TNA ADM 234 360

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THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
Admiral Ramsay records that, at 0030/301, the S.N.O. on the French coast
(Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker) reported that he had no destroyers, though in
fact, at that time, all available destroyers (namely ten) in the Dover Command
were either on the coast, or on passage, while the remaining 5 were at Dover
discharging troops embarking ammunition, fuelling, etc., and were to " sail
within the next 4 hours. Simultaneously, says Admiral Ramsay, the
V.C.I.G.S. reported² that the beaches were well organised, the troops in good
heart, and there had been no bombing since dark, but that there was still a
great shortage of small craft which were urgently required. This last fact",
says Admiral Ramsay, was well known to the Vice-Admiral, Dover'
In fact, on practically every occasion when officers on and off the coast com-
plained of the lack of ships, investigation of ship's reports goes to show that all
ships were working to their utmost capacity and that the only reason for their
absence in any one place was that they could not be in two places at once.
The sharp rise in the numbers of troops landed in England on consecutive
days-e.g., from 17,000 troops on the 28th May, to 47,000 on the 29th, 53,000
on the 30th, and 68,000 on the 31st May-indicates the remarkably effective
effort which was being made in spite of the occasional shortage of ships at
Dunkirk or off the beaches.
It was the constantly changing situation which invariably made abortive
any attempt-by the authorities either in England or in the evacuation area-
to centralise the conduct of the operation except in its broadest aspects. Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker (Rear-Admiral, Dover), states that La Panne was in
telephonic communication with England and sometimes he received messages
by W/T from Dover about the situation there [i.e. at La Panne]-as for instance
one timed 1749 saying that ships were urgently wanted off La Panne though
actually at 1900 there were 4 destroyers and one minesweeper there and the
situation was constantly changing.
Further, he pointed out that G.H.Q. was in touch with the Admiralty and
Vice-Admiral, Dover, and were constantly presenting their own views and
criticisms of what was happening which probably accounts for a signal from
the First Sea Lord on the 30th May, asking if boats were distributed along the
beaches to the best advantage⁴. Actually at the time whalers were the only
boats that could get inshore, (except the pontoons and a few local craft), and
their distribution was entirely dependent on the position of their parent ship⁵.
Rear-Admiral, Dover, takes over his Command
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker points out that where incidents are so crowded
it is difficult not to give a confused picture. "The picture was, however, con-
fused, and so far as operations off the beaches were concerned organisation was
not possible. The most that could be done was to exercise some control and
direction".⁶
This is a just appreciation of the situation, and it provides an explanation
of the not infrequent occasions when officers-both senior and junior and
whether on or off the beaches-considered that, from their own particular view
point, things were going awry. "Dynamo", though termed an operation,
was in the nature of a desperate improvisation ; but it was carried out with
I Error for 0039/30. (See Appendix H.7.)
2 Appendix H.8.
3 D.R. p.13, para. 40.
4 Appendix G.21.
5 R.A. Dover's report (M.017978/41).
6
R.A. Dover's report of Proceedings. (R.O.III, p.373).
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