Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED |
Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 33.
OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED CHAP. III you that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will inevitably be lost even in best circumstances". Later in the day Lord Gort received a further telegram from the War Office which said, inter alia, not possible for French to effect junction with Northern Armies no course open to you but to fall back upon the coast you are now authorised to operate towards the coast forthwith in con- junction with French and Belgian Armies". It will be remembered that on the evening of the 21st May the King of the Belgians had agreed that, if forced to abandon the Belgian positions on the Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining touch with the left of the B.E.F. Now, however, late on the morning of the 26th May, a note was received from General Michiels, the Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, which said, inter alia the Belgian Army is being attacked with extreme violence and the lack of Belgian reserves makes it impossible to extend our boundaries we have no longer any forces available to fill the gap in the direction of Ypres. As regards the withdrawal to the Yser, the idea must be ruled out since it would destroy our units more quickly than the battle. The Belgian collapse was impending, if it had not actually taken place, and the task of defending the Allied line as far as the sea had fallen on the British and French troops.2 Dunkirk perimeter organised Faced with this critical situation Lord Gort, on the evening of the 26th May, put in hand his plans for withdrawing in to the bridgehead at Dunkirk³. Orders had already been given for the embarkation of certain key personnel, and now all units not required for battle were being withdrawn. It was possibly at this juncture that, " owing to a misunderstanding, the personnel of certain anti-aircraft units had been embarked instead of being retained for the defence of the port of Dunkirk".⁴ The task of organising a bridgehead at Dunkirk was delegated to Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam, Bt., Commander of the 3rd Corps.⁵ The Admiralty signals, "Operation 'Dynamo' is to Commence" Meanwhile, in the morning of 26th May, a meeting had been held at the Admiralty to give further consideration to the provision of small craft, and the crews for manning both them and the ex-Dutch skoots. The meeting also examined the number of craft available for the evacuation. The port of Dunkirk had already been so damaged by air attacks as to be no longer avail- able for unloading supplies, which would now have to be landed on the beaches to the eastward. Long before the operation was ordered, the Admiralty fully realized that large numbers of small craft would be required for a beach evacuation; but such was the secrecy of even the possibility of evacuation, that steps could not yet be taken to collect craft for the purpose. During the afternoon of the 26th May, under the pressure of the acute military : situation, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that it was imperative for 'Dynamo' to be implemented with the greatest vigour, I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 44. 2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 45. 3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47. 4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 55. 5 He handed over command of the 3rd Corps to Maj.-Gen. S. R. Wason. 15