TNA ADM 234 360

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only a few minutes later:
" Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005."
To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from
G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might, indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.²
All ships diverted to the beaches
Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from
Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral
Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy, and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³
were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol, the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne.
The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of subsequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵
Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the
17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷, and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and
I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo'
the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040,
Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the beach at Malo-les-Bains.
This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into
3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap between each part. (Appendix O. 11).
2 D.R. page 3, para. 8.
3
The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields.
4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8.
5 D.R., p.3, para. 38.
6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden
Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, Yorkshire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II.
7 Appendix D.6.
23

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
beach evacuation impossible; at no time did this happen, but it was not until the fifth day of the operation (May 30th) that small power boats and beach craft began to become available in adequate numbers.¹
The reason for this is to be sought mainly in the need for secrecy enjoined by the British and French Governments, even after the operation had been ordered. The necessity for avoiding any action that might have given rise to talk rendered the collection of small craft slow. It was not until 31st May that the British public learnt from the press that evacuation had begun.
Disembarkation ports designated
In these early days the limiting factors seemed likely to be the scale of enemy attacks at Dunkirk and on the beaches, and the difficulty of concentrating the ships and the troops at a common point or points².
Meanwhile, in order to ensure air protection, Blenheims maintained a patrol by single aircraft over the Dunkirk area during the night.³
At 2330, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, promulgated the names of ports for the disembarkation of troops in England as follows:-
The Calcutta at Sheerness;
destroyers at Dover;
drifters, minesweepers, skoots and coasters
___???___
At Margate or Ramsgate as directed by N.O.I.C. Ramsgate;
personnel vessels at Folkestone.
Throughout the whole course of the operation the despatch of troops from the points of disembarkation in England was directed by the War Office Movements Control Organisation, and proceeded with great smoothness⁴.
Summary of troops evacuated
The ships which had sailed for Dunkirk on the 26th May brought back
6,183 troops and 646 stretcher cases next day.
During the 27th May only two personnel vessels actually made the round trip, viz.: the Royal Daffodil, which brought back 840 troops from Dunkirk, and the St. Helier, which was ordered back before she could embark any troops.
The destroyers Wolsey and Wolfhound, which embarked 206 and 130 troops respectively from Malo beach on the evening of 27th May, did not sail for
England until shortly after midnight.
Thus, the total number landed in England from the commencement of
Operation "Dynamo" to midnight 27th/28th May was:
26th May - Nil;
27th May - 7,669, all of whom were lifted direct from Dunkirk harbour.
I D.R. covering letter, No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, paras. 3 and 5.
2 D.R. page 3, para. 11.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p. 320.
4 D.R. covering letter No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, para. 6.
25

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP V
While a situation that could only mean surrender was now visualised in
England as possibly a stark necessity, General Weygand sent an urgent telegram to Lord Gort appealing to him personally to ensure that the British
Army took a vigorous part in any counter-attack thought necessary; the situation, said General Weygand, made it essential to hit hard.
Lord Gort, who saw the situation more clearly, observes, when he [General
Weygand] sent this message, he could have had no accurate information of the real position or of the powers of counter-attack remaining to either the
British or French."
Germans take Ostend
That evening, at 2030, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that Ostend was reliably reported to be captured. Dunkirk was the only port left in Allied hands.
Situation at Dunkirk becomes easier
Nor were the prospects at Dunkirk very hopeful. When the Wolfhound and the Wolsey left Malo beach for Dover just after midnight on the 27th May the whole of the port appeared to be ablaze¹.
At 0125 the cruiser Calcutta, en route for La Panne, was missed by a torpedo
100 yards astern fired from an E-boat. No further attack took place, and the
Calcutta arrived off La Panne beach an hour later to find that the destroyers
Grafton, Greyhound and Impulsive, and the paddle-minesweepers Sandown and
Gracie Fields, were already there.
Ever since 0030 destroyers making their first trip to the evacuation area had been arriving off the beaches, and only two - the Gallant and the Wakeful -
went to Dunkirk. The Vivacious and the skoot Hebe II reached Malo beach at about 0030, and the Sabre at 0120. The Hebe II, unable to find any troops, entered Dunkirk harbour and embarked 150 from the east pier; the Sabre embarked troops from two drifters. At 0320 the Vimy arrived off the beach at Zuydcoote, 3 miles east of Dunkirk, and sent her boats to assist in filling up the minesweeper Brighton Belle, which was embarking troops with the assistance of the ex-Belgian canal boat Yser and a small pulling boat. The skoot
Lena had been off Zuydcoote since the previous evening and in the early hours of the 28th May transferred the 120 troops she had embarked to a destroyer;
the minesweeper Medway Queen, off La Panne since 2300/27, sailed with 600
troops on board.
By 0400 the situation in Dunkirk harbour appears to have eased, and at
0436 S.N.O. Dunkirk was asking for all vessels to go alongside the east pier.
At 0445 the Vimy, leaving her boats with the Brighton Belle, went into Dunkirk harbour and embarked 613 troops. At 0955 the destroyer Mackay reached
Dunkirk from the Irish Sea, and picked up 600 troops in an hour from the seaward end of Dunkirk east pier, giving up her berth to the destroyer Montrose.
The Sabre, which had in the meantime returned to Dover with a load of 158
troops from Malo beach, berthed outside the Montrose. An hour later, the destroyers Worcester and Anthony arrived, and berthed ahead of the Montrose.
The pier was crammed with troops and several aircraft, attempting to bomb it, were driven off by the destroyers' gunfire. Vast columns of smoke were drifting westwards from the burning oil tanks ashore, and houses on the sea front were bursting into flames from time to time².
I Report by the Wolfhound.
2 Report by the Montrose.
27

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
and Hilda), two power boats and Kellett a tow and pulling Leda, but boats; the(Doggersbank with the Calcutta¹, the Gallant, Wakeful, of Verity, two skoots was joined by the minesweepers the number there were insufficient boats and motor launches to cope with of troops on the beach.
Calcutta had already lost one of her two whalers2.
70 wounded (cot cases); heavy embarkation difficult and the
Off La Panne, at 2157, the Calcutta, surf assisted made by the skoot Reiger, embarked
By the 28th May beach evacuation had become a vitally essential part complete lack of small beaching craft, other than ships' boats - aftermath
Operation Dynamo". It was, however, severely restricted by the almost of the wish, already noticed, to prevent early information of the operation be- of coming known to the enemy; and an urgent and persistent cry for boats arose from the ships off the beaches.³
Beach craft are sailed for Dunkirk
Steps had already been taken, however, to begin the provision of small boats.
At 0800 on the 28th May, 8 motor boats were sailed from the Thames for the
South Downs. At noon the tug Sun V with 8 cutters and 2 whalers in tow, and the tug St. Clears with 11 cutters in tow, left Sheerness for Ramsgate, and both tugs sailed for Dunkirk late in the evening. Of these two tows, however, only 7 cutters reached the beaches, the remainder being lost en route.4
At 1500 the tug Java left Ramsgate for Dunkirk, in company with four drifters⁵ and 5 motor launches⁶. They arrived off Bray at 0100 on 29th May, and were the first arrivals of small motor craft off the beaches. With them, at 1500 on the 28th May, 5 drifters of the 1st Mine Recovery Flotilla left Ramsgate for Dunkirk⁷, and at 1845, 18 motor boats with 17 whalers left Sheerness for Dover.⁸
Supply of small craft is accelerated
These supplied only a portion of what was required. There was still a lack of small craft, and at 2002 V.A. Dover asked that every available shallow draft power boat should be sent to the beaches⁹. The Admiralty's vigorous reaction to this request became fully evident on the following day, the 29th May, when the Portsmouth and Nore Commands, the Thames estuary and the Port of
London Authority were combed for motor boats, lighters and barges¹⁰. To accelerate the journey arrangements were made to route them direct to the beaches, provided they had charts, food, fuel etc.¹¹, though some difficulty was experienced in providing the large number of charts required. Indeed, on the road map" to navigate on.
31st May the Master of the coaster Hythe states that he was given an army
I 2 The Calcutta reported she was off La Panne.
Appendix H.2.
3 Appendices H.1 and H.2.
Five gunfire from Clears' cutters were lost en morning route to Dunkirk a collision with the destroyer the result of enemy
4 The of the Sun St. V's tow was lost early next in Montrose.
up 5 by The the Sp. Gravelines Serv./V. Crested and Nieuport; Eagle. one of the 5 was, next however, day, as subsequently picked
6 The Lord Walker Rodney, I, Lord Keith, Lord Collingwood
7 8 9 The Appendix Lord Cavan, G.6. Walker Fidget, II, Jacketa, New Britannic, Silver Dawn Nayland, and and Fisher and Lord Angler Boy St. Vincent. (Appendix II. G.5).
Appendix G.7.
II 10 Appendices G.13 to G.18.
Appendix G.9.
32

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VI
and machine gun platforms, a bulkhead wrecking was dished, them was severely shaken, and 13 killed, wounded; of the passengers, and orders killed and 2 men the ship's company, 3 officers 2 officers men and were 10 men were and 18
wounded. Then a fire broke out, further dive bomb were given to flood and burn the signal books. A anchored. attack took bombs fell wide. The Bideford and the tug St. Clears The in tow; she was,
The M/S Kellett came endeavoured alongside the to take Bideford, the Bideford and took off about 300 troops, in tow, but again the tow parted.
ever, fast aground, and the tow parted. dr. Havant then tried to take how-' her
Bideford towed to Dover embarked in the Bideford. from La Panne dawn, gunboat Locust, carrying 620
During the night of 29th-30th Near May, 350 the French and 50 British troops and at daylight she less than 21/2 knots course was set for
British and French troops floated - in tow. At beach, passed a tow to the Bideford,
Dover; en route, during the first 3 miles, the tow parted 3 times. Throughout the 30th May the Locust struggled on with her burden. During the night
French soldier jumped overboard, fully equipped. The tow was stopped, a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered; but, in spite of good visibility and a calm sea, the unknown soldier was not recovered although a search was made a at 1130 on the 31st May and disembarked 436 troops.
for 30 minutes. In spite of the tow again parting, the Bideford reached Dover
The momentous issues at stake in Operation "Dynamo" were not to be attained without grievous losses, but the Bideford's heroic voyage to safety marked a momentary respite from the rapidly mounting toll of lives and ships.
Twelve hundred troops wade out to a skoot
At about 2300 on the 29th May the skoot Patria arrived off Bray from Rams-
The Captain of the Patria, who decided to ground his ship, records that "The gate and, in the glow of the still burning Crested Eagle, saw troops on the beach.
troops, holding hands, waded out and clambered on board by nets, ladders and ropes' ends. The sight of two solid phalanxes of men, delineated by phosphorescence in the water and steadily advancing to the ship, will be memorable them Over 1,000 men were embarked in just over two hours." Among
Crested Eagle and the Fenella.
were naval ratings - casualties with severe burns from the Grenade, the
Dover unaware of losses filtered heavy Lord Lord to Little Earlier Dover, Gort bombardment Gort through information in and and the and at the day to 3rd 0127 Dover, 3rd of other and Corps the Corps the that important except disastrous Vice-Admiral, destroyers at La that information losses Panne it there was Dover, of known the were had, afternoon informed being that however, hit Dunkirk the and soon come Calcutta early after was through evening 1600. under that effort the beach was and to be embark made to the concentrate force. of the B.E.F. destroyers were and at La light Panne, craft and at that that end every of
I D.R.
46

WEDNESDAY, 29TH MAY
CHAP. VI
Calcutta contacts Lord Gort
On receipt of this signal at 0345 the Calcutta, which had already been embarking troops from La Panne beach, sent her boats in again, in charge of Mr. F.J.
March, Gunner. Mr. March made personal contact with Lord Gort about
8 miles inland, and placed the Calcutta at his disposal for his or his staff's evacuation. Lord Gort, however, courteously refused to be evacuated at this stage¹.
La Panne beach cleared of troops
Meanwhile the Calcutta was proceeding with the embarkation, having enlisted the assistance of the minesweepers Sutton and Salamander, the tug Java, five drifters2, and three motor launches³. By 1357 the Calcutta had embarked
1200 troops, with whom she proceeded to Sheerness.
In addition to the ships assisting the Calcutta, 7 minesweepers4, 4 skoots5, and 5 destroyers⁶ also embarked troops from La Panne beach. Of the destroyers, the Greyhound was bombed and severely damaged (see p.42).
The minesweepers embarked, in all, 3415 troops, the skoots 1137 and the destroyers 2100. The tramp Yewdale and the motor vessels Beal and Bullfinch between them brought off 1,854. The assault landing craft A.L.C.15 ferried about 750 troops from the beaches to off-lying ships, and finally transported
25 to Dover; the A.L.C.5 also ferried troops throughout the day.
The paddle-minesweeper Oriole had beached herself at La Panne at about
0600, thus permitting about 2,500 troops to pass over her decks to be embarked by other ships before she refloated at about 1800. In this connection, Sub-
Lieut. Croswell, who had been landed at La Panne at about 0600 with a small beach party in the Harvester's motor skiff, says: " On the beach we found
14 boats which we launched. A line ferry was established from a paddlesteamer [the Oriole] which was aground close inshore, and this steamer served as a pier alongside which other boats were able to come.
Throughout the day embarkation continued."
Later in his report, Sub-Lieut. Croswell says " About 1400
bombing commenced - there were no casualties though 8 heavy bombs fell within 100
yards of the place of embarkation. A supply ship [the danlayer Nautilus]
to the right of the beach was fired and destroyed by a near miss, and a destroyer
[the Greyhound] was hit by an incendiary bomb [in fact she was severely damaged by a near miss] but continued in action. I joined up with the Army
Staff controlling evacuation - there were no other naval officers at La Panne.⁷
About 2300
I requested that piers should be built but was told nothing could be done that night.
Lord Gort arrived on the beach on Thursday morning [30th May] and asked what could be done to assist. I again suggested erection of piers, and under Colonel Porter's direction this was begun, the pier at La Panne being ready and in use by 1400".
I Calcutta's report.
2 The Golden Sunbeam, Lord Rodney, Lord Keith, Lord St. Vincent, and Lord Collingwood.
3 The Angler II, Nayland and New Britannic.
4 The Emperor of India, Gracie Fields, Halcyon, Hebe, Oriole, Princess Elizabeth and
Waverley.
5 The Reiger, Doggersbank, Jutland and Oranje.
6 The Shikari, Harvester, Anthony, Sabre and Greyhound.
7 Sub. Lt. Croswell was not given orders by his commanding officer to remain ashore.
He says as at La Panne there was no liaison between Army and Navy, I realised I could do a much more useful job by remaining there," and he stayed there until 1st June. Commenting on this, Lt. Cdr. M. Thornton, R.N., Captain of the Harvester says: " This young officer wisely accepted responsibility of missing his ship and then took charge of the beaches and embarkation.
(C.W.23187/40.)
47

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VI
and returned to harbour; the remainder Chantecler reached and the La Panne at 0500/30.
Dutch eel-boats Johanna and Chantecler M.B. Golden Lily also The and Ramsgate " compass at which 2200/29. was reached situated The the over beaches, the was engine. however, only capable revolved at 0900 of slowly 4 knots, round and and left her she had no charts, lost way 30th Later darkness, and returned to and brought back 30 troops. her in the Downs in the get over on May, round"¹. She The Johanna did not on the 30th
Ramsgate on the morning of the May. on that day she was towed to the beaches by the skoot Jutland.
Troops transported on 29th May reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve
The 29th May closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked the high rate of evacuation hoped for. The effect of the day's occurrences even more marked next day, when instead of the 50,000 to 60,000 British was troops which had been calculated as the probable achievement, only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.²
Nevertheless, 47,310 troops (including some 2,000 casualties) were landed in England on the 29th May (see Table 2), 13,752 having been lifted from the beaches and 33,558 from the harbour. Only about 11 per cent of these were
French troops³, whose organised evacuation had not yet begun. (See Appendices Y.2 to Y.5).
During the morning and forenoon of the 29th May, when there was no bombing of Dunkirk harbour, 1Q personnel vessels⁴ lifted 14,760 troops from the east pier; during the afternoon, in spite of the bombing, the Canterbury lifted a further 1,960.
The development of beach evacuation is indicated by the fact that nearly
21 times the number of troops were lifted from the beaches on 29th May as compared with the number lifted on the previous day. Seventeen destroyers each made one round trip during the 24 hours of the 29th May and an eighteenth destroyer, the Icarus, made two such trips. On these trips the 18 destroyers embarked and transported to England 10,694 troops of which 6,198 were lifted from the beaches and 4,506 from Dunkirk harbour. Nine minesweepers⁶
together lifted 2,426 troops from the beaches although one of them, the Albury did not land her troops in England until the next day.⁷ Among other ships which brought back troops from the beaches was the cruiser Calcutta with
1,200.
The record of troops landed in England now stood as follows:-
From the
From the
Total for beaches harbour the day
26th May
Nil
Nil
Nil
27th May
Nil
7,669
7,669
28th May
5,930
11,874
17,804
29th May
13,752
33,558
47,310
I Report by Chantecler.
40,724. This figure probably puts does not include troops carried by foreign ships (See Prague,
3 2 D.R., D.R. p.11, which para. incidentally 38. the total of troops and casualties landed on 29th Table May 2). as
The Côte d'Argent, Killarney, King George V, Maid of Orleans, Manxman,
Javelin, Malcolm, Express, Verity, Wolsey and Marmion
Royal 5 The Daffodil, Anthony, Royal Codrington, Sovereign, Esk, Scotia, and Tynwald. Greyhound, Harvester, Intrepid, Worcester. Ivanhoe,
6 The Albury, Duchess Sabre, of Scimitar, Fife, Emperor Shikari, of Vanquisher, India, Fitzroy, Halcyon, Hebe, Leda, and Sharpshooter.
7 See Table 3, in conjunction with the reports of ships' proceedings in Vol. II.
54

CHAP. VI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Ramsgate at 2200/29. situated over the engine. capable of 4 knots, also and left
Dutch eel-boats Johanna The Chantecler was only M.B. Golden Lily The and returned to harbour; and the remainder Chantecler reached and the La Panne at 0500/30.
and brought back lost troops. her in the Downs in the get over on May, and round"¹. She 30 The Johanna did not on the 30th and compass which was reached the beaches, however, revolved at 0900 slowly round her
Ramsgate on the morning on that day she was towed she had no charts, of way the 30th May. Later darkness, and returned to to the beaches by the skoot Jutland.
Troops transported on 29th May reduction in the number of destroyers and with failure to
The 29th May closed with a formidable available list of ships lost or damaged, a marked the high rate of evacuation hoped for. The effect of the day's occurrences achieve even more marked next day, when instead of the 50,000 to 60,000 British was were in fact transported.²
troops which had been calculated as the probable achievement, only 48,000 odd
Nevertheless, 47,310 troops (including some 2,000 casualties) were landed in England on the 29th May (see Table 2), 13,752 having been lifted from the beaches and 33,558 from the harbour. Only about 11/2 per cent of these were
French troops³, whose organised evacuation had not yet begun. (See Appendices Y.2 to Y.5).
During the morning and forenoon of the 29th May, when there was no bombing of Dunkirk harbour, 1Q personnel vessels⁴ lifted 14,760 troops from the east pier; during the afternoon, in spite of the bombing, the Canterbury lifted a further 1,960.
The development of beach evacuation is indicated by the fact that nearly
2½ times the number of troops were lifted from the beaches on 29th May as compared with the number lifted on the previous day. Seventeen destroyers⁵
each made one round trip during the 24 hours of the 29th May and an eighteenth destroyer, the Icarus, made two such trips. On these trips the 18 destroyers embarked and transported to England 10,694 troops of which 6,198 were lifted from the beaches and 4,506 from Dunkirk harbour. Nine minesweepers6
together lifted 2,426 troops from the beaches although one of them, the Albury did not land her troops in England until the next day.⁷ Among other ships which brought back troops from the beaches was the cruiser Calcutta with
1,200.
The record of troops landed in England now stood as follows:-
From the
From the
Total for beaches harbour the day
26th May
Nil
Nil
Nil
27th May
Nil
7,669
7,669
28th May
5,930
11,874
17,804
29th May
13,752
33,558
47,310
I Report by Chantecler.
3 D.R., which incidentally puts the total of and casualties landed on 29th Table May 2). as
2 D.R. p.11, para. 38.
40,724. This figure probably does not include troops carried by foreign ships (See Prague,
4 The Côte d'Argent, Killarney, King George troops V, Maid of Orleans, Manxman,
Royal Daffodil, Royal Sovereign, Scotia, and
Javelin, Malcolm, Sabre, Scimitar, Verity, Wolsey and Worcester. Marmion
5 The Anthony, Codrington, Esk, Express, Tynwald. Greyhound, Harvester, Intrepid, Ivanhoe,
6 The Albury, Duchess of Fife, Emperor Shikari, of Vanquisher, India, Fitzroy, Halcyon, Hebe, Leda, and Sharpshooter.
7 See Table 3, in conjunction with the reports of ships' proceedings in Vol. II.
54

CHAP. IX
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Admiral, When Rear-Admiral Dover, all the Wake-Walker ships which left full had about of not been 0930 sunk to make had contact with many with the signs and collisions. Some were a theme the evidence of bumps first few hours at rest in harbour the
1800," he wrote, the of harbour their strenuous was times all had were for many enjoying days."¹ the that many of them and had
Air Patrols
Consequent on the bombing of at the dawn. day before, As the had asked for fighter aircraft protection appeared on the and low over the ships. More and often not they were fighters constantly came dispersed many than scene, were not taking chances the nearly always opened them. In order to stop firing Rear-Admiral
Flag-" Cease fire", and blew the syren to draw spite of which, however, the after machine gun of his own ship the Keith continued to nothing.² regardless of the cease fire" gong; once firing started they could hear fire
Route X to Dunkirk was patrolled during the early hours of daylight by the
A.A. cruiser Calcutta, which sailed from Margate at 0315 with the corvettes
Mallow and Shearwater and carried out a patrol between W and V buoys. The
Calcutta was recalled to Sheerness at 0938 in readiness to perform the same service next night, and at 1015 she shot down a Heinkel which had bombed and damaged the Mosquito by a near miss 15 miles from Dover.
Fighter Command provided 8 patrols during the 1st June of an average strength of 3 to 4 squadrons. The main periods when no fighter protection was afforded were approximately 0730-0850, 1020-1120, 1120-1145, 1545-
1615 and 1715-1845. Coastal Command continued to fly patrols of 3 aircraft over the North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend line throughout the day.
Enemy air attacks begin St. Fagan sunk 0355.
Sporadic enemy air attacks began at early light. Ships alongside the mole reported being attacked at 0415 and 0500. This was before the first main
R.A.F. air patrol appeared on the scene, for the R.A.F. had been asked to provide maximum protection from 0500 onwards.
Before the first patrol appeared enemy aircraft claimed what was to prove the first of a long series of victims that day. The tug St. Fagan had towed over from Dover during the night three Thames barges. At about 0355, in the
Dunkirk Channel, abreast the town the ship was hit by a bomb and practically disintegrated. Only two officers, including her Captain, Lieut.-Commander
G. H. Warren, M.B.E., R.N., and 6 ratings, were saved out of a total complement of 25. They were picked up by the tug Tanga which had come over from
Ramsgate with 6 boats in tow and had hung off outside Dunkirk most of the night waiting for troops to be brought out to her, and was then on her way home with 160 men on board and a motor-boat in tow.
Almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of our aircraft at 0730 a heavy dive bombing attack developed by a compact formation of some 30 or 40 Ju. 75s, causing the loss of the destroyers Keith and Basilisk, the minesweeper Skipjack, and the tug St. Abbs.
2 I Report, M.017978/41 p.29.
3 M.017978/41, p.23.
R.A.F. narrative.
88

DUSK TO DUSK, IST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
Dunkirk and entered harbour at 1530 on 1st June. Whilst there, she was twice hit by shore batteries, though damage was slight and there was only one and troops and finally proceeded at 2230.
light casualty. The ship lay alongside for 7 hours, embarking stretcher cases
Amongst the various classes of ships none had suffered proportionately heavier losses than the personnel vessels to which Vice-Admiral Dover referred in his message to the Admiralty. Their crews had been doing magnificent work in the face of nerve-racking experiences. Up to date 8 of these ships had been sunk and 4 disabled. It was arranged that during this night's evacuation personnel ships in addition to destroyers were to berth at the East Pier in Dunkirk where they were to be given priority.
The danger of sending these valuable ships in to Dunkirk in daylight was too great, and after the 1st of June they were sent in only under cover of darkness, with a naval Ljeutenant-Commander or Commander on board each ship as adviser to the Master and with crews stiffened by 10 seamen for handling the wires and going alongside under fire. It was hoped by these means not only to get the ships to sail to time but also to ensure that they would enter Dunkirk harbour and not linger outside awaiting a quiet interval, or return empty.
To their credit it must be recorded that not all the personnel ships needed the moral support of naval ratings.
Air Operations, morning of 2nd June
The batteries which had brought Route X under fire were between Le
Clipont, near Pointe de Gravelines (see Plan 3), and Les Huttes, about a mile north east of Gravelines; they were attacked by the R.A.F. in 24 Blenheim sorties between first light and 0745 on the 2nd, the object of spreading the attack in this manner being to neutralise the batteries during the period of daylight evacuation. The Blenheims encountered much anti-aircraft fire, and though no aircraft were lost some were damaged and afterwards crash-landed on their airfields.
The Air Ministry were asked to provide strong continuous patrols over
Dunkirk and the beaches from 0430 to 0830 on the 2nd June, with night fighter patrols during the hours of darkness. It was arranged that the fighter patrols should go out over the routes in use by our ships, and on the return journey fly low on the routes to give maximum protection to ships against low flying bomb and machine gun attacks. The concentration of fighter patrols in the dawn and dusk periods resulted in a great decrease in the total number of flying hours on the 2nd June (See Appendix C.)
The early morning was hazy, and the first two main R.A.F. patrols, both at four squadron strength, encountered no enemy aircraft and no ships reported being attacked during this period. The third patrol, the strongest yet flown, consisting of five full squadrons, which was over the Dunkirk area from 0745-
0845, encountered very considerable enemy forces, and claimed to have shot down 18 enemy bombers and 10 fighters, themselves losing 7 Spitfires. Again, no reports of attacks came from the ships; and as far as can be ascertained no attacks occurred until the Calcutta, patrolling near W buoy with the Mallard and Shearwater, was attacked at 1035 by 3 Ju. 88 which dived out of the sun and bombed her, causing slight damage from near misses. A Coastal patrol witnessed the incident and drove off the enemy. The French light cruiser
Epérvier and destroyer Léopard were also on the patrol line, but they apparently left the patrol when bombing began at 1035 and up to 1442 when the Calcutta returned to Sheerness by orders of Vice-Admiral Dover, nothing more was seen
99

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. X
clearly marked as hospital ships. Neither of the two ever reached Dunkirk.
were despatched from Dover, the Worthing at 1255 and the Paris at 1648, both we should scrupulously observe the Two hospital carriers part en clair asking for hospital ships to be Geneva sent across Convention. and stating that for our
At 1433 the A/S trawler Grimsby Town, on patrol on Route X, reported that had bombed a hospital ship. This was Worthing. Visibility was good.
12 aircraft bearing 90° South Foreland 27 the miles (between V and W buoys)
Nine bombs were dropped and the the Calcutta ship was sent machine the gunned, she was slightly damaged by near misses and corvette Mallard to stand by her. The Worthing returned to harbour.
near W buoy, when two aircraft attacked her, near misses putting out of action
The Paris, after running into thick fog, was in clear visibility at about 1900, her engines and extinguishing all lights. About an hour later the ship was attacked again by 3 aircraft, and received further damage. She was abandoned by all but the Captain and some of the officers, who were shortly afterwards taken off by a fast motor boat which also rescued men from some of the Paris's lifeboats that had been wrecked by bombing. Three tugs, the Sun XV, Sun IV
and Lady Brassey attempted to tow the ship; but at 0400 on 3rd June, after a further air attack, the Paris sank 1 mile east of W. buoy.
Evacuation figures, 2nd June
A total of 26,256 men were landed in England on 2nd June, 19,561 from
Dunkirk harbour and 6,695 from the beaches. Of these totals, French ships working only from the harbour carried 1634, and Belgian trawlers carried 313.
The accumulated total of men evacuated to this date was 285,305.
104

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XIII
the The factors variations recorded in the in the daily following figures paragraphs. are believed to have been influenced by average waiting time normal. This probably norm, due the number of the
28TH MAY. Beaches. corresponded Although the to rate the estimated of lift was average (1: 1), and ing boats. Destroyers, 356 were new to the lifted per trip was below which made 8 was of the 13 trips, to shortage of beach- men and their lift per trip was only Calcutta's as lift against reduced a destroyer aveage of 504 work wounded (cot cases) which she the whole operation. The embarked. was by the large number over of
HARBOUR. Although the average lift was the above normal, the long waiting
The figures of waiting time are not, however, entirely satisfactory only 10
time reduced the men: minutes ratio to estimated norm for the operation.
ships provided data, three of which waited for periods greatly in excess of the average.
HARBOUR. The increase in average lift without corresponding rise in waiting time is accounted for by the great increase in the number of personnel ships employed and the average lifts made by them on this day. The average lift per personnel ship, which on the 28th May was only 552, rose to 1,520 today.
30TH MAY. Beaches. The increase of 25 per cent in the figure for average lift without corresponding rise in waiting time, resulting in the highest men minutes ratio achieved at the beaches during the operation, is believed to have been due to:-
(a) better organisation consequent upon the arrival of R.A. Dover as
S.N.O. on the French coast and of Captain Howson as N.O.I.C. Beaches, together with the employment of two Commodores to take charge off shore at La Panne and Bray; (b) better discipline amongst the troops on the beaches; (c) employment as beaching craft of the A.L.Cs. which began to arrive on the 29th, and the arrival of 12 motor boats for retrieving abandoned pulling boats; (d) absence of enemy air attacks.
Harbour. Although the rate of lift deviated little from the average, both lift and waiting time declined. This was probably the effect of the disastrous air attacks of the previous day on shipping, which resulted in only one destroyer at a time being allowed to enter Dunkırk during the forenoon and early afternoon and perhaps engendered a feeling of insecurity and a wish to get the ships away as quickly as possible.
31ST MAY. Beaches. A considerable reduction in average waiting time and a normal. boats slight rise This above was normal due probably in average to the lift fact gave that a rate greater of lift numbers slightly of better beaching than were available. Although during the forenoon conditions on the beaches were very bad they improved greatly during the afternoon and evening. On the beaches, after 1600, the piers of pontoons were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops.
Harbour. minutes Lift was average, but waiting time high and reduced the men be rate of lift. No valid reason was discovered, and it should noted that all the figures agree closely for this with can the be estimated norm.
" 0943 I This The belief moment is based on the final sentence in Situation Report by S.N.O. Dunkirk at 0950 timed the If single this weather destroyer persists allowed bombing I want to enter starts a ship would all every must remain half shove hour," alongside off "; which and for would only on the half seem signal an to hour. imply that
126

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX D
APPENDIX D
SIGNALS RE BUILD-UP OF DESTROYERS
BETWEEN 27th MAY AND 1st JUNE
Note (i)
The 213 signals in Appendices D to Z have been collated from the some 370 which 2,500 accompanies Dynamo Admiralty signals in Record Admiralty Office Record Case 5458. Office Enclosure copies Box No. of
Note
(ii)
Command, 10 British destroyers-were employed of the Dover Command,
15 destroyers from from the the Portsmouth Nore Command, Command, 10 from and 6 the Western Approaches total of 41 in Operation Dynamo.
Monday, 27th May
1. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY (R) C.-in-C. Nore but not at the expense of Nore Command.
Request Dover Forces may be strengthened forthwith by six additional destroyers
1036/27
2. ADMIRALTY to C.-in-C. WESTERN APPROACHES, C.-in-C. PORTSMOUTH (R) Vice-
Dover. Admiral Dover, C.-in-C. Nore, C.-in-C. Home Fleet, F.O.I.C. Humber, R.A
Request four destroyers from Western Approaches and two from Portsmouth be sailed for Dover as soon as possible.
1317/27
3. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Grafton (R) S.O. 10th M.S.F., Greyhound, Calcutta.
Close beach in vicinity of La Panne at 0100 and send in boats for British troops.
You should withdraw at your discretion and anyhow not later than 0330. Paddle minesweepers and small craft will be in vicinity. Acknowledge.
2054/27
[V.A. Dover informed (between 2015 and 2055/27) that embarkation was only possible from the beaches, and that evacuation on the night of 28th-29th May was problematical (see Apps. M.3 and M.4) ].
4. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Grafton, Greyhound, Blyskawica (R) S.O. 10th M.S.F.
Close the beach at La Panne at 0100 tomorrow Tuesday and embark all possible
British troops using your boats. This is our last chance of saving them.
2127/27
4a.
2242/27: I The Polish destroyer Blyskawica was not in company but she replied at
We have two pulling boats only. Can accommodate 3 in each
Monday, 27th May
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, Impulsive. DOVER to Gallant, Vivacious, Windsor, Vimy, Calcutta, Anthony.
all them. possible British troops using boats. last chance of saving
Close beaches one to three miles east of Dunkirk with utmost despatch and embark
Maid of Orleans, Lormont, your 17 drifters own and other This craft is our will be operating. 2142/27
6. VICE-ADMIRAL, 17 drifters DOVER to Wolfhound, Wolsey.
Direct arriving Dunkirk tonight to beaches as necessary.
2158/27
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, Close DOVER to Vimy.
and embark the beaches one to three miles Tuesday saving them. all possible British troops using east of your Dunkirk boats. at This 0100 is tomorrow our last chance of
2238/27
162

SIGNALS
APPENDIX H
Friday, 31st May-contd.
31. C.-IN-C. NORE to N.C.S.O. SOUTHEND, SHEERNESS F.O.I.C. LONDON, F.O.I.C. D.M.O. HARWICH, CoM-
MODORE IN CHARGE, (R) Admiralty, Sheerness, V.A.
Dover, N.O.I.C. Ramsgate
No more small craft are to be sailed for Ramsgate until further orders. They are to be kept at immediate notice at the places where they now are.
1825/31
32. VICE-ADMIRAL, London. DOVER to ADMIRALTY (R) N.O.I.C. Ramsgate, C.-in-C. Nore, F.O.I.C.
For Admiral Preston.
In view of alteration of plan request 30 motor boats and a number of pulling boats up to 40 may be sent to Ramsgate forthwith. Please advise expected time 2031/31 of arrival.
33. F.O.I.C. LONDON to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) C.-IN-C. Nore, N.O.I.C. Ramsgate,
Admiralty, N.C.S.O. Thames.
V.A. Dover 2031/31. 30 motor boats sailed; expect to arrive Ramsgate 1100.
And 40 lifeboats with 3 tugs should arrive noon 1st June. Crews for lifeboats will be required to join at Ramsgate.
2330/31
Saturday, 1st June
34. ADMIRALTY to F.O.I.C. HARWICH (R) Cdre. i/c Sheerness, V.A. Dover, N.O.I.C.
All motor Ramsgate boats from Burnham if still detained at Harwich and any others available are to be sent at once direct to Ramsgate for operation Dynamo.
0947/1
APPENDIX H
SIGNALS RE LACK OF SMALL CRAFT
Tuesday, 28th May
1. Wakeful to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Plenty of troops few boats. Conditions good alongside Dunkirk east pier protected by smoke.
0507/28
2. Calcutta to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) S.N.O. Dunkirk
Conditions for embarkation at La Panne are very bad owing to heavy surf but may improve with rising tide. Have already lost one and possibly both my whalers.
2225/28
Wednesday, 29th May
3. Leda to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Message from Brigadier-General i/c of embarkation.
Present rate of embarkation from shore to ship quite inadequate. Beach bombed throughout the day.
0210/29
4. D.16 [Malcolm] to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Destroyers motor boats are inadequate to deal with number on beaches.
More boats urgently needed.
Weather is now difficult for boat work.
0428/29
5. Calcutta to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Evacuation at La Panne being seriously delayed by lack of boats.
0805/29
6. M.S. 10 to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Motor landing craft urgently required
Bray strong tide.
1455/29
169

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX J
to return the to effect England. that a was at Dunkirk telling Margate boats to
During the evening skoot of the 1st going June a along report the was beaches recieved from S.N.T.O.
Antje The intended Antje was to hailed get confirmation and told with to from survivors return. her, when A warship the troop was carrier Scoficinity, sarrier Scoticinity, and skoot Oranje with boats in tow was England and complied.
close to her; so Antje filled up told to return and to returned. is understood sunk that another skoot was of these details. was hands. It has not occasion been
In view of these informed reports, message that Dunkirk 2335/1 was in sent German out. On an earlier possible to get confirmation
2332/3
APPENDIX J
SIGNALS RE PATROLS IN THE NORTH SEA SOUTH AND ON THE
ROUTES TO DUNKIRK
Sunday, 26th May
1. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. NORE, (R) V.A. Dover, F.O.I.C. Harwich, F.O.I.C. Humber
All available forces are to be used for covering operation Dynamo tonight Sunday.
1937/26
2. Widgeon to C.-IN-C. NORE
Siroco was torpedoed by 2 M.T.B.'s
0200/31
Saturday, 1st June
3. Malabar to ANY-BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR
explosion 2 miles? S buoy.
Argyllshire sunk by torpedo. Survivors report submarine submerged before
0310/1
4. Kingston Galena to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Capt. A.P.
to Dover.
Stella Dorado torpedoed. Picked up 5 survivors, 1 badly injured. Proceeding
0430/1
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMAND
Magnetic mines reported to have been laid vicinity of buoy F.G. on route X.
2310/1
Sunday, 2nd June
6. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Epervier (R) Léopard, Savorgnan de Brazza.
N. Goodwin L.V. 8 miles. Caused by shell fire. Vanquisher left Dover 1305 B.S.T.
Three aux. patrol vessels reported out of action at 1214 B.S.T. in position 090°
to investigate and report.
1315/2
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Calcutta, (R) C.-in-C. Nore, Admiralty, Savorgnan de Brazza patrol to that carried out today Sunday is to be carried out tomorrow Monday,
Return to Sheerness and revert to 1 hours notice for steam. An exactly similar provided patrol line. C.-in-C. Nore can provide a screen. Inform the French vessels on your
1247/2
were was not already sufficient ships in Dunkirk harbour and that was Oranje's complete, tow of 4 boats,
I A skoot informed Oranje that beach evacuation that there required. About an hour later the Oranje did in fact return to England.
172

SIGNALS
APPENDIX K
8. Calcutta to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Your 1274. French ships apparently left patrol when bombing started at 1035
as I have not seen them since.
1442/2
9. Saon to CAPTAIN A.P.
Blackburn Rovers struck by torpedo. Going to her assistance.
1618/2
10. Saon to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Westella torpedoed.
My posisition 51° 20' N., 02° 7' C.
1639/2
Monday, 3rd June
11. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to C.-IN-C. NORE (R) Admiralty, Calcutta
As withdrawal from Dunkirk tonight 3rd/4th is planned for 0230 instead of 0300, do not propose to employ Calcutta as A/A escort.
1419/3
APPENDIX K
SIGNALS RE ROUTES TO DUNKIRK
27th May
1. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS OPERATING UNDER ORDERS OF VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Routes to Dunkerque are as follows:
Route Z, via No. 6 Calais bell buoy and south of Dunkirk AW buoy.
Route Y, via Downs, West Hinder, North Channel and West Deep, Q.Z.S.80 and
60.
Route X, via Downs from North Goodwin 115 degrees, 24.5 miles to light buoy,
F.G., and thence 164 degrees to No. 6 W buoy. New light buoys' are 115 degrees
7.8, 15.0, and 22.3 miles from N. Goodwin.
Route X may be used in emergency when state of tide permits, or when ordered.
Route Z should only be used at night.
Route Y is in general use.
1107/28
1 i.e. "U", "V" and "W" buoys.
2. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS OPERATING UNDER ORDER OF VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
My 1107. Add to Route Z
passing south of chartered position of Dyck Light Vessel ".
2006/28
29th May
3. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS AND AUTHORITIES, NORE AND DOVER COMMANDS
Route Y is to be amended to run from Middelkerke Bank buoy 320 degrees 91
miles to position north of Dyck whistle buoy. Transports are to be instructed accordingly as opportunity offers.
0631/29
1st June
4. Vice-Admiral, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
Owing to magnetic mines ships evacuating troops may be using Route Y as well as Route X. Request Fighter and Coastal Command be informed.
0313/1
173