Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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CHAPTER XIII |
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CHAPTER XIII ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION Inadequate planning those taking part largely and place that planning. Events on the of Operation "Dynamo" took was the an improvisation, of in which the initiative most developed so swiftly unexpectedly for what lack of time prevented any Continent but than was meagre anticipated. preparation proved to be a far more extensive operation the was and not that date it 19th May, seven days before the operation commenced; The problem mooted of until evacuating the large numbers of British troops from the Continent undertaken. even at was considered unlikely that it would actually be Expeditionary Force would be evacuated. As late as the 24th May it was still uncertain whether the British Two days later, when the Admiralty ordered the operation to commence, the military situation was thought to have deteriorated so rapidly that a lift of no more than 45,000 troops within a period of 48 hours was considered possible, after action. which the evacuation would have to be terminated on account of enemy In the event, seven times as many men were evacuated, and the operation continued for 9 days. The organisation was built up as the evacuation proceeded. A Maintenance Officer to take charge of the small craft was appointed on the 27th May, the day after the beginning of the operation. S.N.O. Dunkirk assumed duty at 1900 on the same day, and S.N.O. Afloat off the beaches two days later. It was not, however, until the 30th May that an S.N.O. arrived to take charge off the French-Belgian coast, together with an N.O.I.C. Beaches and two Commodores to take charge off shore. How great was the effect of these appointments, figures. will be shown in due course in the analysis of the evacuation The arrival of beaching craft at the beaches was unnecessarily delayed on the 28th and 29th May, owing to the Admiralty (and the majority of the Naval Authorities who provided craft), directing them to Dover instead of the Downs, as had been requested by Vice-Admiral Ramsay. Lack of Signal Communications Difficulties and confusion were caused throughout the operation owing to and the the absence signal the beaches of efficient and between signalling Dunkirk arrangements, and Dover. both The locally equipment between taken Dunkirk was in- by adequate beaches to The naval to either party Dunkirk. beach which for parties, inter-communication proceeded as might from have England been between expected, to the Dunkirk beaches used on their 27th or ingenuity from the the improvise local inter-communication but it was not until 30th May that a naval wireless set arrangements capable of communicating with 122