TNA ADM 234 360

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DUSK TO DUSK, IST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
Dunkirk and entered harbour at 1530 on 1st June. Whilst there, she was
twice hit by shore batteries, though damage was slight and there was only one
and troops and finally proceeded at 2230.
light casualty. The ship lay alongside for 7 hours, embarking stretcher cases
Amongst the various classes of ships none had suffered proportionately
heavier losses than the personnel vessels to which Vice-Admiral Dover referred
in his message to the Admiralty. Their crews had been doing magnificent
work in the face of nerve-racking experiences. Up to date 8 of these ships had
been sunk and 4 disabled. It was arranged that during this night's evacuation
personnel ships in addition to destroyers were to berth at the East Pier in Dun-
kirk where they were to be given priority.
The danger of sending these valuable ships in to Dunkirk in daylight was too
great, and after the 1st of June they were sent in only under cover of darkness,
with a naval Ljeutenant-Commander or Commander on board each ship as
adviser to the Master and with crews stiffened by 10 seamen for handling the
wires and going alongside under fire. It was hoped by these means not only to
get the ships to sail to time but also to ensure that they would enter Dunkirk
harbour and not linger outside awaiting a quiet interval, or return empty.
To their credit it must be recorded that not all the personnel ships needed the
moral support of naval ratings.
Air Operations, morning of 2nd June
The batteries which had brought Route X under fire were between Le
Clipont, near Pointe de Gravelines (see Plan 3), and Les Huttes, about a mile
north east of Gravelines ; they were attacked by the R.A.F. in 24 Blenheim
sorties between first light and 0745 on the 2nd, the object of spreading the attack
in this manner being to neutralise the batteries during the period of daylight
evacuation. The Blenheims encountered much anti-aircraft fire, and though
no aircraft were lost some were damaged and afterwards crash-landed on their
airfields.
The Air Ministry were asked to provide strong continuous patrols over
Dunkirk and the beaches from 0430 to 0830 on the 2nd June, with night fighter
patrols during the hours of darkness. It was arranged that the fighter patrols
should go out over the routes in use by our ships, and on the return journey fly
low on the routes to give maximum protection to ships against low flying bomb
and machine gun attacks. The concentration of fighter patrols in the dawn
and dusk periods resulted in a great decrease in the total number of flying
hours on the 2nd June (See Appendix C.)
The early morning was hazy, and the first two main R.A.F. patrols, both at
four squadron strength, encountered no enemy aircraft and no ships reported
being attacked during this period. The third patrol, the strongest yet flown,
consisting of five full squadrons, which was over the Dunkirk area from 0745-
0845, encountered very considerable enemy forces, and claimed to have shot
down 18 enemy bombers and 10 fighters, themselves losing 7 Spitfires. Again,
no reports of attacks came from the ships; and as far as can be ascertained no
attacks occurred until the Calcutta, patrolling near W buoy with the Mallard
and Shearwater, was attacked at 1035 by 3 Ju. 88 which dived out of the sun
and bombed her, causing slight damage from near misses. A Coastal patrol
witnessed the incident and drove off the enemy. The French light cruiser
Epérvier and destroyer Léopard were also on the patrol line, but they apparently
left the patrol when bombing began at 1035 and up to 1442 when the Calcutta
returned to Sheerness by orders of Vice-Admiral Dover, nothing more was seen
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