TNA ADM 234 360

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin), who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May), now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens, attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely foreseen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting, which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
refugees who got on board. The numbers evacuated by the destroyers concerned were approximately:-
Keith
180
Vimy
...
...
150
Whitshed
...
...
580
Vimiera
...
...
Wild Swan
1955 403 (in two trips)
...
...
Windsor
...
600
Venomous
...
500
Total
...
4368
The Venetia, damaged, did not get alongside a quay. During the night
22 23rd May, before the evacuation under fire, the Verity took off two General
Officers and some 150 troops.
In addition to the Venetia, the Wild Swan, Whitshed, Keith and Venomous all received damage during the evacuation. The Keith lost Captain D. (19) and
7 ratings killed, and had 28 wounded; the Vimy had one officer killed and her
Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Comdr. C. G. W. Donald R.N. was seriously wounded and died subsequently; the Whitshed lost one officer killed and had
12 ratings wounded; the Venetia had 20 ratings killed or missing and 11
wounded; the Commanding Officer of the Verity, Lt. Cdr. A. R. M. Black R.N.
was wounded and subsequently died.
23RD 24TH MAY
The "Weygand" Plan
In the midst of this changing panorama of events, on the 23rd May, General
Weygand became Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war". He had, however, previously formulated the ' Weygand plan". This plan contemplated a counter-offensive on a large scale¹ and, briefly, it consisted of 3
operations:-:-
(a) An attack south-westward from the north, by the French 1st Army and the B.E.F., with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting the
British right.
(b) An attack northward from the line of the Somme, which line the newly formed Third French Army Group was reported to be organising.
(c) Operations on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, by a new Cavalry
Corps which was assembling south of the river near Neufchatel.
On the 23rd May Lord Gort received a telegram from the British Prime Minister to extract:- the French Prime Minister, M. Reynaud, of which the following is an
"Strong Salvation enemy armoured forces have cut Armies.
gand's plan. of these I Armies can only be obtained communications by immediate of execution Northern of Weynorth Not could feeling sure that the situation armies in the to General be accurately appreciated developing for the Lord Allied Gort telegraphed
I Sir John Dill asking him to except fly over on the that spot, day.
Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38
10

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris; an extract is quoted below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received from the Secretary of State for War:
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced "!. These were some of the facts:-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice, in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard, that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counterattack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
11

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German break-through on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th ":
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675