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B.R. 1736 (32)
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NAVAL STAFF HISTORY
1227
SECOND WORLD WAR
Battle Summary No. 41
THE EVACUATION
FROM DUNKIRK
Operation "Dynamo"
26th May - 4th June 1940
ID
1949
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RESTRICTED
B.R. 1736 (32)
BATTLE SUMMARY No. 41
THE EVACUATION
FROM DUNKIRK
OF THE
BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
AND FRENCH TROOPS
Operation "Dynamo"
26th May - 4th June 1940
The contents of this book are based on information available up to and including September, 1947.
T.S.D. 64/48.
TACTICAL AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION (HISTORICAL SECTION)
NAVAL STAFF, ADMIRALTY, S.W.I.

MOITAUDAYA THT
моят

CONTENTS
Page
Introduction xiii
CHAPTER I
Preliminary Events, 10th to 18th May, 1940
Germany invades Holland and Belgium
1
Allies reach River Dyle
1
German thrust on French 9th Army front
1
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
2
Germans cross Meuse
2
Dutch Army surrenders
2
Allies withdraw to River Escaut
2
French 9th Army front broken
3
Allied rail communications severed
3
CHAPTER II
The week before Operation "Dynamo", 19th to 25th May, 1940
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
4
...
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
4
...
Vice-Admiral Dover, represented at War Office Conference
4
Channel ports the German objective
4
Gerneral Weygand directing Allied operations
5
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
5
Naval Staff at Dover considers large scale evacuation
5
Provision of small craft considered
5
Counter-attack south of Arras
6
Germans approach Boulogne
6
Organisation of the canal line
7
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
7
Canal line occupied
7
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
7
"The Operation will be known as 'Dynamo' "
7
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
8
Calais cut off
8
i

CONTENTS
Page
F. Signals re the build-up of skoots
164
G. Signals re the build-up of small craft
165
H. Signals illustrating the lack of small craft
169
J. Signals re patrols in the North Sea south, and on the routes to
Dunkirk
172
K. Signals re routes to Dunkirk
173
L. Signals re requests for fighter cover
174
M. Signals re evacuation on 26th and 27th May (additional to those in Appendices D to L)
175
N. Signals re evacuation on 28th May and night of 28th-29th May
(additional to those in Appendices D to L)
176
O. Signals re evacuation on 29th May (additional to those in
Appendices D to L, and in Appendix Y)
176
P. Signals re evacuation on 30th May (additional to those in
Appendices D, E, G to L, and Y)
178
Q. Signals re evacuation on 31st May and night of 31st May-2nd
June
179
...
R. Signals re evacuation on 1st June and night of 1st/2nd June...
182
S. Signals re deliberate attacks on hospital ships, on 2nd June
186
...
T. Signals re the evacuation of the British rearguard on night of
2nd-3rd June
186
U. Signals re evacuation on 3rd June
188
V. Signals re the decision to terminate the evacuation after the night of 3rd-4th June
188
W. Signals re the build-up of ships for the night of 3rd-4th June
189
X. Signals re the evacuation on 4th June
190
Y. Signals re the evacuation of French and Belgian troops
190
Z. Signals re Operation C.K.-the blocking of Dunkirk inner harbour
194
INDEX
195
TABLES
Notes to Tables 1-3
1. An analysis of the allied ships which took part in Operation
"Dynamo", and of the recorded numbers of troops lifted by them from Dunkirk harbour and the beaches
...
Facing page 210
2. An analysis of the recorded numbers of troops lifted daily from
Dunkirk harbour and the beaches
3. Troop and Ship Summaries-
(a) Ships taking part-summary.
(b) Allied ships-summary of troops transported
(c) Disembarkations-summary ix

CONTENTS
PLANS
1. The German break-through on 17th-18th May
2. Allied withdrawal into the Dunkirk perimeter on 30th May
3.
Routes to Dunkirk and the beaches
4. Dunkirk harbour
X

SOURCES
The principal sources on which this account of Operation "Dynamo" is based, are as follows:-
M.011883/40 Operation "Dynamo." Report of Proceedings. (Report of
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, F.O.C. Dover, referred to in this narrative as D.R.)
M.020721/40
List of ships which took part in Operation "Dynamo," 26th
May to 4th June (From F.O.C. Dover, 26/10/40).
M.017681/40
Ships lost during Operation "Dynamo" - Report (From F.O.C.
Dover, 5/9/40).
M.017978/41
Report of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the evacuation from Dunkirk, 29th May to 4th June, 1940. (Rear-Admiral
Dover's Report).
C.W.29685/40
Operation "Dynamo." Recommendations for Honours and
Awards. (From F.O.C. Dover, July 1940).
Case 5458
Operation "Dynamo." Evacuation of troops from Dunkirk,
[6 volumes]
May to June 1940. (Contains reports of individual ships,
Admiralty
"Dynamo" Maintenance Officer, S.N.O. Dunkirk, etc.) Re-
Record Office ferred to as "R.O.I - VI."
Enclosure
Contains signals connected with the operation.
Box No. 370
Admiralty
Record Office
Admiralty War Diary. (Signals).
M.011431/40
Blocking of Dunkirk Harbour (Operation C.K.)
M.010977/40
Demolitions carried out at Dunkirk (Operation X.D.)
Case 6256
H.M. Ships lost during the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk.
Admiralty
Record Office
H. & A.8/42
Evacuation from Dunkirk Norwegian S.S. Hird. Recommendations for awards.
M.016146/40
Dutch coasters. List of commissioned for "Dynamo," etc.
M.010932/40
Report of Proceedings of Riflemen landed to cover Demolition
Party at Boulogne on 23/5/40.
M.010824/40
Evacuation of Boulogne. Report by Major C. F. L. Holford,
Royal Marines (with M.010932/40).
M.3422/40
Particulars of [Belgian] men and craft from the Dartmouth area who assisted in Dunkirk evacuation. (From C. in C.
Western Approaches, 14/7/40).
M.011882/40
Operation "Dynamo" Work of Personnel Vessels. (From
F.O.C: Dover, 18/6/40).
M.014793/40
Reports of Operations off Dutch, Belgian and French Coasts
[Evacuation of Boulogne.]
xi

SOURCES
M.013316/40
Operations conducted by F.O.C. and French Dover during period 10th-
15th May on Dutch, Belgian Coasts.
T.O.9436/40
Operation 5/6/40). "Dynamo" Small Craft. (Ministry of Shipping
T.M. 6213/40
which took part in the evacuation the B.E.F. from Dunkirk.
Voyage reports by Masters or crews of of ships and small craft
(From Ministry of Shipping, Sea Transport Dept., 2/8/40).
T.O.9144/41
(Small craft taken up for "Dynamo" Operation). Letters
(part I)
received giving account of operations. (Ministry of Shipping,
Sea Transport Dept., 17/11/41).
T.O.9144/40
Provision of certain small craft for special service (pooled at
Sheerness) "E" Scheme. (Ministry of Shipping, Sea Transport, Dept., 27/5/40).
T.O.9436/40
Operation "Dynamo" - small craft. Procedure for settlement of claims.
N.L.5097/40
Compulsory reporting of small craft - - Proposed order. (From small vessels pool, 16/4/40).
S.T.N.4B
(Director of Sea Transport). Vessels dealt with by S.T.N.4B
which took part in Dynamo."
D.Y./1/01
Operation "Dynamo" (from Commodore in Charge Sheerness).
(Pack of signals and letters).
R.E./2/014
Operation "Dynamo". (Reports and Recommendations.
From Commodore in Charge Sheerness).
R.A.F. Narrative. The Campaign in France and the Low Countries, Sept.
1939 June, 1940. (Air Historical Branch (1) Air Ministry).
The following sources contain some first-hand information which is not in
Official Records:
Statements made by Masters of tugs engaged in the evacuation from Dunkirk
(From William Watkins Ltd., Steam tug owners, London).
Account by the R.N.L.I. of their work in the evacuation of the B.E.F. from
Dunkirk.
Reports made by crews of vessels engaged in "Dynamo" operation. (From
Pickfords' Ltd.)
"Little ships of Dunkirk)" [in manuscript]. (Reports of small craft collected by Mr. J.D. Casswell, K.C.)
Statements made by Masters of tugs engaged in Operation "Dynamo." (From
W.H. J. Alexander Ltd., tug owners, London).
French Admiralty records of French ships at Dunkirk.
Dunkirk. By A. D. Divine, D.S.M. London. Faber & Faber Ltd. (Mr.
The following books provide a background to the operation
Divine took part in the operation).
The Ltd. Epic of Dunkirk. By E. Keble Chatterton. Hurst & Blackett
(Contains some vividly illustrative photographs). London.
xii

INTRODUCTION
The Dunkirk evacuation looms large in the history of the war. It involved the dual problem of lifting a mass of hard-pressed troops from a continually shrinking perimeter under uncertain conditions of wind and sea, the menace of heavy attacks by air, and the onrush of a great hostile army; and then of transporting them to England in the face of air attacks, shore bombardments, torpedoes, mines, and the dangers of unlit shoals and wreck-strewn channels.
Despite the heavy losses suffered from all these perils, no less than 239,000
troops were embarked from the shattered quays of a wreck-encumbered harbour; while some 99,000 more were lifted from the 10 miles stretch of shoaling beach north-east of the harbour. This was no light task. The evacuation from the beaches was performed by many hundreds of shallow-draught motor boats, fishing craft, lighters, barges, sailing and pulling boats, manned partly by civilian volunteers - which ferried the weary troops to the destroyers, mine-sweepers, skoots, personnel vessels, tugs and other ships lying off in deeper water.
Operation "Dynamo" was essentially a combined operation, requiring the devoted co-operation of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and the cheerful courage and steadiness of an exhausted Army waiting on the beaches with hardly anything to eat or drink.
It must at once be said that the stupendous success which crowned Operation
"Dynamo," in the face of the determined onslaught of numbers of hostile bombers, could not have been achieved without the air cover provided by
Fighter and Coastal Command, which performed its task almost invariably against superior numbers, and with the serious handicap of having no base nearer than England. In spite of the most strenuous efforts, however, the inadequate numbers of aircraft available precluded the possibility of continuous cover, and it is significant that the losses of ships by air attacks were greater than the aggregate of losses from all other enemy action, while their severity varied proportionately with the strength of our fighter cover at the time.
I The following five naval aircraft squadrons also operated under Coastal Command
801
815
806
Skuas
825
Swordfish
826 Albacore
These aircraft were the only available British dive bombers They carried out attacks on tanks, transport, batteries, gun emplacements, enemy positions in the Calais and Dunkirk areas, and E-boats. In spite of their relative inadequacy for the purpose the Skuas were also detailed for fighter escort for ships. (M.011883/40)
The incidence of losses by enemy action is given in the two following tables xiii

RESTRICTED
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY EVENTS
10TH-18TH MAY 1940 (See Plan 1)
10TH MAY
Germany Invades Holland and Belgium
On the 10th May, following the invasion of Holland and Belgium, the Franco-
British forces under General Georges, commanding the French Front of the
North East, crossed the Belgian frontier and began their advance to the River
Dyle,¹ according to plan.
11TH MAY
Allies reach River Dyle
During the afternoon and evening of the 11th May the leading infantry brigades reached the Dyle.
The news from the Belgian Army, of which King Leopold had assumed command on the outbreak of war, was not good. At Maastricht the Belgians had been unable to demolish important bridges over the Albert Canal and the river Meuse, and the enemy had begun to move across them; whilst the
Belgian anti-tank obstacle eastward had been reconnoitred by the French
Cavalry Corps and found to be not only badly sited but unfinished.²
12TH MAY
German thrust on French 9th Army Front
The Allied advance to the Dyle was successfully completed by the 12th May.
The B.E.F. was in position between Wavre and Louvain, with the French 7th
Army (General Giraud) on its left and the French 1st Army (General Blanchard)
on its right. On the right of the French 1st Army was the French 9th Army
(General Corap) of the French Southern Command. Disquieting news was, however, received from the south, where a German thrust with at least two armoured divisions¹ was reported as developing on the front of the French
9th Army.
This thrust eventually proved to be the beginning of the German breakthrough and their sweep westward, which cut off the Allied northern forces from the main French forces in the south, led to the capture of Boulogne and
Calais, and culminated in the evacuation of Dunkirk.
General Billotte was in command of the French First Group of Armies, which included the French 1st Army (with the French Cavalry Corps), and the French 7th Army. Between these two armies lay the Belgian Army
(under the independent command of their King), and the B.E.F., which, though under the command of General Georges, was not under that of General
Billotte. On this day, however, it was agreed to co-ordinate the action of the
British, French and Belgian forces, and General Billotte was appointed to perform this task.³
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 18.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 19.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch para. 22.
1

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. I
13TH MAY
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent in accordance with their plans, and by the May, units of the latter
Movements of the main bodies of the French 13th Ist and 7th Armies continued north of Antwerp on the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming inof Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, which was developing from the north-east.
creasingly evident that they would be unable to prevent the enemy occupation northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp.
During the day and the following night the Belgians were withdrawing their
14TH MAY
Germans cross Meuse
May the 14th was crucial, for on that day the enemy penetrated the French
9th Army front, and crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Mézières.¹ (See
Plan 1).
15TH MAY
Dutch Army surrenders
On the 15th May the Dutch Army laid down its arms. The immediate effect of this on the operations of the B.E.F. was small, but "I anticipated says
Lord Gort, "that this would come as a shock to the Belgian Army".2
The French 7th Army withdrew its advanced formations to the neighbourhood of Antwerp, and the French divisions on the B.E.F.'s left flank were ordered to move across the British rear to fill the gap which had been created on the French 9th Army's front. This move did not, however, actually take place till some 3 days later,² and it then left the Belgian Army responsible for the security of the British left flank.
On the British front the day passed quietly on the whole. The 1st Corps
[Lt.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker] was not attacked in strength; 3rd Division [Maj.-
Gen. B. L. Montgomery] of 2nd Corps [Lt.-Gen. A. F. Brooke] was attacked north-west of Louvain, and its forward positions were penetrated, but a counterattack successfully restored the original line.
and, in spite of British support, some ground was lost.
At about 1800, however, the enemy penetrated the French 1st Army's front,
16TH MAY
Allies withdraw to river Escaut was were impracticable,3 because the French 1st the B.E.F.'s right flank
By the 16th May it became clear that a prolonged defence of the Dyle position withdrawal unlikely to make good the ground lost on Army the on and a further
It seemed likely to be forced on them by events previous in day the south.³
on night of Senne and one day on the River Escaut, spending on the the was River therefore decided to withdraw to the River one day began. 16th-17th May, the 15 to 20 miles withdrawal Dendre. to Accordingly, the Senne positions
2 1 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 22.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 23. 24.
2

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin), who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May), now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens, attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely foreseen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting, which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5

CHAP. II
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
21ST MAY
Counter-attack south of Arras
Mechanised He had Division, co-operation but the movements of the Corps and a byLord Cort was begun the of the French Cavalry Major-General H. by Lord Gort
The counter-attack this day under with 2 the divisions command south of of Arras planned did not materialise. Furthermore, serious attack widely divisions to of the French as 5th Corps would also the The hot develop two the flanks General Franklyn had latter did through wear¹. were now troubles developed beak troubles developed beak bubles developed break the British overworked tanks, whose tracks mechanical troubles developed to that Although the attack the objectives would not of maintain the day its were therefore reached, it became and supported by the French on its left¹. momentum unless it was reinforced clear enemy direction.¹ pressure "Thus compelled concluded the Allied force to withdraw - and in an 23rd
During the 22nd May General the Franklyn held his ground, but on the had valuable defence of Arras," said Lord Gort, easterly blocked imposed a vital a road centre".¹ delay on a greatly superior force against which it... had It
Germans approach Boulogne military situation, for, in the afternoon, an enemy column of all arms the
In the meantime, the 21st May had marked a still more serious change in approaching the Germans Boulogne.² The military situation was rapidly deteriorating; was completely Allied severing our line of communications.³ A quarter of were across the Somme² and had cut the railway at Abbeville, tons of troops now lay north of the Somme, cut off from the daily flow a of million decision ammunition and supplies essential to their maintenance. 2,000
"was to maintain the force through the northern ports", said Lord 'The established at Dunkirk.
finally taken on 21st May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area Gort,
A conference of the Allied Commanders was essential, and at 2000 Lord Gort went He to Ypres where he met the King of the Belgians and General Billotte.4
river explained the situation developing on the Escaut, where the water in the and decided back As the to was it was a that line line SO evident low the be in withdrawn rear, Escaut that that General it should no sooner to longer Billotte the or be later abandoned formed Belgian the a frontier Belgian tank on the obstacle. Army defences.⁵ night would of It 22nd-23rd was have thereupon to swing May, if on he to were the forced to withdraw from the asked positions the on King the of the he Belgians would whether, fall back the line of the Yser SO as to continue to Lys, of days B.E.F.⁵ later His Majesty agreed that maintain touch with the left five the Yser the Belgian command decided no that alternative the idea line of the existed, withdrawal but to must be ruled out".
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 33.
General Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
General Lord Blanchard Gort's Billotte Second succeeded was Despatch, fatally him injured in para. para. command in 37 35. a motor of the accident French returning First Group from of this Armies. conference.
6

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors, for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and consequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was intimated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Dover.¹ It was added that "Dynamo"2 the operation the for first which these ships were prepared word. would be known as mention of the now famous being
18 lying at Poole were London were commissioned Portsmouth on of these,
As a result of this direction, commissioned 40 skoots by the in all C. were in C. commissioned;
the May, 25th and and 22 lying 27th at May. by the C. in C. Nore between
23RD MAY
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
May which (see to have changed enemy hands twice bridgeheads at Aire, at St. 23rd
Over in Plan France, 2), and the situation the on established the canal line deteriorated during the mediately east of St. Omer), and, during the forest of Clairmarais
German seems tanks were reported harbouring during in the the day"3), and near Watten. Omer vehicles within 3 miles of Hazebrouck; day, hostile armoured (im-
Dunkirk. enemy was then within some 20 miles these of movements came had been checked,3 the and though by the evening fighting
Calais cut off gallant was conducted under the orders of the War Office". of
Calais defence was now of Calais finally cut off, and, said Lord Gort, the remainder the
Dunkirk, available though for its water supply was destroyed,⁴ was by this time the and port small unloading supplies. Even the small supply by air of only craft arms ammunition now ceased, as it had become impossible rations
(Licut.-General to land. Accordingly, on the advice of the Quarter-Master-General for air-
During completed. day the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. rations.⁴ was the W. G. Laidsell), Lord Gort put the B.E.F. on half
Dunkirk Naval demolition parties were ready at the Nore, and one was landed
XD(E)). during the day to prepare the locks for demolition. (Operation at
Boulogne evacuated
Comdr. Early A. on E. the same day a demolition party (Operation XD under
Buttercup", destroyer Vimy, to Boulogne, together with despatched, in the P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.), was (G) also Lieut.-
consisted Major of C. F. L. Holford, R.M. was in cover the demolition party; to restore control of the docks area and a force known as Force guns and a medical 4 platoons of seamen, 2 Marine platoons command with a of section this force, of machine and it attacked battery drawn When to had "Force by the been enemy Buttercup" sent tanks party. on the and Two arrived, previous battalions the day. and town the of Irish was under Guards shell and fire an and anti-tank being orders jetty in readiness infantry, for Army forces were being with-
I during the afternoon that the evacuation, troops were although to stay the and War fight Office it out⁵. sent
2 Appendices F.1 and F.2.
Appendix F.3.
4 5 3 Lord Lord Gort's Gort's Second Despatch,
Admiralty Second Despatch, para. 39.
Message 1422/23, War para. Diary 37. 23.5.40, p. 356.
8

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Communication with England was cut, and all messages had to be sent by destroyers.
By 1530 the Germans had occupied the whole of Boulogne except a bridgehead, all anti-tank guns were out of action, and half of Major Holford's force were estimated to be casualties. The destroyers Keith (D. (19), Captain D. J.R.
Simson) and Whitshed went over to Boulogne during the afternoon, and were followed later by the Venetia, Venomous, Vimiera, Wild Swan and Windsor.
The arrival of the first two destroyers was followed by an enemy air attack, together with close range mortar, machine gun and rifle fire, which caused damage and casualties, including Captain D. (19) who was killed, and necessitated breaking off, the work of evacuating wounded and withdrawing temporarily from the port. Fortunately, No. 92 Squadron of the R.A.F. (12
Spitfires) soon encountered the large enemy formation and, with some loss to themselves and much to the enemy, gained a measure of control of the situation;
and by 1955 the destroyers were back in harbour and carrying out the evacuation of the Welsh Guards. The Keith had received a signal at 1749 ordering all troops to be evacuated.
About 2000, while Lieut.-Comdr. Welman was on the point of firing the last of the demolition charges, German tanks towing field guns appeared over the hill north of the harbour and opened heavy fire at the three destroyers coming in to take off Force Buttercup." An amazing engagement, described by eye-witnesses as magnificent, ensued between the German field guns and the destroyers. The Venetia was hit while in mid-channel, but she was got under control and out of the harbour, thus avoiding blocking in the Venomous and Wild who were embarking " Force Buttercup" and the Irish Guards while engaging the enemy tanks and field guns with every gun they had.
It was low water when the destroyers eventually backed out of harbour, loaded down with troops. When the Venomous backed out her wheel jammed and she had to steer with her engines; the Wild Swan, following her, grounded for a moment, but both ships got off and both reached Dover safely. When, at 2234 some 3,000 troops had been brought off, the Wild Swan reported that although a considerable number remained further evacuation was impracticable.
The Windsor, however, which had been ordered at about 2030 to help in the evacuation, arrived after the rest of the destroyers had left; she entered the harbour after dark, filled to capacity and sailed again without damage or much difficulty. On clearing the harbour, the Windsor informed V.-A. Dover that further evacuation under cover of darkness was still possible and that two more destroyers could lift all the soldiers still left at Boulogne.
Vice-Admiral, Dover, therefore, despatched the Vimiera at 0015 on the 24th to try to bring off the remaining troops. She arrived at Boulogne at 0130, and found all silent. At length the Commanding Officer's hail was answered, and it was found that there were more than 1000 troops waiting for a ship.
Going alongside the jetty, the destroyer was crowded to the tiller flat by 0230, the only space left being round the guns; and when she slipped at 0245 she was compelled to leave some 200 men behind. Five minutes later shore batteries opened fire on the jetty, and at 0255 a bomber passed close and a bomb exploded 20 yards away. The Vimiera was so over-loaded that even five degrees of helm made the ship list unpleasantly. She reached Dover safely at 0355
and landed some 1400 men, including Belgian and French troops and some
I The Whitshed had been at Boulogne helping to evacuate wounded from 0630 to 1045
when she left with two transports for Calais.
9

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
refugees who got on board. The numbers evacuated by the destroyers concerned were approximately:-
Keith
180
Vimy
...
...
150
Whitshed
...
...
580
Vimiera
...
...
Wild Swan
1955 403 (in two trips)
...
...
Windsor
...
600
Venomous
...
500
Total
...
4368
The Venetia, damaged, did not get alongside a quay. During the night
22 23rd May, before the evacuation under fire, the Verity took off two General
Officers and some 150 troops.
In addition to the Venetia, the Wild Swan, Whitshed, Keith and Venomous all received damage during the evacuation. The Keith lost Captain D. (19) and
7 ratings killed, and had 28 wounded; the Vimy had one officer killed and her
Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Comdr. C. G. W. Donald R.N. was seriously wounded and died subsequently; the Whitshed lost one officer killed and had
12 ratings wounded; the Venetia had 20 ratings killed or missing and 11
wounded; the Commanding Officer of the Verity, Lt. Cdr. A. R. M. Black R.N.
was wounded and subsequently died.
23RD 24TH MAY
The "Weygand" Plan
In the midst of this changing panorama of events, on the 23rd May, General
Weygand became Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war". He had, however, previously formulated the ' Weygand plan". This plan contemplated a counter-offensive on a large scale¹ and, briefly, it consisted of 3
operations:-:-
(a) An attack south-westward from the north, by the French 1st Army and the B.E.F., with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting the
British right.
(b) An attack northward from the line of the Somme, which line the newly formed Third French Army Group was reported to be organising.
(c) Operations on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, by a new Cavalry
Corps which was assembling south of the river near Neufchatel.
On the 23rd May Lord Gort received a telegram from the British Prime Minister to extract:- the French Prime Minister, M. Reynaud, of which the following is an
"Strong Salvation enemy armoured forces have cut Armies.
gand's plan. of these I Armies can only be obtained communications by immediate of execution Northern of Weynorth Not could feeling sure that the situation armies in the to General be accurately appreciated developing for the Lord Allied Gort telegraphed
I Sir John Dill asking him to except fly over on the that spot, day.
Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38
10

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris; an extract is quoted below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received from the Secretary of State for War:
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced "!. These were some of the facts:-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice, in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard, that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counterattack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
11

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Defences of Dunkirk
It was would be Dunkirk¹. Its local were under the only port du now obvious that if the B.E.F. defences was to be evacuated the available Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose command included the Boulogne, Calais and Dunin these areas to General Fagalde.
kirk, but on this day (24th May) he delegated command of military forces and comprised an inner and an outer sector; inner on
The French defences of Dunkirk extended only the as far as the Belgian frontier,
Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence to Bergues to the frontier and so to the the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer, thence by Cassel and Steen- sea voorde to the frontier.¹
the inundations which formed part of the defence scheme of Dunkirk.²
The French now took over the British posts on the Aa and began to operate
Belgian line penetrated
In the late evening the enemy attacked the Belgian line on the Lys, penetrating to a depth of 1] miles on a 13 mile front3 and endangering the security of the British left flank.
It had become a matter of vital importance to keep open the B.E.F.'s line of communication to the coast through a corridor of withdrawal which was hourly narrowing. The penetration of the Belgian line made it certain that before long the whole area east of the Yser canal would be in the hands of the enemy, with the serious risk of the Belgian right becoming separated from the
British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather than a westerly direction.³
25TH MAY
Enemy pincer attack
On the 25th May enemy activity intensified. He was across the canal at
St. Venant, and was developing the bridgeheads between that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, while further north the situation on the river Aa remained obscure.
During the day the Belgians continued to withdraw in a north-westerly direction under enemy pressure.
General Sir John Dill, who had now succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside as C.I.G.S., visited Lord Gort in the morning. He then informed the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State for War that there could be no disguising the seriousness of the situation.3
By 1800, says Lord Gort, "I was convinced that the steps I had taken to secure the north. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet the growing danger in held; ment the the south-west on Dunkirk had already and being
The from pattern of the enemy pincer attack was becoming clearer. One movebetween counterpart was now developing on the developed, front. was The gap the British left and the Belgian right which Belgian had been threatening
D.R.
3 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 41.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 42.
12

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
the whole day, might at any time become impossible to close; were this to happen, my last hope of reaching the coast would be gone".'
In order to secure the British northern flank Lord Gort decided to issue orders for the occupation, as quickly as troops could be made available, of the line of the Ypres - Comines canal and the positions covering Ypres. In the absence of General Blanchard, who was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,
Lord Gort communicated this decision that evening to the Headquarters of the French First Group of Armies.¹
The necessity of evacuation was becoming a matter of paramount immediacy.
British destroyers bombard suburb of Calais
Meanwhile, on the 25th May, the trawler Lord Howe sailed to Calais with a cargo of ammunition². She entered the port and discharged part of her cargo in the face of heavy enemy fire from the dunes to the southward. In view of the risk involved, Commodore W. P. Gandell, R.N. (P.S.T.O., French Ports), who was on the quay, then ordered the Lord Howe to sail.
Outside Calais the destroyer Greyhound closed the Lord Howe, which was carrying a request for bombardment support of the town. At the same time, the Greyhound received a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover, ordering the bombardment of the Calais suburb of St. Pierre. The Greyhound opened fire, and at 2000, an H.A. battery east of Sangatte registered a hit on her, killing
2 and wounding 3. About this time the destroyer Grafton arrived and also opened fire. The 2 destroyers returned to Dover as darkness set in.³
Evacuation of Calais countermanded
At 2130 a force of seven trawlers⁴, three yachts⁵ and two drifters⁶, sailed for
Calais road, ready to evacuate troops from Calais, the moment an order was received to do so. Five of the trawlers towed motor boats. Commander
W. V. H. Harris, R.N. (Commander M/S, Dover), in the Grey Mist, was in command. The destroyers Windsor and Verity left Dover at 2300, to cover the withdrawal of this force.
On arrival off Calais, two of the motor boats were ordered into Calais harbour.
At about 0300/26, a signal was received that Calais was to be held at all costs;
furthermore, it was ordered that this signal was to be sent by hand to the
Brigadier commanding on shore. The Conidaw went in to deliver the signal.
All ships were then ordered back to the Downs, but the Botanic and Maretta remained behind until the two motor boats and the Conidaw returned.⁷
The Botanic and Maretta were damaged by gunfire when returning on the
26th May, and were unable to take part in Operation "Dynamo".
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 43.
2 Lieut. L. C. Whittle, R.N.R., in the Lord Howe, says it was the 24th May.
3 Vice-Admiral, Dover's 1907/25/5.
4 The Botanic, Fyldea, Maretta, Arley, Polly Johnson, Brock and Calvi.
6 The Grey Mist, Conidaw and Chico.
5 The Playmates and Willing Boys.
7 Report by Commander M/S, Dover (R.O. II, p. 497).
13

CHAPTER III
OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED,
SUNDAY, 26TH MAY, 1940
Allied decision to withdraw
In the morning of Sunday, 26th May, Lord Gort was able to visit General ing collapse of the Belgian Army and felt that the time for the proposed com-
Blanchard at his H.Q. The French general shared his view as to the impendbined French and British counter-attack southwards was past. It was agreed to withdraw the Allied main bodies behind the line of the Lys, subject to there being no further deterioration in the Belgian situation, and with this decision there vanished the last opportunity for a sortie.
from what might be described as a normal situation with Allied troops on the
The disposition of the B.E.F. was beginning to take its final shape. Starting right and left, there had developed an ever-lenghtening defensive right flank.
This had then become a semi-circular line with both flanks resting on the sea, manned by British, French and Belgians. Finally it had assumed the form of a corridor, with its southern end blocked by the French 1st Army, and each side manned, for the greater part of its length, by British troops; next to the sea were flank.¹ French troops on the west, and French and Belgian troops on the eastern
The Franco-British forces were now holding a front of 128 miles, of which
97 miles were beld by British troops, though some of its sectors were held jointly with the French. The immediate problem was to shorten this front, and Lord
Gort issued orders, in accordance with the agreement reached with General
Blanchard that morning, for withdrawals north-westward to take place in successive stages, on the three coming nights.¹ These withdrawals would have the effect of shortening the Franco-British front by 58 miles, but there would still remain the possible necessity of having to occupy the 25 miles front from
Ypres to the sea, at present the responsibility of the Belgian Army.
H.M. Government authorises withdrawal to the coast
So far Lord Gort had not discussed with General Blanchard further withdrawal of to the sea, and although he (Lord Gort) had foreseen a the possibility been being forced to make this move, up to now he instructions had events given authorising me to undertake such an operation".² says, no The of to his was, however, increasing rapidly, for at 1030 on 26th returning tempo which H.Q., Lord Gort received a telegram from the Secretary May, of State on for War said, inter alia, from Somme be cannot be made information in sufficient goes to show
French offensive may Gravelines to fight your way back to west where strength all only course open east to you of small boats will be used for embarkation. beaches and ports and timation and R.A.F. would give full Navy will provide fleet of ships first inagreed with replied that seriously considered.
Lord Gort to Lord Gort that evacuation must support. be 2" This was the
Belgian front the withdrawal north-westward had been
I Lord was concluded, He added "I that must the not news conceal from from the
2 Ibid, Gort's para 44. Second Despatch, para. 43.
14

OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED
CHAP. III
you that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will inevitably be lost even in best circumstances".
Later in the day Lord Gort received a further telegram from the War Office which said, inter alia, not possible for French to effect junction with Northern Armies no course open to you but to fall back upon the coast you are now authorised to operate towards the coast forthwith in conjunction with French and Belgian Armies".
It will be remembered that on the evening of the 21st May the King of the
Belgians had agreed that, if forced to abandon the Belgian positions on the
Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining touch with the left of the
B.E.F. Now, however, late on the morning of the 26th May, a note was received from General Michiels, the Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, which said, inter alia the Belgian Army is being attacked with extreme violence and the lack of Belgian reserves makes it impossible to extend our boundaries we have no longer any forces available to fill the gap in the direction of Ypres. As regards the withdrawal to the Yser, the idea must be ruled out since it would destroy our units more quickly than the battle.
The Belgian collapse was impending, if it had not actually taken place, and the task of defending the Allied line as far as the sea had fallen on the British and French troops.2
Dunkirk perimeter organised
Faced with this critical situation Lord Gort, on the evening of the 26th May, put in hand his plans for withdrawing in to the bridgehead at Dunkirk³. Orders had already been given for the embarkation of certain key personnel, and now all units not required for battle were being withdrawn. It was possibly at this juncture that, " owing to a misunderstanding, the personnel of certain anti-aircraft units had been embarked instead of being retained for the defence of the port of Dunkirk".⁴ The task of organising a bridgehead at Dunkirk was delegated to Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam, Bt., Commander of the
3rd Corps.⁵
The Admiralty signals, "Operation 'Dynamo' is to Commence"
Meanwhile, in the morning of 26th May, a meeting had been held at the
Admiralty to give further consideration to the provision of small craft, and the crews for manning both them and the ex-Dutch skoots. The meeting also examined the number of craft available for the evacuation. The port of
Dunkirk had already been so damaged by air attacks as to be no longer available for unloading supplies, which would now have to be landed on the beaches to the eastward.
Long before the operation was ordered, the Admiralty fully realized that large numbers of small craft would be required for a beach evacuation; but such was the secrecy of even the possibility of evacuation, that steps could not yet be taken to collect craft for the purpose.
During the afternoon of the 26th May, under the pressure of the acute military: situation, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that it was imperative for 'Dynamo' to be implemented with the greatest vigour,
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 44.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 45.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 55.
5
He handed over command of the 3rd Corps to Maj.-Gen. S. R. Wason.
15

CHAP. III
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
with a view to lifting up to 45,000 of the B.E.F. within two days, at the end of which it was probable that evacuation would be terminated by enemy action".
A further step was taken when, at 1800, Captain W. G. Tennant, M.V.O.,
R.N., was ordered by the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice-Admiral T.S. V.
Phillips, C.B., to proceed to Dunkirk to take control of the naval shore embarkation parties. Captain Tennant's appointment as S.N.O., Dunkirk, was promulgated, his duties to commence the following day2, and beach masters and pier parties were ordered to proceed from the Nore to Dover.
Then, at 1857, there went out from the Admiralty, by teleprinter, the historic signal, "Operation Dynamo is to commence "3, which was to save our Army in France, and to have the most momentous results for the Nation, the Empire and the World.
Mona's Isle makes the first round trip
Except for the destroyer Wolsey, which left Dover at 1930 to act as W/T
link ship, the first ship to sail on this great mission was the armed boarding vessel Mona's Isle, which left the Downs at 2116. After some delay with a fouled propeller she berthed at the Quai Félix Faure during an air attack, and embarked 1420 troops. On the return journey, she was straddled by shore guns off Gravelines, and shortly after, was heavily machine-gunned from the air; these attacks caused 83 casualties, including 23 dead. She reached
Dover at noon on the 27th May escorted by the destroyer Windsor, which had put her doctor on board and landed her troops. Mona's Isle was the first ship to complete the round trip in Operation "Dynamo".
Mona's Queen first ship back on 27th May
This, however, was not the first passage on 26th May. Even before the
Admiralty signal, the despatch of personnel vessels to Dunkirk had begun, a flow of 2 vessels every 4 hours having been accepted by the B.E.F.4. The armed boarding vessel King Orry had sailed at 0930, and the Mona's Queen at noon. The Maid of Orleans had sailed at 1100 (with 6,000 two-gallon cans of water), but arriving off Dunkirk during an air attack was unable to effect an entrance and returned to Dover"; she was sailed again at 1726, escorted by the destroyer Wild Swan, which had also taken out the Canterbury at 1728, and escorted her part of the way.
The Mona's Queen (carrying 1200 troops) was the first of these ships to arrive back from Dunkirk, reaching Dover shortly after midnight on the
26th/27th May; the Canterbury arrived at 0309/27 (with 1,340 troops), the store ship Ngaroma at 0500/27 (with a hundred troops), the Maid of Orleans at
0600/27 (with 980 troops), and the King Orry at 1100/27 (with 1,131). As a result of these sailings on the 26th May 6,083 troops were landed in England on the 27th May, of which Mona's Isle had contributed 1,420 towards the two days".
tentative Admiralty target of "lifting up to 45,000 of the B.E.F. within
Hospital carriers under Hague Convention was ignored, and their conspicuous white hulls
The the work of the hospital carriers was specially hazardous; their immunity
I D.R. page ii.
2 Appendix M. 2.
3 Appendix M. 1.
4
D.R.
16

OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED
CHAP. III
and blazing lights made them an easy target. On the 26th May the hospital carriers St. Andrew and St. Julien sailed at 1054 for Dunkirk, but coming under fire from the guns of Gravelines, they returned to Dover in company with the
P/V Maid of Orleans.
The hospital carriers Isle of Guernsey and Worthing sailed from Dover at noon and were bombed when off, Calais; nevertheless, that night, flood-lit by the fires which raged in the docks and town of Dunkirk, they each embarked about 300 stretcher cases.
Admiralty call for cutters and whalers
All these troops and casualties, it should be noted, were lifted from the quays of Dunkirk harbour. Evacuation from the beaches did not commence until
24 hours later, and then only in a very small way, using ships' boats. On the
26th May, says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, the only inshore craft available were
4 Belgian passenger launches and the naval small craft of the Dover Command such as drifters, and motor boats from the Contraband Control Base at Ramsgate; the only ones capable of lifting personnel direct from a beach being the boats from Ramsgate." The Admiralty had been asked for a supply of small boats, especially whalers and cutters, but there remained the difficulty of arranging for the personnel to man them¹. This request led at 2028, on 26th
May, to an Admiralty signal to the Home Ports asking how many cutters and whalers could be made available for immediate service under Vice-Admiral,
Dover.²
Sea and air patrols
Meanwhile, at 1937, C. in C. Nore had been requested to use all available forces to cover Operation Dynamo that night.
In conformity with these directions Allied fighters maintained continuous patrols, from 1700 to 2130, on the line Calais-Dunkirk.3.
Germans occupy Calais
That very night, however, the gallant defence of Calais came to an end.
The yacht Gulzar had gone there with water and stretchers, to bring back wounded. She secured alongside the Gare Maritime and sent a party on shore to investigate. The town was found to be in German hands, and the Gulzar made a hasty departure under fire. On the way out, however, in response to a hail, she stopped, and brought off 3 officers and 48 men from the end of the breakwater.⁴
I D.R. p. 1, para. 2.
2 Appendix G. 1.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p. 315.
4 R.O. II, p. 513.
B
17

CHAPTER IV
MONDAY, 27TH MAY
(See Plan 3)
The Dunkirk perimeter the organisation of the Dunkirk the bridgehead. Canal de la Its perimeter was to extend from
On the morning of 27th May, Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam commenced and thence by Furnes and Nieuport Gravelines to the Belgian coast. In fact, however,
Gravelines, south-eastward to Colme, along the canal to Bergues perimeter, and were falling back to the line of the Mardyck Canal, from the the French were already evacuating and the western part of the to Spyker on the Canal de la Colme. The French were to be responsible sea, for the defence of the western half of the perimeter as far as Bergues inclusive, and the British for the eastern half. The position of the Belgian Army was now so obscure that its inclusion in the bridgehead was not taken into account. I
The British sector of the Dunkirk perimeter had its right at Bergues, whence it followed the canals to Furnes and Nieuport. Immediately north of this line were the inundations; to the north of the inundations was low-lying land, and then the Dunkirk-Furnes Canal and the main lateral road from Furnes to
Dunkirk; finally, there was the narrow strip of dunes giving way to a wide open beach running the whole length of the position and shelving very gradually to the sea. There were no quays or piers whatever, except those at Dunkirk itself. At intervals of from 3 to 4 miles along the shore (from east to west) lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, La Panne, Braye-Dunes, and Malo-les-Bains
(adjoining Dunkirk).
During the day troops and their transport began to withdraw into the perimeter on the fronts of all three British Corps. Where the troops had received the necessary orders, vehicles were disabled and abandoned in the assembly areas; but owing to the shortage of troops for traffic control a great number of British and French vehicles were able to enter the perimeter and the town of Dunkirk², causing grave congestion on the roads. Beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray-Dunes and Malo-les-Bains, one beach being allotted to each of the 3 British Corps.³
Dunkirk had been bombed for some days, but the town and port received their most serious damage on 27th May. At least 12 attacks were made on
Dunkirk and the sea approaches between 0825 and 20004. Lorry columns had been set on fire in the town and a pall of black smoke from the burning oil tanks hung continuously over the town and docks, impeding the air defence.
Dunkirk was therefore cleared of all troops and they were sent to the dunes east of the town to await embarkation.³
The Belgain armistice
During the 27th May Lord Gort received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for War which read, " want to make it quite clear that sole
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47.
4 3 R.A.F. Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 50.
Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 49.
Narrative, p.320.
18

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
task now is to evacuate to England maximum of your force possible."¹ No policy had yet been laid down by French G.Q.G., or any other French higher authority, for a withdrawal northward of the Lys, and, says Lord Gort, "I had no idea what plans either he [General Blanchard] or Admiral Abrial had in mind".'
Lord Gort failed to contact General Blanchard either at La Panne, or at the
French naval headquarters, situated at Bastion No. 32, Dunkirk. While at the
Bastion, however, at 2300, he was informed in the course of conversation with
General Koeltz (General Weygand's deputy) that the King of the Belgians had asked for an armistice from midnight that night. The British Commanderin-Chief thus found himself suddenly faced with an open gap of 20 miles between
Ypres and the sea, through which enemy armoured forces might reach the beaches².
Owing to congestion on the roads Lord Gort was unable to reach his headquarters at Houtkerque until 0430 on 28th May; he then found that a telegram had been received from the War Office at 0130/28 saying that the King of the
Belgians was capitulating at midnight, 27th/28th May.³
This was the derelict situation facing Lord Gort in the early hours of the morning.
Dunkirk locks prepared for demolition
On the 27th May, on the orders of Admiral Abrial, the Royal Naval demolition party which had arrived at Dunkirk on the 23rd May placed demolition charges at the New, the Trystram and the Guillain locks in Dunkirk harbour.
Route Z under fire Route Y adopted Route x prepared
Owing to the great lack of inshore craft for beach work the main naval effort during the day had been confined to maintaining the flow of personnel vessels to Dunkirk at the rate of 2 every 31/2 hours. Even this limited transport service had been seriously interrupted by the fire of shore batteries between Les
Hemmes (east of Calais) and Gravelines. At 0623 the Biarritz and Archangel, en route for Dunkirk escorted by the destroyer Verity, were shelled 6 miles
E.N.E. of Calais. The Biarritz was hit several times and had 1 killed and 2
wounded. The Archangel was also apparently damaged, and neither ship took any further part in "Dynamo". At 0640, the M/V Sequacity and the freighter Yewdale were also shelled off Calais. The Sequacity was hit four times, and at 1020, when north of Dunkirk channel, after the crew had been transferred to the Yewdale, the Sequacity went down by the head and sank.
At 0750 the armed boarding vessel Mona's Isle, loaded with troops, suffered severe casualties and damage from shore guns off Gravelines, and also from an air attack shortly afterwards, and had to go into dock for repairs. At
0800 the H/C Isle of Thanet was shelled off Calais and returned to Dover. At
0900, the A.B/V King Orry, returning from Dunkirk loaded with troops also suffered casualties and damage from the Calais guns.
As a result of these happenings the Vice-Admiral, Dover, reported to the
Admiralty that the normal or southern route, Dover to Dunkirk (later known as Route Z), was impracticable in daylight. Another, more northern route
(later known as Route Y), via the Dyck Whistle buoy, Middelkerk buoy, and
Zuydcoote Pass, was accordingly adopted. This, however, increased the
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 51.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 49.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch 50.
19

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IV
round trip from 80 to 172 miles, and the for route the had to be swept before it and thence into the Dunkirk Impulsive, the THE
be used. Orders were therefore given the North Goodwin route (the middle Route X), from road, and at 1140
commenced by the destroyer Vessel Patricia. This advantage of shortening the round trip to 108 miles.
Halcyon, and the Trinity House from 172 route X had the great and
Helier¹ and Royal Daffodil, which left at 1054 under escort of the des- St.
Among the earliest ships to use the Dover northern Route Y were the P/V's
The convoy was joined en route by the hospital carriers St. Andrew and St.
troyer Vimy; in company was the destroyer Anthony, escorting the S.S. Kyno.2
Julien. Route Y was certainly, at that time, out of range of gunfire, but two bombing attacks were made on the hospital carriers between the West Hinder and Kwint Bank buoys, and when the convoy arrived off Dunkirk heavy air attacks were in progress there. The Royal Daffodil and the St. Helier entered the harbour, but the latter was ordered to withdraw, and she and the 2 hospital carriers returned empty to the Downs under escort of the Vimy. The Royal
Daffodil embarked 840 troops before returning to Dover.
Sea and Air Patrols
The principal patrol line covered in the morning of the 27th May by Fighter
Command, was Calais-Dunkirk, as it was not known that the Calais garrison had ceased fire. From 1450 onwards, however, Calais fell out of the picture, and it became possible to concentrate fighter protection more exclusively on the work of evacuation³. Sixteen squadrons, varying in strength from 9 to 20
aircraft, were engaged on these activities from 0500-2130; patrols were, however, limited to squadron strength. Most squadrons carried out 2 patrols, and 287 sorties in all were flown during the day.4
To cover the passage of ships between Dunkirk and the Downs destroyer patrols had been established to the northward during the forenoon, and Vice-
Admiral, Dover, asked for 6 additional destroyers to strengthen the Dover forces. The Admiralty immediately ordered 4 destroyers from the Western
Approaches Command, and 2 from the Portsmouth Command, to proceed to Dover.⁵
Ex-Dutch skoots for Dunkirk
Other vessels were on their way to Dunkirk during the day, among them being 15 skoots⁶. Of these the Lena, Hebe II, and later the Oranje, arrived off the beaches and embarked troops during the night of 27th/28th May the
Abel Tasman, Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with ammunition and food, arrived off La Panne early in the morning of 28th May; the Hilda and Doggersbank reached Dunkirk by noon the 28th May, and were sent to the beaches;
while the remainder⁷, in error, returned to the Downs, after having got within a few miles of Dunkirk.
2 Off R buoy the Anthony, with the Kyno, was ordered back to the Downs and sub-
I Eleven of the St. Helier's crew had been replaced by naval ratings.
sequently 3 to Portsmouth. The Kyno took no further part in Operation "Dynamo".
R.A.F. Narrative, p. 319.
5 4 R.A.F. Narrative, P. 320.
Scimitar were sent.
Appendices D. 1 and D. 2. The Wakeful, Mackay, Worcester, Montrose, Shikari and
6 7 See Appendix F.
The Bornrif, Brandaris, Hondsrug, Jutland, Patria, Tilly, and Twente.
20

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
The "build-up" of small craft commences
Early on the 27th May, the Ministry of Sea Transport had been asked by the Admiralty to find between 40 and 50 small craft, which were to assemble at Sheerness for a special requirement". The Director of the Small Vessels
Pool (Vice-Admiral Sir Lionel Preston, K.C.B.) supplied a list of what were thought to be suitable vessels, but it was soon found that a great number of these were not in a fit state for service. A meeting was therefore held at the
Admiralty which was attended by a representative of the Director of Sea
Transport, Mr. H. C. Riggs. On Mr. Riggs' suggestion, Admiral Preston agreed to send some of his officers to the various boat-yards from Teddington to
Burnham and Brightlingsea, to inspect and send to Sheerness all vessels fit for service¹. Forty motor boats or launches were thus obtained, and arrangements made for them to reach Sheerness by 28th May.2 Very few of these reached the Dunkirk beaches by the 29th May, but they were the forerunners of nearly 300 small craft, which were destined to play an important part in the embarkation from the beaches of some 99,000 troops, by ferrying them to offlying ships.
In the evening of the 27th the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, assumed by arrangement the duty of fuelling and despatching all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla.
Some delays occurred in the assembly at Ramsgate or in the Downs of small craft despatched from other commands, owing to many of them being routed to Dover in error, instead of to the Downs. Once despatched by the authorities no communication with these small vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination; this resulted in delays of up to 24 hours or more before assembly, because during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift owing to the moderate weather or collisions, and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight.
"Dynamo Maintenance Officer" appointed
To take charge of these small craft, Rear-Admiral, A. H. Taylor, O.B.E.,
(with the acting rank of Commodore), after getting final instructions from the
Vice-Admiral, Dover, proceeded to Sheerness on the 27th May to act as
Dynamo Maintenance Officer." He was responsible for the preparation of various vessels, small motor craft, and pulling boats, for service in Operation
'Dynamo his staff comprised Cdr. H. R. Troup, R.N., and Lt. Cdr. D. E.
Holland-Martin, R.N. The type of machinery fitted in many of the vessels and its defective state presented the Fleet Engineer Officer, Captain T. E.
Docksey, R.N., and Sheerness Dockyard with some difficult problems; but within a week, under Commodore Taylor's general direction, no less than 100
motor boats, 10 self-propelled lighters, 7 skoots, 1 oil tanker, 6 paddle steamers, and numerous pulling boats, were prepared for service and sent out from
Sheerness.
S.N.O. Dunkirk assumes duty 1900/27
Meanwhile, at 1315, Captain Tennant left Dover for Dunkirk in the destroyer
Wolfhound, with a naval beach and pier party of 12 officers and 160 ratings.
A communications staff was also taken, as it was intended that the Wolfhound should relieve the Wolsey at Dunkirk as W/T link. The Wolfhound was
I T.O. 9144/40.
2 Appendix G. 3.
21

CHAP. IV
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
attacked misses, and, twice arrival by dive-bombers at Dunkirk en at route, 1655, receiving found some damage was in progress. on an air attack by 21 from aircraft near enveloped air raid casualties lying about depots the and The was investigate in the a vast pall of smoke from the oil area of Naval Headquarterters to
Captain Tennant local proceeded situation. ashore The whole to the Bastion with was blazing, masses of wreckage. were streets, which were littered town
Parminter; On arrival at Colonel the Bastion, Whitfeld, Captain Sub-Area Tennant Commandant; held a meeting and with Brigadier
H. P. Henderson, R.N., the B.N.L.O. It to was retain decided that the harbour Commander as a W/T link.
untenable, and that it was impracticable the Wolfhound at Dunkirk was
At 1900 Captain Tennant assumed the duties of S.N.O. Dunkirk, ordered the Wolfhound and Wolsey to proceed to the beach east of Dunkirk and and embark troops, using their own boats. This they proceeded to do, but did not get away unscathed; the Wolfhound grounded as she left Dunkirk harbour and received further damage from a bomb which struck the jetty six feet away. She made no more trips to Dunkirk, but on that evening she and the Wolsey became the pioneers of beach evacuation.
Beach evacuation begins
Meanwhile, during the afternoon, four personnel vessels and two hospital carriers had sailed for Dunkirk¹. Of these, the personnel vessels Queen of the
Channel and St. Seiriol left Dover at 1330, by Route Y, and entered Channel Dunkirk at about 1930, during an air raid. The Queen of the beaches. had At harbour barely embarked 50 troops when both boats ships were had started diverted ferrying, to the S.N.O. Dunkirk to troyers' passed 2230, boats, embark signalled however, which this motor 1,000 order were the boats. before men. Wolfhound manned to the the The The St. St. as Queen to Wolfhound, Seiriol's necessary Seiriol send of a beach by the personnel by then megaphone Channel, naval and with ship then, ratings the using to and Wolsey returning the or her commandeered east towed own off pier, to the by except boats, Dunkirk, Dunkirk the beaches des- em- the her she harbour, destroyers barked was about unfortunately picked Wolfhound 150 up troops a and further sunk Wolsey, from by 700 aircraft the to troops. embark early She next troops was morning from the first the (May ship, beaches, 28th) shortly though after leaving Dunkirk.
" tomorrow night is problematical "
S.N.O. local By 1958, Dunkirk, and Captain he sent Tennant this dramatic had arrived signal to at immediately.
Evacuation on 27th May, only an hour after he a the duties of the of situation, available craft to beaches T.O.Of.1988."kirk
" Evacuation tomorrow transmission, night is was not received until 2055, but in and the
Please send every problematical.
This I The signal, Queen delayed of the Channel, in St. Seiriol, Canterbury, Maid of Orleans, Isle of Thanet
Worthing.
22

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only a few minutes later:
" Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005."
To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from
G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might, indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.²
All ships diverted to the beaches
Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from
Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral
Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy, and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³
were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol, the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne.
The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of subsequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵
Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the
17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷, and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and
I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo'
the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040,
Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the beach at Malo-les-Bains.
This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into
3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap between each part. (Appendix O. 11).
2 D.R. page 3, para. 8.
3
The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields.
4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8.
5 D.R., p.3, para. 38.
6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden
Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, Yorkshire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II.
7 Appendix D.6.
23

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IV
from the St. Seiriol and Queen of the Channel, in addition to the drifters'
beaches during the night dinghies, enabled these drifters of the to 27th/28th lift some May. 2,000 troops from Malo and Bray own
Results of S.N.O. Dunkirk's 2005/27
assembling off the beaches on 1 cruiser, 27th/28th May the Wolfhound,
As a result of the action taken the on night S.N.O. of Dunkirk's signals, there
3 Channel skoots and (the the Lena, St. Hebe Seiriol). other II and All small Oranje) these ships boats, were ordered to use Queen of thers, their own
Wolsey and 6 other destroyers¹, a pulling boats, were yet available.
boats for ferrying, as no power cutters, whalers or other
S.N.O. Dunkirk's signals had therefore a big result; but owing to the difficulty of passing orders at night in a shattered harbour his decision to divert vessels to the beaches had unforeseen repercussions, and it was associated with a false report that Dunkirk had fallen, and the failure of one personnel vessel and 7 skoots to reach the beaches that night. The circumstances are described below.
The P/V Canterbury, which had entered Dunkirk harbour at 2000, left at
2058 with 457 troops, including 140 stretcher cases. Before leaving, she was ordered by the Sea Transport Officer to turn back ships attempting to enter Dunkirk the order, evidently intended to divert ships to the beaches, was misunderstood. In the Dunkirk road, the Canterbury passed the order to the P/V Maid of Orleans and to the H/C's Isle of Thanet and Worthing, and those vessels thereupon turned back to Dover. Later the order became definitely garbled, for the skoot Tilly (which was in company with the 4 skoots
Hondsrug, Jutland, Patria and Brandaris) met the Canterbury (in company with the 2 hospital carriers) 8 or 9 miles from Dunkirk, and received from her the signal "Dunkirk is in enemy hands. Keep clear." This signal was variously recorded by some of the other skoots, as Dunkirk has fallen. Return"; and all five of them, as well as the skoots Bornrif and Twente, did in fact return to the Downs, although the Jutland and the Patria first closed
Nieuport Bank buoy in an unsuccessful endeavour to obtain more definite information. Some of the skoots, in turn, promulgated this false report to other ships, notably to the P/V Dorrien Rose; this ship, which received the signal, unsafe to approach Dunkirk," did at first alter course to the northward, but, shortly after, again set course for Dunkirk. It was subsequently thought by some of the vessels concerned that the false information had been passed by fifth columnists," though there is very little proof of this.³
Chronic shortage' of beaching boats
Such was the beginning of the great build-up of ships4 and of the inauguration of beach evacuation. The successful development of the latter was necessarily good in into I the The of northern situation the dependent chronic having sector shortage changed on between the by continuation the south-west of beaching and of boats⁵. fine north-east weather, A wind would and and of any Wakeful the have strength making made went from Dunkirk. The Windsor remained time they arrived, Anthony the Gallant had not yet returned
2 Portsmouth whither she had escorted on the patrol. S.S. Kyno. The
Canterbury's report.
4 3 See Appendices H.30 and H.32.
5 Appendices D, E and F.
D.R. page 3, para. 11.
24

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
beach evacuation impossible; at no time did this happen, but it was not until the fifth day of the operation (May 30th) that small power boats and beach craft began to become available in adequate numbers.¹
The reason for this is to be sought mainly in the need for secrecy enjoined by the British and French Governments, even after the operation had been ordered. The necessity for avoiding any action that might have given rise to talk rendered the collection of small craft slow. It was not until 31st May that the British public learnt from the press that evacuation had begun.
Disembarkation ports designated
In these early days the limiting factors seemed likely to be the scale of enemy attacks at Dunkirk and on the beaches, and the difficulty of concentrating the ships and the troops at a common point or points².
Meanwhile, in order to ensure air protection, Blenheims maintained a patrol by single aircraft over the Dunkirk area during the night.³
At 2330, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, promulgated the names of ports for the disembarkation of troops in England as follows:-
The Calcutta at Sheerness;
destroyers at Dover;
drifters, minesweepers, skoots and coasters
___???___
At Margate or Ramsgate as directed by N.O.I.C. Ramsgate;
personnel vessels at Folkestone.
Throughout the whole course of the operation the despatch of troops from the points of disembarkation in England was directed by the War Office Movements Control Organisation, and proceeded with great smoothness⁴.
Summary of troops evacuated
The ships which had sailed for Dunkirk on the 26th May brought back
6,183 troops and 646 stretcher cases next day.
During the 27th May only two personnel vessels actually made the round trip, viz.: the Royal Daffodil, which brought back 840 troops from Dunkirk, and the St. Helier, which was ordered back before she could embark any troops.
The destroyers Wolsey and Wolfhound, which embarked 206 and 130 troops respectively from Malo beach on the evening of 27th May, did not sail for
England until shortly after midnight.
Thus, the total number landed in England from the commencement of
Operation "Dynamo" to midnight 27th/28th May was:
26th May - Nil;
27th May - 7,669, all of whom were lifted direct from Dunkirk harbour.
I D.R. covering letter, No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, paras. 3 and 5.
2 D.R. page 3, para. 11.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p. 320.
4 D.R. covering letter No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, para. 6.
25

CHAPTER V
TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
First supplies reach the beaches from England arrived at the beaches, landed La spite of many and ammy enition
This was a day of tension. The first supplies and in of food, water action considerable quantities were at Panne and at the north of it.¹
Germans reach Nieuport
Early on the 28th May the leading enemy mobile troops and tanks reached
Nieuport, but the danger that the enemy forces, released by the Belgian armistice, might forestall the B.E.F.'s occupation of the perimeter had been foreseen², and the measures taken by Lord Gort to meet a desperate situation and to delay the enemy proved successful.
At 1100 General Blanchard visited Lord Gort at his headquarters at Houtkerque. It then transpired that General Blanchard, having received no instructions from his Government regarding the evacuation of French troops, declined to contemplate any such operation. Later in the day, however, he consented, and orders were given for part of the French 1st Army to withdraw
SO as to arrive within the Dunkirk perimeter on 30th May.3
Lord Gort's Headquarters move to La Panne
Meanwhile, during the afternoon, Lord Gort moved his headquarters from
Houtkerque to La Panne, which was in direct telephonic communication with
London. There he received from Lt.-Gen. Sir Ronald Adam and the Quarter-
Master-General, Lt.-General W. G. Laidsell, a very unfavourable report:
No ships could be unloaded at the docks at Dunkirk, and few wounded could be evacuated. There was no water in Dunkirk and very little on the beaches.
The Naval plans were not yet in full operation, and some 20,000 men were waiting to be taken off the beaches, 10,0004 having been taken off in the last
2 " days, chiefly from Dunkirk." Also, they stated it as their opinion that given a reasonable measure of immunity from air attack, troops could be gradually evacuated. If, however, intensive air attacks continued the beaches might easily become a shambles within the next 48 hours".⁵
Possibility of surrender is visualised
Lord Gort informed the C.I.G.S. of the gist of this report, and asked that
H.M. " Government should consider the policy to be followed if a crisis arose, as well it might." He received this telegram in reply:
"
H.M. Govt. fully approve your withdrawal to extricate your force in order to embark maximum number possible of B.E.F. If you are cut from all communication from us, and all evacuation from Dunkirk and beaches had, in your judgment, been finally prevented after every attempt to re-open it had failed, you to would become sole judge of when it was impossible to inflict further damage enemy"."
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 50.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 53.
4 Gort's Second Despatch, 52.
5 Some Lord of these had been taken para. off before operation Dynamo' commenced.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. 54.
26

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP V
While a situation that could only mean surrender was now visualised in
England as possibly a stark necessity, General Weygand sent an urgent telegram to Lord Gort appealing to him personally to ensure that the British
Army took a vigorous part in any counter-attack thought necessary; the situation, said General Weygand, made it essential to hit hard.
Lord Gort, who saw the situation more clearly, observes, when he [General
Weygand] sent this message, he could have had no accurate information of the real position or of the powers of counter-attack remaining to either the
British or French."
Germans take Ostend
That evening, at 2030, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that Ostend was reliably reported to be captured. Dunkirk was the only port left in Allied hands.
Situation at Dunkirk becomes easier
Nor were the prospects at Dunkirk very hopeful. When the Wolfhound and the Wolsey left Malo beach for Dover just after midnight on the 27th May the whole of the port appeared to be ablaze¹.
At 0125 the cruiser Calcutta, en route for La Panne, was missed by a torpedo
100 yards astern fired from an E-boat. No further attack took place, and the
Calcutta arrived off La Panne beach an hour later to find that the destroyers
Grafton, Greyhound and Impulsive, and the paddle-minesweepers Sandown and
Gracie Fields, were already there.
Ever since 0030 destroyers making their first trip to the evacuation area had been arriving off the beaches, and only two - the Gallant and the Wakeful -
went to Dunkirk. The Vivacious and the skoot Hebe II reached Malo beach at about 0030, and the Sabre at 0120. The Hebe II, unable to find any troops, entered Dunkirk harbour and embarked 150 from the east pier; the Sabre embarked troops from two drifters. At 0320 the Vimy arrived off the beach at Zuydcoote, 3 miles east of Dunkirk, and sent her boats to assist in filling up the minesweeper Brighton Belle, which was embarking troops with the assistance of the ex-Belgian canal boat Yser and a small pulling boat. The skoot
Lena had been off Zuydcoote since the previous evening and in the early hours of the 28th May transferred the 120 troops she had embarked to a destroyer;
the minesweeper Medway Queen, off La Panne since 2300/27, sailed with 600
troops on board.
By 0400 the situation in Dunkirk harbour appears to have eased, and at
0436 S.N.O. Dunkirk was asking for all vessels to go alongside the east pier.
At 0445 the Vimy, leaving her boats with the Brighton Belle, went into Dunkirk harbour and embarked 613 troops. At 0955 the destroyer Mackay reached
Dunkirk from the Irish Sea, and picked up 600 troops in an hour from the seaward end of Dunkirk east pier, giving up her berth to the destroyer Montrose.
The Sabre, which had in the meantime returned to Dover with a load of 158
troops from Malo beach, berthed outside the Montrose. An hour later, the destroyers Worcester and Anthony arrived, and berthed ahead of the Montrose.
The pier was crammed with troops and several aircraft, attempting to bomb it, were driven off by the destroyers' gunfire. Vast columns of smoke were drifting westwards from the burning oil tanks ashore, and houses on the sea front were bursting into flames from time to time².
I Report by the Wolfhound.
2 Report by the Montrose.
27

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
off Dunkirk at 1315. They had picked up that morning from arrived
The destroyers Codrington, Jaguar and Javelin, 33 survivors diverted from patrol,
S.S. Abukir, which had been torpedoed by United an E-boat while returning the about 200 evacuees from Ostend to Grenade the which Kingdom; these survivors with
Javelin Dunkirk. were transferred using The their Codrington to own the boats, destroyer went embarked into Dunkirk troops harbour, from subsequently Bray while beach. the went Jaguar At on 1730 and to the Grenade left Dunkirk with 1,000 troops on board.
skoot Lena. The Vimy also made a second
359 troops from Zuydcoote, assisted by ships' a the second.t.Bip,embarked
Between 1230 and 1815 the Vivacious, a her
Dunkirk harbour.
More ships were on the way. From 1230 onwards 19 minesweepers were sailed from Harwich, from Dover and the Downs, for Dunkirk and the beaches.
By 2130 five of them had arrived off Bray beach I, and four off La Panne²;
three reached Dunkirk by 2140³.
Four other minesweepers arrived off the beaches late on the night of
28th/29th May4, and two more reached the beaches at 0600/29⁵.
Early on the 28th May the eight ships of the 7th and 8th minesweeping flotillas had been ordered from Rosyth to Harwich, to work under the orders of the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁶; they could not, however, reach the beaches until about 72 hours later.
During the forenoon and afternoon of the 28th May the call went out for more and more destroyers, and seven reached the evacuation area next day⁷.
In the signals from the Admiralty and the Vice-Admiral, Dover, summoning them there sounds the same note of extreme urgency, traceable to S.N.O.
Dunkirk's message⁸ declaring that evacuation on the night of 28th/29th May was problematical. "If the older class destroyers and other vessels cannot compete with the situation signalled the Admiralty, destroyers of all classes are to be used for bringing men off'.9 Every available destroyer" in the
Western Approaches and Portsmouth Commands was to be sailed to Dover.
Destroyers on patrol or on escort duty were to be diverted to Dunkirk or the beaches.¹¹
Vulnerability of personnel vessels
The vulnerability of the personnel vessels, with their large troop-carrying capacity, was a cause of anxiety. On the 27th May the Biarritz and Archangel, the Mona's Queen, King Orry, Sequacity, Yewdale, and the Isle of Thanet12,
I The Albury, Gossamer, Leda, Kellett and Sutton.
2 The Salamander, Halcyon, Skipjack and Waverley.
3 The Ross, Pangbourne and Lydd.
4 The Hebe, Sharpshooter, Duchess of Fife snd Emperor of India.
5 The Oriole and Marmion.
6
A.M.0163/28.
7 The Verity, Harvester, Esk, Malcolm, Express, Shikari and Scimitar.
8 Appendix M.4.
9 A.M.0754/28.
10 A.M.1229/28.
11 Appendices D.4, D.5 and D.7.
collided with the Examination Service Vessel leaving Ocean Reward, which sank
12 At 0254, on 28th May, shortly after Dover for Newhaven, the Isle of Thanet
Assisted by the tug Lady Brassey, a search was made for survivors, but none was found.
28

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
had all come under fire from the shore guns at Calais and Gravelines. At
0415 on the 28th May the Queen of the Channel, loaded with 904. troops, was attacked by one aircraft; 3 or 4 bombs were dropped, which straddled the ship abaft the mainmast and broke her back, the starboard propeller shaft and the rudder. By good fortune the Dorrien Rose, en route for Dunkirk, was in the vicinity and rescued the troops: the Queen of the Channel sank about 1/2 hour later. The St. Seiriol, which left Dunkirk at about 0415 with 494 troops, reached Folkestone in safety.
Civilian crews feel the strain
Some 45 personnel vessels were used during operation "Dynamo"
Of these eight were sunk, at least six were so damaged by bombing or gunfire as to render them unfit for further use during the operation, and two were damaged in collision. Nine of the largest of these personnel vessels had been engaged prior to "Dynamo" in operations at Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and their Captains and crews were beginning to feel the strain when Operation
"Dynamo" started.
Thus it was that the Master of the Canterbury, which had already completed
2 round trips to Dunkirk in operation "Dynamo", reported, on the 28th May, that he was too worn out to make a third trip. The P.S.T.O. went on board and explained the gravity of the situation to the Master, and the Canterbury sailed at 0930 the next day. On her return voyage from Dunkirk she was bombed and damaged, and after landing her 1960 troops went into dock for repairs. In the 3 trips she made the Canterbury brought back 4,416 troops;
her Master, Captain C. A. Hancock, was awarded the D.S.C.
Personnel vessels not to be employed during full daylight
On the 28th May, however, it had become apparent that development of the German air threat over the evacuation area, and the increasing artillery fire from shore batteries covering the sea approaches to Dunkirk, prohibited the employment of personnel and similar vessels during daylight, until the position was restored, and that evacuation from Dunkirk by day must for the moment be confined to warships and small vessels².
It was not, therefore, until later in the day, that the P/V Royal Daffodil sailed for Dunkirk, and eight other personnel vessels and a hospital carrier³
received their sailing orders during the afternoon and evening.
The northern Route Y was by this time in general use⁴, but ships proceeding from Dover to Dunkirk were ordered to use the southern and shorter Route Z, if the passage from Calais Bell buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
N.O.I.C. Ramsgate responsible for servicing skoots
In these circumstances some 20 skoots reached Dunkirk, or arrived off the beaches during the day and evening of the 28th May; others were on the way.
Their speed varied, but most of them were very slow. Eight of them went into Dunkirk harbour⁵, and four to Bray beach⁶. The Abel Tasman, loaded with ammunition, the Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with food, and three
I This number includes 3 store ships, 3 motor vessels and a few freighters, coasters and tramps.
2 D.R. p. 4, para. 13.
3 The Scotia, Malines, Prague, Manxman, Royal Sovereign, Tynwald, Lochgarry, Killarney and the H.C. Paris.
4 Appendix K.1.
5 The Caribia, Fredanja, Friso, Jutland, Tilly, Patria, Sursum-Corda, and Twente.
6 The Amazone, Doggersbank, Hilda, and Oranje.
29

CHAP. V
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
an after air she attack, had been and she refloated, was abandoned. up as a result of morning, was put aground her engines seized a hours others¹ were off La Panne to facilitate beach. The unloading; Alice which few arrived in
N.O.I.C. Margate Ramsgate. and Ramsgate beaches, servicing was performed by
At this stage began the and running the of a continuous whose service of skoots between
Evacuation plan for the night 28th-29th May
The full significance of this rapidly growing armada of ships became in the numbers of troops lifted the following day. By midday on apparent the 28th
May, approximately 12,000 troops had been transported since the commenceabout 5,000 were embarking in 5 destroyers. Nine more destroyers were ment of Operation Dynamo" about 1,000 were en route to the U.K., and the way to Dunkirk, and a total force of 16 destroyers would be maintaining on a continuous ferry service during the day.
The plan for the night of 28th/29th May, was to sail all available ships, small craft and boats, so as to develop the maximum effort at 2200. The details of the plan were signalled by V.A. Dover to S.N.O. Dunkirk at 1555. Briefly,
3 hospital carriers, 7 personnel vessels and 2 destroyers were to embark troops at the east pier Dunkirk; while some 20 destroyers, 19 paddle and fleet sweepers, 17 drifters, 20 to 40 skoots, 5 coasters, 12 motor boats, 2 tugs, 28
pulling cutters and lifeboats, were to work along the 10 mile stretch of beach from Dunkirk to La Panne.
Fighter Command patrols strengthened
Meanwhile, at Dunkirk, conditions had proved easier during the day enemy air activity over the port was restricted, probably by the heavy pall of smoke from the burning town, and increased fighter activity was keeping the enemy in check2. Fighter Command patrols were strengthened from an average of one squadron to an average of 2 squadrons, and Coastal Command maintained a continuous daylight patrol (usually of 3 aircraft at a time) on the line North
Goodwins - Gravelines - Ostend. About 320 sorties were flown on Continental patrols during the day, and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy. Nineteen
Me. fighters.³ 109's and 4 bombers were definitely destroyed for a loss of 13 British
Windsor damaged
At 1000 some 40 Me. 109's were engaged by our fighters, and at 1040 they encountered the At South 1145 destroyer the a destroyer Anthony German observed Windsor, force of 40 nearly which to 50 was 150 planes bombers on in patrol, aerial and was combat fighters3. attacked over Dunkirk. At near 1125, the she casualties. suffered considerable damage from near misses and m.g. fire and had 30
Goodwin Light Vessel by 15 dive-bombers supported by 10 fighters
2 I The Reiger, Pacific and Pascholl.
Appendix L.3.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p. 323.
30

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
Boy Roy and Paxton damaged and beached
At 1215 German fighters in strength were encountered by our fighter patrols;
during the rest of the day there was no further air fighting¹, but the minesweeper Sandown was bombed off the Gull Light buoy at 1230, and Bray beach was bombed at 1420². In an air raid off Dunkirk channel at about 1800, the prifters Boy Roy and Paxton were damaged by near misses and had to be beached; there were, however, no casualties.
Difficulty of synchronising arrival of ships with flow of troops
Meanwhile, at 0935, 2,000 troops were on Malo beach and 7,000 more were on the sand dunes, waiting anxiously for ships to come³. An hour after midday, 6,000 troops were reported to be on Bray beach, 7 miles east of Dunkirk pier, and 4 minesweepers were sailed from the Downs to embark them. When they arrived at 2130, however, conditions had changed, and three of them, the Salamander, Fitzroy and Skipjack, went to La Panne; the fourth, the
Sutton, went to the beach at Zuydcoote 4 miles east of Dunkirk4. Throughout the whole operation it was never found possible to adjust the arrival of ships, either at Dunkirk or opposite the beaches, to synchronise with the ebb and flow of troop concentrations.
Shortage of drinking water.
At this time the troops were sorely in need of drinking water; joint naval⁵
and military measures were taken to provide it in tanks and cans, and ships off the beaches were directed to do what they could from their own resources.
There was, however, inevitably some delay before all requirements could be met, and as late as the 30th May no water or food had yet reached Malo beach⁶.
Brighton Belle sunk
Meanwhile, at 1230, the Brighton Belle, returning to Ramsgate with the 350
troops she had picked up from the beach at Zuydcoote, struck a submerged wreck off the Gull Light buoy during an air attack and sank. All the crew and troops were transferred to the Sandown, Medway Queen, and Yser. Paymaster Sub.-Lieut. W. J. Butler, R.N.V.R., of the Sandown was killed and
2 ratings were wounded.
Shortage of boats
At 1420, when Bray beach was bombed, S.N.O., Dunkirk, ordered some of the troops there to march to Dunkirk in spite of the congestion in the port.
By 1830, however, there were still several thousand troops at Bray and more were arriving. At this time the Grafton reported that she was off Bray beach
I R.A.F. Narrative, P. 323.
2 Report by S.N.O. Dunkirk, (R.O. III p. 346).
3 Appendix N.2.
4 It is not always possible to record precisely the beaches off which ships were lying.
The 10-miles stretch of beach had arbitrarily been divided up into 3 sections, Malo, Bray and La Panne. In the confusion of the times, and particularly in the darkness of the night, it is not surprising that ships in company sometimes gave different names to the particular section of beach off which they were lying.
5 The Maid of Orleans had landed 6,000 two-gallon cans of water at Dunkirk on the
26th May. The motor boat Glitter II went over with water for the beaches on the 29th
May and the lighter Seine took 5,000 cans of it; the Friso and the Mona's Queen also went over on the 29th with water, but the latter was mined and sunk before she could unload it.
' Appendix P.1.
31

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
and Hilda), two power boats and Kellett a tow and pulling Leda, but boats; the(Doggersbank with the Calcutta¹, the Gallant, Wakeful, of Verity, two skoots was joined by the minesweepers the number there were insufficient boats and motor launches to cope with of troops on the beach.
Calcutta had already lost one of her two whalers2.
70 wounded (cot cases); heavy embarkation difficult and the
Off La Panne, at 2157, the Calcutta, surf assisted made by the skoot Reiger, embarked
By the 28th May beach evacuation had become a vitally essential part complete lack of small beaching craft, other than ships' boats - aftermath
Operation Dynamo". It was, however, severely restricted by the almost of the wish, already noticed, to prevent early information of the operation be- of coming known to the enemy; and an urgent and persistent cry for boats arose from the ships off the beaches.³
Beach craft are sailed for Dunkirk
Steps had already been taken, however, to begin the provision of small boats.
At 0800 on the 28th May, 8 motor boats were sailed from the Thames for the
South Downs. At noon the tug Sun V with 8 cutters and 2 whalers in tow, and the tug St. Clears with 11 cutters in tow, left Sheerness for Ramsgate, and both tugs sailed for Dunkirk late in the evening. Of these two tows, however, only 7 cutters reached the beaches, the remainder being lost en route.4
At 1500 the tug Java left Ramsgate for Dunkirk, in company with four drifters⁵ and 5 motor launches⁶. They arrived off Bray at 0100 on 29th May, and were the first arrivals of small motor craft off the beaches. With them, at 1500 on the 28th May, 5 drifters of the 1st Mine Recovery Flotilla left Ramsgate for Dunkirk⁷, and at 1845, 18 motor boats with 17 whalers left Sheerness for Dover.⁸
Supply of small craft is accelerated
These supplied only a portion of what was required. There was still a lack of small craft, and at 2002 V.A. Dover asked that every available shallow draft power boat should be sent to the beaches⁹. The Admiralty's vigorous reaction to this request became fully evident on the following day, the 29th May, when the Portsmouth and Nore Commands, the Thames estuary and the Port of
London Authority were combed for motor boats, lighters and barges¹⁰. To accelerate the journey arrangements were made to route them direct to the beaches, provided they had charts, food, fuel etc.¹¹, though some difficulty was experienced in providing the large number of charts required. Indeed, on the road map" to navigate on.
31st May the Master of the coaster Hythe states that he was given an army
I 2 The Calcutta reported she was off La Panne.
Appendix H.2.
3 Appendices H.1 and H.2.
Five gunfire from Clears' cutters were lost en morning route to Dunkirk a collision with the destroyer the result of enemy
4 The of the Sun St. V's tow was lost early next in Montrose.
up 5 by The the Sp. Gravelines Serv./V. Crested and Nieuport; Eagle. one of the 5 was, next however, day, as subsequently picked
6 The Lord Walker Rodney, I, Lord Keith, Lord Collingwood
7 8 9 The Appendix Lord Cavan, G.6. Walker Fidget, II, Jacketa, New Britannic, Silver Dawn Nayland, and and Fisher and Lord Angler Boy St. Vincent. (Appendix II. G.5).
Appendix G.7.
II 10 Appendices G.13 to G.18.
Appendix G.9.
32