TNA ADM 234 360

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Thereupon, at about 0050 on the 1st June Lt. Cdr. McClelland informed
Dover that he was closing down the telephone line as the headquarters were now being abandoned.
While this decision was being arrived at further batteries had come into action on the town of La Panne, and by 0100 the rate of fire on the beach was increased. Lt. Cdr. McClelland says that he had by that time lost touch with
Major-General Montgomery, who had left earlier and subsequently embarked in the Codrington at Dunkirk at 0525 on the 1st June.
By 0130 it was low water, and about half a mile walk to the end of the piers which were now high and dry. While walking there with the intention of assisting in the embarkation of the few men who had not been ordered to march to Dunkirk, Lt. Cdr. McClelland was twice knocked down by shell bursts a splinter smashed the box signalling lantern he was carrying, and another slightly injured his ankle. Several houses on the front were now blazing fiercely.
On reaching the embarkation point Lt. Cdr. McClelland was told that no boats had been in for over half an hour, and that the naval beach party had left-apparently in accordance with his orders that they were to leave in the last boat.¹ As will be seen later, the beach parties at Bray also embarked early on the 31st May.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches, Lt. Cdr. McClelland ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beaches with the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside Bray-Dunes before 0400.
At 0200, two or three miles down the beach towards Bray, three ships2 at anchor and some troops had been trying unsuccessfully to attract their attention by firing their rifles. Further on, as other large groups were waiting for boats,
Lt. Cdr. McClelland decided to swim off and report on the situation. He managed to get close enough to the Gossamer, which was anchored 4 cables from the shore, to pick up a lifebelt on a line brought to him by one of the ship's company.
He was just able to gasp out his message to the Captain of the Gossamer before collapsing, but he had told of the 4th Division's change of plan and of the state of the beaches and had asked that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and
Vice-Admiral Dover be informed. The former was evidently informed at
0215³, and at 0235, the Gossamer signalled V.A. Dover that 6,000 British were marching from La Panne through Bray on Dunkirk⁴.
Being very exhausted and no longer able to walk because of the pain from the wound in his ankle, Lt. Cdr. McClelland remained in the Gossamer.⁵
Sub.-Lieut. E. C. Croswell's report on La Panne confirms that of Lt. Cdr.
McClelland. He says On Friday [31st May] embarkation at La Panne was slowed up as shelling caused some ships to move westward to Bray-Dunes.
The rest camp in the rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut were hit during bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday, and ships also suffered shell fire
On Friday evening German gunners found the range of the beach and were aided by 2 observation balloons which we did not manage
I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report (R.O.III, p.392).
2 The Codrington, Ivanhoe and Gossamer.
3 M.017978/41, p.21.
4
Appendix H.20.
5
Lt. Cdr. McClelland received a mention in despatches.
77

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
of embarkation".
to destroy. At 0200 Saturday [Ist June] La Panne was abandoned as a place
1st June 1940², confirms the
The following extract from above War accounts: Diary General Staff 4 Division, dated the
"[At La Panne] by 0100 hrs. not more be embarked than three had to four hundred men of
Division out of eight thousand to been put on transports. the conference was called at Divisional decided H.Q. that which it was had useless now opened in a house by the A
side of the beach where it was to continue the embarkation from La Panne. Motor Contact officers Dunes were and sent out to inform Brigades that they were to proceed direct to Bray Dunkerque Mole. Whilst were sustained. A Staff Officer was sent warn the French Guards at at the conference was going on the beach was heavily to shelled by 5.9's and a this
Frontier that 4 Division would be passing through them.
was sent to order the men on the beach to make their way along the beach either to Bray or Dunkerque. From this moment H.Q. ceased to operate until follows:- arrived at Dunkerque Mole. Certain officers arrived at Dunkerque Mole as it
GSO II, GSO III, and Camp Commandant at 0500 hrs. 1 June. GOC, GSO I,
AA and QMG, I.O., ADC, Motor Contact Officer at about 0700 hrs."
Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R., Beach Master
In view of the foregoing outline of events at La Panne, it is necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to refer briefly to a report by Captain Pim who was sent over from the Admiralty to assist in speeding up the embarkation.
After visiting as many of the beaches as possible he assumed the duties of
Beach Master (at Bray beach) and arranged to continue the organisation of ferrying boats until all the troops on the beaches were on board. I told them", he said, that if anything went wrong during the night we would return at dawn".³
Later, Captain Pim stated All the troops that I could find were embarked by midnight and placed in ships which sailed for England. Just before midnight I went along certain beaches to look for stragglers. A Staff Officer informed me that no more troops would embark from these beaches⁴ but that they would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated these beaches would be shelled and would probably be in German hands the following day." Captain
Pim estimated that from pontoon bridges and beaches, approximately 5,000
troops were probably embarked.
Although his report is entitled Final evacuation of troops from the beaches of La Panne and Bray", Captain Pim does not say that these 5,000 troops were embarked from La Panne, and it is evident from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker's report, and particularly from Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report, and the War Diary of the 4th Division, that they were not embarked from La Panne. Vice-Admiral
Dover6, however, assumes from Captain Pim's report that he worked at La to the east and west of it.
Panne, the weight of evidence shows that he worked at Bray and immediately the west, as shells meant for the beaches were ricocheting over the Hilda.
During the night, Captain Pim found it necessary to shift his anchorage to
Then, Captain at 0315 on the 1st June, in accordance with his undertaking to the troops, western Pim sent off all [his] boats. to search the beaches, starting from the end of Bray-Dunes". During the next 3 hours, he says, only about 250
I C.W.23187/40.
3 2 4 Capt. Provided Pim's by report Lt. Col. (R.O. H. IV, F. Joslen, p.52). (Historical Section, War Cabinet).
5 Evidently the La Panne beaches.
6 Capt. Pim's report (R.O. IV, P.52).
D.R., p.20, para.61.
78

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
from the beach, apparently stragglers. A large rearguard party probe to Dunkink.of to the the men the 4th Division) marching along the beach decided
Bray Beach parties return to England
It was on this day that the majority of the beach parties returned to England.
that the enemy were closing in and that it might be expected that the final
Captain Howson records that on the evening of the 30th May he had learnt evacuation would take place during the following day (31st May) or night at latest". As he had received orders that beach parties were not to be taken prisoner², and anticipated that very many troops would be left ashore, he deemed it undesirable for all naval personnel to embark in the final rush".
Accordingly he arranged that half the naval personnel should embark during the early hours of Friday (31st May)3.
This arrangement to some extent accounts for V.A. Dover's 1229/31 to Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker saying that officers and men of beach parties had returned to Dover on instructions from Dunkirk, and that they must be retained to the last⁴; and his further signals notifying that more beach parties were being sent out with all despatch in the destroyer Worcester5.
An account of the activities of the beach parties at Bray has been given by
Lieutenants G. W. Vavasour and J. G. Wells, R.N. They were among the 12
officers and 60 ratings, who sailed from Dover in the Esk with Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker and Commodores Stephenson and Hallett on the 29th May
(Page 49).
On the way over the 12 officers were divided into 3 groups of 4 officers, and to each of the 12 officers was allocated a party of 1 P.O., 1 Leading Seaman,
2 Able Seamen and a Signalman. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker told the officers that on no account were their parties to be captured, and that with this in mind, they were to re-embark when they thought fit.
On arrival off the various beaches at about 2330 on May 29th the Esk stopped off each and the 3 beach parties were landed in whalers; one party went to
La Panne where Cdre. Stephenson was to be S.N.O., Afloat, off the beach⁶, one went west of Bray, and the third went to Bray where Commodore Hallett was to be S.N.O., Afloat, off the beach. There is no report available of the activities of the first two parties.
The 4 officers in Cdre. Hallett's section were Lieuts. Vavasour, Wells, Tibbits and Cameron, R.N., all of H.M.S. Excellent. Cdre. Hallett had previously explained to these officers that he himself would be afloat approximately in front of his sections (E, F, G and H) of the beach, and repeated the warning that the officers were to be the sole judges of when to evacuate the naval parties.
I Capt. Pim's report (R.O. IV, p.52), Italics not in original.
2 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker says that the V.A. Dover had stressed that Naval ratings
(in beach parties) were not to risk being taken prisoner (M.017978/41, p.3).
3 Capt. Howson's Report (R.O. IV, p.117).
4 Appendix Q.12.
6 5 Appendices Q.13 and Q.14.
Lt. Vavasour's report, R.O.III, p.422. Lt. Vavasour says that Cdre Stephenson was
S.N.O., A.B.C.D. Sections. But the beaches had been lettered A to O, from west to east and so the La Panne beach was L.M.N.O. It was probably because of the almost invariable confusion about the lettering of the beaches that this method of designating beaches was changed by signal at 1906/29 (Appendix 0.11), and the whole length was divided into 3
equal parts, referred to as Malo, Bray and La Panne, from west to east with a mile gap between each part.
79

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
if one party had to leave, it was to communicate along the moreover, beach so that all would have the warning¹. of the Bray whole
4 sections, being small, should of about 400 yards; they at took covering frontage, in all, at first once proceded to proceedesition
On landing, the 4 section Lieutenants remain close together, and party they decided that all organize but, dunes within and 3 a approached embarkation 2 minutes obeyed orders of the landing, points. boats. about about There boats The troops 5,000 given were from troops were by the on left naval the no their whole signs officers cover of easy and in to the control sand and except implicity the orders to bring back the boats ships to shore. ratings,
Vavasour says that by 0500 on the loaded May and doubtful if 80 men were
Evacuation in Commodore Hallett's 30th section it is was very slow and Lieut.
reached a ship, they let the boats go adrift, as were no off. A few boats appeared, were there sent off; but boat-keepers. troops
No suggestions or orders were issued from headquarters, says 12 Commanders along the front at Bray. There he saw a Captain R.N. and
At dawn Lieut. Vavasour contacted a headquarters² in one of the houses
One of the commanders, who had come from Dunkirk", him that the port was out of action, and the moles were in ruins.
off Bray beach, but the boat situation had acute now
Shortly after 0500 on the 30th May there was a destroyer and minesweeper rand there werweeper about 15,000 troops on the beach. With the assistance of some senior
Army Officers who by then had arrived, the troops were moved away from the water's edge and settled in the sands.
By 0600, a considerable number of collapsible boats had been collected from the Royal Engineers and these were loaded with 10 soldiers apiece and sent off.
In the majority of cases, however, on arrival at the ships the boats were abandoned and, drifting to the east, came ashore abreast the French, who used them to go off to British ships. By 0700, there were no power boats at all, and whaler trips were very infrequent. The rate of evacuation continued to be very slow.
Meanwhile the Captain R.N." (Captain Howson) had gone to La Panne and Lieut. Vavasour did not see him again.
By 0730 more ships had arrived and evacuation proceeded more quickly, as the beach parties had organised their own boat keepers. It was still, however, far from satisfactory. The troops found it difficult to get into the boats in the surf, and the beach parties had to wade out shoulder-deep to keep the boats stern-on to the beach.
Lieut. Vavasour and his party then boarded the Anthony to get a change of clothing, and while there obtained a motor boat which they manned for 12 hours lost until she broke down. They first proceeded to recover the majority of their boats, now in use by the French, and then organised a ferry service.
At 0900 contact was made with Commodore Hallett who then in a drifter.
He " I informed him of what I was doing Lieut. Vavasour. was " He approved.
Commodore informed me that he was very short says of coal. At approximately 0930 the
Lieut. steamed away to seaward. I did the Commodore again."
his boat broke down, and he had to saw be towed [the clear Commodore] of the danger at area." as
Wells said We never him not see all I believe
2 I Report Probably by Lt.
3 Captain Cdrs. Otway-Ruthven to by Capt. Howson and Gorton, (Section or 158) Richardson.
80

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
to the method of embarking the troops, Lieut. Wells found that the best way queues were 3 deep and were spaced available. out groups The of 10, this number being
As to organise them into a long queue at each in of the 3 embarkation points.
The suitable for the type of boat following group could be most used for shoving off a loaded boat, which took a good deal of moving at half tide to a bar running parallel to the sea. The Army pontoon boats proved most owing suitable, because of their draught, double-ended construction and general handiness. The main difficulty, according to Lieut. Wells, lay in the insufficiency of naval boat keepers. As a rule the soldiers detailed to return the boats did not carry out orders and the beach parties had to swim or wade out for drifting boats, which continually delayed and slowed up the operation. Lieut. Wells considered that the troops could hardly be blamed as it was clearly a naval responsibility. More ratings were asked for from outlying ships, but none could be sent.
At 0930 on May 30th there was only one other motor boat working within
5 miles either side of Lieut. Vavasour's beach, i.e. G section. It was a destroyer's motor boat which, being aground when the destroyer sailed, had been left behind.
By about noon, all ships within sight from G beach had departed fully loaded.
About an hour later a destroyer [the Windsor] anchored east of Bray, and as many boats as possible were towed out to her. Lieut. M. A. Hemans R.N., says Lieut. Vavasour closed the destroyer. On board her were two officers,
Lieuts. Stubbs and Fletcher from the beach party which had gone to La Panne
(under Cdre. Stephenson) who said they had been told to leave by their
Commodore. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was on board the destroyer and he told Lieuts. Hemans and Vavasour to carry on with the boats.
At about 1300 some 10 trawlers, drifters and minesweepers began to arrive, and evacuation proceeded apace until 2000, in spite of there being only 3 motor boats for towing and ferrying. By 2000 all ships had left except the Special
Service vessel Royal Eagle. By 2100, however, just after dark, many destroyers and minesweepers commenced to arrive.
Lieut. Vavasour went on board the Royal Eagle at about 2000 in response to a signal. While his motor boat was away collecting boat loads of troops for the
Royal Eagle the former broke down and was picked up by a destroyer which was on the way to La Panne. That was the last Lieut. Vavasour saw of his party. He later got on board a minesweeper at 0100/31 and sailed for Harwich.
Subsequently, on arrival at H.M.S. Excellent he found the remainder of Cdre.
Hallett's lieutenants were back. They had been told, he says, to abandon the evacuation about midnight by the S.N.O. of the beach-a Commander".
"I felt most limited in my activities," says Lieut. Vavasour, by the very definite orders that I had received that on no account was the naval party to be left behind. No accurate information was available.
I was unable to obtain any information at all from any single one of the large number of ships to which
I towed boats during the day and night". This is not surprising because in the circumstances, with the situation continually and rapidly changing, no one either ashore or afloat had any accurate information. Thus, for instance, the
Gossamer which anchored one mile west of La Panne at 2207, had sent in the motor boat Handy Billie in charge of S/Lt. M. Phipps R.N. to search for troops.
He found none, and received no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however, the situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship".'
I Report by Gossamer (R.O.I, p.264).
D
81

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
Lieut. Wells says that at 0100/31 he was continued. informed that Some naval personnel would
Division, original have the The to Brigadier' shelling party evacuate who was had of the at [?Major embarked already dawn beach left, General if continued, at the and about shelling W. at 0330. 0300/31 embarkation and G. Holmes] (says he Lieut. swam in command Wells) out to officers fetch the of not a order the boat in 42nd was his for passed from Headquarters that as the would probably be over dawn the following day [Ist June], all naval personnel were to embark forth- at with". Lieut. Wells accordingly remained in the Halcyon, where he had taken the Brigadier". The Halcyon arrived at Dover at 0845/31.
There is clearly some connection between the above order from Headquarters' and Captain Howson's arrangement for embarking naval personnel during the early hours of the 31st May.
The only other account of the activities of the beach parties comes from Cdr.
H. du P. Richardson, R.N., who worked with Lt. Cdr. D. B. Dowling, R.N., and a naval platoon at Malo beach from 2000 on May the 27th until the beach was cleared of troops at about noon on the 28th May.
S.N.O. Dunkirk then ordered him to Bray beach to embark 5,000 troops, and he arrived there at about 1700 on the 28th May, with Cdr. Ken² [?Kerr] and
16 men. They found about 30,000 troops, stretching from Bray to the eastward, awaiting embarkation. Cdr. Richardson's beach party, as will be seen, also returned on the 31st May.
At 0130 on the 29th May a high wind got up which made beach embarkation almost impossible. Cdr. Richardson therefore sent off about 20,000 troops to
Dunkirk in batches of 1000.
During the night of 29th/30th May another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward³, and this reduced the limits of Cdr. Richardson's beach.
Early on the morning of the 30th May Cdr. Richardson went to Brigade
H.Q.4 at Bray and suggested that piers be built by running lorries into the sea.
This, he says, was quickly done and proved successful.
Between 1800 and 2000 on the 30th May the enemy directed accurate artillery fire on to the beach, and continued firing throughout the night. Cdr. Richardson's beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers. " No boats", he says,
" had now been in for 16 hours on our beach".
During the night of the 30th/31st May, the weather became bad once more, and a heavy surf was running. By about 0300 on the 31st May it was impossible to carry out embarkation from the beaches.
Cdr. Richardson's men were by now showing signs of extreme exhaustion, and as it was impossible to communicate with the S.N.O. he decided to take over S.N.O. a whaler they had salved and go to the nearest destroyer to report to the
They waited for high water, and at about 0730 put to sea. There was a very heavy surf running, and they had an uneven set of oars, rope crutches and only
Two other destroyers passed at about 7 cables, but paid no attention.
an oar to steer by. They approached 2 destroyers, but both got underway.
2 I Cdr. There Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.367).
3 is no officer of this name in the May 1940 List.
These Evidently the party landed at E.F.G.H., Cdre. Hallett's Navy sections of the beach.
headquarters 4 were probably (p. 59). the same H.Q. as those referred to by Capt. Howson as Corps
82

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
After about an hour the Margate life-boat, the Lord Southborough, appeared.
All destroyers were now under way, and as the life-boat was returning to Margate the party went back in her¹. She reached Margate at 1450 on May 31st.
Thus, by about 0830 on the 31st May all the beach parties of which there are any records had returned or were on their way to England.
Devonia is beached
At 1035 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker had informed V.A. Dover that he would beach a ship in the hope of improving conditions for boat work, which was then being made difficult by a lop and he instructed Cdre. Stephenson accordingly.
Cdre. Stephenson, then in the yacht Bounty off. La Panne, boarded the minesweeper Devonia at 1600 and gave orders to beach the ship. The
Devonia, already much damaged by near misses at 1230, was beached at full speed off La Panne, and at 1930, on account of the shelling and bombing, she was abandoned. Fortunately by 1700 the weather off the beaches had much improved.
Casualties to H.M. Ships
With the exception of the Devonia none of H.M. ships was lost on this day, but the following were slightly damaged: the Vivacious was damaged by a shell hit and had 3 dead and 12 wounded; the Hebe received slight damage from a near miss; the Wolsey was in collision with the P/V Roebuck; the
Impulsive damaged a propeller on uncharted wreckage; the Malcolm was in collision with Dunkirk pier; and the Scimitar was in collision with the Icarus and later with a drifter².
Air patrols
During the 31st May Fighter Command carried out patrols, as on the 30th
May, at an average strength of three to four squadrons. Eight patrols in all were flown, involving 289 sorties. The periods in the day when the Dunkirk area was not covered were 0620-0800, 0830-1110, 1510-1615, and 1745-1915³.
Coastal Command patrolled the line North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend throughout the day, patrols being of one section strength, involving in all
37 sorties⁴.
Shortly before 0930 the Air Ministry intercepted a meassage indicating that the enemy air force had been ordered not to attack the town or harbour of
Dunkirk but to concentrate attacks on shipping at sea, or leaving the coast³.
It was at about 1230 that, off La Panne, the Devonia received extensive damage to her hull from 4 near misses, but the first major attack on our ships occurred about 1415-1430 when one of our squadrons estimated the enemy strength as about 100 aircraft (bombers and fighters). Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker says, "a terrific air battle took place overhead and it seemed to go against us". Actually, we lost 9 aircraft and claimed 7 enemy shot down.6
Air attacks then followed at half-hourly intervals between 1530 and 1730, and at about 1717 the Ivanhoe, Whitehall and Express off Dunkirk harbour were attacked by about 50 bombers. The Whitehall received some damage and the Express slight damage from near misses. At this time also the Hebe was attacked off La Panne by 4 bombers and was damaged by near misses;
I Cdr. Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.370).
2 Probably either the Gervais Rentoul or the Eileen Emma which both returned damaged as the result of collisions.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p.334.
4 R.A.F. Narrative, p.336.
5 M.017978/41, p.17.
6 R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
83

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
she shot down one Heinkel aircraft in flames. in mixed Between 1630 and 1745 our air encountered many enemy this series of combats formations, we the largest patrols of about thirty. In lost 5 aircraft being
Rear-Admiral due to always re-appearedisid to definitely group shoot down destroyed¹. Wake-Walker, the enemy It was observation "at during times this hauled balloon latter down failed period but to that always re-appearedia find a squadron for enemy a
At 1800, when until Lord 1930. Gort was embark, there were a a which continued
Between 1920 and 1930 our patrols the were engaged with a formation of
At 1920, off Dunkirk, the Whitehall's after group shot down a bomber.
70 H.E.111's and M.E.109's. In encounter, Fighter Command lost about 3
craft and claimed 10 bombers and 6 fighters definitelydestroyed. Some of air-
Hurricane pilots complained on their return that they had been shot at by the the engaged about thirty M.E.109's, but no bombers were intercepted.
Spitfires¹. At 2010 six Hurricanes trying to locate the observation balloon at Nieuport
Final evacution of B.E.F. expected on night 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, at 1920, all ships in the Nore and Dover Commands were informed by the V.A., Dover, that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expected on the night 1st/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from the 1st June by both British and French ships². At 2309 General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan and stated that
General Alexander had been placed in command of the final phase of the evacuation, that the composition of his force was not known, and that it was impossible now to state how long the French evacuation would take but that the Alexander force would remain till the last³.
Meanwhile, no firm information could be obtained from the French on the following matters4:-
(i) the number of French troops to be evacuated;
(ii) the nature and extent of French seaborne transport;
(iii) the French military plan for the defence of the perimeter and the final withdrawal of French troops.
Embarkation reaches its zenith
The main features of the day had been:-
(a) the increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk, La Panne beach and
(b) the change in the military plan as regards the locality and time of lifting the approach channels
(c) the set-back to beach evacuation that occurred during the the choppy afterthe final contingents of the B.E.F.
noon and evening, forenoon, when large numbers were lifted from the weather of the followed by an excellent recovery in western
22,942 total of were 68,014 lifted proved from to the be beaches the highest daily total of the
The rate of embarkation had, however, and 45,072 up from expectations:, beaches. come to A total of
I R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
2 Appendix Q.19.
3 Appendix Q.22.
4 D.R. p.21, para. 63.
84

CHAPTER IX
SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
GERMANS RENEW THEIR HEAVY AIR EFFORT
E-Boat activity: sinking of the Stella Dorado and Argyllshire
During the night of 31st May-1st June there was a recrudescence of enemy
E-boat activity. After the torpedoing of the destroyers Grafton and Wakeful off Nieuport in the early hours of the 29th May M.T.B. patrols had been established during the dark hours to prevent enemy E-boats from using the inshore channels.
It was, however, in the less confined waters along Route Y that the enemy obtained their successes, despite intensive air and surface patrols. Route Y
was patrolled that night by 2 corvettes and 6 trawlers, while Coastal Command provided 6 aircraft with bombs and parachute flares; and owing to magnetic mines ships evacuating troops were given permission in the early hours of 1st
June to use that route as well as Route X.
At 0230 on the 1st June the A/S trawler Stella Dorado, which 24 hours earlier had picked up 55 survivors from the Siroco, torpedoed by an E-boat near
T buoy, was herself torpedoed in the same position and sunk whilst on patrol.
About a quarter of an hour later the A/S trawler Argyllshire, on patrol in company with the Lord Melchett and Stella Rigel about 2 miles east of S buoy, commenced an attack on what appeared to be a submarine. Within 5 minutes she was struck by a torpedo fired by an E-Boat and sank immediately. Five survivors, including her Captain, Sub-Lieutenant J. S. Weddle, R.N.R., S.O.
11th A/S Striking Force, were picked up by the trawler Malabar.
At the time there were many trawlers and other small craft in the neighbourhood, and one of the two E-Boats responsible for these sinkings was reported to have been disguised as a sailing boat.
Final evacuation postponed
Already on the afternoon of the 31st May ships in Dunkirk road had come under fire from guns on shore at Mardyck, and early on 1st June it became evident that Major General Alexander's force could not be evacuated completely on the night of 1st/2nd June. At 0800, therefore, he agreed on a modified plan with Admiral Abrial and General Fagalde which involved holding his present line till midnight 1st/2nd June, so as to cover Dunkirk and to enable the French to evacuate as many of their troops as possible. Subsequently
Major General Alexander was to withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirk with all available A/A and anti-tank guns and such troops as had not yet embarked.
Embarkations over Bray beaches
It was not only in Dunkirk roads that the ships had been under fire on the previous day; off Bray they had the same experience. Troops were moving westward, and embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. It was clear to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that beach work at Bray would be costly, and he so informed Vice-Admiral, Dover (0235/1), who concurred, whilst pointing out the necessity of using the beaches up to the last possible moment.
85

CHAP. IX
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
east of Dunkirk. deserted. The too, empty, small seen that the beach to the enemy tanks or As the light grew, at 0330, it was position against
The Rear-Admiral, lorries in along the Keith, the beach, with the was Basilisk for supporting fire and going instructions Panne back was westward, to to England move though westward as intended. sea to were was Dunkirk However, moving whilst ships westward those were boats which a still had loading off Bray vanished were by under La to the men anchored the had been hit by shell fire. she grounded aft and continued at daylight, and at about her motor boat and two She closed the shore ship as the Panne, using
The minesweeper Speedwell whalers was to ferry troops a little to the west of La shortly after low water, fire by aircraft of the thus to embark 0500, and the ship, until minesweeper took off 100 her off. She sailed at boats, under machine-gun the enemy Albury towed troops on shore, the troops for Dunkirk. On the way she troops from the Ivanhoe 0730
made repeatedly damaged up her by but a number bomb unsuccessfully as of the troops Speedwell bombed. to 972 was and steaming The left minesweeper for past Dover her. at 0950 Salamander At Dunkirk after which being was she anchored a mile east of Bray Dunes, similarly engaged in embarking troops was with her boats, and she sailed for Dunkirk astern of the Keith and Skipjack soon after 0600. At Dunkirk she came in for two air attacks in one of which, at about 0820, she was damaged by a near miss, but she reached Dover on one boiler at 1530 and disembarked 479 troops. It was her last trip. A mile east of Bray, too, the minesweeper Sutton embarked 453 troops from the beaches before sailing at 0600 for Dover. She was bombed and machine-gunned, but the only man hit was one wounded soldier. The minesweeper Dundalk was anchored nearer to La Panne, also embarking troops. Having no motor boat, the Speedwell and Salamander both lent a hand to tow her whalers. From
0500 onwards she was subjected to air attacks at regular intervals, and about
0800 she decided to proceed to Margate," where she arrived at 1215 with
280 troops. Still further east, the minesweeper Halcyon was anchored off La
Panne embarking troops swimming off to the ship, paddling in rubber boats, and in her whalers, during which she had one officer (Lieut. N. Thurston, R.N.)
mortally wounded and suffered some casualties amongst the crew from machine gunning by enemy aircraft.
Off Bray, the destroyer Sabre was embarking 451 troops and the minesweeper
Niger 310, pressing into service carley floats and lifebelts with which men swam from the beach. Daylight showed a minesweeper and a paddle minesweeper ashore, and the Rear-Admiral hailed a tug which was on its way homeward with soldiers on board, and told him to go in and try to tow off the minesweepers.
However, the tugs had been sent over from England with pulling boats in tow and told to load up, and they regarded themselves as transports only, whereas
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, who knew nothing of these instructions, naturally regarded them as tugs. It was not until a gun was trained on the tug and an
R.N.V.R. Sub.-Lieutenant put on board to take charge, that the master's anxiety to get away was overcome.
A welcome addition to the evacuation craft consisted of the first of a dozen
Belgian fishing boats which now appeared on the scene from seaward down the Zyuidcoote Pass.¹
Early liftings from Dunkirk
At 0241 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker had given orders for all small craft to
I Probably the 10 Belgian trawlers from Brixham, referred to in Section 176.
86

SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
CHAP. IX
move westward with boats in tow in the direction of Dunkirk, towards which the troops were now marching from La Panne.
The first loaded ship to leave Dunkirk seems to have been the Whippingham, in time of peace an Isle of Wight paddle ferry boat belonging to the Southern
Railway. She had been embarking troops alongside the mole since 2200 on the previous day, and when she cast off at 0130 on 1st with 2,700 troops on board she was overladen and her sponsons were only about a foot above water.
Disaster nearly overwhelmed her at the start, when she was straddled by shell fire and the troops rushed over to the port side, causing the ship to list 20°.
Fortunately, the sea was calm. The chief mechanician (Ch. Mech. 2nd C1.
F. A. Ford) checked the rush, moved the troops back to starboard, and thereby probably saved the ship.
Another early sailer was the personnel vessel Lady of Mann, who proceeded at 0430 for Dover, with 1500 casualties. The hospital carriers St. Andrew and
St. Julien disembarked in England this day 130 and 287 wounded, respectively, after which no more hospital ships brought wounded from Dunkirk. Space alongside the large-ship berths was too valuable to be occupied by hospital ships, and walking wounded went with the troops, whilst those that could not walk had to be left behind.
The personnel ship Maid of Orleans berthed at the East Mole at about 0330
and for 6 hours, most of the time under air attack, she acted as a floating stage for the embarkation of troops on board the destroyers Icarus, Vanquisher and Windsor, whose upper decks were far below the top of the mole. The pier was crowded and as many troops as possible were embarked over mess tables rigged across the "B" gun decks of inside ships to the outside vessel.
The Vanquisher was the first of the three to leave, at 0630 with 1200 troops.
An hour later the Icarus and Windsor sailed in company, with 1,114 and 493
troops respectively. Finally, at about 0900 the Maid of Orleans herself proceeded, during an air attack, with 1,856 troops, which, like the destroyers, she disembarked at Dover. In six trips, once being diverted without completing the trip and once returning on account of collision, the Maid of Orleans had transported in all 5,461 men; but this was her last crossing, for when leaving
Dover again for Dunkirk at 2030 that day she was rammed amidships by the destroyer Worcester returning from Dunkirk with manoeuvrability impaired through damage to propellers and rudder, caused by air attack at 1630 in which she had 6 men killed and 40 wounded, and shot down two enemy aircraft. No lives were lost in the collision, but the Maid of Orleans was too badly damaged to continue her voyage. For the Worcester, too, this was the final crossing she had evacuated 4,545 troops in 6 trips.
Other destroyers were embarking troops at the same time alongside Dunkirk pier. The Vivacious, after being dive-bombed whilst waiting to enter harbour, went alongside at 0630, embarked 475 troops in a quarter of an hour, and sailed again for Dover at 0645. The Winchelsea was bombed at 0745 and again at 0830, but was not damaged, and she sailed at 0830 with 1150 troops on board.
Despite vicious air attacks, the embarkation of troops continued. The gunboat Locust, after embarking troops for four hours from Malo beach in her whalers, having no power boat, moved to Dunkirk at 0415 and took on board a further 500 at the east pier under air attack before sailing for Dover at 0610.
The corvette Kingfisher left the east pier at 1130 with 210 troops and some wounded, embarked under almost continuous high level bombing.
There were times, however, during the day when the harbour was deserted.
87

CHAP. IX
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Admiral, When Rear-Admiral Dover, all the Wake-Walker ships which left full had about of not been 0930 sunk to make had contact with many with the signs and collisions. Some were a theme the evidence of bumps first few hours at rest in harbour the
1800," he wrote, the of harbour their strenuous was times all had were for many enjoying days."¹ the that many of them and had
Air Patrols
Consequent on the bombing of at the dawn. day before, As the had asked for fighter aircraft protection appeared on the and low over the ships. More and often not they were fighters constantly came dispersed many than scene, were not taking chances the nearly always opened them. In order to stop firing Rear-Admiral
Flag-" Cease fire", and blew the syren to draw spite of which, however, the after machine gun of his own ship the Keith continued to nothing.² regardless of the cease fire" gong; once firing started they could hear fire
Route X to Dunkirk was patrolled during the early hours of daylight by the
A.A. cruiser Calcutta, which sailed from Margate at 0315 with the corvettes
Mallow and Shearwater and carried out a patrol between W and V buoys. The
Calcutta was recalled to Sheerness at 0938 in readiness to perform the same service next night, and at 1015 she shot down a Heinkel which had bombed and damaged the Mosquito by a near miss 15 miles from Dover.
Fighter Command provided 8 patrols during the 1st June of an average strength of 3 to 4 squadrons. The main periods when no fighter protection was afforded were approximately 0730-0850, 1020-1120, 1120-1145, 1545-
1615 and 1715-1845. Coastal Command continued to fly patrols of 3 aircraft over the North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend line throughout the day.
Enemy air attacks begin St. Fagan sunk 0355.
Sporadic enemy air attacks began at early light. Ships alongside the mole reported being attacked at 0415 and 0500. This was before the first main
R.A.F. air patrol appeared on the scene, for the R.A.F. had been asked to provide maximum protection from 0500 onwards.
Before the first patrol appeared enemy aircraft claimed what was to prove the first of a long series of victims that day. The tug St. Fagan had towed over from Dover during the night three Thames barges. At about 0355, in the
Dunkirk Channel, abreast the town the ship was hit by a bomb and practically disintegrated. Only two officers, including her Captain, Lieut.-Commander
G. H. Warren, M.B.E., R.N., and 6 ratings, were saved out of a total complement of 25. They were picked up by the tug Tanga which had come over from
Ramsgate with 6 boats in tow and had hung off outside Dunkirk most of the night waiting for troops to be brought out to her, and was then on her way home with 160 men on board and a motor-boat in tow.
Almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of our aircraft at 0730 a heavy dive bombing attack developed by a compact formation of some 30 or 40 Ju. 75s, causing the loss of the destroyers Keith and Basilisk, the minesweeper Skipjack, and the tug St. Abbs.
2 I Report, M.017978/41 p.29.
3 M.017978/41, p.23.
R.A.F. narrative.
88

SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
CHAP. IX
The second series of attacks, which began at about 0906 and caused the loss of the Havant, coincided with the arrival of the third main R.A.F. patrol of the day. Coastal Command patrols were also over the ships, and at about 1015
one drove off a He. 111 which was about to attack two destroyers.
The third, a particularly heavy and prolonged enemy air attack, took place from about 1009 to 1120, at which latter time a patrol of 28 Hurricanes appeared and within ten minutes was engaged with an enemy force of 50 or 60 M. 109s and 110s. The presence of enemy bombers was also reported, but they were not engaged. They were responsible for sinking the French destroyer
Foudroyant, the minesweeper Brighton Queen, personnel vessel Scotia, and damaging a second personnel vessel the Prague. A fourth air attack developed, at about 1230, during the Hurricanes' patrol. In this raid the corvette Kingfisher received damage from a near miss which rendered her unseaworthy in heavy weather, and the gunboat Mosquito was sunk.
There was a lull after this and the next air attacks fortunately occurred at a time when the fifth R.A.F. patrol was operating, at 1500 and 1530, and a
Coastal Command patrol was also on the spot; and no ship was damaged.
Renewed attacks occurred at 1600-1630 in the very short interval before the sixth R.A.F. patrol came up, and it was in this raid that the paddle minesweeper
Westward-Ho, sailing from Dunkirk with 900 French troops, and the destroyer
Worcester were damaged, over 100 bombs being dropped near the latter ship
When this was over, visibility had so far declined that at 1750 the paddle minesweeper Princess Elizabeth, trying to approach Bray beach, ran into fog and was compelled to return to Dover. The seventh R.A.F. patrol was troubled by poor visibility, and the eighth and last encountered no enemy at all. No bombing attacks were reported after 1840.
Five destroyers, a gunboat, two minesweepers, two personnel vessels, and two tugs were sunk or put out of action by the German bombers on this 1st
June.
The weight of the enemy attacks may be gauged from the fact that over
1000 German bombing sorties were reported over the Dunkirk area during the day. Forty-three enemy aircraft were destroyed.
The first heavy air attack, 0730. Keith, Skipjack and St. Abbs sunk
The Keith and Salamander moved westward from the deserted eastern beaches. At 0737, off Bray, a large number of enemy bombers accompanied by fighters was seen approaching, and a dive-bombing attack was made on the
Keith. The latter's manoeuvrability was restricted by shoals, magnetic mines and wrecks, but she was not hit. But a delay action bomb from a dive bomber exploded just astern of the ship and caused the steering wheel on the bridge to jam. Tiller flat steering was connected up and the ship was conned by telephone from the bridge. By this time all the Keith's 3-inch ammunition had been expended, and the only defence which the ship could put up was the passive one of continuing to turn in small circles at high speed in the restricted waters.
At about 0800 numerous dive-bombing attacks took place, and the Keith was hit or near missed on the starboard side. A large hole was blown in the side at the forward end of the starboard engine room below the water line, and the bulkhead between the engine room and the after boiler room was ruptured, flooding both spaces and killing Lieut. (E) W. H. Kenward, R.N. and several men. The boiler room shortly afterwards caught fire, possibly as the result of a further
89

CHAP. IX
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
side by two further hits, within a few inches of the to port, which the bomb hit. It seems probable for the that ship serious took a damage heavy list was now caused to until the upper deck was with one anchor down. water. Steam was increased lost and the ship stopped, depth charges set to safe and Torpedoes were gradually no range on and all were jettisoned.
As the ship was now settling, the order Rear-Admiral to abandon Wake-Walker transferred the Keith to M.T.B. 102 this moment a further series ship was given, and from shook the ship with near misses amongst the men in the water.
the men left her. At which landed of dive bombing most attacks of took off survivors and picked up men water. The skoot Hilda
About 0830 the tug St. Abbs came alongside in the and assisted by the tug Vincia was bombed and sunk. As late as 1100 men were still struggling in the oil rescued 7 ratings. An unidentified grey yacht which was picking up survivors
Lt. Gen. Laidsell, 2 officers, and 20 ratings. The minesweeper Salamander rescued slick, and the motor barge Sherfield, which had arrived off the coast with a small convoy of 2 X lighters and a motor launch, rescued 15.
At about 0940 aircraft again appeared, and the Keith was sunk in a salvo of bombs from about 50 of the enemy. Three officers and 33 men were reported lost.
Ten minutes later the St. Abbs, by this time off Dunkirk, was hit by bombs and sank in 45 seconds. Of the 135 officers, ratings and trcops on board, 30
were left swimming in the water, including the Captain of the Keith, Capt. E. L.
Berthon, D.S.C., R.N., who was saved.
Meanwhile the Skipjack, which had been busy off Malo embarking troops and fighting off continuous air attacks from 0530 which had reduced her ammunition supply to about 12 rounds a gun, was dive-bombed at 0845 by 10
aircraft and hit by 2 bombs. A minute later 3 more bombs hit her. She turned turtle and floated bottom upwards for about 2 minutes before finally sinking. A few survivors were picked up by the Hilda and the St. Abbs. Nearly all the 275 troops on board were below decks and had no chance to escape.
Enemy aircraft machine-gunned men in the water.
Ivanhoe damaged, Basilisk sunk.
Already, by this time, another destroyer had been put out of action. At
0800 off Dunkirk harbour, the Ivanhoe, with 1,000 troops on board which she had embarked from La Panne, was dive-bombed and hit amidships. Damage was severe and she had 26 killed and 30 wounded. The troops and wounded the were transferred to the Havant, the Speedwell and the yacht Grive; and proceeded to Sheerness. tug While within radius of 1 mile of No. 6 W buoy,
Ivanhoe, assisted by the Persia and escorted by the War Dept. M. L. Haig, 3
waves (each of 21 bombers) attacked the a Ivanhoe and other vessels in that area for half an hour, but the Ivanhoe received no further damage.
and Dunkirk, the Basilisk the also Keith and bombed off La Panne. Three room,
At about the time that Ivanhoe were under attack off attacks Bray were made. In the first was being exploded in No. 3 boiler out of action; six other bombs auxiliary exploded steam underneath lines the ship, causing the upper cutting the main and attack one bomb and putting all machinery deck and the ship's sides to buckle.
Torpedoes and depth charges were jettisoned and at 0845 the ship was floating on an even keel.
An hour later, while efforts were being made by the French trawler Jolie
90

SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
CHAP. IX
Mascotte to tow the Basilisk, the enemy returned to the attack but made no hits. The French trawler slipped the tow and moved off to a safer distance.
At noon bombers returned for a third time, diving to about 400 feet.
Smothered by hits and near misses the Basilisk shuddered and heeled to starboard, righted herself momentarily, but sank in about 3 minutes, settling on the bottom on an even keel in some 4 fathoms. As soon as she was abandoned the Whitehall completed her destruction by gunfire and torpedoes.
The Jolie Mascotte picked up 6 officers and 71 ratings, the Whitehall 2 officers and 52 ratings. Other survivors got away in the motor boat and a whaler.
Second air attack, 0906: sinking of the Havant
Meanwhile the Havant, after transferring 500 troops from the damaged
Ivanhoe, proceeded down Dunkirk Channel. At 0906, at the western end of the channel, she was hit by 2 bombs which entered the starboard side of the engine room killing every one in it. A third bomb dropped 50 yards ahead and exploded as the Havant passed over it. Out of control and listing to port, the ship continued to steam ahead towards the sandbanks opposite Dunkirk. The engine room and No. 2 boiler room were on fire, there was a heavy escape of steam and all auxiliary machinery was out of action, resulting in a failure of the electric supply. It was impossible to enter the engine room, but Chief
Stoker M. Gallon, in spite of the fire, let the steam out of the boilers and the ship was brought up in 4 fathoms by the starboard anchor.
The Saltash and Grive came alongside and the Havant's troops were transferred during almost continuous bombing. The Saltash took the Havant in tow, but further concussion from near misses increased considerably the destroyer's list to port, so the majority of her ship's company were transferred to the skoot Aegir. A bomb fell between the Havant and the Saltash followed by another close to the Havant's port quarter. By 1000 the list had increased and the decks were almost awash. 'Abandon ship" was ordered, the tow was slipped and the remainder of the ship's company were transferred to the Aegir.
At 1015 the Havant rolled over and sank. 1 officer and 7 men were killed,
25 wounded.
Third air attack, 1009. Prague damaged
The enemy air attacks had not been confined to ships off the beaches. At
1009 the personnel vessel Prague, which had embarked about 3000 French troops from Dunkirk harbour, was attacked by dive-bombers between W and V
buoys and suffered severe damage astern from 3 near misses which put the starboard engine out of action.
The majority of the troops were transferred, whilst the ship continued to go ahead on the port engine, to the Scimitar, the minesweeper Halcyon and the paddle minesweeper Queen of Thanet, the later taking on board no less than
1,500 and the Scimitar 376; and at 1331 the tug Lady Brassey took the Prague in tow to the Downs, where the remaining troops were transferred to the trawlers
Olvina and Lady Philomena. The Prague had ended her service in Operation
' Dynamo", for to save her from sinking she was beached off Sandown Castle,
Deal, at 1730 that day. In three trips, she had taken out from Dunkirk over
6,000 men.
Sinking of the Foudroyant
Before the morning was out yet a fourth destroyer, the French Foudroyant, was sunk by air attack. The ship had sailed from England at 0800. She
91

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IX
reached the Dunkirk attack Channel, of at the the day, beginning when she of Route X, about damaged, trawler salvos of Gara; bombs, picked on board and up a the 137 nearby up, motor of the French yacht Foudroyant's Naiad tug. Some Errant crew were and the also a score the the third heavy air blew and sank in 21 minutes. was put French them minesweeping trawler Bernadette. picked up by and the
Brighton Queen and Scotia sunk
The paddle minesweeper last Brighton hour been Queen under arrived at Dunkirk at 1035
sailed for Margate.
more than half an hour on Moroccan troops and which she successfully fought she took board pounder 700 French and Lewis gun. In attack little
1st June, having for the off with 12 continuous enemy air on the
The ship had barely rounded No. 5 buoy, off Mardyck, and entered channel (Route X) when a formation of enemy dive bombers came out of the cloud and peeled off to attack. One bomb, estimated at 200 pounds, exploded a very close on the starboard quarter, causing severe damage and a number of casualties. The ship began to settle at once, took a heavy list, and in five minutes filled and sank on an even keel in about 5 fathoms of water. The crew worked quickly and intelligently in getting life rafts and floating material over the side, and the French troops, despite the language difficulty, behaved steadily and intelligently though nearly half of them were killed by the explosion or drowned. The minesweeper Saltash was quickly alongside, rescued some
400 survivors, and landed them safely at Margate.
The main attack of the enemy formation was directed against the personnel ship Scotia (3,500 tons) which had left Dunkirk carrying 2,000 French troops very shortly after the Brighton Queen, and was now only 2 cables distant on her port bow. The enemy attacked in sections of 4 aircraft, two each with machine guns and bombs of small size. At least 4 of the latter hit the ship, which began to sink by the stern, and the order to abandon her was given.
The Scotia heeled over until her forward funnel and mast were in the water.
The enemy now made another attack on the sinking vessel, dropping 4 more bombs and machine gunning the men swimming and clinging to the wreckage.
By this time, however, the destroyer Esk had come out from Dunkirk and drove off the enemy aircraft when they returned yet again. The destroyer put herself alongside the sinking Scotia and transferred nearly 1,000 of the troops, a fine feat, and the destroyer Worcester and other craft picked up several; but 28 of the Scotia's crew and an estimated 200 to 300 of the French troops were unfortunately lost.
Fourth air attack, 1230. Sinking of the Mosquito
Among the vessels which went to the assistance of the Scotia was the gunboat
Mosquito, though she never reached her.
was attacked miss, 30 The French but Mosquito on was and the able Belgian way arrived to over continue off by Dunkirk a on single her from course. dive bomber the Off Downs and the at was channel,she procetted about she damaged 1230 by she a some near
Scotia was reported to be troops sinking from at the the motor west end boat of towards the scene, followed by the Rapid I.
Almost immediately (about of flight of 20 Ju.87s attacked With her from different directions, 1330) obtaining six or a more direct hit a and a near miss.
92

SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
CHAP. IX
boiler and engine rooms badly holed, the steering gear jammed with the rudder hard over, the ship took a heavy list to port. The crew of the pom-pom were all killed or knocked out except Acting Leading Seaman Ronald Thirlwall, who, although shockingly badly wounded in at least four places, kept the one undamaged barrel firing until ammunition was exhausted. The 0.5" gun aft was also kept in action by Able Seaman C. A. L. Hirschfield, who went aft and brought the gun into action single handed after all the crew were wounded.
With water pouring into the ship, the Mosquito was abandoned, the survivors being picked up by the Rapid and two drifters. Among the killed was the executive officer Lieutenant A. H. Mainwaring, R.N.
Fifth and sixth air attacks, 1500 and 1610
Between 1230 and about 1500 there was a lull in the air attacks on shipping, and when attacks were renewed at the latter hour R.A.F. and Coastal Command patrols were operating and no damage occurred.
About 1600 the French minesweeping trawlers Président Briand, Denis
Papin, Moussaillon and Vénus, were approaching Dunk'rk after landing troops in England, when gunfire from a shore battery opposite 6 W buoy caused the two former, who were ahead, to turn back. Ten minutes later, a formation of
9 enemy aircraft dived cn them, directing their bombs on the Vénus and the
Denis Papin. The latter apparently sank immediately with total loss of her crew, and the Vénus in four minutes, after a direct hit. Whilst the other two trawlers were engaged in rescuing the survivors of the Vénus, the Moussaillon was hit and sank within a minute.
Losses from mines
On this black day mines were also taking their toll of shipping. Enemy aircraft had been mining the inshore channels during the night 31st May-1st
June, and at 0313 Vice-Admiral Dover informed the Admiralty that he was allowing ships evacuating troops to use Route Y as well as Route X. In the early hours the corvette Sheldrake after a night spent in dodging M.T.B.
torpedoes", was skilfully directed by aircraft to a position between the West
Hinder and Kwint buoys, where she found wreckage with men clinging to it.
This was the remains of the trawler St. Achilleus which had been mined on patrol. The Sheldrake rescued 11 men, but 4 of them died before they could be got to harbour. About the same time, i.e. at 0330, the little Thames Estuary cockle bawley boat Renown was blown to pieces with her crew of 3, on the way back from Dunkirk.
The third ship to be sunk on this day was the F.A.A. training yacht Grive a vessel which, on account of her untiring activity, could ill be spared. Having disembarked 374 troops at Dover at 0100 on the 1st June the Grive sailed again two hours later for Dunkirk without waiting to replenish ammunition, of which she had only 5 rounds per gun remaining. On the way in to the harbour she lent assistance to the Ivanhoe after the latter was bombed and damaged, went alongside the jetty and embarked troops under heavy bombing. At 0800 she left again. On the way out, she passed the sinking destroyer Havant with the
Ivanhoe's troops and survivors of the crew on board; these she transferred, and arrived at Dover with 785 persons about 1300. Three hours later, her indefatigable Captain (Capt. the Hon. L. J. O. Lambart, D.S.O., R.N. (Retired)
sailed once more for Dunkirk. But he never arrived, for at about 2230, when a mile or so outside the harbour, the Grive was blown to pieces by a mine.
Nineteen survivors were picked up, but her Captain was not among them.
93

CHAP. IX
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Loadings at Dunkirk during the day
In the space of a
few hours the supply cerned to shipping at at any the as losses time, during of asked the destroyers, whole the of enemy a the type previous had of vessel caused 7 which days. almost was as much damage Noremase and services carrying used of ing personnel attack. 6 only through of power; in no vessels positions In less serious the no than short was other where damage. 15 perhaps view, of vessels they them however, Admiralty equally could could had been manoeuvre the compare serious. to effect lost give to with on The orders the thigh speed under bor them. operation, that possessed Up 9 to by date the sinking great loss the
Dunkirk Nevertheless, through and the despite growing the number increasing of difficulty of threading was throughout day, though not without a series of setbacks. vessels maintained the wrecks, the supply of personnel a way into
The Côte d'Argent, a French mail boat transferred to the orders of
Admiral Dover, disembarked 1,000 troops from Dunkirk harbour on the Vicedisembarked 1,250 troops at Dover in the morning and left again about 0930
June, the King George V 700, the French vessel Rouen 800. The St. Helier. 1st
At 1530 she entered Dunkirk harbour to embark wounded and troops, and was twice hit by shore batteries before sailing for Dover once more at 2230 with
1,334 troops.
The controlling organisation
The organisation which controlled the supply of shipping functioned in a room below Dover Castle, known as the Dynamo Room from the codeword of the Dunkirk operation. In charge was Captain M. M. Denny, R.N. With him there were 20 or more officers, soldiers, naval officers and Board of Trade and Sea Transport officials, and the work they did was marvellous. They were controlling, organizing, fuelling and supplying, not only men-of-war, but a variety of merchant vessels. Sometimes a merchant vessel would need a crew to take her over to Dunkirk again, but within a few hours the Sea the new Transport Officer would get one and the ship would sail. At Ramsgate, collected and various other places besides Dover, ships and boats were where
Nore, and organised, but the head and control of the whole was in this room, they worked continuously and tirelessly against time day and night.¹
for the numerous small craft, working parties, and beach small parties craft were of provided by the Chatham serviced and controlled by N.O.I.C. to assist
Crews Depot. The great majority of the Ramsgate. At
Harwich, which exceptional called there to make a quick turn round their by vessels.
the inshore an flotillas were Naval and Military system was organised relieving the tired those ships' ships companies of the work of cleaning and clearing
NAVAL LOSSES OF THE DAY.
SUNK BY AIR ATTACK.
Destroyers-Basilisk, Havant, Keith, French Foudroyant.
Gunboat Mosquito.
Minesweepers French Minesweeping Brighton Trawlers Queen, Skipjack. Denis Papin, Moussaillon, Vénus.
Personnel vessel Scotia.
Tugs St. Abbs, St. Fagan.
Barges Lady Robinson, Doris.
I Report of R. A. Wake-Walker, M 017978/41, p.27.
94

SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
CHAP. IX
SUNK BY E-BOAT TORPEDOES.
Trawlers Argyllshire, Stella Dorado.
SUNK BY MINES.
Trawler St. Achilleus, small craft Renown.
SUNK BY GUNFIRE.
Drifter Lord Cavan.
SUNK BY COLLISION OR OTHER MISADVENTURE.
Drifters Eileen Emma, Fair Breeze, Gervais Rentoul.
Yachts Amulree, Pellag II.
Barges Aidie, Barbara Jean, Duchess, Ethel Everard, Lark, Royalty.
Small craft, number unknown.
DAMAGED BY AIR ATTACK.
Destroyers Ivanhoe, Worcester.
Minesweepers Ross, Salamander, Westward-Ho.
Corvette Kingfisher.
Personnel vessel Prague.
DAMAGED BY MINE.
Hospital carrier St. David.
DAMAGED BY GUNFIRE.
One trawler, name uncertain.
DAMAGED BY COLLISION OR GROUNDING
Destroyer Vimy.
Personnel vessel Maid of Orleans.
The evacuation figures for the day
Little ships added their quotas to those of the big ships, though not without casualties they suffered heavy losses from collision or other misadventure, although in the circumstances it was not always possible to obtain details
(See App. B.I.)
On this day there were lifted from the beaches and from Dunkirk harbour:
by motor boats and the like 2334 persons, by hopper barges 1470, by tugs 736, by yachts 1,831, by skoots 3,170, of which almost all were from the beaches, by special service vessels 1,250, by drifters 2,968, and by trawlers 1,876 practically all of whom were lifted from Dunkirk harbour. French ships lifted
3,967, Belgian trawlers 402, and a Dutch yacht 114; all troops evacuated by foreign ships were embarked in Dunkirk harbour, none coming from the beaches.
Though losses of ships had been highest this day the total of troops lifted was the second highest of the operation, no less than 64,429 being landed in England.
Of these, 47,081 had been embarked in Dunkirk harbour and 17,348 from the beaches.
95

CHAPTER x
THE NIGHT OF 1ST - 2ND JUNE AND
FROM DAYLIGHT TO DUSK ON 2ND
Situation ashore on evening of 1st (Plan 3)
During the Ist June heavy enemy attacks developed the of the line, and our forces had to give some THE a a the enemy advance had been checked on a thence due east of the frontier and along the frontier sea.
was to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold.
French troops were holding a line in rear of ours, and the British rearguard
Two divisions of French Territorial troops reduced in strength, in addition to part of the British 1st Corps and rearguard of 4,000 men, still remained to be evacuated on the evening of the 1st. The War Office, aware that they were not in a position to judge the local situation, did not set a period to the evacuation but ordered Major-General Alexander to hold on as long as possible in order that the maximum number of French and British might be embarked. It left to the General, in close co-operation with Admiral Abrial, to decide was the moment when evacuation must come to an end.¹
Plan for the night 1st-2nd June (See Plan 4)
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June the only remaining Route x came under the fire of German guns, and it was judged impossible to carry out any further evacuation by day. There was hope both at Dover and at the War Office that it would be possible to complete the evacuation of the B.E.F. during the dark hours of the night 1st/2nd June, by using both sides of Dunkirk harbour, pier and eastern beach. The War Office asked General Weygand to urge Admiral
Abrial to co-operate in completing the evacuation of the French this night.
Evacuation was to be confined to the period between 2100 and 0330. It was estimated that British vessels could lift about 17,000 men, probably in the proportion 50 per cent British and 50 per cent French, during these hours, as follows:-(Appendix R8):-(a) From the beach between Dunkirk and 11 miles to the eastward between 2100/1 and 0300/2, 9,000 men. (b) At the East Pier between 2100/1 and 0330/12, 7,000 men. This time might be extended.
(c) On the east side inside the harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, 1,000 men.
It was intended to withdraw all naval personnel this night3.
All minesweepers, both fleet and paddle, and skoots and all small craft except certain flotillas specially organised, were to lift from the beach stretching eastward 100 1½ miles from Dunkirk, and it was hoped to employ here also about
French small beach fishing craft and drifters. Personnel ships up to 7 in
2 I The Report of Captain W. Tennant, S.N.O. Dunkirk, Record Office Case 5458 Vol. 3, p.357.
written 0330 or from by hand, and the time has been altered by the exceptionally) either typed from 0300 to read originator's copy of this signal is (rather instead of being was intended 0330 to read 0300, though it is not possible typewriter, to with which figure
Admiral to be sent. The time was received at the say certainty at 0330, and Rear
S.N.O. Wake-Walker in his Report, M.017978/41 p.32 Admiralty 0330 intended.
giving details of the plan until 0430/2.
Dunkirk reported, however (Appendix R.24) says that he did was not receive the message
96

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
number and 8 destroyers were to enter Dunkirk harbour and go alongside the
East Pier, where British troops were. Only by using this pier would it be possible to evacuate large numbers, and there was considerable apprehension lest the Germans should shell it heavily and damage it or render it impossible for ships to lie alongside. The pier had already been damaged by the armed boarding vessel King Orry when she secured alongside at 1730 on 29th May with her steering gear out of order and all instruments shattered by air attack, but the gap had been bridged. Drifters and other small craft were to be sent into the inner harbour at Dunkirk, to lift troops from the Quay Félix Faure, in the Tidal Harbour, the North Quay, in the shipyard, and the quay in the new outer harbour.
The French troops assembled on the west side of the harbour, and it was intended that French vessels, including torpedo boats, should serve the West
Quay in the new outer harbour, whilst private small boats used the Quay Félix
Faure.
Assembly of shipping
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June Vice-Admiral Dover recalled all destroyers to harbour and minesweepers of the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th M/S Flotillas were warned for duty only ships having degaussing equipment were to sail.
Five vessels, the Sharpshooter, Albury, Kellett, Ross, and Leda were unable to comply; the compasses of another the Pangbourne, were unreliable, though her D.G. gear was functioning; and in the event, she sailed, led by a Dutch skoot, though she was too late to go to the beaches, and accordingly proceeded along Route Y as far as T buoy, looking for any ships in need of assistance.
The destroyers designated Force K, were to proceed in pairs at hourly intervals to berth at the East Pier in Dunkirk harbour, returning to Dover when loaded.
If there was no vacant berth at the pier when a pair of destroyers arrived, they were to assist at the beach instead. Four pairs were detailed, viz. the
Windsor and Icarus, Codrington and Sabre, Shikari and Esk, Winchelsea and
Whitshed. The Esk, however, which had been running almost continuously since 27th May, was unable to sail and was given 24 hours stand off.
Preparations to assemble the requisite small craft for working off the beach commenced early in the forenoon of 1st June, when a number of Senior Officers were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all stray motor boats in the Downs and along the routes, and direct them back in the evening to the beach 11 miles east of Dunkirk. A flight of 30 motor boats and 34 lifeboats with 3 tugs, the last three large tugs left in London, was sent during the early hours of 1st June from London to Ramsgate where they were prepared for beach work, naval crews being placed in the lifeboats that lacked crews and extra towage provided. Motor boats were also sent from Harwich and Sheerness. A number of flotillas under Commodore A. H. Taylor and Captain the
Hon. G. Frazer were re-organised for the night's effort.
Abandonment of daylight evacuations (Appendix R)
It was decided to abandon daylight evacuation after 1st June, because the scale of enemy air attack experienced on that day, and the fact that the Germans could by now command the newly swept central route at its point of junction with Dunkirk Roads by gunfire from the shore, rendered it too costly.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, when drawing up the plan for the night, intended sailings to cease at 0300 or 0330; and Captain Tennant at Dunkirk, who did not yet know of the plan arranged for the night, independently gave orders,
97

CHAP. x
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
of by the the French B.E.F. troops would also have on been lifted. night, by which time most was consequently would be completed the following in the late afternoon to of sail the during 1st June daylight with and General that Alexander's concurrence that no ships were to cease at 0300 on 2nd. If the
0700 and, evacuation if necessary was then still possible. Only between June until dark to tine any of tontine any of the three also from 1730 on the 2nd was to to tine any of
The Admiralty, channels however, during daylight decided hours, that, should evacuation it be possible light there would be sailings. They intended to be 0700 and 1730
evacuation 2nd was possible no in daylight as late as 0700. the arbiters as to whether on the
Admiral to Ramsay casualties now being caused to all of therne instructions of therne Instructick Vice-
At 2114, an hour informed and a the half Admiralty after the and receipt had owing ordered withdraw before shipping followed been this signal to at 2329 by daylight on the up situation he a knew message to the detail Y the Z shipping under fire as of German it. All three channels to Dunkirk, some maining which daylight route into X, action had that to be suspended on account of a new re-
X, and were now had batteries, for traffic on the last battery Vice-Admiral came evening and was maintaining a enemy heavy barrage¹. Ramsay's information (not altogether correct)
that a total of 16 transports (personnel vessels invaluable in the work of evacua- was tion) were now out of action, 8 being lost and 8 disabled, and that two of the sinkings had been caused by enemy shell fire on Route X. It was now difficult to compel the crews of the remainder to face the conditions which existed.
This had been a day of very heavy naval sinkings coupled with losses of troops from drowning. It is obvious that at some point losses incurred in continuing daylight evacuation would more than counterbalance the gains it seems clear that Vice-Admiral Ramsay considered that this point had now been reached, and, in accordance with the Admiralty's own direction sent to him earlier in the evening, he now informed them that any attempt to continue the evacuation in daylight was unwise and he asked permission to withdraw all his forces at
0300 until the following night. In this, he told the admiralty, Major General
Alexander concurred.
The Admiralty, however, were unwilling that evacuation should cease altogether at daylight and directed that it was to continue up to 0700, but only by destroyers unless further experience showed that enemy gunfire was rendering the channel prohibitively dangerous.
Danger to personnel ships
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that in the difficulty of obtaining accurate reports of conditions on the routes and estimating the true causes of the mounting losses of ships the danger from shell fire was magnified in the minds of those at Dover. By some means enemy the planners had been informed that two personnel ships had already been sunk by shell fire in the fairway near No. 5 buoy. Not only was this but in point of fact no ship of any kind was lost from gunfire the incorrect, routes the 1st June the only sinking by shell fire on that day on during Lord Cavan, depot ship of other S.N.O. Dunkirk hit as she quitted was the the drifter at Dunkirk, whilst the only ship to be hit was the personnel vessel pier St. Helier. This ship arrived at
German
I The War guns." Office 1330/1 reported Only remaining channel now coming under fire of
98

DUSK TO DUSK, IST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
Dunkirk and entered harbour at 1530 on 1st June. Whilst there, she was twice hit by shore batteries, though damage was slight and there was only one and troops and finally proceeded at 2230.
light casualty. The ship lay alongside for 7 hours, embarking stretcher cases
Amongst the various classes of ships none had suffered proportionately heavier losses than the personnel vessels to which Vice-Admiral Dover referred in his message to the Admiralty. Their crews had been doing magnificent work in the face of nerve-racking experiences. Up to date 8 of these ships had been sunk and 4 disabled. It was arranged that during this night's evacuation personnel ships in addition to destroyers were to berth at the East Pier in Dunkirk where they were to be given priority.
The danger of sending these valuable ships in to Dunkirk in daylight was too great, and after the 1st of June they were sent in only under cover of darkness, with a naval Ljeutenant-Commander or Commander on board each ship as adviser to the Master and with crews stiffened by 10 seamen for handling the wires and going alongside under fire. It was hoped by these means not only to get the ships to sail to time but also to ensure that they would enter Dunkirk harbour and not linger outside awaiting a quiet interval, or return empty.
To their credit it must be recorded that not all the personnel ships needed the moral support of naval ratings.
Air Operations, morning of 2nd June
The batteries which had brought Route X under fire were between Le
Clipont, near Pointe de Gravelines (see Plan 3), and Les Huttes, about a mile north east of Gravelines; they were attacked by the R.A.F. in 24 Blenheim sorties between first light and 0745 on the 2nd, the object of spreading the attack in this manner being to neutralise the batteries during the period of daylight evacuation. The Blenheims encountered much anti-aircraft fire, and though no aircraft were lost some were damaged and afterwards crash-landed on their airfields.
The Air Ministry were asked to provide strong continuous patrols over
Dunkirk and the beaches from 0430 to 0830 on the 2nd June, with night fighter patrols during the hours of darkness. It was arranged that the fighter patrols should go out over the routes in use by our ships, and on the return journey fly low on the routes to give maximum protection to ships against low flying bomb and machine gun attacks. The concentration of fighter patrols in the dawn and dusk periods resulted in a great decrease in the total number of flying hours on the 2nd June (See Appendix C.)
The early morning was hazy, and the first two main R.A.F. patrols, both at four squadron strength, encountered no enemy aircraft and no ships reported being attacked during this period. The third patrol, the strongest yet flown, consisting of five full squadrons, which was over the Dunkirk area from 0745-
0845, encountered very considerable enemy forces, and claimed to have shot down 18 enemy bombers and 10 fighters, themselves losing 7 Spitfires. Again, no reports of attacks came from the ships; and as far as can be ascertained no attacks occurred until the Calcutta, patrolling near W buoy with the Mallard and Shearwater, was attacked at 1035 by 3 Ju. 88 which dived out of the sun and bombed her, causing slight damage from near misses. A Coastal patrol witnessed the incident and drove off the enemy. The French light cruiser
Epérvier and destroyer Léopard were also on the patrol line, but they apparently left the patrol when bombing began at 1035 and up to 1442 when the Calcutta returned to Sheerness by orders of Vice-Admiral Dover, nothing more was seen
99

CHAP. X
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
arranged from 801 and 806 Command been of them (Appendix 0830 until J.7). 1100 Air on protection 2nd June, by and Coastal Fighter Command had
Command three aircraft during of Nos. these 206, hours, 235, to cover Route Squadrons X. operated under patrols Coastal of
Fifth column activities (Appendix H27-32)
such "Dynamo", effective fifth use during the war. type time during Operation
On the Ist June column there came activities to notice, of the for the of first empty, the to keep a look out and turn such
Sutton in and company, orders were met sent a out from Dover power to the and small the Dunkirk with thing boats return the boats returning boats returning
At 2150 on the 1st the Minesweeper number of Niger, boats en route to
Apparently the severe minesweepers, conditions it was at in and first from enormous believed the S.N.T.O. at wastage Dover on that the small French boats boats and were Belgian to daunted their coasts; duty. by but a report came about the Ramsgate during the evening that fifth column skoot was going first beaches at Dunkirk giving false informa- a tion and orders to return. The example to come to notice was at 1300
the 1st when the skoot Oranje, off Dunkirk Channel, was informed by another on sufficient ships in Dunkirk Harbour, and that the Oranje's boats were not skoot that evacuation from the beaches was complete, that there were already required. The Oranje remained where she was, however, in case the four boats turned for home about 1515, subsequent to air attack.
she had towed over were needed, and until all ships in her neighbourhood
Although on the night of the 1st-2nd June the services of a number of small craft were lost to the coast, there actually were a sufficient number off the beaches to cope with the troops available.
Embarkation from the beaches
The first ships of the night flight to arrive off the beaches were minesweepers, which began to anchor off Malo about 2000 on 1st. Here there were already some 3 or 4 Thames barges, besides the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen which had arrived some four hours earlier and had been engaged in filling up with troops ever since. The skoot Lena had been there since 1300 on the 1st.
embarking 340 B.E.F. and 6 French troops; she was slightly damaged by air attack during the day, and sailed at 2145 for Ramsgate. By midnight on the
1st-3nd June there were anchored off the beaches the minesweepers Marmion,
Snaefell, Niger, Glen Avon, Emperor of India, Glen Gower and Lydd, besides the personnel ship Portsdown and the special service vessel Royal Eagle. Loading was a slow process, for there were more ships lying off the beaches than could be loaded by the boats available. Only one ship finished in 3 hours, most of them taking nearly twice that length of time.
with 213 troops. She left behind her, abandoned the beach, the R.N.L.I.
The Emperor of India was apparently the first ship to sail from Malo, at 0238, motor lifeboat Mary Scott which had ferried troops on and towed the Emperor of
India's whalers from the shore until she broke down. Queen left shot at troops boat, 0245, down and and after an some nearly enemy details, Il aircraft hours including at on anchor the 10 beach Spanish during west which refugees of Dunkirk. the The rescued ship Medway claimed from She took an to have open 426
down the crews of two motor boats, the whose engines broke unrecorded, like SO many small craft which came to grief in the course of renderafter some hours of ferrying troops and one, towing, Aura, and another, with name
100

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. x valuable service in the operation. The Glen Avon, which sailed a quarter of ing an hour after the Medway Queen, also picked up 24 Spaniards, from the
Dutch S.S. Alphacca; it is not known how they came to be afloat, for the
Alphacca was not sunk until 4 April 1942. The Lydd left at the same time as the Medway Queen, with 200 troops, but defective degaussing then necessitated and Royal Eagle all sailed within half an hour of one another. The last ship putting an end to her service in Operation' Dynamo". The Niger, Snaefell, to leave Malo beach was, by her own account, the Glen Gower at 0320, as day wa breaking, by which time it was low water. Her Captain, Acting Commander
M. A. O. Biddulph, R.N., S.O. 8th M.S.F., reported that the embarkation had been very trying, for the enemy's gunfire during the night had been mainly directed at the beaches, which had been very heavily shelled¹, and the Glen Gower was continually under fire from guns and howitzers on shore from the time she anchored at 2355. "Sight and hearing were almost overwhelmed by the ruddy glow of flames, the flashes of gunfire, the shrieking of shells all around, and the noise of their explosion as they burst". When the
Glen Gower sailed, with 435 troops, she had lost two of the boats (one from shrapnel hits) which she had brought from England to ferry troops from the beach to the ships, whilst a third was left aground.
Of all the minesweepers that left the beach this night only the Snaefell was filled to capacity.
Embarkations at Dunkirk
Although there were more ships than were required off the beaches there was plenty of room at the East Pier, and during the night Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, who had come over from Dover and was afloat in M.A /S.B.10, diverted some of the redundant ships from Malo. He met the minesweeper Sutton at
2121 and sent her to load at the East Pier, where she embarked in about 11/2
hours 725 troops, about a third of whom were French. The Duchess of Fife arrived off Malo at 2310, found no troops and was sent on to Dunkirk Pier where she embarked 550 men. The destroyer Venomous had come over to
Malo with a beach party of 10 officers and 90 men; no boats came off from the shore, and at 0200 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker sent her to Dunkirk, where she took on board 632 troops and sailed for Dover about 0230. The paddle minesweeper Marmion was ordered into Dunkirk Harbour at 0200 on 2nd, after waiting in the roads for four hours, and embarked 225 French troops.
Ships were led into harbour and allocated to their berths by Commander Maund in a motor boat.
French troops, to the number of 285, were also embarked by the trawler
(danlayer) Strathelliot alongside the inner jetty amongst them was General
Nicolle and his staff. The Strathelliot grounded outside the harbour on sailing at 0130 but got off undamaged, by her own efforts. Another small ship to get away early with French troops only on board was the skoot Reiger which left the jetty in the Nouvel Avant Port at 2215 on 1st after lifting 330 men in 45
minutes.
The first pair of destroyers to berth alongside the East Pier were the Codrington at 2300 and the Sabre a quarter of an hour later. The former embarked
878 troops, the latter 756 both ships taking only 45 minutes. The Icarus which left Dover with the Windsor, also berthed at 2300 and took on board
677 troops. On the way home, she was in collision with a trawler in Dunkirk
Channel, and her further service in Operation "Dynamo" was cancelled.
I Report of R. A. Wake-Walker, M.017978/41, p.31.
101

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. X
The Windsor did some quick turns round. From the present night's work she returned to Dover with 493 troops, sailed again for Dunkirk and lifted a further was out, she was once more alongside Dunkirk East Pier embarking troops,
624 men which she disembarked at Dover, leaving about 1900. Before the day and she sailed at 0100 on 3rd June, loaded with 1,022 men.
As the Esk was unable to sail owing to exhaustion of her crew the Shikari proceeded alone. She berthed at Dunkirk at 0125 and left again at 0200 with
470 troops. When the first vessel of the last pair of destroyers, the Whitshed and Winchelsea, arrived at Dunkirk the East Pier was bare of troops; but by using a loud hailer and making a search a total of 512 were collected. The
Winchelsea disembarked 1,100 men at Dover.
On this night personnel vessels were not much in evidence at Dunkirk. The
Côte Argent disembarked 1,250 troops in England on 2nd June, the Newhaven
716 at Dover at 1030. The Royal Daffodil, after bring turned back earlier in the day by a French destroyer, left Margate again at 2200 on the 1st and was back at 0600 on the 2nd with 1,500 troops. The Manxman did not arrive at
Dunkirk until 0506 on the 2nd, long after daylight; she brought back 177 troops and disembarked them at Dover at 1043. The only other considerable lift from Dunkirk pier by a British ship on this night was by the 220 ton coaster
Seine, which arrived at Dunkirk about 2000 and, after an air attack lasting about an hour, went alongside the pier and embarked 250 troops. After landing these at Ramsgate the crew, who had worked continuously for four days and nights, had their first night's sleep.
In addition to the large ships, tugs, skoots, drifters and all manner of small craft evacuated troops on this night. Some lay off and were loaded by smaller boats ferrying troops out to them, others went up harbour, past the large ship berths. Over 4,000 men were brought to England on the 2nd June in this way. Of these the skoot Hondsrug took 421 French and the skoot Reiger
330 French.
French embarkations
During the early part of the night 1st-2nd June French troops embarked as arranged at the West Pier, though none of the French torpedo boats which it was intended to employ disembarked troops in England.¹ Looking shoreward from the sea, the characteristic helmets of the endless line of French troops on the West Pier showed up against the glare of fires inland. The town and harbour lay under a pall of smoke. The minesweeping trawler Chasse-Marée lifted from the harbour 391 troops, the patrol vessel Reine des Flots 350, the cargo ship Cap Antifer 291, and trawlers and motor fishing vessels a further
548; all these were landed in England.
June. Four Belgian trawlers brought over 313 troops from Dunkirk on the 2nd
British Naval base party embarks, 0245/2
the The shore end of the East Pier at Dunkirk, to embark the base party as arranged.
At 0200 on the 2nd Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in M.A/S.B.10 went up to party arrived and the M. A/S.B. sailed at 0245.
had been haze which had prevented some ships from arriving the morning was
By this time it was beginning to get light, and although at one time there
T.B's. on this night alongside the West quay.
I Rear-Admiral loaded Wake-Walker in his Report M.017978/41 p.32 says, however, French
102

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
very clear and the Rear-Admiral decided to get the ships away at 0300
now of 0330 as originally planned. The Admiralty orders that evacuation
Dunkirk Pier was to continue until 0700 did not apparently Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker not receive the orders which went by Dunkirk (Appendix did R.20, 23); and it is to be preout from the Admiralty at 0115/2, that destroyers were to continue the evacuation until 0700 (Appendix R.21). Although men were still coming down the the Rear-Admiral was unwilling to run the risk of having ships sunk alongside pier, and blocking the pier and harbour. Accordingly he told the ships to leave and himself followed out of harbour the last of them, apparently the destroyers Winchelsea and Whitshed about 0300.
British rearguard held up
Meanwhile, a most disquieting message had been received at Dover. At
0040 on the 2nd the Lydd, while embarking troops off Malo beach, was requested by the Brigadier of the brigade then embarking to transmit to Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker a message from Major General Alexander reporting that on account of French congestion on the mole at Dunkirk a considerable number of British troops were held up and further arrivals were still expected. It was essential that the rearguard of the B.E.F. should embark from the beaches east of the mole, where they were expected to arrive by 0230.
What had happened was, that French troops had cut into the flow of British making their way along the road to the East Pier, by a converging route; and both
British and French troops were now being embarked at the pier.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker apparently never received the message and knew nothing of the state of affairs at the East Pier until he arrived there at
0200.
Vice-Admiral Dover, who received the message at 02001, at once sent orders to all destroyers of Force K still on the coast, the minesweepers, and the gunboat Locust which was off Bray supporting the evacuation by covering fire, to endeavour to embark the British rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300
if necessary. The coding and transmission of the message took some time, and the orders apparently went out too late; all ships had sailed, and the rearguard could not get away that night. Only the personnel vessel Portsdown was left on the coast. This was an undegaussed ship manned by a naval crew, which had anchored off Malo at 2205/1. After running to death her own two dinghies ferrying troops she got hold of a large motor boat, and she sailed about 0400. On the way home the ship collected further troops from a French vessel aground off Dunkirk, and from two further vessels encountered, and she eventually disembarked at Dover 168 British and 450 French.
Bombing of the hospital ships Worthing and Paris. (App. S)
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk because no hospital ships had sailed for 24 hours, orders having been given to evacuate fit men in preference, since, other considerations apart, embarking wounded would have taken up too much valuable time. The cessation of daylight sailings rendered it possible for hospital ships to occupy berths alongside, without detriment to the operation, and jt was decided to get some of the wounded away in daytime in hospital ships, in the hope that the Germans would respect them.
In order to afford the enemy no excuse to attack a warning signal was sent
0120. I Dover Report, p.27. The time of receipt on the flimsy of the decypher appears to be
103

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. X
clearly marked as hospital ships. Neither of the two ever reached Dunkirk.
were despatched from Dover, the Worthing at 1255 and the Paris at 1648, both we should scrupulously observe the Two hospital carriers part en clair asking for hospital ships to be Geneva sent across Convention. and stating that for our
At 1433 the A/S trawler Grimsby Town, on patrol on Route X, reported that had bombed a hospital ship. This was Worthing. Visibility was good.
12 aircraft bearing 90° South Foreland 27 the miles (between V and W buoys)
Nine bombs were dropped and the the Calcutta ship was sent machine the gunned, she was slightly damaged by near misses and corvette Mallard to stand by her. The Worthing returned to harbour.
near W buoy, when two aircraft attacked her, near misses putting out of action
The Paris, after running into thick fog, was in clear visibility at about 1900, her engines and extinguishing all lights. About an hour later the ship was attacked again by 3 aircraft, and received further damage. She was abandoned by all but the Captain and some of the officers, who were shortly afterwards taken off by a fast motor boat which also rescued men from some of the Paris's lifeboats that had been wrecked by bombing. Three tugs, the Sun XV, Sun IV
and Lady Brassey attempted to tow the ship; but at 0400 on 3rd June, after a further air attack, the Paris sank 1 mile east of W. buoy.
Evacuation figures, 2nd June
A total of 26,256 men were landed in England on 2nd June, 19,561 from
Dunkirk harbour and 6,695 from the beaches. Of these totals, French ships working only from the harbour carried 1634, and Belgian trawlers carried 313.
The accumulated total of men evacuated to this date was 285,305.
104

CHAPTER XI
THE NIGHT 2ND 3RD JUNE
B.E.F. EVACUATED 2330/2
Plan for the night 2nd-3rd June
During the forenoon of the 2nd June considerable doubt existed at Dover to the numbers remaining to be evacuated from Dunkirk. Captain Tennant thought as that about 5,000 British and 30,000 French remained, but it was estimated at Dover, that in addition to the rearguard of 4,000, (who had been withdrawn according to plan, from the front line), a further 2,000 British troops might be found in Dunkirk; while the estimated number of French troops remaining increased during the forenoon from 25,000 quoted on the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000. Admiral Nord himself estimated the French remaining to number 65,000 of which he hoped that 30,000 might be evacuated on the night 2nd-3rd and the remaining 35,000, who were holding the bridgeheads, on the following night.
Major-General Alexander intended that all British troops should be evacuated by 2400 on 2nd, and Captain Tennant asked for the maximum number of transports to be sent over. During the forenoon of the 2nd a joint
Naval and Military conference was held at Dover, attended by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker who came over from Dunkirk in the early hours, and by Commander J. C. Clouston, Pier Master at the East Pier, to devise a plan to accomplish this. The French Admiralty wished daylight evacuation to be resumed, but Vice-Admiral Ramsay refused to countenance it. The suspension of traffic in daylight hours had the advantage of enabling all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent"
upon Dunkirk harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and control of traffic in the harbour channels by motor boats, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100 on 2nd and 0300 on 3rd.
At 1052 Vice-Admiral Dover made a signal to the destroyers and minesweepers, which practically amounted to a call for volunteers for the night's work (Appendix T.3):-
"The final evacuation is staged for tonight, and the Nation looks to the Navy to see this through.
I want every ship to report as soon as possible whether she is fit to meet the call which has been made on our courage and endurance".
The replies showed that there was no lack of willing spirit. Ships were fit and ready", ready and anxious to carry out your orders", ship unfit but
...
officers and ship's company are willing to serve in any capacity: so the replies came in. Only the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen, which had returned to Ramsgate three hours earlier on her fifth evacuation trip, was unable to sail owing to the exhaustion of her crew, and was sent on to Dover where additional officers and crew were lent from the Sandown, which, like the destroyer Javelin, was not degaussed and was consequently forbidden to sail.
It was hoped to avoid on this night the situation which occurred on the previous night, when more ships could have used the pier had they been available, by working out a programme whereby personnel ships, destroyers, fleet
105

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XI
minesweepers different berths SO that three or four ships should be alongside the East and paddle minesweepers were to come in at intervals of half an hour to Five inside berths were established, three large, A. B, smaller, Pier C at continuously. the D outer and end E, at of the the inner pier end for destroyers for minesweepers, and personnel all of which vessels, were and to and two be kept constantly filled. If all inside berths were occupied a berth might be used on the east side of the pier, though this would not normally be filled.
A pier master (Commander E. R. Lewis, R.N. (Retd.) was to direct the berthing, and ships were to be guided to their berths by motor boat, two of which were sent over in the afternoon. However, one of the two motor boats was sunk by air attack on the way across with Commander Clouston, and the other disabled. (See p.110).
Special brows and ladders were prepared at Dover, for even at high water the decks of all but the larger personnel ships were below the level of the footway of the pier; and ships were told to have boxes ready to form steps.
Thirteen destroyers were detailed to sail to arrive at Dunkirk at intervals of half an hour from 2100. Groups of minesweepers were to sail at intervals of an hour and a half from Margate, Sheerness, Dover, and Harwich respectively, commencing with the Margate contingent at 2100, and ships in each group were to stagger their time of arrival at Dunkirk.
In addition to the large ships, tugs, scoots, drifters and various small craft were to go over for the night's work, some to lie off and be loaded by smaller boats, and others to go right up the harbour, past the larger ships' berths.
Demolitions at Dunkirk (Operation X.D.(E)) (See Plan 4)
Now that the operation was drawing to a close it was time to carry out demolitions in the port. The Royal Naval demolition party, which arrived at
Dunkirk on the 23rd May, had carried out the placing of demolition charges at the New Lock, the Trystram Lock, and the Guillain Lock in Dunkirk harbour, demolition of which had been agreed upon at an Anglo-French conference as a British responsibility. The French undertook to destroy Le Main Lock and all the pumping stations and the bridges over the locks and canals.
On the 2nd June Admiral Abrial decided to carry out the following modified programme of demolitions:-
New Lock-gates and bridge to be demolished;
Trystram Lock-the two gates at the outer and inner ends to be demolished
Guillian Lock-the two northern gates to be demolished.
All bridges had to be left intact as large numbers of French troops were still withdrawing across them.
By now, however, two of the charges which were not under water and four primers had been exploded by bomb or shell fire they had been replaced and re-fuzed, but supplies of demolition stores were running short.
Demolitions were completed by 1400 on the 2nd June, except one depth charge at Guillain Lock which misfired. A second charge which was placed and primed also misfired and there remained now no further primers or fuzes.
Situation ashore the afternoon of the 2nd the S.N.O. Dunkirk hoped to get the troops away that
Although during the forenoon the military position had seemed critical, on night. of The French were still maintaining the front line except for an area east
Bergues where the Germans had penetrated to a depth of two miles, to
106

THE NIGHT 2ND-3RD JUNE
CHAP. XI
Teteghem, the event this was postponed 2000 and when it took place some on a front of two miles. The until French intended to counter-attack at
There was no movement in the port. Later Admiral was in the hands of the enemy, but they had not advanced beyond. Further attacks were expected by the French this day, when the situation regarding munitions might become critical.
Sailing of the night flight from England
The movement from England towards Dunkirk commenced at 1700. The armada consisted of 13 personnel vessels, 2 large store carriers, 11 destroyers,
5 paddle minesweepers, 9 fleet sweepers, 1 special service vessel, 9 drifters,
6 skoots, 2 armed yachts, 1 gunboat, a large number of tugs, lifeboats, etc., formed either in organised tows or proceeding individually. For various reasons, however, not all of these ships evacuated troops.¹
The composition of the French contingent was not known at Dover. Actually,
3 French torpedo boats, two minesweeping trawlers, two patrol vessels, and
17 trawlers and motor fishing vessels landed troops in England on the 3rd June.
One Belgian patrol boat and 16 or 17 trawlers brought troops.
B.E.F. evacuated, 2330/2
The first destroyers to reach Dunkirk were the Sabre and Shikari, which sailed together from Dover at 1845. As the latter ship rounded No. 6 W buoy enemy shore batteries opened fire, but caused no damage. Berthing was carried out by an officer with a loud speaker at the pier head. Both destroyers sailed again at 2200, the Sabre with 500 and the Shikari with 700 troops. The
Venomous, which arrived at 2150, had difficulty in going alongside the East Pier.
This was not a solid jetty, but was built of concrete piles through which the west-going tide set. This, coupled with a fresh easterly wind, made it very
I The following ships (other than those on patrol which picked up survivors and landed them) landed troops in England on 3rd June, (numbers in brackets):-
BRITISH Destroyers - Codrington (44), Esk (500), Sabre (500), Shikari (700), Vanquisher (37),
Venomous (1500), Whitshed (82), Winchelsea (152), Windsor (1022);
Gunboat Locust (800)
Minesweepers - Albury (200), Duchess of Fife (300), Dundalk (399), Gossamer (490),
Halcyon (416), Kellett (364), Marmion (198), Medway Queen (481), Niger (430),
Oriole (750), Pangbourne (47), Speedwell (300), Westward-Ho (48);
Special Service Ship Golden Eagle (1);
Drifters - Forecast (108), Golden Sunbeam (163), Lord Howard (100), Midas (43),
Netsukis (119), Starlight Rays (319), Ut Prosim (49), Yorkshire Lass (103)
Trawler Cayton Wyke (300);
Skoot Doggersbank (50);
Yacht Sargasso (252);
Personnel ships - Côte d'Argent (955), King George V (1460), Newhaven (396),
Lady of Mann (18), Rouen (1286), Royal Sovereign (1500), St. Helier (2000),
Tynwald (1200) H.M.S. Nelson's M.B. (27)
Tugs - St. Olaves (200), Sun X (211), Sun XI (188), War Dept. M.Ls. (69)
Sailing barge Glenway (213)
R.N.L.I. Lifeboats Cecil & Lilian Philpot (51), Michael Stephens (52):
3 motor boats and launches (300).
FRENCH Torpedo boats - Bouclier (340), La Flore (410);
Destroyer Léopard (19);
S/M Chaser 6 (50, apparently disembarked at Havre);
M/S trawlers - Ste. Bernadette de Lourdes (79), Ste. Denise Louise (78);
Patrol vessels - Lucien Gougy (78), Reine des Flots (500);
17 trawlers and M.F.V's. (1663).
BELGIAN Patrol boat A.5 (229);
17 trawlers (1583).
107

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XI
difficult for ships to get alongside until the tide turned, about 2300. Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker, who was afloat in M.A/S.B. 10 used the latter to harbour was now filled with numbers of small French craft of every sort, size the Venomous in and tried to get other small craft to do likewise. The narrow push and description. At this moment a defect Venomous developed in the M.A /S.B's clutch, apparently her from going as the astern result and of down pushing made on turning her the from a most both alongside, directions. hazardous which adventure prevented with boats of all sorts bearing The was away again in half an hour, with 1,500
Alexander and his staff who had been taken on
Admiral Wake-Walker and transferred to the had difficulty in getting alongside but managed to clear the harbour with 1,022
troops, one minute before the next destroyer was due to enter. The stream of
British troops was evidently diminishing in volume now, for the Winchelsea, which arrived at the pier at 2300, embarked only 152. The gunboat Locust, however, which sailed two minutes later, carried 800 troops, a proportion of whom were French.
Eight drifters disembarked 1,004 men in England, the Starlight Rays bringing
319 of these. The yacht Sargasso brought 252. Only two personnel vessels lifted British troops from the East Pier; the King George V embarked 1,460
in 27 minutes and sailed at 2225 and the St. Helier embarked 2,000 and sailed at 2330 for England.
This completed the evacuation of the British rearguard.
At 2330 Captain Tennant made the welcome signal "B.E.F. evacuated."
He embarked in M.T.B. 102, together with the demolition party and left for
Dover.
A pause in the embarkation
After the last of the B.E.F. were clear there was a long pause. French troops should have followed the British rearguard on the East Pier, but they did not appear. The West Quay, however, was crowded with French in their distinctive helmets, though there seemed a scarcity of ships on that side of the harbour. The personnel ship Royal Sovereign, which had been joined that afternoon by Commander L.P. Skipwith as adviser to the Master, Captain T.
Aldis, went alongside the West Quay at 2130, handled magnificently, turning and going alongside bows out", as Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker reported. She embarked 1,500 French troops and sailed at 2205 for Margate. The Rear-
Admiral also sent the personnel ship Rouen, a French cross-channel steamer, to the West Quay. In getting away she got broadside on to the wind and grounded just to the westward of the quay, where she lay, on a falling tide, showing up clearly against an oil fuel fire behind her. A tug was sent to help her but drew too much water and could not get near. However, the ship remained unhit throughout the shelling, and she floated off with the next tide in daylight and reached England safely with 1,286 men.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was unable to discover the reason for the cessation of the flow of French troops to the East Pier; it was apparently caused make a counter-attack, for the counter-attack which was to have been made by the necessity either of repelling a German attack or holding them up to at 1500 to restore the line east of Bergues was postponed until 2000. With destroyers waiting to be filled the situation was most exasperating. Five destroyers had to be sent back to England for lack of to fill them. The she Vanquisher was ordered to return to Dover to 0230, taking troops only 37 troops which embarked from a small boat while lying off the harbour. The Codrington
108

THE NIGHT 2ND-3RD JUNE
CHAP. XI
also stopped off the harbour by entered orders at the 0050 harbour and had only 44 troops when she devoid of troops and was by Whitshed found Wake-Walker to return to was sailed at 0250. The Express ordered Rear-Admiral at 0200, found the pier sailed at 0245 with 82 men collected small craft. Finally, the Malcolm and Dover lay outside with orders to hail from stop other ships from entering. She with the Codrington. The and no berth on arrival at 0030
was ordered back at 0248, empty. Thus five destroyer trips were wasted.
Only the minesweepers which berthed at the inner end of the East Pier after the British rearguard had embarked, managed to collect normal quotas from the trickle of French troops.
Dunkirk was the headquarters of a French Naval Command and there was always a considerable number of French marines in evidence. But after the
British naval ratings left at 2300 there was difficulty in getting ships berthed, as the French did not replace them.
The Albury embarked 200 French troops, the Duchess of Fife 300, the Dundalk
399, the Gossamer 490, the Halcyon 416, the Kellett 350 French and 14 British, the Marmion 198, the Medway Queen 481, and the Speedwell 300. The Niger slipped at 0120 with 430 French troops. While turning an unknown French craft crossed her bows and was rammed, though apparently no damage was done to her. A few minutes later the Frenchman returned and rammed the
Niger.
Personnel ships did well. The Royal Sovereign sailed at 2205 with 1500
troops, the King George V at 2225 with 1460, the St. Helier at 2330 with 2,000.
The Côte Argent took 955 men, the Newhaven 396 French, the Tynwald 1,200, the Rouen 1,286; but the Lady of Mann was ordered back for lack of troops and took only 18 French embarked from a small boat.
Amongst the French ships the torpedo-boat Bouclier embarked 340 men and the La Flore 410. The patrol vessel Reine des Flots embarked 500 troops during a violent bombardment" and also reported air attacks (from German strays returning no doubt), en route to England, for which she sailed from
Dunkirk at 2300 on the 2nd. Seventeen French trawlers and motor fishing vessels brought off 1,662 troops and a Belgian patrol boat 229.
Summary of troops evacuated, night 2nd-3rd June
To Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, who had worked out a programme by which 37,000 men could have been lifted, in addition to those that would get off in small craft, this had been a most disappointing night's work, owing to the long pause when the flow of men to the East Pier ceased for some hours after the British rearguard completed its embarkation, and the difficulty of getting ships berthed owing to the failure of the French to replace the British naval parties after these left Dunkirk. Between midnight on 2nd-3rd and
0300 on the 3rd a lifting capacity of about 10,000 men was left empty.
There were disembarked in England on 3rd June 26,700 troops. Of these,
British ships lifted 21,671, French ships 3,216 and Belgian ships 1,812. The great majority of these, namely 24,830, were embarked in Dunkirk harbour, principally by ships berthed alongside, though a few were ferried to ships waiting outside the port. Most of the remainder were taken out of small craft by ships which were likely to reach England with greater expedition and certainty many of these found in small craft had no doubt come off from the beaches.
109

CHAP. XI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
79, Of these 808 and 211,137 casualties were 1,129. Allied fit numbered 305,078.
At noon on the 3rd June British the fit total and of 13,004 troops casualties. evacuated had reached
Naval losses 2nd June harbour at from motor boat sunk off Malo, and by enemy action,
The brightest Dunkirk feature had been of the carried night out was without that embarkation disturbance in the and apart one losses off by enemy act from small craft from collision or other misadventure, sinkings were confined to
In marked contradistinction attack the from 2nd. the heavy This losses of the 1st June only ship was sunk from by air Calshot R.A.F. on station, which was the fast motor boat Seaplane one at 1500 with Commander from J. C. the Clouston, situation R.N., pier master of the mole,
Tender 243, sailed from Dover for Dunkirk was returning discussing with the staff at Dover, and a who embarkation that the party; boats should she was be in used company with S.T. 276, the intention naval being
Walker during the night's work. At 1855, about 6 miles from Gravelines, 4
two as runners" for Rear-Admiral Wakeenemy aircraft attacked S.T. 243, which received severe damage from a miss and was abandoned in a sinking condition. Commander Clouston ordered near
S.T. 276 to proceed as the enemy aircraft were still continuing to attack, and she subsequently arrived at Dunkirk though too badly damaged to be of service.
rating from S.T. 243 were picked up and saved.
Commander Clouston was seen later, drowned, and only one officer and one
The transport Royal Daffodil nearing Dunkirk from England was attacked all movable gear to port and filling boats with water she was listed to bring by aircraft about an hour after S.T. 243. The ship was holed but by shifting the damage above water. The engineers, J. W. Coulthard and W. L. Evans kept the motors running although the water had risen in the engine room, and the ship returned to Margate under her own steam. Another personnel ship, the Ben-My-Chree, was in collision on the evening of the 2nd shortly after leaving Folkestone for Dunkirk, and took no further part in the operation.
Two further ships were sunk by mines on Route Y on the 2nd June, although it was at first thought they had been torpedoed. At about 1600 the trawlers
Blackburn Rovers and Westella were on patrol near T buoy, when the former blew up on a mine and sank instantly. As the Westella closed the position, explosions from the Blackburn Rovers' depth charges lifted the ship out of the water and put her asdic installation and pumps out of action. About 40
minutes later the Westella was herself blown up by a mine between S and T
buoys, and commenced to sink. Her depth charges were set to 'safe', and the trawlers Saon and Grimsby Town sank her and picked up her survivors and those of the Blackburn Rovers, some badly injured. (Appendix J.9, J.10).
Two other trawlers met with misadventure on the 2nd, but neither was sunk.
Details are lacking but it is known that the Spurs and another trawler, probably either the Kingston Alalite or Kingston Olivine, were both damaged by gunfire.
The Spurs was on the patrol line, and it is not known how she came close enough to the coast to be damaged by shore gunfire. Gunfire also sank the
Gallant's motor boat off Malo at 0210.
known. These were the Getuigt Vor Christus, the O.L.V. van Vlaandaren,
Three Belgian trawlers were lost on th 2nd June, though no details are and the Sunny Isle.
Air co-operation, night 2nd-3rd June
The R.A.F. flew a patrol over the approaches to Dunkirk from about 2010
110

THE NIGHT 2ND-3RD JUNE
CHAP. XI
to were seen and no ships Dunkirk of No. 604
2120 on the 2nd June, to clear reported the air being for the attacked. night's work. Blenheims No enemy aircraft Squadron then continued to patrol singly over throughout the night.
reported, and R.A.F. fighters intercepted successfully 3rd on three.
Only on three occasions during the 2nd June were enemy all aircraft formations evacuation effort. Eighteen Blenheims a level (1,000-3,000
series of attacks on the batteries near bombed Gravelines, from low to coincide with the
During the early morning hours of Pointe the de June the R.A.F. carried out a feet), but were unable to observe results.
By night, the policy was continued of directing a small proportion of our effort to targets near the battlefront and the main weight against Germany;
and air in conformity with this policy twelve Wellingtons attacked Bergues.
Blocking of Dunkirk Inner Harbour (Operation C.K.) (See Plan 4 and
Appendix Z)
The blocking of the inner harbour at Dunkirk was under the command of
Captain E. Dangerfield, R.N., and was carried out on two successive nights.
The operation was first timed to be carried out on the night 1st-2nd June, but at 1808 on the 31st the Admiralty ordered its postponement.
On each night three blockships, escorted by a destroyer, an MA/S.B. and an
M.T.B., were employed. The blockships assembled in the Downs, and (as usual) they were such crocks that one, the French built Emerald Wings (Government Yard, Cherbourg, 1920) broke down soon after leaving Portsmouth for the Downs and had to be towed back to harbour; a second could not keep up with the convoy; and a third, the Moyle, developed defects which, however, by dint of working on her all night, were remedied in time.
The ships finally employed on the night 2nd-3rd June were as follows:-
Vivacious (destroyer)
M.A/S.B. 7
M.T.B. 107
Blockships Westcove 2734 tons, built 1912
Edvard Nissen 2062 tons, built 1921.
Holland Dutch M.V. 895 tons, built 1923.
Early on the 2nd of June Admiral Nord asked that the blockships might be sent over to arrive at the entrance to Dunkirk harbour at 0300 on the 3rd, the latest hour at which they could enter on that night, by which time it was hoped the evacuation would have been completed. During the afternoon of the 2nd however, the Admiralty received a message from the Admiral postponing the operation because the evacuation would not be completed that night. However, the Admiralty still hoped to complete the evacuation and ordered the blockships to sail.
At 2030 on the 2nd the Vivacious, with Captain Dangerfield on board and with M.T.B. 107 in tow and M.A/S.B. 7 in company, sailed from the Downs, leading the three blockships, and proceeded to Dunkirk by Route Z. The
Holland, unable to maintain the 71 knots speed of the convoy, was soon lost to sight astern. Nearing Dunkirk a tug (either the Sun X, Sun XI or Foremost
87), towing a very long line of boats, crossed her bows and still further delayed her, but she eventually made contact with M.A/S.B. 7 and asked to be led into the harbour. The other two blockships had anchored at 0230, and a
1 This is her correct name
111

CHAP. XI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
quarter of an hour later they all three proceeded, with the Holland last in the line, to carry out their part in blocking the port. As they neared Dunkirk a
"long line of destroyers came out of the harbour. " Astern of them", stated the Holland, there was a gap of over a mile and then a large and fast transport". M.A/S.B. 7 led the Holland through the gap between the destroyer line and the transport. When the latter was 6 cables away, and steaming very fast with the first streaks of dawn behind her, the danger of collision became apparent, SO the Holland sounded one blast and put her wheel hard astarboard.
Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Coats, R.N., captain of the blockship, reported that the transport had then only to alter course 5° to starboard to pass well clear. However, she appeared to alter to port", with the result that she struck the Holland hard on the bridge and just before the boiler room bulkhead. The transport, which did not appear to have sustained much damage, backed out and carried on her way. The Holland had no buoyancy in hand, and, a few seconds before she was struck, her captain ordered abandon ship", seeing that it was inevitable she would be rammed. The bows sunk at once and rested on the bottom, there being apparently only 8 feet of water under her keel;
the stern remained above water. Two seamen were crushed and seriously injured in the collision. M.A/S.B.7 took off the crew and transferred them to the Vivacious. The wreck of the Holland came within an ace of being rammed a second time, for two more ships, reported to be destroyers, passed and missed the Holland's stern by no more than a few feet.
At 0300 the blockship Westcove entered Dunkirk, followed ten minutes later by the Edvard Nissen. Both ships proceeded into the channel leading to the inner harbour. When in her allotted position the Westcove put her wheel hard astarboard to ram the Inner Western Jetty, but her bows struck mud about
50 feet from the pier, with the ship at an angle of about 30° across the channel.
By going full speed ahead on the engines, the athwartship's angle was increased to 50°.
As the Edvard Nissen came in with the intention of ramming the East Pier she endeavoured to strike the Westcove's stern a glancing blow in order to increase her angle to the channel before scuttling herself; but underestimating the strength of the ebb stream she passed close under the Westcove's stern, and rammed the East Pier abreast of the latter. Letting go an anchor, she applied full port helm with all engine power to increase the blocking angle. The
Westcove now fired her scuttling charges, which probably owing to coal gas in the bunkers, caused a large column of flame and smoke to envelop the ship's stern. When this had dissipated, the crew, who had pulled clear in their boat, saw that the Westcove had slid off the sloping bank of the channel and was lying on an even keel in the line of the piers, almost in mid stream, thus causing a minimum of obstruction. Between the sterns of the two ships there was now a gap of 80 feet which was reduced to 50 feet by heaving on a hawser run by the Edvard Nissen's motor boat from the ship's stern to the Westcove. No more could be done and the Edvard Nissen abandoned ship and fired her scuttling charges from the boat. M.A/S.B. 7 took out both ship's crews to the Vivacious.
1 No transport reported being in collision at this time and it has not been possible to identify any of the vessels concerned. The following destroyers and transports sailed from
Dunkirk at the times given destroyers - Vanquisher 0230, Whitshed 2045, Malcolm 0248,
Codrington 0250 and Express 0250; transports Newhaven (French 1,888 tons) 0245,
Tynwald (British 2,376 tons) 0300, Rouen (French, 1,882 tons time not known but ship was in Dunkirk in the early hours of 3rd June), and Côte Argent (French 3,047 tons, time not known but ship landed troops at Dover on 3rd June.)
112

CHAPTER XII
THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD - - 4TH JUNE
Decision to terminate evacuation after night 3rd-4th June (Appendix V)
After the last ship quitted Dunkirk at daylight on 3rd June a large number of French troops still remained behind, and it was decided at Dover that the evacuation must continue.
There was no certainty that the coming night would see the end of the operation. Admiral Nord stated in a situation report timed 0403 June 3rd, that as enemy attacks were probable during the day the situation concerning munitions might become critical; but the message was much mutilated, and the possibility that exhaustion of ammunition might prevent the continuance of resistance after the night 3rd-4th June was apparently not taken into account at Dover.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, who had no reliable information of the number of
French troops still to be evacuated but was aware that the figure was considerable and conscious that it was his duty to our Allies to continue evacuation as long as any French troops offered themselves for embarkation, was faced with a situation with which the forces remaining at his disposal might, with the best will in the world, be unable to cope.
The operation which had been in progress for the past nine days was of a nature unprecedented in naval warfare, and imposed on the crews of ships engaged an unprecedented strain. Officers and men had not only to cope with the ordinary hazards of the war-such as bombing on an unparalleled scale, frequent shelling, constant working in mined waters, and rescue work under most unpleasant conditions-but were also exposed to the exhaustion produced through having their mess decks and every other available space in their ships constantly crowded with troops. This precluded rest for the watch below, the preparation and enjoyment of proper meals, and such meagre amenities as a small ship operating in face of the enemy could offer. Stokers suffered equally with the seamen because, owing to the physical exhaustion of boats' crews after hours of work, relief crews of stokers were frequently provided from amongst the many who volunteered.
Even as early as the 28th May the strain was beginning to tell. Lieutenant
P. F. S. Gould, R.N. of M.T.B. 16, working off Bray Beach, reported: "Comparatively fresh appearance of troops.
contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed with the evidence of strain shown by ship's companies of H.M.
ships"¹. Exhaustion was particularly marked in the destroyer force, the remnants of which had been executing a series of round trips without intermission for several days. Some of the ships had been working off the coasts of France and the Low Countries for the two weeks preceding the beginning of Operation "Dynamo", engaged on various duties such as evacuating refugees and giving supporting fire to the army and evacuating Boulogne, work which had imposed an intense strain and resulted in heavy losses of ships and men. Vice-Admiral Ramsay consequently represented to the Admiralty that continuance after the night of 3rd-4th June of the demands made by the evacuation would subject a number of officers and men to a test that might be beyond the limit of human endurance, and he requested that fresh forces should be employed if evacuation continued after the coming night, any consequent delay being accepted.
I M.011883/40, p.38.
E
113

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XI
The Admiralty had already continued (2312/2) for the undertaken evacuation that ships would be night the evacuation 3rd to 4th on June, this and night. they To this the French agreed. complete on the vided and air protection now urged the French of Admiralty trops pro-
Plan for the night embarkation, the hours of 2230/3 and with such ships for
For this last and night the maximum it was decided effort to was cut to down be made, by one hour the time mained available, between to be made by personnel 0230/4. From the as re-
Pier, liftings were to be sent to the entire vessels, destroyers, and East minesweepers; be ships received, were and it was estimated that length of the pier as paddle as they could Drifters and fast thus be provided and for docks 14,000 of men. the inner harbour. small craft were to go would up to the quays be French ships, for which right latter pier the remaining would also lift ships (minesweepers the other than paddle, the beach, the Quai Félix Faure, British Avant Port (West Pier); from numbers could be estimated, were and the to New responsible for evacuation from Malo no boats. Locust was to remain loads ferried out to her by small vettes and skoots) outside and troops, receive to number of 5,000. The gunboat cor-
It was intended to employ on the work a force of 9 personnel vessels, 9
destroyers (all that were available), 4 paddle minesweepers, 7 fleet minesweepers,
9 drifters, the Locust, 2 corvettes, 4 French torpedo boats, and a number of organised motor boats flotillas including lifeboats from Ramsgate and Dover, together with a large number of French and Belgian fishing vessels. Eleven small French ships and 3 small tugs left Cherbourg for Dover on the night
2nd-3rd June; Le Havre was scheduled to send 8 trawlers, 2 minesweepers,
1 tug, and 20 small dinghies; and Fécamp sent 14 trawlers.
During the afternoon of the 3rd the French authorities transmitted the figure of French troops still remaining in Dunkirk. This was about 30,000, a proportion of whom belonged to other than combatant units. The total capacity of the lifting force, if used to the full, was 30,000, but this was about 5,000 more than the facilities within the port would permit of being embarked in 4 hours, even if the French troops moved with the greatest rapidity at all points of embarkation. On previous occasions there had been some instances of difficulty in persuading French troops to embark otherwise than as complete units.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay consequently impressed on the French liaison officers the necessity of speed, and he added a number of French officers and ratings to the augmented pier parties which were despatched to Dunkirk at 2200, in
I The following ships landed troops in England on 4th June (numbers landed in brackets)
British - destroyers Express (611), Malcolm (736), Sabre (592), Shikari (383), Vanquisher
Minesweepers Albury (400), Halcyon (501), Kellett (30), Leda (500), Medway Queen (266), ferred to trawler off Dunkirk on account of collision damage) Gunboat Locust (196)
(414), Venomous (1200), Whitshed (444); Corvettes Guillemot (460), Kingfisher (200, trans-
Princess Elizabeth (329), Queen of Thanet (150), Speedwell (396) Trawler Saturn (418)
Drifters Forecast (123), "L.H.W.D." (90) Skoots Bornrif (96), Hondsrug (308), Pascholl
(255), Ruja (300); Yacht Gulzar (140); Personnel vessels Autocarrier (712), Canterbury
Princess (659), Côte d'Argent (1349), King George V (817), Lady of Mann (1244), Newhaven (729),
(1350), Tynwald (3000); Tugs Racia (123), Sun XV (37) War Dept. M.Ls.
Maud (1270), Royal Sovereign (took the place of Manxman which refused to sail)
Pigeon (23), Swallow (23); Sailing Barge Beatrice Maud (31), Tanga not reach England until 5th and June) launches (260); R.N.L.I. lifeboats Edward Z. Dresden (50), Greater (did London (48); Motor boats
Nayland Bonny Heather (210), Diana Mary (28), Elizabeth Green (10), Meuse (50),
Coliath trawlers (355), 3 patrol vessels (836), 13 trawlers and M.F.Vs. (1416), 1104. Belgian Tug
3 M/S (55), Walker II (76). French 5 Torpedo boats 2 S/M chasers (127),
(183), 5 trawlers (554).
114

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
advance of the evacuation force. Captain de Revoir, the French Naval Attaché, also crossed over to assist.
There were still many British wounded in Dunkirk, and Admiral Nord was asked to make special arranagements to evacuate as many as possible in return for the effort the British were making on behalf of the French Army.
Air Protection
Coastal Command were to provide protection for shipping between Dover and Dunkirk during the period from 1930 on the 3rd until dark.
Fighter Command was to maintain a continuous patrol by one Blenheim over the Dunkirk area during the dark hours. Fighter protection over the
Dunkirk area and shipping in the Channel was arranged for first light, the intention being that Fighter Command should patrol from 0345 to 0600 on
June 4th, and Coastal Command from 0600 to 0800. The execution of the first part of this programme was hindered, and that of the second part prohibited by fog which, however, no doubt supplied an even more thorough form of protection for the ships.
From 0430 to 0615 four Spitfires squadrons were on the line, but encountered no enemy aircraft. Fog rendered their landing in England difficult on their return. Hurricane squadrons continued the patrol, reaching the Dunkirk area about 0530 again no enemy aircraft were encountered, and again great difficulty was experienced in landing, one squadron losing 4 aircraft. With this unfortunate anti-climax, the fighter patrols over Dunkirk came to an end.
The scene at Dunkirk 2200, 3rd June
Movements from England of the 50 or so ships and numerous small craft for the night's evacuation commenced according to plan. Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker, who had come over to Dover earlier in the day for consultation, returned to Dunkirk, arriving at 2200 in M.T.B. 102 " to find the harbour swarming with French fishing craft and vessels of all sorts. They were yelling and crowding alongside the East Pier which was already thick with French troops. At one time it looked as if they would get in the way of the transports and destroyers which were on their way, but I managed to get them to go on up the inner harbour and out of the way in time."¹
"The congestion", said Lieutenant J. N. Wise, R.N.V.R., one of the officers of the skoot Pascholl which arrived at Dunkirk at 2300, was chaotic, ships going astern into others coming ahead. French destroyers shrieking on their sirens, small craft nipping here and there, rendering the exit most dangerous."
The numerous wrecks in the harbour and its approaches increased the difficulty and danger of entering. In addition to old wrecks marked on the charts there were now a dozen or more new ones, 3 to the west, and 9 to the east, half of them in the fairway; and more wrecks lay in the harbour. One lay alongside the East Pier; there was a wrecked trawler off the end of the piling on the west side of the Channel leading up harbour and blockships in the Channel, though luckily the tide was high.
Off the Thanet Coast and in mid-Channel there was thick fog (the Royal
Sovereign, 40 minutes out from Margate, reported visibility nil), though the ships were spared this added difficulty at Dunkirk where a fresh easterly wind was blowing and there was a choppy sea at the entrance.
M.017978/41 Report of R. A. Wake-Walker, p.37.
115

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XII
Casualties from collison and grounding had It embarked was under 200 conditions French such troops of as the at these harbour the West that per which was rammed when just clear 20 feet from the stern, 2319, line, Edmond cutting René; her her degaussing port bow, circuits. and the The troops collision was caused opened the up two to the wawler water which was undamaged. eventually joining a water, trawler, swing alongside one another, The Kingfisher, making trans-shipped little to the ships to towards England at 7 knots, casualty. company with the minesweeper proceeded
Leda, another collision
West Pier about an hour into the prevailing fog, and off 0300, the on the way back the
The Leda, having embarked after the 484 Kingfisher. French troops, At had pushed off from she ran down the Belgian The Leda's bows
Margate, the ship ran trawler Maréchal Foch. Goodwin Light Buoy to damaged, and for a while the minesweeper the Albury, which had sailed from were
West Pier at about the same time as Leda, with 400 troops, stood by her; the but the Leda's forward bulkhead held, so the ship continued on her way to
Margate, escorted for a while by the Kellett until the latter had to break off assist a ship in greater trouble and left her with the Kingfisher as companion to in misfortune. The fog was thick at Margate, and in the roads the Kingfisher was rammed once more, the personnel vessel King George V hitting her on the starboard bow, though only minor damage was caused.
Meanwhile, the Maréchal Foch had sunk. In economy of operation this
Belgian trawler seems to have been unequalled, for despite the fact that her entire complement consisted only of the Master, Captain P. Lusyne, and one man, (F. Decoster), she had embarked no less than 300 troops. To accomplish this, the ship had lain alongside the quay at Dunkirk since the 2nd of June, for she had grounded on the falling tide and did not get away until the night of the 3rd-4th. It is satisfactory to know that the Captain and his crew were picked up and landed at Dover; but half of the 300 troops she was carrying were drowned. The French M.T.B. V.T.B 25 which was bringing Admiral
Abrial from Dunkirk picked up some but was hampered by a propeller disabled by wreckage, and some were rescued by the destroyer Malcolm, which left
Dunkirk at 0245 and reported picking up, in fog near the North Goodwin, survivors of an unknown schuyt' which had been sunk in collision with a minesweeper.
Another ship that grounded in Dunkirk and was lost in consequence, was the
Skoot Lena. This vessel had sailed from England at 1530 on the 3rd June, in company with four other skoots, the Pascholl (S.O.), Hondsrug, Bornrif, and
Reiger. The latter ran aground on the Quern Sand soon after leaving Ramsgate, and was left behind. Going alongside the middle pier of Avant Port"
at Dunkirk (probably the West Quay or Guiding Jetty, or possibly the Inner but
Western high none British water, was drifter Pier) available orders were the having Lena and unsuccessful. attempts grounded been given made At at that about 1045 to no tow on 2300. further the her 4th off A embarkation tug June, by was the two asked Bornrif was hours crew for, to and after take em- a place after daylight, it was decided to abandon ship. Part of remainder, the inbarked in a British drifter, part in a French drifter, and the cluding the officers, were ferried to the Locust outside the harbour.
forthcoming to tow off owing the difficulty for minutes
It was presumably to of tug was considerable convoy of tugs Lena, arrived off within the entrance a to the
116

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
on motor boats, sailed the Thark with the motor boats, the 3rd the tugs Sun from IV, Tanga, Ramsgate Sun to XV, Dunkirk. and Racia, Two towing of between them were on account of water trouble petrol; the Diana Mary was
14 abandoned on the way across: in the while foul propeller and rudder, mouth, to piled up 28 Dunkirk troops), on some with and submerged engine the barge masonry of the (though Admiral in Dunkirk she Superintendent, eventually harbour and returned Ports- was abandoned. After waiting off Dunkirk since 2300 on the 3rd, the four tugs ordered at about 0200 on the 4th to go alongside the (East) Pier and embark were as many troops as possible, and by the time they were ordered to out they had collected 203 between them. Of the 14 motor boats which started clear from Ramsgate with the tugs only 5 or 6 found their way back; all the remainder were abandoned for one reason or another.
Embarkations at the West Pier (see Plan 4)
Owing to confusion of nomenclature it is impossible in every case to specify definitely at which of the west piers or jetties the ships (other than destroyers and personnel vessels which berthed at the east pier) embarked their troops.
In the western part of the port, reading from west to east, were (1) the West
Pier (termed western jetty in the Sailing Directions), (2) the West Quay or
Guiding Jetty, and (3) the Inner Western Pier (the inner or old western jetty of the Sailing Directions). Of the other three skoots that came over with the
Lena, the Bornrif stated that she embarked 96 troops at the West Mole"
between 2230 on the 3rd and 0100 on the 4th, and the Hondsrug 308 at the
"West Pier' between 2245 and 0000; while the Pascholl, which had been commanded by four different captains in 8 days, does not specify from which part of the port she lifted the 255 troops with which she sailed at 0030. Another skoot, the Rina, which had spent 24 hours at Dunkirk, sailed about this time with 300 troops.
The corvette Guillemot, which had come over with the Kingfisher, went to the Western mole" and secured ahead of the minesweeper Speedwell at 2355, leaving again at 0154 with French troops embarked to capacity" (460).
This was her first and only trip, her previous service having been as base ship at Margate. The Speedwell which had berthed nearly an hour earlier than the
Guillemot, took off 396 French troops, and the Halcyon, which had sailed from
Dover in her company, 501.
The minesweeper Kellett grounded forward against the western breakwater on a falling tide when she attempted to go alongside at 0100. It was an anxious moment, for almost simultaneously there same a report that 6 enemy
T.B.Ds. were proceeding south-westward from off Ostend; but the motor lifeboat Greater London towed the Kellett's stern away from the wall and enabled her to back away. She embarked a few troops from motor boats and sailed for Margate at 0220 by orders of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, for the West
Pier was occupied and it would be some time before she could be loaded, and the Rear-Admiral feared that so slow a ship might not be able to reach England while our fighter patrols were operating. Two of the personnel ships were sent by Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to the West Pier instead of to the East Pier, since the former was continuously crowded with French troops, whereas at the East Pier there were gaps in the flow of men. One of the two, the Royal
Sovereign, embarked 1,350 men and sailed overladen half an hour after she should have been clear.
Among the many ships and craft of which few or no details are recorded
117

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XII
were the trawler Saturn which An brought unknown 418 drifter troops to England, and the
Gulzar which brought 140. Maud, while brought 90, and abandoned Dover by a destroyer by her crew, on the and 5th were June. up mid-Channel and towed to boarded the sailing barge Beatrice picked in she was lying at the staff of Rear-Admiral Pier at 2230, Maintenance on
Pier for the embarkation on A. H. Taylor, "Dynamo" R.N., West
The Leda paid tribute in her this report night. to the Commander excellent arrangements at him assumed number of charge men they at the could Centre take quickly. and then Commander getting making the Troup ships French fast, officers finding to out Officer, assist the embarked at least 10,000 troops.
to embark the troops estimated that he
Embarkations at the East Pier despite a hold up which threw out the programme of ships entering the harbour
Meanwhile, there had been some heavy liftings of troops from the East Pier and caused great congestion in the entrance. The flow of French troops to the East Pier was better than on the preceding night, though there were some bad pauses.
The first ship to arrive off the pier was the destroyer Whitshed at 2215, with
Commander H. J. Buchanan, R.A.N. and pier party on board. In consequence of the fresh easterly wind and the westgoing tide the ship could not get alongside the East Pier, where there was nobody who could be persuaded to take a line.
However, after disembarking part of her pier party into Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker's M.T.B. for transfer to the pier, she got her bows alongside the personnel ship Autocarrier and her stern alongside the Sabre and commenced embarking troops. The Sabre had been working since 30th May with a compass damaged and rendered unreliable by a shell splinter, and had been led across by the Venomous. She got away from the East Pier at 0025 with 592
troops and followed other ships towards England until they were lost to sight near U buoy at the south end of the South Falls. This was within hearing of the North Goodwin Light Vessel, which the Sabre located by sound, subsequently proceeding from buoy to buoy until she reached Dover at 0500.
When the Autocarrier left in her turn at 0035 she carried 712 French troops.
The Canterbury left ten minutes later with 659, while the Côte Argent had shoved off from the pier five minutes earlier with 1,349 troops. After these three practically simultaneous sailings of personnel ships some time elapsed before another bunch got away. The Princess Maud had berthed at the extreme end of the pier, and sailed at 0150 with 1,270 troops and dogs of all kinds" that managed to get aboard. The Lady of Mann which berthed about the time when the first three personnel vessels left, took 1,244 troops at 0200.
The Tynwald seems to have been the last to leave the East Pier. She sailed at 0305 with the record lift, only equalled by the Scotia on 29th May, of 3,000
French troops: in 4 trips she had evacuated 8,953 men. With a single exception all destroyers had now gone; the Malcolm went at 0245 with 736
troops, Vanquisher at 0240 with 414, and the Venomous, which had arrived at
0245 to find the harbour very congested and ordered to wait outside until
0130, 5 took out no less than 1,200 troops. In four was days the Venomous had made trips, evacuating 4,410 men in all, to fog, did not arrive at Dunkirk until 0230 on the 4th. She left half an hour
The British pier party was taken off by the destroyer Express which, owing later, having embarked 611 troops.
118

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
The Locust also, after embarking troops ferried out to her from 2300, came alongside the East Pier at 0225, and when she sailed ten minutes later had on board 196 troops.
Mining of the Emile Deschamps
The personnel vessel King George V which left the East Pier about 0300 with
817 troops, ran into thick fog off the English coast. About 0615, near the
Elbow Buoy 21/2 miles east of the North Foreland, she passed a "small French naval vessel." Suddenly there was a heavy explosion astern of her, and within a minute the vessel had sunk.
The small French ship was the Fleet Auxiliary Emile Deschamps which had sailed from Dunkirk for England at about 2100 on 3rd June, crowded with troops and refugees. About 0558 the minesweeper Albury, 5 cables ahead of her, gave her a course for the North Goodwin Light Vessel, which the French ship had missed. A quarter of an hour later the Emile Deschamps struck the magnetic mine which sank her.
Several vessels were near and hastened to rescue the survivors. The firefloat Massey Shaw, on passage from Ramsgate to London, was only 200 yards away at the time and picked up 40, reported to be all sailors, which she transferred to the Albury. The King George V lowered four boats and picked up
67. The minesweeper Kellett, called up by signal from the Albury, rescued some very badly injured people as did also H.M.S. Nelson's motor boat, whose log contains the apparently, but no doubt unintentionally, casual entry
' 2400. L/Sea. Eggington lost overboard with candle-lantern." Fog came down again as the rescue operations were completed. Among the survivors landed at Margate were 7 French women and a boy.
Blocking Operation repeated night 3rd-4th June
Owing to the failure of the blocking operation of the previous night to close the port, the Admiralty, during the forenoon of the 3rd June, ordered it to be repeated on this night with Admiral Abrial's concurrence. Captain E. Dangerfield, R.N. was again in charge. The ships employed were as follows:-
destroyer:
Shikari;
coastal craft: M. A./S. B. 10,
M.T.B. 107
blockships
Gourko, 1975 tons, built 1911,
Moyle, 1761 tons, built 1907,
Pacifico, 687 tons, built 1905.
The force sailed from the Downs at 2030 on the 3rd by Route Z, M.T.B. 107
being in tow of the Shikari, and anchored at 0130 on the 4th between No. 14 W
and 16 W buoys, near the entrance to Dunkirk harbour.
At 0230 Captain Dangerfield, who had transferred to M. A/S. B. 10 ordered the ships to weigh and the Shikari proceeded to lead them to the entrance.
The Gourko's anchor was barely aweigh when a violent explosion occurred aft, caused, it is reported, by a magnetic mine, although the ship was degaussed and had been wiped in Chatham Dockyard as recently as the 31st May. The
Gourko began to sink rapidly and was ordered to be abandoned. She sank stern first in 3 minutes. M. A/S. B. 10 took off 9 survivors and transferred them to the Shikari. M.T.B. 107 rescued 7 others, some of them from the water. One of the crew was missing, and 8 were wounded.
Meanwhile, the other two blockships carried on with the operation. The
119

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XII
Moyle rammed the As Inner she sank, Western she Pier slid off abreast the bank the wreck towards of the Westcove scuttled line channel, intention The of Pacifico the herself. as was channel, the to decided Westcove proceed her to after between had scuttle part done, down and in being and the between beyond finally against position the them settled the allotted wrecks Westcove. at of to a slight the the the Edvard Gourko. centre angle to of Her and the the and Westcove and defeated then drift this the Pacifico broadside on. Nissen the strong current after hold, dropped manoeuvre, anchor so into her and rammed However,
The stern then swung not over turn further owing to the tide Nissen, but, after cove abreast her to port towards the Edvard secured ships. of certain point, Orders would were then accompanied given for the by scuttling considerable of the Pacifico; race between As in the the case two a due in this instance to vapour.
the Westcove, this was oil fuel a sheet of flame, probably
One shell hit the pier, causing many casualties, for there were still some 200
The time now was about 0330 and at this juncture shelling recommenced.
French troops on the East Pier. General Bathelemy, Commander of the
Flanders Garrison, who was taken off by the Shikari, stated that 12,000 French troops still remained in Dunkirk. The Shikari carried 383 when she sailed from Dunkirk at 0340 by orders of Captain Dangerfield; she was the last ship to leave. Apart from an air attack, which caused no damage, her passage home was uneventful.
An M.T.B. had been detailed to evacuate Admiral Abrial but the latter could not be found, and as a matter of fact he was brought out from Dunkirk in a French M.T.B. V.T.B. 25. Near the North Goodwin Light Vessel the vessel's propeller became disabled by wreckage, and the Malcolm towed her to Dover about 0600.
On the conclusion of the blocking operation there remained a gap of about
100 to 120 feet unobstructed on the west side of the channel. Part of this gap was, however, shoal water, because of the shelving bank.
Disembarkation figures, 4th June
There were landed in England on 4th June 26,175 persons, of which British ships had evacuated 21,600, French 3,838, and Belgian 737. These figures included a number of survivors, both troops and ships' crews, from sunken ships and some refugees. It was recorded that 622 of the total were evacuated from the beaches, but it is doubtful whether any of these were actually evacuated from the beaches, for the figure includes many such as the 43 French troops landed by the Pangbourne, who were taken from a French vessel
(probably the mail packet Rouen) which had run aground on a sand bank: the
260 brought over by the Beatrice Maud: a number (apparently 210) recorded as evacuated from the beaches and landed in England but actually ferried from
Dunkirk pier to various transports, by the motor launch Bonny Heather.
Operation Dynamo completed, 1423/4th June
Ammunition in Dunkirk was exhausted, enemy were and reported the remaining consisted
When the Shikari sailed, the to be only 3 miles away.
principally the of non-combatant units. troops Admiral Nord agreed that was dispersed at 1030.
operation should be considered as Accordingly, terminated. The fleet of rescue ships
The decision to terminate the operation was agreed to by the French
120

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
Admiralty, and at 1423 on the 4th June a message went out from the Admiralty:
" Operation Dynamo now completed."
Vice-Admiral Ramsay was aware that the aftermath of the operation would probably be a number of open boats, barges and so forth drifting about in the
Channel with troops on board. Air reconnaissances were accordingly carried out on the 4th and 5th. On the 4th a transport was reported lying on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines and a barge was sighted east of the Goodwins with survivors on board. Two M.T.B.s. despatched by C.-in-C. Nore searched for the transport without success.
Air reconnaissance was carried out on the morning of the 5th but nothing was reported. However, an R.A.F. speedboat carried out a sweep south of a line Goodwins - Boulogne and recovered 33 French troops and two naval ratings. During the day, patrols picked up French troops and brought them in to Dover, Margate and Ramsgate; and troops also arrived in French and
Belgian trawlers. It is reported that in all about 1,100 men were brought in during the 5th June.
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CHAPTER XIII
ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION
Inadequate planning those taking part largely and place that planning. Events on the of
Operation "Dynamo" took was the an improvisation, of in which the initiative most developed so swiftly unexpectedly for what lack of time prevented any Continent but than was meagre anticipated. preparation proved to be a far more extensive operation the was and not that date it 19th May, seven days before the operation commenced;
The problem mooted of until evacuating the large numbers of British troops from the Continent undertaken. even at was considered unlikely that it would actually be
Expeditionary Force would be evacuated.
As late as the 24th May it was still uncertain whether the British
Two days later, when the Admiralty ordered the operation to commence, the military situation was thought to have deteriorated so rapidly that a lift of no more than 45,000 troops within a period of 48 hours was considered possible, after action. which the evacuation would have to be terminated on account of enemy
In the event, seven times as many men were evacuated, and the operation continued for 9 days.
The organisation was built up as the evacuation proceeded. A Maintenance
Officer to take charge of the small craft was appointed on the 27th May, the day after the beginning of the operation. S.N.O. Dunkirk assumed duty at
1900 on the same day, and S.N.O. Afloat off the beaches two days later. It was not, however, until the 30th May that an S.N.O. arrived to take charge off the French-Belgian coast, together with an N.O.I.C. Beaches and two
Commodores to take charge off shore. How great was the effect of these appointments, figures. will be shown in due course in the analysis of the evacuation
The arrival of beaching craft at the beaches was unnecessarily delayed on the 28th and 29th May, owing to the Admiralty (and the majority of the Naval
Authorities who provided craft), directing them to Dover instead of the Downs, as had been requested by Vice-Admiral Ramsay.
Lack of Signal Communications
Difficulties and confusion were caused throughout the operation owing to and the the absence signal the beaches of efficient and between signalling Dunkirk arrangements, and Dover. both The locally equipment between taken Dunkirk was in- by adequate beaches to The naval to either party Dunkirk. beach which for parties, inter-communication proceeded as might from have England been between expected, to the Dunkirk beaches used on their 27th or ingenuity from the the improvise local inter-communication but it was not until
30th May that a naval wireless set arrangements capable of communicating with
122

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION
CHAP. XIII
England was sent to Dunkirk; until then messages had either to be sent through the French station in an unsuitable code, or fortuitously via any destroyer which might be lying alongside, necessitating a messenger forcing his way along the narrow crowded footway of the pier.
In. the absence of efficient communication it was impossible to distribute ships to the best advantage off the beaches or between Dunkirk harbour and the beaches; whilst the uncertainty as to whether the harbour was blocked on the 29th May was responsible for a reduction of 10,000 men in the possible lift during the night 29th-30th.
Air Co-operation
There is no doubt that the R.A.F. carried out, as far as their available resources permitted, all the tasks which they were asked by the Navy to undertake. The odds at which our airmen fought were very long, four or five to one.
Formations of single squadron strength or less would boldly attack German groups of forty or fifty machines, usually with success out of all proportion to the odds against them. It was a direct test of British against German quality.
Numbers did not, however, permit of a continuous patrol being maintained over the scene, though the whole Metropolitan Air Force, our last sacred reserve, was used. Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a day'.' Unfortunately, the troops on the beaches and on Dunkirk piers saw but little of the fighting in the air, for much of the weight of the effort of the Royal Air Force was directed against objectives far inland, to prevent or break up enemy raids before these reached the beaches and ships. It was the ships that took the brunt of the German attack. Galling though it was to our troops to be bombed and machine gunned with little or no opportunity to defend themselves their losses, grievous enough, were yet never of such severity as to jeopardise the entire operation, as did the losses of ships. However, the system of co-operation in force at that early date, which did not permit of direct contact with R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command, rendered difficult complete co-ordination of effort with naval requirements on the spot.
Evacuation figures analysed²
In analysing the evacuation figures it is necessary to consider separately the rates of lift from day to day and the daily total figures of troops lifted.
The former naturally affected the latter; but the days which showed the best rates of lift were not necessarily those giving the highest evacuation total, since circumstances affected the two sets of figures differently and factors which affected one set often had no effect whatever on the other.
The following table shows the number of men from the beaches and the harbour landed daily in England by British ships, and the number of round trips undertaken. Evacuations of wounded by hospital carriers have been omitted, as have also the liftings from the beaches on 3rd and 4th of June, which were largely fortuitous.
1 Churchill, The Second World War Vol. II.
2 The figures employed in this analysis are those of H.S./T.S.D. The total differs by
397 (= 0.0013%) from the military figure. See Note to Tables 1-3 which will be found before the appendices at the end of this book.
123

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XIII
the The factors variations recorded in the in the daily following figures paragraphs. are believed to have been influenced by average waiting time normal. This probably norm, due the number of the
28TH MAY. Beaches. corresponded Although the to rate the estimated of lift was average (1: 1), and ing boats. Destroyers, 356 were new to the lifted per trip was below which made 8 was of the 13 trips, to shortage of beach- men and their lift per trip was only Calcutta's as lift against reduced a destroyer aveage of 504 work wounded (cot cases) which she the whole operation. The embarked. was by the large number over of
HARBOUR. Although the average lift was the above normal, the long waiting
The figures of waiting time are not, however, entirely satisfactory only 10
time reduced the men: minutes ratio to estimated norm for the operation.
ships provided data, three of which waited for periods greatly in excess of the average.
HARBOUR. The increase in average lift without corresponding rise in waiting time is accounted for by the great increase in the number of personnel ships employed and the average lifts made by them on this day. The average lift per personnel ship, which on the 28th May was only 552, rose to 1,520 today.
30TH MAY. Beaches. The increase of 25 per cent in the figure for average lift without corresponding rise in waiting time, resulting in the highest men minutes ratio achieved at the beaches during the operation, is believed to have been due to:-
(a) better organisation consequent upon the arrival of R.A. Dover as
S.N.O. on the French coast and of Captain Howson as N.O.I.C. Beaches, together with the employment of two Commodores to take charge off shore at La Panne and Bray; (b) better discipline amongst the troops on the beaches; (c) employment as beaching craft of the A.L.Cs. which began to arrive on the 29th, and the arrival of 12 motor boats for retrieving abandoned pulling boats; (d) absence of enemy air attacks.
Harbour. Although the rate of lift deviated little from the average, both lift and waiting time declined. This was probably the effect of the disastrous air attacks of the previous day on shipping, which resulted in only one destroyer at a time being allowed to enter Dunkırk during the forenoon and early afternoon and perhaps engendered a feeling of insecurity and a wish to get the ships away as quickly as possible.
31ST MAY. Beaches. A considerable reduction in average waiting time and a normal. boats slight rise This above was normal due probably in average to the lift fact gave that a rate greater of lift numbers slightly of better beaching than were available. Although during the forenoon conditions on the beaches were very bad they improved greatly during the afternoon and evening. On the beaches, after 1600, the piers of pontoons were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops.
Harbour. minutes Lift was average, but waiting time high and reduced the men be rate of lift. No valid reason was discovered, and it should noted that all the figures agree closely for this with can the be estimated norm.
" 0943 I This The belief moment is based on the final sentence in Situation Report by S.N.O. Dunkirk at 0950 timed the If single this weather destroyer persists allowed bombing I want to enter starts a ship would all every must remain half shove hour," alongside off "; which and for would only on the half seem signal an to hour. imply that
126