in tow of the Shikari, and anchored at 0130 on the 4th between No. 14 W
and 16 W buoys, near the entrance to Dunkirk harbour.
At 0230 Captain Dangerfield, who had transferred to M. A/S. B. 10 ordered the ships to weigh and the Shikari proceeded to lead them to the entrance.
The Gourko's anchor was barely aweigh when a violent explosion occurred aft, caused, it is reported, by a magnetic mine, although the ship was degaussed and had been wiped in Chatham Dockyard as recently as the 31st May. The
Gourko began to sink rapidly and was ordered to be abandoned. She sank stern first in 3 minutes. M. A/S. B. 10 took off 9 survivors and transferred them to the Shikari. M.T.B. 107 rescued 7 others, some of them from the water. One of the crew was missing, and 8 were wounded.
Meanwhile, the other two blockships carried on with the operation. The
119

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XII
Moyle rammed the As Inner she sank, Western she Pier slid off abreast the bank the wreck towards of the Westcove scuttled line channel, intention The of Pacifico the herself. as was channel, the to decided Westcove proceed her to after between had scuttle part done, down and in being and the between beyond finally against position the them settled the allotted wrecks Westcove. at of to a slight the the the Edvard Gourko. centre angle to of Her and the the and Westcove and defeated then drift this the Pacifico broadside on. Nissen the strong current after hold, dropped manoeuvre, anchor so into her and rammed However,
The stern then swung not over turn further owing to the tide Nissen, but, after cove abreast her to port towards the Edvard secured ships. of certain point, Orders would were then accompanied given for the by scuttling considerable of the Pacifico; race between As in the the case two a due in this instance to vapour.
the Westcove, this was oil fuel a sheet of flame, probably
One shell hit the pier, causing many casualties, for there were still some 200
The time now was about 0330 and at this juncture shelling recommenced.
French troops on the East Pier. General Bathelemy, Commander of the
Flanders Garrison, who was taken off by the Shikari, stated that 12,000 French troops still remained in Dunkirk. The Shikari carried 383 when she sailed from Dunkirk at 0340 by orders of Captain Dangerfield; she was the last ship to leave. Apart from an air attack, which caused no damage, her passage home was uneventful.
An M.T.B. had been detailed to evacuate Admiral Abrial but the latter could not be found, and as a matter of fact he was brought out from Dunkirk in a French M.T.B. V.T.B. 25. Near the North Goodwin Light Vessel the vessel's propeller became disabled by wreckage, and the Malcolm towed her to Dover about 0600.
On the conclusion of the blocking operation there remained a gap of about
100 to 120 feet unobstructed on the west side of the channel. Part of this gap was, however, shoal water, because of the shelving bank.
Disembarkation figures, 4th June
There were landed in England on 4th June 26,175 persons, of which British ships had evacuated 21,600, French 3,838, and Belgian 737. These figures included a number of survivors, both troops and ships' crews, from sunken ships and some refugees. It was recorded that 622 of the total were evacuated from the beaches, but it is doubtful whether any of these were actually evacuated from the beaches, for the figure includes many such as the 43 French troops landed by the Pangbourne, who were taken from a French vessel
(probably the mail packet Rouen) which had run aground on a sand bank: the
260 brought over by the Beatrice Maud: a number (apparently 210) recorded as evacuated from the beaches and landed in England but actually ferried from
Dunkirk pier to various transports, by the motor launch Bonny Heather.
Operation Dynamo completed, 1423/4th June
Ammunition in Dunkirk was exhausted, enemy were and reported the remaining consisted
When the Shikari sailed, the to be only 3 miles away.
principally the of non-combatant units. troops Admiral Nord agreed that was dispersed at 1030.
operation should be considered as Accordingly, terminated. The fleet of rescue ships
The decision to terminate the operation was agreed to by the French
120

CHAPTER XIII
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION
Inadequate planning those taking part largely and place that planning. Events on the of
Operation "Dynamo" took was the an improvisation, of in which the initiative most developed so swiftly unexpectedly for what lack of time prevented any Continent but than was meagre anticipated. preparation proved to be a far more extensive operation the was and not that date it 19th May, seven days before the operation commenced;
The problem mooted of until evacuating the large numbers of British troops from the Continent undertaken. even at was considered unlikely that it would actually be
Expeditionary Force would be evacuated.
As late as the 24th May it was still uncertain whether the British
Two days later, when the Admiralty ordered the operation to commence, the military situation was thought to have deteriorated so rapidly that a lift of no more than 45,000 troops within a period of 48 hours was considered possible, after action. which the evacuation would have to be terminated on account of enemy
In the event, seven times as many men were evacuated, and the operation continued for 9 days.
The organisation was built up as the evacuation proceeded. A Maintenance
Officer to take charge of the small craft was appointed on the 27th May, the day after the beginning of the operation. S.N.O. Dunkirk assumed duty at
1900 on the same day, and S.N.O. Afloat off the beaches two days later. It was not, however, until the 30th May that an S.N.O. arrived to take charge off the French-Belgian coast, together with an N.O.I.C. Beaches and two
Commodores to take charge off shore. How great was the effect of these appointments, figures. will be shown in due course in the analysis of the evacuation
The arrival of beaching craft at the beaches was unnecessarily delayed on the 28th and 29th May, owing to the Admiralty (and the majority of the Naval
Authorities who provided craft), directing them to Dover instead of the Downs, as had been requested by Vice-Admiral Ramsay.
Lack of Signal Communications
Difficulties and confusion were caused throughout the operation owing to and the the absence signal the beaches of efficient and between signalling Dunkirk arrangements, and Dover. both The locally equipment between taken Dunkirk was in- by adequate beaches to The naval to either party Dunkirk. beach which for parties, inter-communication proceeded as might from have England been between expected, to the Dunkirk beaches used on their 27th or ingenuity from the the improvise local inter-communication but it was not until
30th May that a naval wireless set arrangements capable of communicating with
122

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION
CHAP. XIII
England was sent to Dunkirk; until then messages had either to be sent through the French station in an unsuitable code, or fortuitously via any destroyer which might be lying alongside, necessitating a messenger forcing his way along the narrow crowded footway of the pier.
In. the absence of efficient communication it was impossible to distribute ships to the best advantage off the beaches or between Dunkirk harbour and the beaches; whilst the uncertainty as to whether the harbour was blocked on the 29th May was responsible for a reduction of 10,000 men in the possible lift during the night 29th-30th.
Air Co-operation
There is no doubt that the R.A.F. carried out, as far as their available resources permitted, all the tasks which they were asked by the Navy to undertake. The odds at which our airmen fought were very long, four or five to one.
Formations of single squadron strength or less would boldly attack German groups of forty or fifty machines, usually with success out of all proportion to the odds against them. It was a direct test of British against German quality.
Numbers did not, however, permit of a continuous patrol being maintained over the scene, though the whole Metropolitan Air Force, our last sacred reserve, was used. Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a day'.' Unfortunately, the troops on the beaches and on Dunkirk piers saw but little of the fighting in the air, for much of the weight of the effort of the Royal Air Force was directed against objectives far inland, to prevent or break up enemy raids before these reached the beaches and ships. It was the ships that took the brunt of the German attack. Galling though it was to our troops to be bombed and machine gunned with little or no opportunity to defend themselves their losses, grievous enough, were yet never of such severity as to jeopardise the entire operation, as did the losses of ships. However, the system of co-operation in force at that early date, which did not permit of direct contact with R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command, rendered difficult complete co-ordination of effort with naval requirements on the spot.
Evacuation figures analysed²
In analysing the evacuation figures it is necessary to consider separately the rates of lift from day to day and the daily total figures of troops lifted.
The former naturally affected the latter; but the days which showed the best rates of lift were not necessarily those giving the highest evacuation total, since circumstances affected the two sets of figures differently and factors which affected one set often had no effect whatever on the other.
The following table shows the number of men from the beaches and the harbour landed daily in England by British ships, and the number of round trips undertaken. Evacuations of wounded by hospital carriers have been omitted, as have also the liftings from the beaches on 3rd and 4th of June, which were largely fortuitous.
1 Churchill, The Second World War Vol. II.
2 The figures employed in this analysis are those of H.S./T.S.D. The total differs by
397 (= 0.0013%) from the military figure. See Note to Tables 1-3 which will be found before the appendices at the end of this book.
123

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION
CHAP. XIII,
1ST JUNE. Beaches. The climax of boat shortage occurred on this day, and
" increasing enemy air attack caused continual interruptions of embarkation on the beaches and in Dunkirk ' (D.R. P. 25). The disastrous figures reflect the serious situation that developed on the beaches about 2030 on the 31st
May, when the rate of embarkation fell to about 150 an hour owing to shortage of boats.
Harbour. The interruptions caused by air attacks and shelling undoubtedly accounted partly for the poor rate of lift. A further factor was the berthing of destroyers two or three deep at the East Pier. It is true that some destroyers filled up in less than an hour the Vivacious, for example, out of 35 minutes spent in Dunkirk, was alongside the East Pier for only 15 minutes, during which time she took on board 475 men; and the Shikari needed only 20 minutes to embark 623 troops. On the other hand, owing to the state of the tide, the personnel vessel Maid of Orleans spent 51 hours at the East Pier acting as a floating pontoon for destroyers, while the outermost destroyer, the Windsor, spent nearly 15 hours alongside.
2ND JUNE. No daylight evacuations took place after the 1st June, all took place at night.
Beaches. The average lift and waiting time were both much below normal.
There were more ships lying off the beaches than could be loaded by the boats available; consequently, scarcely a single ship left with a full load of troops.
The rate of lift, however, was average.
Harbour. The night of the Ist-2nd June saw the introduction of planned arrival and berthing of ships at Dunkirk. This resulted in a marked improvement in the average lift, which was almost the best of the entire operation.
3RD JUNE. The increase in average time spent at Dunkirk during the night of the 2nd-3rd June over the previous night was probably accounted for by the difficulties experienced by ships in going alongside the East Pier. The figure was worsened by the fact that, owing to the cessation of the flow of
French troops to the East Pier after the embarkation of the British rearguard at 2330 on the 2nd, five destroyers had to be sent back to England practically empty.
4th JUNE. Owing to chaotic conditions in Dunkirk harbour time waiting to berth averaged no less than 100 minutes. Pauses in the flow of French troops to the piers, and the impossibility of inducing them to embark in quick and orderly manner (which latter factor had also operated on the previous night)
sufficed to depress the rate of lift from the high averages of the two previous nights, to the norm for the operation.
Discipline
No instances of naval indiscipline came to light. But in an operation where the level of initiative was very high an unaccountably heavy wastage of small boats occurred from lack of boatkeepers. There were undoubtedly instances where small boats which were brought off from shore to ship manned only by troops, drifted away and were lost after the troops climbed out of them, owing to the omission to put boatkeepers into them.
The state of discipline of the troops had a direct bearing on the rate of embarkation. In the early stages of the operation the troops on the beaches were mainly rear units and indiscipline occurred. The arrival of combatant
127

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX A
TROOPS
MOTOR BOATS, LAUNCHES AND VESSELS (contd.)
TRANSPORTED
M.F.H. (W. H. Smith, Capt.)
87
Minikoil (S/Lt. R. E. Blows, R.N.V.R.)
/
Minoru II'
/
Minotaur (T. Towndrow, Skipper)
/
Minwood
51
Mirasol
/
Moss Rose1
/
Murious
/
Naiad Errant
8
(A. B.S. Palmer, i/c)
Nanette II
30
Nayland
83
Nemo IV'
/
New Britannic
83
(W. Matthews, Cox.)
New Prince of Wales'
-
(S/Lt. P. H. E. Bennett, R.N.)
New White Heather
-
Offemia
50
Patricia (T.H.V.)
/
Pauleter
400
(Sto. D. T. Banks)
Peggy IV:
-
(S. H. Hughes, Skipper)
Pioneer¹
-
Princess Freda
-
(S/Lt. E.S. Forman, R.N.V.R.)
Princess Lily
-
(Prob. Ty. S/Lt. K. E.A. Bayley, R.N.V.R.)
Princess Maud
-
Provider
Not known
(F. Hannaford, Skipper)
Queen Boadicea II
-
(Lieut. J.S. Seal, R.N.R.) (Capt. J. Whittaker)
Queen of England'
-
Quest
-
Quicksilver
20
(S/Lt. D.L. Satterford. R.N.) (L/Sea. T. Phillips)
18
Quisisana
(S/Lt. A. J. Weaver, R.N.V.R.)
28
Rapid I
(S/Lt. J.C. Clarke, R.N.V.R.)
Reda
44
Reliance (S/Lt. P. Snow, R.N.) (P.O. R. W. Rawlings, Motorman)
80
(Skpr. A. Legget)
Renown'
-
Resolute (Skpr. W.H. Noakes)
40
Roberta (Skpr. H.D. Osborne)
-
Rocinante
-
Rosabelle
-
Rose Marie
Not known
St. Patrick1
-
Sambrez
Not known
Santosy
-
Saviour (Actg. S/Lt. J.M. Chappell, R.N.)
22
I Lost.
2 Ex-Belgian canal boat.
150

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX J
to return the to effect England. that a was at Dunkirk telling Margate boats to
During the evening skoot of the 1st going June a along report the was beaches recieved from S.N.T.O.
Antje The intended Antje was to hailed get confirmation and told with to from survivors return. her, when A warship the troop was carrier Scoficinity, sarrier Scoticinity, and skoot Oranje with boats in tow was England and complied.
close to her; so Antje filled up told to return and to returned. is understood sunk that another skoot was of these details. was hands. It has not occasion been
In view of these informed reports, message that Dunkirk 2335/1 was in sent German out. On an earlier possible to get confirmation
2332/3
APPENDIX J
SIGNALS RE PATROLS IN THE NORTH SEA SOUTH AND ON THE
ROUTES TO DUNKIRK
Sunday, 26th May
1. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. NORE, (R) V.A. Dover, F.O.I.C. Harwich, F.O.I.C. Humber
All available forces are to be used for covering operation Dynamo tonight Sunday.
1937/26
2. Widgeon to C.-IN-C. NORE
Siroco was torpedoed by 2 M.T.B.'s
0200/31
Saturday, 1st June
3. Malabar to ANY-BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR
explosion 2 miles? S buoy.
Argyllshire sunk by torpedo. Survivors report submarine submerged before
0310/1
4. Kingston Galena to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Capt. A.P.
to Dover.
Stella Dorado torpedoed. Picked up 5 survivors, 1 badly injured. Proceeding
0430/1
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMAND
Magnetic mines reported to have been laid vicinity of buoy F.G. on route X.
2310/1
Sunday, 2nd June
6. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Epervier (R) Léopard, Savorgnan de Brazza.
N. Goodwin L.V. 8 miles. Caused by shell fire. Vanquisher left Dover 1305 B.S.T.
Three aux. patrol vessels reported out of action at 1214 B.S.T. in position 090°
to investigate and report.
1315/2
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Calcutta, (R) C.-in-C. Nore, Admiralty, Savorgnan de Brazza patrol to that carried out today Sunday is to be carried out tomorrow Monday,
Return to Sheerness and revert to 1 hours notice for steam. An exactly similar provided patrol line. C.-in-C. Nore can provide a screen. Inform the French vessels on your
1247/2
were was not already sufficient ships in Dunkirk harbour and that was Oranje's complete, tow of 4 boats,
I A skoot informed Oranje that beach evacuation that there required. About an hour later the Oranje did in fact return to England.
172

INDEX
Fighter Command. 36-7. See Royal Air Force.
Fisher, Cdr. R. L., 51n.
Fisher Boy, 32n,
Fletcher, Lt., 81.
Fitzroy, 31, 54n.
Fog, 115, 118-9.
38.
Ford, Ch. F. A., saves Whippingham, 87.
Ford R.N.A. Station, 71n
Forecast, 23n, 107n, 114n.
Foremost 87, 71n, 111.
Foremost IOI, 72n.
Foremost 102, 71n.
Foudroyant, 62n, 91-2 (sunk).
Fouque, Capt. de Freg. R., 62.
Franklyn, Maj.-Gen. H. E., 6.
Frazer, Capt. Hon. G., 97.
Fredanja, 29n.
French Navy. Failure to supply pier parties, 109.
French ships arrive, 35, 62.
French troops evacuation begins, 35; rush boats, 45, 51, 53; organised evacuation not begun, 54; to embark equally with British, 56, 68; lack of information from, 84
uncertainty as to numbers, 105; pause in embarkation, 108; slow to embark, 128;
12,000 left, 120; discipline, 128.
Friso, 29n, 31n.
Fyldea, 13n, 39, 40n, 44.
Gallant, 23, 24n, 27, 32, 39 (damaged), 55n her motor boat, 110.
Gallion's Reach, 72n.
Gallon, Ch. Stkr. M., 91.
Gandell, Cdre., W. P., P.S.T.O. French Ports, 13.
Gara, 92.
Genius, 71n.
Georges, General, 1.
Gerard Léon, 73.
Gervais Rentoul, 83n (damaged), 95 (sunk).
Getuigt vor Christus, lost, 110.
Gipsy King, 72n.
Girl Gladys, 23n, 62.
Girl Pamela, 23n, 55 (sunk).
Glagla, 71n, 74.
Glen Avon, 60n, 100-1.
Glen Gower, 60n, 100-1.
Glenway, 71n, 107n.
Glitter II, 31n, 53 (towed to England).
Godman, S/Lt., T. E., R.N.V.R., 72.
Golden Eagle, 42, 107n.
Golden Gift, 23n.
Golden Lily, 54, 60n.
Golden Spray II, 72n, 75n.
Golden Sunbeam, 23n, 47n, 62, 107n.
Goliath, 114.
Gort, Lord faces possibility of evacuation, 4; proposal to counter attack, 5, 11, 14, 27
directed to execute Weygand Plan, 10; delays enemy, 26; moves H.Q. to La Panne,
26; refuses to be evacuated, 47; orders piers to be built, 47; plans for final phase,
56; hands over command and embarks, 66, 76; staff embarking, 67.
Gorton, Cdr. H. G., 49, 80n.
Gossamer, 28n, 33, 36, 75, 77, 81, 107n, 109.
Gould, Lieut. P. F. S., 113.
Gourko, 119-20.
Gracie Fields, 23n, 27, 41-2 (abandoned), 47n.
Grafton, 13 (bombards Calais); in Dynamo, 23, 27, 31, 37-8 (sunk), 55n, 85.
Gravelines, evacuated, 18.
Gravesend, sends small craft, 61.
Greater London, 117.
199

INDEX
Mosquito,44,727, 74, 88 (damaged), 92-3 (sunk).
Motor boats Control sunk Organisation, 5, 25.
93. to salvage pulling boats, 60-61,; follow Capt. Howson to England 74.
Movements 119-120.
M.T.B.67, 66n, 67.
M.T.B.16, 28, 113.
M.T.B.68, 66n, 71, 75.
M.T.B.107, 66n, 111, 119 (in operation CK).
M.T.B.102, 66n, 90, 108, 115.
Naiad Errant, 72n, 92.
Nautilus, sunk, 36, 42, 47.
Nanette II, 72n.
Nelson's, picket boa+, 72n: motor boat, 107n, 119.
Nayland, 32n, 47n, 114n.
Netsukis, 23n, 107n.
Nettle, Lt., 49.
New Britannic, 32n, 47n.
Newhaven, 102, 107n, 109, 112n, 114n.
Newhaven, sends small craft, 61.
New Prince of Wales, damaged, 74.
Ngaroma, 16.
Nicolle, General, 101.
Niger, 61, 86, 100 (meets small craft returning empty), 101, 107n, 109 (rams a French ship).
Noakes, Mr. W. H., killed, 73.
N.O.I.C. Beaches, see Capt. Howson.
Noneta, 71n.
Nord, Admiral. see Abrial, Admiral.
Nore C. in C., 8, 17 (to cover Dynamo); provision of boats, 51; M.T.B.'s, 70.
Normania, sunk, 44.
Ocean Breeze, 60, 71n.
Ocean Cock, 71n.
Ocean Reward, 28n, 34 (sunk).
Olivier, Mr. G. D., 73.
Olvina, 60 (goes to France in error), 91.
O.L.V. van Vlaandaren, 73n, 110 (lost).
Operations: CK Blocking of Dunkirk, 111-2, 119-20; XD (E) Dunkirk demolitions, 8,
19, 106; XD (G) Boulogne demolitions, 8-9.
Oranje, 20, 24, 29n, 47n, 100.
Oriole, 28n, 47 (beached to form pier), 107n.
Osborne, Mr. F. W., 73n.
Osborne, Mr. L. V., 73n.
Ostend, unsuitable for military requirements, 7; captured, 27.
Otway-Riven, Cdr. H. J. O., 49, 80n.
Our Bairns, 34.
Overfalls, 71n.
Pacific, 30n.
Pacifico, 119-120.
Pangbourne, 28n, 41 (damaged), 42, 97, 107n, 120.
Paris, 29n, 103-4 (sunk).
Parminster, Brigadier, 22.
Pascholl, 30n, 114n, 115-7.
Patria, 20n, 24, 29n, 46.
Patricia, 20.
Patrols: air, see Royal Air Force; Naval of the routes, 20, 23, 28, 33-34 (ships taken off),
34 (strengthened), 85 (inshore channel).
Pauleter, 60n.
Paxton, 23n, 31 (damaged).
Pellag II, sunk, 95.
Persia, 71n, 90.
Personnel vessels: vulnerability, 28; not to be employed in daylight, 29, 99; strain
Pharailde, 73n.
on, 48; sailings suspended, 70; heavy losses, 98-9.
203

INDEX
Phillips, Vice-Admiral T.S. V., 16.
Phipps, L/St. M., 81.
Pickford & Co., 72n.
Pierre, set on fire, 74.
Pierre et Marie, 73.
Piers (beach) built at La Panne, 47, 60, 76; of barges impracticable, 49; built at Bray,
59, 82.
Pigeon, 72n, 114n.
Pim, Capt. R., R.N.V.R., 78.
Playmates, 13n.
Polly Johnson, 13n, 39, 40 (damaged), 43, 44 (sunk).
Pool, S/Lt. R. A. W., 72.
Port of London Authority, 32.
Porter, Col., 47.
Portsdown, 100, 103.
Portsmouth, C. in C.: sends destroyers, 20; provision of boats, 51 Inner Patrol yachts,
71 A.S.'s. barge, 117 (abandoned).
Pownall, Lt. Gen. H. R., 4.
Prague, 29n, 54n, 64n, 91 (damaged).
Président Briand, 93.
Preston, Vice-Adm. Sir L. (D.S.V.P.), 21.
Princess Elizabeth, 47n, 89, 114n.
Princess Lily, 75n.
Princess Maud, 48n, 53 (goes aground), 62 (damaged), 114n, 118.
Prudential, 60.
Pudge, 71s.
Queen of England, sunk, 53.
Queen of Thanet, 91, 114m.
Queen of the Channel, 22, 24, 29 (sunk).
Queen's Channel, 72n.
Racia, 71n, 114я, 117.
R.A. Dover, see Wake-Walker, Rear Admiral W.F.
Ramsay, Vice-Adm. Sir B. (V.A. Dover): to control evacuation, 4; to arrange air cover,
5; asks for more destroyers, 20; driving force, 23, 33; promulgates disembarkation ports, 25; efforts to increase supply of small craft, 23, 32; plan for night 29/30th
May, 50; orders all ships to beaches, 51; concern at losses of destroyers, 94; calls for volunteers, 105; reports exhaustion of crews, 113.
Ramsgate, N.O.I.C. Administers in shore flotilla, 21, 94; services skoots, 30.
Raphael-Raymonde, 73n.
Rapid I, 72, 92.
Reda, 53, 60n.
Reed, 7ln.
Refugees, 37, 100-1, 119.
Reiger, 32, 47m, 64, 101-2, 116.
Reine des Flots, 102, 107n, 109.
Reliance, 73n.
Renascent, 71n.
Renown, 73, 93 (sunk).
Resolute, 73n.
Revoir, Capt. de, 115.
Rewga, 71n.
Reynaud, M., 10, 11.
Richardson, Cdr. H. du P., 80n, 82, 83n.
Riggs, Mr. H. C., 21.
Rika, 41.
Rina, 117.
Robinson, Cdr. C. E. C., killed, 37.
Roebuck, in collision, 83.
Rope for towing, 61.
Rose Marie, 72n.
Ross, 28n, 44, 97.
Rouen, 94, 107n, 108 (goes aground), 109, 112n, 120 (aground).
Route, X prepared, 20; mined, 38; tested by destroyers, 39 taken into use, 48; last route to come under fire, 96-7; traffic suspended, 98.
Route, Y adopted, 20, 29; under fire, 48; E-boats, on 85; in use, 93; mines on, 110.
Route, Z under fire, 20, 48; to be used in darkness, 29, 48.
204

INDEX
Silver Moon, crosses to France without charts or compass, 53.
Silver Queen, 53, 60n.
Simpson, Ch. Skpr. D. W. L., R.N.R., lost, 34.
Simson, Capt. D. J. R., Capt. D. (19), killed, 9.
Siroco, 39, 43, 62n, 69 (sunk), 85.
Skipjack, 20, 28n, 31, 60, 86, 90 (sunk).
Skipwith, Cdr. L. P., handling of Royal Sovereign, 108.
Skoots: Commissioned, 7; return to Downs in error, 20; reach Dunkirk and beaches, 29;
continuous service, 30.
Skylark, sunk, 72.
Small craft: provision of 5, 15, 17, 21, 32, 51 manning difficulty, 17; sent to Dover, in error, 21, 22; shortage of, 24-5, 32-3, 61, 76, 80-82, 127 losses of 32, 36; difficulties due to weather, 36, 48, 69-70; overcrowding, 36; supply increases, 51, 61, 71
ordered to move towards Dunkirk, 86-7; return empty to England, 100.
broached to and stranded, 58, 69-70; cast adrift and lost, 60; all vanished, 86;
Snaefell, 100-1.
S.N.O. Afloat, see Bush, Capt, E. W. and Wake-Walker, Rear-Adm. W. F.
S.N.O. Dunkirk, see Tennant, Capt. W. G.
Solomon, S/Lt. M. B. H., R.N.V.R., 73n.
Spanish refugees, 100-1.
Speedwell, 86, 90, 107n, 109, 114n, 117.
Spurs, 32n, 69 (hunts S/M.), 110 (damaged).
Starlight Rays, 60n, 107n, 108.
Stella Dorado, 34n, 69, 85 (sunk).
Stella Reigel, 85.
Stephenson, Vice-Adm. G. O., 49 (act. Cdre.), 58 (takes charge off La Panne), 66-7, 79,
83; effect of his arrival, 126.
Strathelliot, 72, 101.
Stubbs, Lt., 81.
Submarine Chaser 6, 107n.
Submarines (German): believed minelaying, 38; sighted, 69.
Sunshine, 60n, 75n.
Sun IV, 71n, 104n, 117.
Sun V, 32, 36 (put out of action).
Sun VII, 71n.
Sun VIII, 71n.
Sun X, 107n, 111.
Sun XI, 71n, 107n, 111.
Sun XII, 71n.
Sun XV, 71a, 104, 114n, 117.
Sunny Isle, lost, 110.
Surcouf, 62n.
Sursum Corda, 29n.
Survivors, machine gunned, 44, 90, 92.
Sutton, 28n, 31, 42, 47, 86 (attacked), 101.
Swallow, 69-70, 72n, 114n.
Swift Wing, 7In.
Tanga, 71n, 88, 114n, 117.
Tanks, British worn out, 6.
Taransay, 71n.
Taylor, Rear-Adm. (act. Cdre.), A. H., (Dynamo Maintenance Officer), 21, 97.
Tennant, Capt. W. G., 16, 50 (appointed S.N.O. Dunkirk); 21-22 (assumes duty)
22 (sends dramatic signal) 24, 48 (asks for all ships to be sent to Dunkirk); 50 (responsible England). under R.A. Dover); 50n (false report sent in his absence); 108 (embarks for
Thark, lost, 117.
Thele, 71n.
Thérèse Compas, 73.
Thérèse Louis, 62n.
Thirlwall, A/Ldg. Sea. R., 93.
Thomas Bartlett, sunk, 34.
Thornton, Lt. Cdr. M., 47n.
Thuringia, sunk, 34, 38.
Thurston, Lt. N., mortally wounded, 86.
Thyra, 71n.
Tibbits, Lieut., 79.
206

INDEX
I, 72n. small craft, 61.
29n, 53 (rams and sinks Queen of England).
Tilly Tolly, 71n.
Torbay 23n.
53, 60n, 74, 75n.
Tugs, Troup, use as transports, 41.
Triton, Cdr. H. R., 21, 118, 86. 128.
Twente, 20n, 24, 29n,
Two Rivers, 75n.
Tynwald, 29n, 54n, 64n, 107n, 109, 112n, 114n, 118 (record lift).
U-boats, see Submarines.
Ut Prosim, 23n, 63, 107n.
V.A. Dover, see Ramsay, Vice-Admiral B. H.
Vanguard, 60.
Vanquisher, 37-8, 54n, 55, 61, 62 (make two trips on 30th May), 87, 107n, 108 (sent back empty), 112n, 114n, 118.
Vavasour, Lt. G. W., 79-81.
Vega, 34, 42, 69.
Venetia, at Boulogne, 9-10.
Venomous, at Boulogne, 9-10; in Dynamo, 61, 101, 107-8, 114n, 118.
Vénus, sunk, 93.
Verity, at Calais, 10; in Dynamo, 13, 19, 28n, 32, 43-4, 49, 51 (reports on Dunkirk),
54n, 55.
Victor-Erna, 73n.
Viewfinder, sunk by Belgian troops, 53.
Viking, 60.
Vimiera, at Boulogne, 9-10.
Vimy, at Boulogne, 8-9; in Dynamo, 20, 23, 27-8, 62 (makes two trips on 30th May), 64n,
69 (hunts S/M.), 74 (rams and sinks Amulree), 95.
Vivacious, 23, 27-8, 45, 61 (calls for more ships and boats), 74 ( -boats), 83 (damaged),
Vincia, 71n, 90.
87, 111-2 (in Operation CK), 127.
V.T.B.25, 116 (evacuates Admiral Abrial), 120 (towed to Dover).
Vulture, 72n.
W.24, 60.
W.26, 72n.
Wakeful, 20n, 23, 24n, 27, 32, 36 (sunk), 37, 85.
Wake-Walker, Rear-Adm. W.F. (R.A. Dover) Apptd. S.N.O. Afloat, 49, 50; takes over duties, 58; tranships four times in 24 hours, 59; general policy, 71; urges M.B's. to be sent back, 74; investigates position E. of Dunkirk, 85-6; transfers to M.T.B.102,
90 clears Dunkirk of ships, 103; activities night 2/3 June, 108; on the final night,
115; effect of his arrival, 126.
Walker I, 32n.
Walker II, 32n, 114n.
Wardrop, Lt. Cdr. R. G., R.N.R., 49.
Warren, Lt. Cdr. G. H., 88.
Water supply, shortage at Dunkirk and beaches, 26, 31, 62.
Wave Queen, 72n.
Waverley, 28n, 42 (sunk), 47n.
Weather, affects boat work, 36, 48.
Weddle, S/Lt. J. S., R.N.R., 85.
Wells, Lt. J. G., 79-82.
Welman, Lt. Cdr. A. E. P., 8, 9.
Westcove, 111-2, 120.
Westella, 34n, 38 (sinking of), 69 (hunts S/M.), 110 (sunk).
Westerley, 72n.
Westward-Ho, 89 (damaged), 107n.
Weygand, General, 5, 10 (Plan), 11, 27, 96.
Whalley, Lt. 49.
Whippingham, overloaded, 87.
Whitehall, 55, 83 (damaged), 84 (shoots down bomber), 91.
White Heather, 72n.
Whitfield, Col., 22.
207