TNA ADM 234 360

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
and Hilda), two power boats and Kellett a tow and pulling Leda, but boats; the(Doggersbank with the Calcutta¹, the Gallant, Wakeful, of Verity, two skoots was joined by the minesweepers the number there were insufficient boats and motor launches to cope with of troops on the beach.
Calcutta had already lost one of her two whalers2.
70 wounded (cot cases); heavy embarkation difficult and the
Off La Panne, at 2157, the Calcutta, surf assisted made by the skoot Reiger, embarked
By the 28th May beach evacuation had become a vitally essential part complete lack of small beaching craft, other than ships' boats - aftermath
Operation Dynamo". It was, however, severely restricted by the almost of the wish, already noticed, to prevent early information of the operation be- of coming known to the enemy; and an urgent and persistent cry for boats arose from the ships off the beaches.³
Beach craft are sailed for Dunkirk
Steps had already been taken, however, to begin the provision of small boats.
At 0800 on the 28th May, 8 motor boats were sailed from the Thames for the
South Downs. At noon the tug Sun V with 8 cutters and 2 whalers in tow, and the tug St. Clears with 11 cutters in tow, left Sheerness for Ramsgate, and both tugs sailed for Dunkirk late in the evening. Of these two tows, however, only 7 cutters reached the beaches, the remainder being lost en route.4
At 1500 the tug Java left Ramsgate for Dunkirk, in company with four drifters⁵ and 5 motor launches⁶. They arrived off Bray at 0100 on 29th May, and were the first arrivals of small motor craft off the beaches. With them, at 1500 on the 28th May, 5 drifters of the 1st Mine Recovery Flotilla left Ramsgate for Dunkirk⁷, and at 1845, 18 motor boats with 17 whalers left Sheerness for Dover.⁸
Supply of small craft is accelerated
These supplied only a portion of what was required. There was still a lack of small craft, and at 2002 V.A. Dover asked that every available shallow draft power boat should be sent to the beaches⁹. The Admiralty's vigorous reaction to this request became fully evident on the following day, the 29th May, when the Portsmouth and Nore Commands, the Thames estuary and the Port of
London Authority were combed for motor boats, lighters and barges¹⁰. To accelerate the journey arrangements were made to route them direct to the beaches, provided they had charts, food, fuel etc.¹¹, though some difficulty was experienced in providing the large number of charts required. Indeed, on the road map" to navigate on.
31st May the Master of the coaster Hythe states that he was given an army
I 2 The Calcutta reported she was off La Panne.
Appendix H.2.
3 Appendices H.1 and H.2.
Five gunfire from Clears' cutters were lost en morning route to Dunkirk a collision with the destroyer the result of enemy
4 The of the Sun St. V's tow was lost early next in Montrose.
up 5 by The the Sp. Gravelines Serv./V. Crested and Nieuport; Eagle. one of the 5 was, next however, day, as subsequently picked
6 The Lord Walker Rodney, I, Lord Keith, Lord Collingwood
7 8 9 The Appendix Lord Cavan, G.6. Walker Fidget, II, Jacketa, New Britannic, Silver Dawn Nayland, and and Fisher and Lord Angler Boy St. Vincent. (Appendix II. G.5).
Appendix G.7.
II 10 Appendices G.13 to G.18.
Appendix G.9.
32

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VI
and machine gun platforms, a bulkhead wrecking was dished, them was severely shaken, and 13 killed, wounded; of the passengers, and orders killed and 2 men the ship's company, 3 officers 2 officers men and were 10 men were and 18
wounded. Then a fire broke out, further dive bomb were given to flood and burn the signal books. A anchored. attack took bombs fell wide. The Bideford and the tug St. Clears The in tow; she was,
The M/S Kellett came endeavoured alongside the to take Bideford, the Bideford and took off about 300 troops, in tow, but again the tow parted.
ever, fast aground, and the tow parted. dr. Havant then tried to take how-' her
Bideford towed to Dover embarked in the Bideford. from La Panne dawn, gunboat Locust, carrying 620
During the night of 29th-30th Near May, 350 the French and 50 British troops and at daylight she less than 21/2 knots course was set for
British and French troops floated - in tow. At beach, passed a tow to the Bideford,
Dover; en route, during the first 3 miles, the tow parted 3 times. Throughout the 30th May the Locust struggled on with her burden. During the night
French soldier jumped overboard, fully equipped. The tow was stopped, a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered; but, in spite of good visibility and a calm sea, the unknown soldier was not recovered although a search was made a at 1130 on the 31st May and disembarked 436 troops.
for 30 minutes. In spite of the tow again parting, the Bideford reached Dover
The momentous issues at stake in Operation "Dynamo" were not to be attained without grievous losses, but the Bideford's heroic voyage to safety marked a momentary respite from the rapidly mounting toll of lives and ships.
Twelve hundred troops wade out to a skoot
At about 2300 on the 29th May the skoot Patria arrived off Bray from Rams-
The Captain of the Patria, who decided to ground his ship, records that "The gate and, in the glow of the still burning Crested Eagle, saw troops on the beach.
troops, holding hands, waded out and clambered on board by nets, ladders and ropes' ends. The sight of two solid phalanxes of men, delineated by phosphorescence in the water and steadily advancing to the ship, will be memorable them Over 1,000 men were embarked in just over two hours." Among
Crested Eagle and the Fenella.
were naval ratings - casualties with severe burns from the Grenade, the
Dover unaware of losses filtered heavy Lord Lord to Little Earlier Dover, Gort bombardment Gort through information in and and the and at the day to 3rd 0127 Dover, 3rd of other and Corps the Corps the that important except disastrous Vice-Admiral, destroyers at La that information losses Panne it there was Dover, of known the were had, afternoon informed being that however, hit Dunkirk the and soon come Calcutta early after was through evening 1600. under that effort the beach was and to be embark made to the concentrate force. of the B.E.F. destroyers were and at La light Panne, craft and at that that end every of
I D.R.
46

WEDNESDAY, 29TH MAY
CHAP. VI
No contact with S.N.O. Dunkirk
At 2057 the Vice-Admiral, Dover, asked the Verity and the S.N.O., Dunkirk, whether the harbour was blocked¹. At 2120 the Verity replied that the eastern half of the channel was blocked, and that on leaving the harbour she had grounded slightly on a sunken drifter in the entrance. S.N.O. Dunkirk replied at 2150 that the harbour was not blocked, but that it was doubtful whether much more could be done during daylight hours². It is not known if or when this reply was received, because as late as 2357 V.A. Dover signalled Admiral
Abrial, "I cannot get in touch with Captain Tennant. Can you inform me whether it is still possible for transports to enter harbour and berth alongside."
It is noteworthy that reception on the Naval W/T set at Dunkirk was not established until 2300 on the 30th May, and full communication with Dover was not established on the set until daylight on the 31st May.³
Vice-Admiral, Dover, diverts all ships to the beaches
Indeed, already at 2128, the situation, as it could be seen by the staff at
Dover, was confused, and it seemed probable that the use of Dunkirk harbour would be denied to us except possibly for small ships⁴. Consequently, the
Vice-Admiral, Dover, ordered all ships approaching Dunkirk not to close the harbour, but to remain off the eastern beach and collect troops from the shore5;
drifters and minesweepers which were about to be despatched to Dunkirk harbour were also diverted to the beach⁶.
A good opportunity at Dunkirk missed
In the event, only 4 drifters and a yacht⁷ entered Dunkirk during the hours of darkness, and as only 2 bombing attacks were made a good opportunity was missed. It is probable that about 10,000 troops could have been lifted from the harbour during the night with little reduction of the numbers embarked from the beaches⁸. Nevertheless, it was only by good fortune that the vital
Dunkirk channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date⁹.
Admiralty's urgent call for small craft
Meanwhile, during the forenoon of the 29th May, in response to the insistent call for beaching craft, the Admiralty called on the C's in C. Portsmouth and the Nore "to investigate as a matter of urgency the provision of additional small motor craft and X and other self-propelled lighters, which could be made available within 48 hours from all ports in their Commands¹⁰. Thereafter, the supply of beaching craft increased rapidly.
The A.L.C.'s arrive off the beaches
On this day, however, only the first trickle of the anxiously awaited small motor craft began to arrive off the beaches. The most important arrivals
I S.N.O. Dunkirk's report. (R.O.III, p.350).
2 Appendix O.12.
3 See p. 67.
4 D.R. p.10, para. 34.
5 D.R. p.10, para. 34.
6 D.R. p.10, para. 34.
7 The 4 drifters of the 1st M/R Flotilla - the Fidget, Fisher Boy, Jacketa and Silver Dawn and the yacht Bystander.
8 D.R. p.10, para. 35.
V.A. Dover's letter No. A 14/0/876/40 of 10th June 1940 (covering his report on Operation Dynamo), para. 7(b).
10 Appendix G.14.
51

CHAP. VII
ferring By 0100 to her Rear-Admiral from single-minded come face to be of spoken incredible such a THE EVACUATION
gress situation, Captain the water of Bush. and up to of their From the the waists. ghastly him, Esk, Wake Walker Lound sight He had of the the more trans- from as a seemed then Commodores seen, to embarkation", detect but I in did his not voice". says feel Rear-Admiral that I could accept Wake-Walker to the note of terribly standing in despair I had pro- not
Stephenson and
Bray. proceeding to take charge off-shore Hallett at were La Panne, transferred and the to drifters, latter off-shore the which former I
groups he had of to work. all He saw the beaches. a dark line of men the
Wake-Walker By dawn the was Hebe able was to off glimpse La Panne, for the and first in the growing light Readmul at stern completely men blown over off and Off Bray the Bideford was ashore and large off the beaches Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested the Locust was trying to take her in tow. with her were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while Lying were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There men was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men filed down the sand dunes, and at the back of our minds all the time", says line
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence boats.²
could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was
Twice during contact Captain Tennant. With his staff these ships in the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk he transferred in unsuccessful efforts to to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, home as in the Hebe from the Hebe with troops. Captain Bush took passage large numbers were to turn " to stress filled the up vital necessity for boats and crews if any The Rearbenches".³
would Admiral come There off arrive was was the great hampered at beaches difficulty by and in lack start exercising of means loading; The control urgency of getting and off of a the beaches. Ships everything⁴. desirable, At 2000 would on the be 30th May was at La La Panne discussed Panne at and where 1800 arrangements next he met day, Lord and were Commodore Gort made and for of Stephenson identifying Tennas embarkation fre of the beaches seaward it. was
On this evening a
method
M.017978/41, p.4.
R.A. Dover's report (M.017978/41).
(R.O.III, p.374).
R.A. R.A. Dover's Report
Dover's Report (M.017978/41).
58

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester, by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars
By about 0600, all destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any of them². Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval officers " who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, "I proceeded on a motor bicycle to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who took me to see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later the sky was overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend, for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed.
"During the forenoon on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claude5 high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and distribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I
Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6
This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
and miracle. unpredictable difficulties, as a such courage, energy and single-mindedness, that it has since and in come the face to be of such incredible found the
Hebe situation, Captain the ferring By water 0100 to Bush. and her up Rear-Admiral to from "of their From the the waists." ghastly him, Esk, Wake-Walker Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral he sight He took had of over the had the shore, Wake-Walker, Wake-Walker to duties watch black of with the off S.N.O. heard terribly standing in Bray, (Afloat) and, trans- from gress of embarkation", says I could the which I had proseemed to detect in his voice".¹
then seen, but I did not feel that accept note of despair which not I
proceeding to take charge off-shore at Panne, and the latter off-shore at
Commodores Stephenson and Hallett were La transferred to drifters, the former
Bray.
Wake-Walker was able to glimpse for the first
By dawn the Hebe was off La Panne, and in the growing light Adminal the growing lear Readminl he had to work. He saw a dark line of men at the water's edge, and large groups of men all over the beaches. Off Bray the Bideford was ashore with her stern completely blown off and the Locust was trying to take her in tow. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Lying off the beaches were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while men were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men filed down the sand dunes, and "at the back of our minds all the time", says
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was boats.²
Twice during the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk in unsuccessful efforts to contact Captain Tennant. With his staff he transferred from the Hebe to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, as these ships in turn " filled up with troops. Captain Bush took home in the Hebe come off the benches".3
to stress the vital necessity for boats and crews if passage any large numbers were to would Admiral was hampered by lack of means of about quickly". Ships
There was great difficulty in exercising control off the beaches. The Reardesirable, everything would be impracticable. The urgency of a the moment governed arrive at beaches and start loading; getting and redistribution, though where At 2000 he on the 30th May Rear-Admiral Panne and met Lord Gort and Captain Tennant. Wake-Walker landed at La discussed
1800 arrangements next were made for Lord Gort's The situation was Panne at
On this day, and Commodore Stephenson embarkation from of La it.
1 evening a method of identifying was the put beaches in charge from seaward was
2 2 R.A. report
M.A. Dover's p.4.
R.A. Dover's Dover's Report Report (M.017978/41). (M.017978/41). (R.O.III, p.374).
58

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester, by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, " in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars.
By about 0600, all destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any of them². " Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval officers who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, " I proceeded on a motor bicycle to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who took me to see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later the sky was overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend, for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed.
"
"During the forenoon on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claudes high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and distribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6 This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
of embarkation".
to destroy. At 0200 Saturday [Ist June] La Panne was abandoned as a place
1st June 1940², confirms the
The following extract from above War accounts: Diary General Staff 4 Division, dated the
"[At La Panne] by 0100 hrs. not more be embarked than three had to four hundred men of
Division out of eight thousand to been put on transports. the conference was called at Divisional decided H.Q. that which it was had useless now opened in a house by the A
side of the beach where it was to continue the embarkation from La Panne. Motor Contact officers Dunes were and sent out to inform Brigades that they were to proceed direct to Bray Dunkerque Mole. Whilst were sustained. A Staff Officer was sent warn the French Guards at at the conference was going on the beach was heavily to shelled by 5.9's and a this
Frontier that 4 Division would be passing through them.
was sent to order the men on the beach to make their way along the beach either to Bray or Dunkerque. From this moment H.Q. ceased to operate until follows:- arrived at Dunkerque Mole. Certain officers arrived at Dunkerque Mole as it
GSO II, GSO III, and Camp Commandant at 0500 hrs. 1 June. GOC, GSO I,
AA and QMG, I.O., ADC, Motor Contact Officer at about 0700 hrs."
Captain R. Pim, R.N.V.R., Beach Master
In view of the foregoing outline of events at La Panne, it is necessary, in order to avoid confusion, to refer briefly to a report by Captain Pim who was sent over from the Admiralty to assist in speeding up the embarkation.
After visiting as many of the beaches as possible he assumed the duties of
Beach Master (at Bray beach) and arranged to continue the organisation of ferrying boats until all the troops on the beaches were on board. I told them", he said, that if anything went wrong during the night we would return at dawn".³
Later, Captain Pim stated All the troops that I could find were embarked by midnight and placed in ships which sailed for England. Just before midnight I went along certain beaches to look for stragglers. A Staff Officer informed me that no more troops would embark from these beaches⁴ but that they would march to Dunkirk, as it was anticipated these beaches would be shelled and would probably be in German hands the following day." Captain
Pim estimated that from pontoon bridges and beaches, approximately 5,000
troops were probably embarked.
Although his report is entitled Final evacuation of troops from the beaches of La Panne and Bray", Captain Pim does not say that these 5,000 troops were embarked from La Panne, and it is evident from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker's report, and particularly from Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report, and the War Diary of the 4th Division, that they were not embarked from La Panne. Vice-Admiral
Dover6, however, assumes from Captain Pim's report that he worked at La to the east and west of it.
Panne, the weight of evidence shows that he worked at Bray and immediately the west, as shells meant for the beaches were ricocheting over the Hilda.
During the night, Captain Pim found it necessary to shift his anchorage to
Then, Captain at 0315 on the 1st June, in accordance with his undertaking to the troops, western Pim sent off all [his] boats. to search the beaches, starting from the end of Bray-Dunes". During the next 3 hours, he says, only about 250
I C.W.23187/40.
3 2 4 Capt. Provided Pim's by report Lt. Col. (R.O. H. IV, F. Joslen, p.52). (Historical Section, War Cabinet).
5 Evidently the La Panne beaches.
6 Capt. Pim's report (R.O. IV, P.52).
D.R., p.20, para.61.
78

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
if one party had to leave, it was to communicate along the moreover, beach so that all would have the warning¹. of the Bray whole
4 sections, being small, should of about 400 yards; they at took covering frontage, in all, at first once proceded to proceedesition
On landing, the 4 section Lieutenants remain close together, and party they decided that all organize but, dunes within and 3 a approached embarkation 2 minutes obeyed orders of the landing, points. boats. about about There boats The troops 5,000 given were from troops were by the on left naval the no their whole signs officers cover of easy and in to the control sand and except implicity the orders to bring back the boats ships to shore. ratings,
Vavasour says that by 0500 on the loaded May and doubtful if 80 men were
Evacuation in Commodore Hallett's 30th section it is was very slow and Lieut.
reached a ship, they let the boats go adrift, as were no off. A few boats appeared, were there sent off; but boat-keepers. troops
No suggestions or orders were issued from headquarters, says 12 Commanders along the front at Bray. There he saw a Captain R.N. and
At dawn Lieut. Vavasour contacted a headquarters² in one of the houses
One of the commanders, who had come from Dunkirk", him that the port was out of action, and the moles were in ruins.
off Bray beach, but the boat situation had acute now
Shortly after 0500 on the 30th May there was a destroyer and minesweeper rand there werweeper about 15,000 troops on the beach. With the assistance of some senior
Army Officers who by then had arrived, the troops were moved away from the water's edge and settled in the sands.
By 0600, a considerable number of collapsible boats had been collected from the Royal Engineers and these were loaded with 10 soldiers apiece and sent off.
In the majority of cases, however, on arrival at the ships the boats were abandoned and, drifting to the east, came ashore abreast the French, who used them to go off to British ships. By 0700, there were no power boats at all, and whaler trips were very infrequent. The rate of evacuation continued to be very slow.
Meanwhile the Captain R.N." (Captain Howson) had gone to La Panne and Lieut. Vavasour did not see him again.
By 0730 more ships had arrived and evacuation proceeded more quickly, as the beach parties had organised their own boat keepers. It was still, however, far from satisfactory. The troops found it difficult to get into the boats in the surf, and the beach parties had to wade out shoulder-deep to keep the boats stern-on to the beach.
Lieut. Vavasour and his party then boarded the Anthony to get a change of clothing, and while there obtained a motor boat which they manned for 12 hours lost until she broke down. They first proceeded to recover the majority of their boats, now in use by the French, and then organised a ferry service.
At 0900 contact was made with Commodore Hallett who then in a drifter.
He " I informed him of what I was doing Lieut. Vavasour. was " He approved.
Commodore informed me that he was very short says of coal. At approximately 0930 the
Lieut. steamed away to seaward. I did the Commodore again."
his boat broke down, and he had to saw be towed [the clear Commodore] of the danger at area." as
Wells said We never him not see all I believe
2 I Report Probably by Lt.
3 Captain Cdrs. Otway-Ruthven to by Capt. Howson and Gorton, (Section or 158) Richardson.
80

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
Lieut. Wells says that at 0100/31 he was continued. informed that Some naval personnel would
Division, original have the The to Brigadier' shelling party evacuate who was had of the at [?Major embarked already dawn beach left, General if continued, at the and about shelling W. at 0330. 0300/31 embarkation and G. Holmes] (says he Lieut. swam in command Wells) out to officers fetch the of not a order the boat in 42nd was his for passed from Headquarters that as the would probably be over dawn the following day [Ist June], all naval personnel were to embark forth- at with". Lieut. Wells accordingly remained in the Halcyon, where he had taken the Brigadier". The Halcyon arrived at Dover at 0845/31.
There is clearly some connection between the above order from Headquarters' and Captain Howson's arrangement for embarking naval personnel during the early hours of the 31st May.
The only other account of the activities of the beach parties comes from Cdr.
H. du P. Richardson, R.N., who worked with Lt. Cdr. D. B. Dowling, R.N., and a naval platoon at Malo beach from 2000 on May the 27th until the beach was cleared of troops at about noon on the 28th May.
S.N.O. Dunkirk then ordered him to Bray beach to embark 5,000 troops, and he arrived there at about 1700 on the 28th May, with Cdr. Ken² [?Kerr] and
16 men. They found about 30,000 troops, stretching from Bray to the eastward, awaiting embarkation. Cdr. Richardson's beach party, as will be seen, also returned on the 31st May.
At 0130 on the 29th May a high wind got up which made beach embarkation almost impossible. Cdr. Richardson therefore sent off about 20,000 troops to
Dunkirk in batches of 1000.
During the night of 29th/30th May another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward³, and this reduced the limits of Cdr. Richardson's beach.
Early on the morning of the 30th May Cdr. Richardson went to Brigade
H.Q.4 at Bray and suggested that piers be built by running lorries into the sea.
This, he says, was quickly done and proved successful.
Between 1800 and 2000 on the 30th May the enemy directed accurate artillery fire on to the beach, and continued firing throughout the night. Cdr. Richardson's beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers. " No boats", he says,
" had now been in for 16 hours on our beach".
During the night of the 30th/31st May, the weather became bad once more, and a heavy surf was running. By about 0300 on the 31st May it was impossible to carry out embarkation from the beaches.
Cdr. Richardson's men were by now showing signs of extreme exhaustion, and as it was impossible to communicate with the S.N.O. he decided to take over S.N.O. a whaler they had salved and go to the nearest destroyer to report to the
They waited for high water, and at about 0730 put to sea. There was a very heavy surf running, and they had an uneven set of oars, rope crutches and only
Two other destroyers passed at about 7 cables, but paid no attention.
an oar to steer by. They approached 2 destroyers, but both got underway.
2 I Cdr. There Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.367).
3 is no officer of this name in the May 1940 List.
These Evidently the party landed at E.F.G.H., Cdre. Hallett's Navy sections of the beach.
headquarters 4 were probably (p. 59). the same H.Q. as those referred to by Capt. Howson as Corps
82

CHAP. IX
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Admiral, When Rear-Admiral Dover, all the Wake-Walker ships which left full had about of not been 0930 sunk to make had contact with many with the signs and collisions. Some were a theme the evidence of bumps first few hours at rest in harbour the
1800," he wrote, the of harbour their strenuous was times all had were for many enjoying days."¹ the that many of them and had
Air Patrols
Consequent on the bombing of at the dawn. day before, As the had asked for fighter aircraft protection appeared on the and low over the ships. More and often not they were fighters constantly came dispersed many than scene, were not taking chances the nearly always opened them. In order to stop firing Rear-Admiral
Flag-" Cease fire", and blew the syren to draw spite of which, however, the after machine gun of his own ship the Keith continued to nothing.² regardless of the cease fire" gong; once firing started they could hear fire
Route X to Dunkirk was patrolled during the early hours of daylight by the
A.A. cruiser Calcutta, which sailed from Margate at 0315 with the corvettes
Mallow and Shearwater and carried out a patrol between W and V buoys. The
Calcutta was recalled to Sheerness at 0938 in readiness to perform the same service next night, and at 1015 she shot down a Heinkel which had bombed and damaged the Mosquito by a near miss 15 miles from Dover.
Fighter Command provided 8 patrols during the 1st June of an average strength of 3 to 4 squadrons. The main periods when no fighter protection was afforded were approximately 0730-0850, 1020-1120, 1120-1145, 1545-
1615 and 1715-1845. Coastal Command continued to fly patrols of 3 aircraft over the North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend line throughout the day.
Enemy air attacks begin St. Fagan sunk 0355.
Sporadic enemy air attacks began at early light. Ships alongside the mole reported being attacked at 0415 and 0500. This was before the first main
R.A.F. air patrol appeared on the scene, for the R.A.F. had been asked to provide maximum protection from 0500 onwards.
Before the first patrol appeared enemy aircraft claimed what was to prove the first of a long series of victims that day. The tug St. Fagan had towed over from Dover during the night three Thames barges. At about 0355, in the
Dunkirk Channel, abreast the town the ship was hit by a bomb and practically disintegrated. Only two officers, including her Captain, Lieut.-Commander
G. H. Warren, M.B.E., R.N., and 6 ratings, were saved out of a total complement of 25. They were picked up by the tug Tanga which had come over from
Ramsgate with 6 boats in tow and had hung off outside Dunkirk most of the night waiting for troops to be brought out to her, and was then on her way home with 160 men on board and a motor-boat in tow.
Almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of our aircraft at 0730 a heavy dive bombing attack developed by a compact formation of some 30 or 40 Ju. 75s, causing the loss of the destroyers Keith and Basilisk, the minesweeper Skipjack, and the tug St. Abbs.
2 I Report, M.017978/41 p.29.
3 M.017978/41, p.23.
R.A.F. narrative.
88

DUSK TO DUSK, IST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
Dunkirk and entered harbour at 1530 on 1st June. Whilst there, she was twice hit by shore batteries, though damage was slight and there was only one and troops and finally proceeded at 2230.
light casualty. The ship lay alongside for 7 hours, embarking stretcher cases
Amongst the various classes of ships none had suffered proportionately heavier losses than the personnel vessels to which Vice-Admiral Dover referred in his message to the Admiralty. Their crews had been doing magnificent work in the face of nerve-racking experiences. Up to date 8 of these ships had been sunk and 4 disabled. It was arranged that during this night's evacuation personnel ships in addition to destroyers were to berth at the East Pier in Dunkirk where they were to be given priority.
The danger of sending these valuable ships in to Dunkirk in daylight was too great, and after the 1st of June they were sent in only under cover of darkness, with a naval Ljeutenant-Commander or Commander on board each ship as adviser to the Master and with crews stiffened by 10 seamen for handling the wires and going alongside under fire. It was hoped by these means not only to get the ships to sail to time but also to ensure that they would enter Dunkirk harbour and not linger outside awaiting a quiet interval, or return empty.
To their credit it must be recorded that not all the personnel ships needed the moral support of naval ratings.
Air Operations, morning of 2nd June
The batteries which had brought Route X under fire were between Le
Clipont, near Pointe de Gravelines (see Plan 3), and Les Huttes, about a mile north east of Gravelines; they were attacked by the R.A.F. in 24 Blenheim sorties between first light and 0745 on the 2nd, the object of spreading the attack in this manner being to neutralise the batteries during the period of daylight evacuation. The Blenheims encountered much anti-aircraft fire, and though no aircraft were lost some were damaged and afterwards crash-landed on their airfields.
The Air Ministry were asked to provide strong continuous patrols over
Dunkirk and the beaches from 0430 to 0830 on the 2nd June, with night fighter patrols during the hours of darkness. It was arranged that the fighter patrols should go out over the routes in use by our ships, and on the return journey fly low on the routes to give maximum protection to ships against low flying bomb and machine gun attacks. The concentration of fighter patrols in the dawn and dusk periods resulted in a great decrease in the total number of flying hours on the 2nd June (See Appendix C.)
The early morning was hazy, and the first two main R.A.F. patrols, both at four squadron strength, encountered no enemy aircraft and no ships reported being attacked during this period. The third patrol, the strongest yet flown, consisting of five full squadrons, which was over the Dunkirk area from 0745-
0845, encountered very considerable enemy forces, and claimed to have shot down 18 enemy bombers and 10 fighters, themselves losing 7 Spitfires. Again, no reports of attacks came from the ships; and as far as can be ascertained no attacks occurred until the Calcutta, patrolling near W buoy with the Mallard and Shearwater, was attacked at 1035 by 3 Ju. 88 which dived out of the sun and bombed her, causing slight damage from near misses. A Coastal patrol witnessed the incident and drove off the enemy. The French light cruiser
Epérvier and destroyer Léopard were also on the patrol line, but they apparently left the patrol when bombing began at 1035 and up to 1442 when the Calcutta returned to Sheerness by orders of Vice-Admiral Dover, nothing more was seen
99

CHAP. XI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
quarter of an hour later they all three proceeded, with the Holland last in the line, to carry out their part in blocking the port. As they neared Dunkirk a
"long line of destroyers came out of the harbour. " Astern of them", stated the Holland, there was a gap of over a mile and then a large and fast transport". M.A/S.B. 7 led the Holland through the gap between the destroyer line and the transport. When the latter was 6 cables away, and steaming very fast with the first streaks of dawn behind her, the danger of collision became apparent, SO the Holland sounded one blast and put her wheel hard astarboard.
Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Coats, R.N., captain of the blockship, reported that the transport had then only to alter course 5° to starboard to pass well clear. However, she appeared to alter to port", with the result that she struck the Holland hard on the bridge and just before the boiler room bulkhead. The transport, which did not appear to have sustained much damage, backed out and carried on her way. The Holland had no buoyancy in hand, and, a few seconds before she was struck, her captain ordered abandon ship", seeing that it was inevitable she would be rammed. The bows sunk at once and rested on the bottom, there being apparently only 8 feet of water under her keel;
the stern remained above water. Two seamen were crushed and seriously injured in the collision. M.A/S.B.7 took off the crew and transferred them to the Vivacious. The wreck of the Holland came within an ace of being rammed a second time, for two more ships, reported to be destroyers, passed and missed the Holland's stern by no more than a few feet.
At 0300 the blockship Westcove entered Dunkirk, followed ten minutes later by the Edvard Nissen. Both ships proceeded into the channel leading to the inner harbour. When in her allotted position the Westcove put her wheel hard astarboard to ram the Inner Western Jetty, but her bows struck mud about
50 feet from the pier, with the ship at an angle of about 30° across the channel.
By going full speed ahead on the engines, the athwartship's angle was increased to 50°.
As the Edvard Nissen came in with the intention of ramming the East Pier she endeavoured to strike the Westcove's stern a glancing blow in order to increase her angle to the channel before scuttling herself; but underestimating the strength of the ebb stream she passed close under the Westcove's stern, and rammed the East Pier abreast of the latter. Letting go an anchor, she applied full port helm with all engine power to increase the blocking angle. The
Westcove now fired her scuttling charges, which probably owing to coal gas in the bunkers, caused a large column of flame and smoke to envelop the ship's stern. When this had dissipated, the crew, who had pulled clear in their boat, saw that the Westcove had slid off the sloping bank of the channel and was lying on an even keel in the line of the piers, almost in mid stream, thus causing a minimum of obstruction. Between the sterns of the two ships there was now a gap of 80 feet which was reduced to 50 feet by heaving on a hawser run by the Edvard Nissen's motor boat from the ship's stern to the Westcove. No more could be done and the Edvard Nissen abandoned ship and fired her scuttling charges from the boat. M.A/S.B. 7 took out both ship's crews to the Vivacious.
1 No transport reported being in collision at this time and it has not been possible to identify any of the vessels concerned. The following destroyers and transports sailed from
Dunkirk at the times given destroyers - Vanquisher 0230, Whitshed 2045, Malcolm 0248,
Codrington 0250 and Express 0250; transports Newhaven (French 1,888 tons) 0245,
Tynwald (British 2,376 tons) 0300, Rouen (French, 1,882 tons time not known but ship was in Dunkirk in the early hours of 3rd June), and Côte Argent (French 3,047 tons, time not known but ship landed troops at Dover on 3rd June.)
112

CHAP. XIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
British units soon Naval put officers an end and to this men: of meanwhile the beach it was effectively was dealt with by the with In the the British early stages in being the disorganised French troops and were when Commander language with Pier French being be Many made on perhaps properly consistently soldier the reports, for difficulty final H. the a unwilling led; lack R. night demoralising however, slower and Troup, of and:- sea the to it than sense, be bear seems who particular separated position British. tribute constituted resulted fitting system in from to to in the take the himself the discipline a embarkation remainder the last piermaster look of of at the his of them French French together at rendered the as seen Centre troops troops The by
"I the would last like ship to left put about on record 0300 the [on wonderful 4th June]. discipline of the French troops when
General About and 1,000 his men staff stood about to 30 attention feet four and deep about half way along the and heels, saluted and then turned about up their steel helmets, the officers clicked light, their the flames behind them showing whose faces were indiscernable in the dawn away; after having faced the troops, pier, the came down to the boat with me and we left at 0320."
The operation was at an end.
1 Commander Troup's Report, R.O. II, p.369.
128

SIGNALS
APPENDIX G
7. It is a matter of great importance that these ships should be got ready as.
soon as possible.
Brabant1
Bart
8. Twente
Tilly
Antje
Hondsrug
Brandaris
Reiger
Delta
Lena
Princess Juliana
Borneo¹
Caribia
Oranje
Liberty
Vrede
Gorecht
Bernina
Fiducia'
Rika
Limburg'
Patria
Junior
Bornrif
Amstelroom
Deneb
Martha
Express
Mercurius¹
Aegiv
Jutland
1704/22
F.3. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER, C.-IN-C. NORE, C.-IN-C. PORTSMOUTH, (R)
F.O.I.C. London, F.O.I.C. Southampton, F.O.I.C. Portland
Admiralty 1703/22 and 1704/22 to certain addressees only. The operation for which these ships are being prepared will be known as Dynamo.
1944/22
APPENDIX G
SIGNALS RE LACK OF SMALL CRAFT
Sunday, 26th May
1. ADMIRALTY to A/S CHATHAM, A/S PORTSMOUTH, (R) C.-IN-C. Nore, C.-in-C. Portsmouth,
V.A. Dover
Investigate and report how many cutters and whalers can be made available for immediate service under V.A. Dover.
2028/26
2. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. PORTSMOUTH, VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Combrax Portsmouth,
Commandant 1st D.C. Fort Cumberland
8 A.L.C's. with crews complete are available and will be embarked in S.S. Clan
Macalister at Southampton a.m. 27th May.
2337/26
Monday, 27th May
3. (ADMIRALTY) D.S.V.P. to COMMODORE, SHEERNESS (R) C.-in-C. Nore V.A. Dover
About 40 motor launches have been ordered to Sheerness of which 30 should arrive at daylight tomorrow Tuesday. The rest during the day. These will be manned on arrival at Sheerness
Request you will inform V.A. Dover when boats are ready for service.
2035/27
Tuesday, 28th May
Note: [At 0436. S.N.O. Dunkirk asked for all vessels to be sent alongside east pier.]
4. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to S.N.O. DUNKIRK (R) Fighter Command
Further destroyers and small craft are being sent now to Dunkirk.
0630/28
SIGNALS RE BUILD-UP OF SMALL CRAFT
5. N.O.I.C. RAMSGATE to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
1st Mine Recovery Flotilla vessels Lord Cavan, Fidget, Jacketa, Silver Dawn and Fisher Buoy. Tug Java. Drifters Lord Collingwood, Lord Rodney, Lord Keith,
Lord St. Vincent. Motor boats New Britannic, Walker I, Walker II, Angler, Nayland, sailed Ramsgate for Dunkirk.
1550/28
I Was not available.
165

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX H
Thursday, 30th May
7. S.N.O. AFLOAT to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
There is a serious shortage of ships and boats.
I have no destroyers.
8. V.C.I.G.S. to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
0039/30
since dark. There is still a great shortage are
Beaches well organised. Troops in good of small heart. craft There which has been no bombing
9. REAR-ADMIRAL IN CHARGE BASE to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Beaches are filling up rapidly. More ships and boats are an essential requirement.
0744/30
10. REAR-ADMIRAL IN CHARGE, BASE to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Can beach as soon as possible.
you send over 5 ships life boats with skeleton crews to work from
0916/30
Friday, 31st May
11. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Admiralty
Urgent need for boats particularly power boats still paramount at La Panne and
Bray. Presence of motor boats will be decisive in final evacuation. Request I be informed of action taken on this signal.
0045/31
12. Icarus to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Situation at Bray impossible. No power boats?evacuation 10 an hour. At least 2,000 men still ashore. Troops being bombed and shelled. Dunkirk being bombed continually. If no power boats become available propose withdraw at dawn.
0047/31
13. COLONEL HUTCHISON, Impulsive, to ADMIRALTY (R) V.A. Dover
Conditions ideal at present for embarkation but pulling cutters urgently required also more power boats.
0945/31
14. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) C.-in-C. Portsmouth, C.-in-C. Nore.
War Office request maximum possible number of Carley floats and similar devices be left lying on beaches together with paddles after other craft have withdrawn.
1152/31
15. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Boats not yet arrived. Most available vessels are evacuating from Dunkirk.
Minesweepers will not be here in time. I will do what I can.
1736/31
16. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER
La Panne reports 6,000 troops to clear urgently and they lack boats and ships.
2130/31
Saturday, 1st June
17. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER.
Troops arriving now. Send more boats.
0132/1
18. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Niger, Gossamer, Halcyon.
Use own boats. Utmost despatch essential.
0204/1
Reply from Gossamer.
19. Your 0204. Hardly any boats available.
0226/1
170

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX L
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
came into action this evening suspending on only remaining daylight Toute,
Channels to Dunkirk now all under traffic fire of German batteries.
namely X, maintaining heavy barrage
2329/1
2nd June
6. Venemous to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Dunkirk approach channel is under fire from the shore guns.
2110/2
3rd June
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMANDS
close to Southern channel buoys.
Route X. From F.G. buoy steer 172 degrees for No. 3 W buoy and thence keep
1635/3
APPENDIX L
SIGNALS RE REQUESTS FOR FIGHTER COVERS
Monday, 27th May
1. B.N.L.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Pass to War Office from O.C. Dunkirk:
Complete fighter protection over Dunkirk now essential if a serious disaster is to be avoided.
1655/27
2. AIR LIAISON DUNKIRK to FIGHTER COMMAND (R) Air Ministry
Unless fighter protection is provided continually from dawn tomorrow result will be very serious. Embarkation on beach east of 892 [?] Dunkirk.
2350/27
Tuesday, 28th May
3. (C.A.S.) AIR MINISTRY to FIGHTER COMMAND, COASTAL COMMAND etc.
Today is likely to be the most critical day ever experienced by the British Army.
The extreme gravity of the situation should be explained to all units. I am confident that all ranks will appreciate that it is the duty of the R.A.F. to make their greatest effort today to assist their comrades of both the Army and Navy.
0125/28
1 Chief of the Air Staff.
4. B.N.L.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Continuous bombing and machine gunning on beaches. Only maximum air protection can alleviate situation at dawn.
0225/28
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to COASTAL COMMAND, FIGHTER COMMAND, (R) 16 Group, 11
Group, Dover Forces, Admiralty, Air Ministry
Request maximum fighter protection throughout today 28th as follows:
line Fighter North Command, Dunkirk and adjacent beaches. to Skuas Nord from and Detling are patrolling
Suggest Coastal Command patrol line Ostend Sandettie Bank.
Goodwin to Nieuport from 0800 to 1300.
0855/28
174

APPENDIX R
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX R
SIGNALS RE EVACUATION ON 1st JUNE
AND NIGHT OF 1st-2nd JUNE
Saturday, 1st June
1. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Dunkirk road.
Parachute mines are being dropped all over west of Bray. Request sweep of
0047/1
2. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Admiralty dangerous area westward. reason, and mining, consider any beach work
Yesterday ships off Bray For were this under fire. Today's shorter front will bring too costly and evacuation must be confined to Dunkirk. Small craft will be moved westward at dawn.
0235/1
3. VICE-ADMIRAL, Sharpshooter DOVER to REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Halcyon, Skipjack, Speedwell,
Troops from La Panne now marching towards Dunkirk. Act accordingly.
0306/1
4. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER
We must take full advantage of low visibility to use beaches. Keep me informed on this point.
0630/1
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, Dunkirk DOVER to GENERAL ALEXANDER, DUNKIRK (R) R.A. Dover, S.N.O.
On the likely assumption that complete evacuation will be ordered tonight the problem beach. of transport makes it essential to use both sides of harbour, pier and eastern
I am planning on these lines and for evacuation to start at 2200/1.
0951/1 (as amended by 1044/1)
6. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to DESTROYERS
All destroyers are to return to harbour forthwith.
1345/1
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to C.-IN-C. NORE, N.O.I.C. HARWICH, COMMODORE in CHARGE,
SHEERNESS, N.O.I.C. RAMSGATE, 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th M/S Flotillas
All available ships operating under V.A. Dover of the minesweeping flotillas addressed, are required to assist in evacuation tonight Saturday.
Ships to sail to arrive off the beach between Dunkirk and a point 11 miles east, at
2200/1. Ships which have not D.G. equipment are not to sail. Ships report forthwith whether they can comply.
1510/1
8. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to GENERAL ALEXANDER, S.N.O. DUNKIRK. C.-IN-C. NORTHERN
NAVAL FORCES (R) Admiralty
Evacuation will take place tonight Saturday from
(A) Beach betwween Dunkirk and 11 miles to the eastward, between 2100/1 and
0300/2, for 9,000 men.
(B) East Pier, between 2100/1 and 0330/2, for 7,000 men.
(C) East side inside harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, for 1,000 men.
182

INDEX
Royal Air Command, 64, 83-4, 4, 88 (evacuated (fired from France), 17, 20, 30,
(attacks 38 all that was asked of them, concentrated 123. at dawn and dusk): 100,
(patrols Stren batteries); 99 (patrols on by own ships), 89, 93, 99
Royal Daffodil, 20, 25, 100-1. 29, 54n, 62, 102, 110 (damaged).
110-111, 115; did
Royal Royal Sovereign, 29n, 54n, 64n, 107n, 108-9, 114n, 115, 117.
Eagle, 42, 81,
95 (sunk).
Royally,114n,
Sabre, 23, 27, 44, 47n, 49 (takes across with beach parties), 53, 54n, 55, 62n, 64 (damaged), 86,
97, 101, 107, 114n, 118 (crosses compass damaged).
St. Abbs, 71n, 90 (sunk).
Achilleus, sunk, 93.
St. St. Andrew, Shelled, 18: bombed, 20; last trip, 87.
Ste. Bernadette de Lourdes, 107n.
St. Clears, 32, 46.
St. David, damaged, 38, 95.
Ste. Denise Louise, 107n.
St. Fagan, 71n, 88 (sunk).
St. Helier, 20, 25, 64n, 94, 98-9, 108-9.
Ste. Isabelle, 74.
St. Julien, shelled, 17 bombed, 20, 43; crew supplemented, 48n; last trip, 87.
St. Olaves, 107n.
St. Patrick, 75n.
St. Seiriol, 22, 24, 29, 43, 48 (damaged).
Saladin, 44-5 (damaged).
Salamander, 28n, 31, 42, 47, 86 (damaged), 89-90.
Saltash, 91-2.
Sambre, 60.
Sandown, 23n, 27, 31, 42, 105 (forbidden to sail).
Santosy, lost, 117.
Saon, 34n, 110.
Sargasso, 60n, 107n, 108.
Sark, 60.
Saturn, 114n, 118.
S.C.6 (French), 107n.
Sceneshifter, rushed and sunk by French troops, 53.
Schuyts. see skoots.
Scimitar, 20n, 28n, 54n, 55, 62n, 91.
Scotia, 29n, 54n, 83 (in collision), 92 (sunk), 118 (record lift).
Scottish Co-operator, 60.
Sea Falcon, 75n.
Seaplane Tender 243, 71n, 75n, 110 (sunk).
Seaplane Tender 254, 71n.
Seaplane Tender 276, 71n, 110.
Seaplane Tender 291, 71n, 75 (damaged).
Seasalter, 60.
Sea Transport Officials, serve in personnel ships, 48; in Dynamo Room, 74.
Secrecy, effect on supply of small craft, 15.
Seine, 31n, 60, 102.
Sequacity, 19, 28.
Seriola, 71n.
Shamrock, lost, 53.
Sharpshooter, 28n, 54n, 97.
Shearwater, 34, 88, 99.
Sheldvake, 34, 37n, 69 (hunts S/M.), 93.
Shell fire (German): causes serious interruption to shipping, 19; Route Y under fire, 48;
La Panne beach shelled, 60, 76; interrupts sailings of personal ships, 70; danger of, magnified at Dover, 98.
Sherfield, 72n, 90.
Shelland, 60.
Shikari, 20n, 28n, 47n, 54n, 55, 97, 102, 107, 114n, 119-20 (in Operation CK), 127.
Shipmates, 23n.
Signalling, see Communications.
Silver Dawn, 32n, 51n.
205