TNA ADM 234 360

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 23.

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were
actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin),
who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all
theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May),
now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from
the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens,
attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because
it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually
in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately
followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption
by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was
unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two
divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this
attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and
it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely fore-
seen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider
the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting,
which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control
and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and
small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations
and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of
evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very
gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was
considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated
could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports
must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised
that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took
place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and
the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation
and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats
required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5