TNA ADM 234 360

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PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's
front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured
and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was
a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British
rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and
weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the
defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers,
and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their
localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved
or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed
to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was
also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right
flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on
the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued
without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and
prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its
withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was
soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the
river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the
opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern
area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off
from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed
this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3