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TNA / ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360
Collection details

TNA ADM 234 360

Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 234 360
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors, for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and consequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was intimated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

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Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 25.

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank
of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut
to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were
made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison
work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once
again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer
and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was
possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors,
for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of
anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no
effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the
canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and con-
sequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too
that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military
requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening
enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last
remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was
abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal
to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an
evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and
in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters
which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after
allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed
the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the
remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names
of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was in-
timated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7