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TNA / ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360
Collection details

TNA ADM 234 360

Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 234 360
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
to the method of embarking the troops, Lieut. Wells found that the best way queues were 3 deep and were spaced available. out groups The of 10, this number being
As to organise them into a long queue at each in of the 3 embarkation points.
The suitable for the type of boat following group could be most used for shoving off a loaded boat, which took a good deal of moving at half tide to a bar running parallel to the sea. The Army pontoon boats proved most owing suitable, because of their draught, double-ended construction and general handiness. The main difficulty, according to Lieut. Wells, lay in the insufficiency of naval boat keepers. As a rule the soldiers detailed to return the boats did not carry out orders and the beach parties had to swim or wade out for drifting boats, which continually delayed and slowed up the operation. Lieut. Wells considered that the troops could hardly be blamed as it was clearly a naval responsibility. More ratings were asked for from outlying ships, but none could be sent.
At 0930 on May 30th there was only one other motor boat working within
5 miles either side of Lieut. Vavasour's beach, i.e. G section. It was a destroyer's motor boat which, being aground when the destroyer sailed, had been left behind.
By about noon, all ships within sight from G beach had departed fully loaded.
About an hour later a destroyer [the Windsor] anchored east of Bray, and as many boats as possible were towed out to her. Lieut. M. A. Hemans R.N., says Lieut. Vavasour closed the destroyer. On board her were two officers,
Lieuts. Stubbs and Fletcher from the beach party which had gone to La Panne
(under Cdre. Stephenson) who said they had been told to leave by their
Commodore. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was on board the destroyer and he told Lieuts. Hemans and Vavasour to carry on with the boats.
At about 1300 some 10 trawlers, drifters and minesweepers began to arrive, and evacuation proceeded apace until 2000, in spite of there being only 3 motor boats for towing and ferrying. By 2000 all ships had left except the Special
Service vessel Royal Eagle. By 2100, however, just after dark, many destroyers and minesweepers commenced to arrive.
Lieut. Vavasour went on board the Royal Eagle at about 2000 in response to a signal. While his motor boat was away collecting boat loads of troops for the
Royal Eagle the former broke down and was picked up by a destroyer which was on the way to La Panne. That was the last Lieut. Vavasour saw of his party. He later got on board a minesweeper at 0100/31 and sailed for Harwich.
Subsequently, on arrival at H.M.S. Excellent he found the remainder of Cdre.
Hallett's lieutenants were back. They had been told, he says, to abandon the evacuation about midnight by the S.N.O. of the beach-a Commander".
"I felt most limited in my activities," says Lieut. Vavasour, by the very definite orders that I had received that on no account was the naval party to be left behind. No accurate information was available.
I was unable to obtain any information at all from any single one of the large number of ships to which
I towed boats during the day and night". This is not surprising because in the circumstances, with the situation continually and rapidly changing, no one either ashore or afloat had any accurate information. Thus, for instance, the
Gossamer which anchored one mile west of La Panne at 2207, had sent in the motor boat Handy Billie in charge of S/Lt. M. Phipps R.N. to search for troops.
He found none, and received no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however, the situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship".'
I Report by Gossamer (R.O.I, p.264).
D
81

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 105.

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
to the method of embarking the troops, Lieut. Wells found that the best
way queues were 3 deep and were spaced available. out groups The of 10, this number being
As to organise them into a long queue at each in of the 3 embarkation points.
The suitable for the type of boat following group could be
most used for shoving off a loaded boat, which took a good deal of moving at half tide
to a bar running parallel to the sea. The Army pontoon boats proved
most owing suitable, because of their draught, double-ended construction and general
handiness. The main difficulty, according to Lieut. Wells, lay in the insufficiency of naval
boat keepers. As a rule the soldiers detailed to return the boats did not carry
out orders and the beach parties had to swim or wade out for drifting boats,
which continually delayed and slowed up the operation. Lieut. Wells con-
sidered that the troops could hardly be blamed as it was clearly a naval res-
ponsibility. More ratings were asked for from outlying ships, but none could
be sent.
At 0930 on May 30th there was only one other motor boat working within
5 miles either side of Lieut. Vavasour's beach, i.e. G section. It was a des-
troyer's motor boat which, being aground when the destroyer sailed, had been
left behind.
By about noon, all ships within sight from G beach had departed fully loaded.
About an hour later a destroyer [the Windsor] anchored east of Bray, and as
many boats as possible were towed out to her. Lieut. M. A. Hemans R.N.,
says Lieut. Vavasour closed the destroyer. On board her were two officers,
Lieuts. Stubbs and Fletcher from the beach party which had gone to La Panne
(under Cdre. Stephenson) who said they had been told to leave by their
Commodore. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker was on board the destroyer and he
told Lieuts. Hemans and Vavasour to carry on with the boats.
At about 1300 some 10 trawlers, drifters and minesweepers began to arrive,
and evacuation proceeded apace until 2000, in spite of there being only 3 motor
boats for towing and ferrying. By 2000 all ships had left except the Special
Service vessel Royal Eagle. By 2100, however, just after dark, many destroyers
and minesweepers commenced to arrive.
Lieut. Vavasour went on board the Royal Eagle at about 2000 in response to a
signal. While his motor boat was away collecting boat loads of troops for the
Royal Eagle the former broke down and was picked up by a destroyer which
was on the way to La Panne. That was the last Lieut. Vavasour saw of his
party. He later got on board a minesweeper at 0100/31 and sailed for Harwich.
Subsequently, on arrival at H.M.S. Excellent he found the remainder of Cdre.
Hallett's lieutenants were back. They had been told, he says, to abandon the
evacuation about midnight by the S.N.O. of the beach-a Commander".
"I felt most limited in my activities," says Lieut. Vavasour, by the very
definite orders that I had received that on no account was the naval party to be
left behind. No accurate information was available.
I was unable to obtain
any information at all from any single one of the large number of ships to which
I towed boats during the day and night". This is not surprising because in
the circumstances, with the situation continually and rapidly changing, no one
either ashore or afloat had any accurate information. Thus, for instance, the
Gossamer which anchored one mile west of La Panne at 2207, had sent in the
motor boat Handy Billie in charge of S/Lt. M. Phipps R.N. to search for troops.
He found none, and received no answer to his hails. Inside an hour, however,
the situation had changed, and thousands were massing abreast the ship".'
I Report by Gossamer (R.O.I, p.264).
D
81