Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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MONDAY, 27TH MAY |
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MONDAY, 27TH MAY CHAP. IV task now is to evacuate to England maximum of your force possible."¹ No policy had yet been laid down by French G.Q.G., or any other French higher authority, for a withdrawal northward of the Lys, and, says Lord Gort, "I had no idea what plans either he [General Blanchard] or Admiral Abrial had in mind".' Lord Gort failed to contact General Blanchard either at La Panne, or at the French naval headquarters, situated at Bastion No. 32, Dunkirk. While at the Bastion, however, at 2300, he was informed in the course of conversation with General Koeltz (General Weygand's deputy) that the King of the Belgians had asked for an armistice from midnight that night. The British Commander- in-Chief thus found himself suddenly faced with an open gap of 20 miles between Ypres and the sea, through which enemy armoured forces might reach the beaches². Owing to congestion on the roads Lord Gort was unable to reach his head- quarters at Houtkerque until 0430 on 28th May; he then found that a telegram had been received from the War Office at 0130/28 saying that the King of the Belgians was capitulating at midnight, 27th/28th May.³ This was the derelict situation facing Lord Gort in the early hours of the morning. Dunkirk locks prepared for demolition On the 27th May, on the orders of Admiral Abrial, the Royal Naval demolition party which had arrived at Dunkirk on the 23rd May placed demolition charges at the New, the Trystram and the Guillain locks in Dunkirk harbour. Route Z under fire Route Y adopted Route x prepared Owing to the great lack of inshore craft for beach work the main naval effort during the day had been confined to maintaining the flow of personnel vessels to Dunkirk at the rate of 2 every 31/2 hours. Even this limited transport service had been seriously interrupted by the fire of shore batteries between Les Hemmes (east of Calais) and Gravelines. At 0623 the Biarritz and Archangel, en route for Dunkirk escorted by the destroyer Verity, were shelled 6 miles E.N.E. of Calais. The Biarritz was hit several times and had 1 killed and 2 wounded. The Archangel was also apparently damaged, and neither ship took any further part in "Dynamo". At 0640, the M/V Sequacity and the freighter Yewdale were also shelled off Calais. The Sequacity was hit four times, and at 1020, when north of Dunkirk channel, after the crew had been transferred to the Yewdale, the Sequacity went down by the head and sank. At 0750 the armed boarding vessel Mona's Isle, loaded with troops, suffered severe casualties and damage from shore guns off Gravelines, and also from an air attack shortly afterwards, and had to go into dock for repairs. At 0800 the H/C Isle of Thanet was shelled off Calais and returned to Dover. At 0900, the A.B/V King Orry, returning from Dunkirk loaded with troops also suffered casualties and damage from the Calais guns. As a result of these happenings the Vice-Admiral, Dover, reported to the Admiralty that the normal or southern route, Dover to Dunkirk (later known as Route Z), was impracticable in daylight. Another, more northern route (later known as Route Y), via the Dyck Whistle buoy, Middelkerk buoy, and Zuydcoote Pass, was accordingly adopted. This, however, increased the I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 51. 2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 49. 3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch 50. 19