TNA ADM 234 360

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CHAP. x
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
of by the the French B.E.F. troops would also have on been lifted. night, by which time most
was consequently would be completed the following
in the late afternoon to of sail the during 1st June daylight with and General that Alexander's concurrence
that no ships were to cease at 0300 on 2nd. If the
0700 and, evacuation if necessary was then still possible. Only between June until dark to tine any of tontine any of
the three also from 1730 on the 2nd was to to tine any of
The Admiralty, channels however, during daylight decided hours, that, should evacuation it be possible
light there would be sailings. They intended to be 0700 and 1730
evacuation 2nd was possible no in daylight as late as 0700. the arbiters as to whether on the
Admiral to Ramsay casualties now being caused to all of therne instructions of therne Instructick Vice-
At 2114, an hour informed and a the half Admiralty after the and receipt
had owing ordered withdraw before shipping
followed been this signal to at 2329 by daylight on the
up situation he a knew message to the
detail Y the Z shipping under fire as of German it. All three channels to Dunkirk, some
maining which daylight route into X, action had that to be suspended on account of a new re-
X, and were now had batteries, for traffic on the last
battery Vice-Admiral came evening and was maintaining a enemy heavy
barrage¹. Ramsay's information (not altogether correct)
that a total of 16 transports (personnel vessels invaluable in the work of evacua- was
tion) were now out of action, 8 being lost and 8 disabled, and that two of the
sinkings had been caused by enemy shell fire on Route X. It was now difficult
to compel the crews of the remainder to face the conditions which existed.
This had been a day of very heavy naval sinkings coupled with losses of troops
from drowning. It is obvious that at some point losses incurred in continuing
daylight evacuation would more than counterbalance the gains it seems clear
that Vice-Admiral Ramsay considered that this point had now been reached,
and, in accordance with the Admiralty's own direction sent to him earlier in
the evening, he now informed them that any attempt to continue the evacuation
in daylight was unwise and he asked permission to withdraw all his forces at
0300 until the following night. In this, he told the admiralty, Major General
Alexander concurred.
The Admiralty, however, were unwilling that evacuation should cease alto-
gether at daylight and directed that it was to continue up to 0700, but only by
destroyers unless further experience showed that enemy gunfire was rendering
the channel prohibitively dangerous.
Danger to personnel ships
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that in the difficulty of obtaining
accurate reports of conditions on the routes and estimating the true causes of
the mounting losses of ships the danger from shell fire was magnified
in the minds of those at Dover. By some means enemy the planners had been in-
formed that two personnel ships had already been sunk by shell fire in the
fairway near No. 5 buoy. Not only was this but in point of fact no
ship of any kind was lost from gunfire the incorrect, routes the 1st June the
only sinking by shell fire on that day on during Lord Cavan, depot ship
of other S.N.O. Dunkirk hit as she quitted was the the drifter at Dunkirk, whilst the only
ship to be hit was the personnel vessel pier St. Helier. This ship arrived at
German
I The War guns." Office 1330/1 reported Only remaining channel now coming under fire of
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