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INTRODUCTION
The Dunkirk evacuation looms large in the history of the war. It involved
the dual problem of lifting a mass of hard-pressed troops from a continually
shrinking perimeter under uncertain conditions of wind and sea, the menace of
heavy attacks by air, and the onrush of a great hostile army; and then of
transporting them to England in the face of air attacks, shore bombardments,
torpedoes, mines, and the dangers of unlit shoals and wreck-strewn channels.
Despite the heavy losses suffered from all these perils, no less than 239,000
troops were embarked from the shattered quays of a wreck-encumbered har-
bour ; while some 99,000 more were lifted from the 10 miles stretch of shoaling
beach north-east of the harbour. This was no light task. The evacuation
from the beaches was performed by many hundreds of shallow-draught motor
boats, fishing craft, lighters, barges, sailing and pulling boats, manned partly
by civilian volunteers - which ferried the weary troops to the destroyers,
mine-sweepers, skoots, personnel vessels, tugs and other ships lying off in
deeper water.
Operation "Dynamo" was essentially a combined operation, requiring the
devoted co-operation of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and the
cheerful courage and steadiness of an exhausted Army waiting on the beaches
with hardly anything to eat or drink.
It must at once be said that the stupendous success which crowned Operation
"Dynamo," in the face of the determined onslaught of numbers of hostile
bombers, could not have been achieved without the air cover provided by
Fighter and Coastal Command, which performed its task almost invariably
against superior numbers, and with the serious handicap of having no base
nearer than England. In spite of the most strenuous efforts, however, the
inadequate numbers of aircraft available precluded the possibility of continuous
cover, and it is significant that the losses of ships by air attacks were greater
than the aggregate of losses from all other enemy action, while their severity
varied proportionately with the strength of our fighter cover at the time.
I The following five naval aircraft squadrons also operated under Coastal Command
801
815
806
Skuas
825
Swordfish
826 Albacore
These aircraft were the only available British dive bombers They carried out attacks on
tanks, transport, batteries, gun emplacements, enemy positions in the Calais and Dunkirk
areas, and E-boats. In spite of their relative inadequacy for the purpose the Skuas were
also detailed for fighter escort for ships. (M.011883/40)
The incidence of losses by enemy action is given in the two following tables
xiii