TNA ADM 234 360

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris; an extract is quoted below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received from the Secretary of State for War:
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced "!. These were some of the facts:-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice, in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard, that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counterattack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
11

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IV
from the St. Seiriol and Queen of the Channel, in addition to the drifters'
beaches during the night dinghies, enabled these drifters of the to 27th/28th lift some May. 2,000 troops from Malo and Bray own
Results of S.N.O. Dunkirk's 2005/27
assembling off the beaches on 1 cruiser, 27th/28th May the Wolfhound,
As a result of the action taken the on night S.N.O. of Dunkirk's signals, there
3 Channel skoots and (the the Lena, St. Hebe Seiriol). other II and All small Oranje) these ships boats, were ordered to use Queen of thers, their own
Wolsey and 6 other destroyers¹, a pulling boats, were yet available.
boats for ferrying, as no power cutters, whalers or other
S.N.O. Dunkirk's signals had therefore a big result; but owing to the difficulty of passing orders at night in a shattered harbour his decision to divert vessels to the beaches had unforeseen repercussions, and it was associated with a false report that Dunkirk had fallen, and the failure of one personnel vessel and 7 skoots to reach the beaches that night. The circumstances are described below.
The P/V Canterbury, which had entered Dunkirk harbour at 2000, left at
2058 with 457 troops, including 140 stretcher cases. Before leaving, she was ordered by the Sea Transport Officer to turn back ships attempting to enter Dunkirk the order, evidently intended to divert ships to the beaches, was misunderstood. In the Dunkirk road, the Canterbury passed the order to the P/V Maid of Orleans and to the H/C's Isle of Thanet and Worthing, and those vessels thereupon turned back to Dover. Later the order became definitely garbled, for the skoot Tilly (which was in company with the 4 skoots
Hondsrug, Jutland, Patria and Brandaris) met the Canterbury (in company with the 2 hospital carriers) 8 or 9 miles from Dunkirk, and received from her the signal "Dunkirk is in enemy hands. Keep clear." This signal was variously recorded by some of the other skoots, as Dunkirk has fallen. Return"; and all five of them, as well as the skoots Bornrif and Twente, did in fact return to the Downs, although the Jutland and the Patria first closed
Nieuport Bank buoy in an unsuccessful endeavour to obtain more definite information. Some of the skoots, in turn, promulgated this false report to other ships, notably to the P/V Dorrien Rose; this ship, which received the signal, unsafe to approach Dunkirk," did at first alter course to the northward, but, shortly after, again set course for Dunkirk. It was subsequently thought by some of the vessels concerned that the false information had been passed by fifth columnists," though there is very little proof of this.³
Chronic shortage' of beaching boats
Such was the beginning of the great build-up of ships4 and of the inauguration of beach evacuation. The successful development of the latter was necessarily good in into I the The of northern situation the dependent chronic having sector shortage changed on between the by continuation the south-west of beaching and of boats⁵. fine north-east weather, A wind would and and of any Wakeful the have strength making made went from Dunkirk. The Windsor remained time they arrived, Anthony the Gallant had not yet returned
2 Portsmouth whither she had escorted on the patrol. S.S. Kyno. The
Canterbury's report.
4 3 See Appendices H.30 and H.32.
5 Appendices D, E and F.
D.R. page 3, para. 11.
24

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. VI
return to Dover at 15 knots, and could take no further part in "Dynamo."
The personnel vessel Lorina was bombed and sunk at about this period, but no details are forthcoming.
Icarus damaged
The destroyer Icarus, which had been embarking troops off Zuydcoote, and in addition had embarked about 470 from the skoot Doggersbank, was attacked by 10 dive bombers at 1830. She received only slight damage from near misses but had 1 killed and 25 wounded.
King Orry sunk
The armed boarding vessel King Orry arrived at Dunkirk harbour at about
1900, to find it apparently occupied only by burning and sinking ships. She herself was immediately subjected to a bombing attack which put her steering gear out of action and shattered all her instruments. Further air attacks, and damage by near misses ensued. Realising the risk of the ship blocking the channel, S.N.O. Dunkirk instructed her Captain, shortly after midnight, to take her out of harbour. She struggled out at 0230/30, but when clear of the harbour entrance the King Orry foundered. Several ships, including the drifter
Vivacious, the trawler Lord Grey, and a D.C./M.B., picked up survivors.
Isle of Guernsey deliberately bombed
At about the same time that the King Orry was being bombed, the M/S
Halcyon witnessed the deliberate bombing of the hospital carrier Isle of
Guernsey. She was bombed by 10 planes off Dunkirk harbour while attempting to pick up an airman. The airman was subsequently picked up by the Halcyon.
Although damaged by near misses, the Isle of Guernsey entered the harbour after dark and embarked 490 wounded in the early hours of 30th May. She then proceeded to Newhaven, but was not repaired in time to make another trip to Dunkirk.
Bideford's stern blown off
The air onslaught had not yet, however, come to an end. The sloop Bideford had arrived off Bray beach at 1730. At 1750 the first boat loads of troops
(mostly French) came alongside. 'The boats," says her Captain, Lt. Cdr.
J. H. Lewes, R.N., were dangerously overcrowded and several swamped on the way off from the shore. On arrival alongside, the men would all jump on board and let their boats drift off on the tide. Paddles were lost overboard, rendering the boats useless. Bideford's M/B was lowered and ordered to collect and tow inshore any empty boats. The whaler was lowered and 2
officers and a signalman were sent in to endeavour to take charge on the beach this was next to impossible. The men rushed the boats and capsized them in shallow water, and then left the boats without making any attempt to right them and use them again. There were only 2 motor landing craft in the vicinity. One [A.L.C.17] had one engine out of action; the other
[A.L.C.16] was blown up subsequently when lying alongside the ship."
Dive-bombing attacks commenced on the Bideford at about 1915. She was then machine-gunned by low flying aircraft. At 2007 four bombs were dropped; one landed 30 yards away one hit the quarter deck; and one hit or near missed the stern, detonating a depth charge. About 40 feet of the
Bideford's stern was blown away completely; a further 40 feet was reduced to a tangled mass of metal; the mainmast fell in 3 pieces on the searchlight
45

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Later on 2nd June, on instructions from the N.O.I.C., the original crew took charge of the Marsayru, but she did not, apparently, make a second trip to Dunkirk. Her skipper (G. D. Olivier) received the D.S.M. for his services, and her engineer (C. Coggins) a mention in despatches.
The Cockle Bawley boats
Of the small craft that went over on this day, Admiral Ramsay speaks in the following terms of the Cockle Bawley boats²:
"The conduct of the crews of these cockle boats was exemplary. They were all volunteers who were rushed over to Dunkirk in one day, probably none of them had been under gunfire before and certainly none of them under Naval discipline.
These boats were Thames estuary fishing boats which never left the estuary, and only one of their crews had been further afield than Ramsgate before. In spite of this fact perfect formation was maintained throughout the day and night under the control of a Sub-Lieutenant R.N.V.R.³ in command of the Unit, and all orders were carried out with great diligence even under actual shell fire and aircraft attack."
One of these cockle boats, the Renown, was blown up by a mine while returning to England disabled and in tow of the drifter Ben and Lucy. Her skipper,
W. H. Noakes, and his crew⁴ were killed. The Ben and Lucy had been towing the drifter Feasible (disabled by a shell hit), 3 life-boats and the cockle boat
Letitia. At 0115 on the 1st June the Renown, by then disabled, attached herself to this tow, but an hour later she was blown to pieces and a hail of wood and splinters came down on the Letitia's deck. The Letitia's skipper (A. J.
Dench) says, In the pitch dark we could see nothing, and after the explosion we hard nothing and we could do nothing, except pull in the tow rope, which was just as we passed it to the Renown about 3 hour before.
French and Belgian ships arrive
Early on the 31st it became known that the Belgian Government were anxious that several small Belgian fishing craft lying at Brixham should take part in the evacuation and steps were taken to arrange this.
At 1335 the French destroyer Léopard routed from the Downs to Dunkirk two French trawlers5, three French motor fishing vessels⁶, and ten Belgian trawlers⁷.
The Belgian trawlers were under the orders of Pilote Malet; the remainder of the ships under Lieutenant de vaisseau Drogou.
Other Allied ships that sailed for Dunkirk on this day were the French cargo ships Ingénieur Cachin and Margaux, the trawlers Pierre et Marie, Emma and
Duperre, and the patrol vessel Diligente; the Belgian trawlers Lydie Suzanne and Yvonne, and the drifters Gerard-Léon (H.64), Anne Marie and Thérèse
Compas. On her return journey the Pierre et Marie picked up 3 English sailors from a drifting motor boat.
I The Marsayru's skipper says that throughout 31st May, and the days and nights that followed (its all a complete jumble in my mind) we were under constant fire but the ship was not hit by anything." It seems, however, that Mr. Olivier was only in the evacuation for 5 hours, i.e. from 1600 to 2100, 31st May.
2 Defender, Endeavour, Letitia, Reliance, Renown and Resolute.
3 S/Lt. M. H. B. Solomon, R.N.V.R.
4 L. V. Osborne, Mate, and F. W. Osborne, Engineer.
5 Chasse-Marée and Angèle Marie.
6 Margaux (D.692), Jeune France (Di.1213) and Du Guesclin (D.G.910).
7 Indépendence (0.308), Victor-Erna (H.63), Louise-Irène (H.80), Pharailde (H.42)
Raphael-Raymonde (H.43), O.L.V. Van Vlaandeven (N.49), John (O.210) Anna Marguerite
(Z.2), Buffalo Bill (Z.4) and the M.41.
73

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
very clear and the Rear-Admiral decided to get the ships away at 0300
now of 0330 as originally planned. The Admiralty orders that evacuation
Dunkirk Pier was to continue until 0700 did not apparently Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker not receive the orders which went by Dunkirk (Appendix did R.20, 23); and it is to be preout from the Admiralty at 0115/2, that destroyers were to continue the evacuation until 0700 (Appendix R.21). Although men were still coming down the the Rear-Admiral was unwilling to run the risk of having ships sunk alongside pier, and blocking the pier and harbour. Accordingly he told the ships to leave and himself followed out of harbour the last of them, apparently the destroyers Winchelsea and Whitshed about 0300.
British rearguard held up
Meanwhile, a most disquieting message had been received at Dover. At
0040 on the 2nd the Lydd, while embarking troops off Malo beach, was requested by the Brigadier of the brigade then embarking to transmit to Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker a message from Major General Alexander reporting that on account of French congestion on the mole at Dunkirk a considerable number of British troops were held up and further arrivals were still expected. It was essential that the rearguard of the B.E.F. should embark from the beaches east of the mole, where they were expected to arrive by 0230.
What had happened was, that French troops had cut into the flow of British making their way along the road to the East Pier, by a converging route; and both
British and French troops were now being embarked at the pier.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker apparently never received the message and knew nothing of the state of affairs at the East Pier until he arrived there at
0200.
Vice-Admiral Dover, who received the message at 02001, at once sent orders to all destroyers of Force K still on the coast, the minesweepers, and the gunboat Locust which was off Bray supporting the evacuation by covering fire, to endeavour to embark the British rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300
if necessary. The coding and transmission of the message took some time, and the orders apparently went out too late; all ships had sailed, and the rearguard could not get away that night. Only the personnel vessel Portsdown was left on the coast. This was an undegaussed ship manned by a naval crew, which had anchored off Malo at 2205/1. After running to death her own two dinghies ferrying troops she got hold of a large motor boat, and she sailed about 0400. On the way home the ship collected further troops from a French vessel aground off Dunkirk, and from two further vessels encountered, and she eventually disembarked at Dover 168 British and 450 French.
Bombing of the hospital ships Worthing and Paris. (App. S)
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk because no hospital ships had sailed for 24 hours, orders having been given to evacuate fit men in preference, since, other considerations apart, embarking wounded would have taken up too much valuable time. The cessation of daylight sailings rendered it possible for hospital ships to occupy berths alongside, without detriment to the operation, and jt was decided to get some of the wounded away in daytime in hospital ships, in the hope that the Germans would respect them.
In order to afford the enemy no excuse to attack a warning signal was sent
0120. I Dover Report, p.27. The time of receipt on the flimsy of the decypher appears to be
103

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX G
6. D.M.O.' escorted 18 motor to VICE-ADMIRAL, by trawler boats and Asama. 17 DOVER whalers (R) left C.-in-C. Sheerness Nore, for N.O.I.C. Dover
1916/28
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to C.-IN-C. NORE (R) Admiralty
Request you will send every available to shallow off draft power boat capable ing stocked from with beaches fuel to and ships, provisions direct for ships 2 days. lying beaches to eastward of of Dunkirk ferry-
2002/28
8. (ADMIRALTY) D.S.V.P. to C.-IN-C. Nore, S.N.O. DOVER, S.N.O. SHEERNESS
to Additional arrive before motor tomorrow boats up night to a 29th. possible 40 are being sent from Thames to Dover
Some boats will come await by lorries arrival direct of to boats. Dover. Runner 12 crews are being sent to ness and 20 but to will Sheerness not proceed to further. crews take boats to Sheer- Dover
2031/28
9. N.C.S.O. THAMES N.O.I.C. to RAMSGATE COMMODORE SHEERNESS, C.-IN-C. NORE, VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER, have charts, food, fuel, they be sent to Sheerness first.
All small craft are being etc. route-ed If not direct complete to beaches will east of Dunkirk provided they
2301/28
Wednesday, 29th May
10. ADMIRALTY to COMMODORE IN CHARGE, SHEERNESS (R) C.-in-C. Nore V.A. Dover.
N.O.I.C. Ramsgate
All motor boats being prepared for service under V.A. Dover are to be sent
Naval-Officer-in-Charge. immediately they are ready to Ramsgate where they will recieve orders from the
0120/29
11. Wolfhound to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Have you any orders for fleet of motor boats now tied up alongside Wolfhound.
0224/29
Reply
12.
Make utmost endeavour to hasten departure of motor boats to La Panne beach.
0256/29
13. (ADMIRALTY) D.S.V.P. to C's-in-C. PORTSMOUTH, NORE, S.N.O.'s YARMOUTH, NEW-
HAVEN, VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER,
Officers from S.V.P. are proceeding to requisition suitable motor boats reported to S.V.P. under Emergency Statute² and otherwise, for immediate service on coast from Portsmouth to Yarmouth.
In all about 140 are anticipated of which 40 have already been requisitioned in the Thames Estuary for special service and ordered to Dover.
It is requested that boats when collected are placed under control until their crews arrive as follows:
Area I-Lymington to Littlehampton including I.O.W. assembling at Hamble.
Area 2-Littlehampton to Rye, assembling at Newhaven.
Area 3-Brightlingsea to Harwich, assembling at Harwich.
Area 4-Southwold to Gt. Yarmouth, assembling at Yarmouth.
0940/29
2 I This Dynamo Maintenance Officer (Admiral Taylor) at Sheerness.
of Small Craft (Information) Order, 1940. It was issued 718, at the on 16th April 1940, emergency statute was Statutory Order No. dated 10th May, 1940, entitled the Admiral Sir Lionel Preston, request, view of feet probable The in order, requirements briefly, called for small on Director all motor owners of craft. the of Small Vessels Pool, craft Admiralty, between 30 in and 100
Order length, to send particulars of their craft self-propelled to the Admiralty within 14 days. The clearly At the time of the conception way, Order, May however, there was the B.B.C. was published in the press in the usual and on 14th it was broadcast on no question of a possible evacuation from and the issue Continent. of the
166

SIGNALS
APPENDIX H
20. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, from DOVER La
6,000 British marching Panne through Bray on Dunkirk.
0235/1
21. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER west
We must have more boats of La Panne.
0243/1
22. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Gossamer
It is now impracticable to send more boats. You must do your utmost with 0334/1 yours.
23. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER, REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Situation on beaches is critical. Third Division marching to Dunkirk. More boats urgently required.
0345/1
24. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Thousands more (?moving) from La Panne westward. No boats.
0358/1
25. GENERAL WHITAKER to GENERAL DILL, WAR OFFICE
Absolutely essential provide many more small boats with motor boats to tow if grave losses are to be avoided and remainder B.E.F. cleared. Matter utmost urgency.
0430/1
26. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
All craft used for towing boats have returned in the night. They must be sent back.
0611/1
27. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Warn following ships to stop them.
2150/1
20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty
Reported that number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Essential to arrest this. Keep good lookout and force them back.
2201/1
20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
Owing to severe conditions and enormous wastage on Dunkirk coast, small boat flotillas, vital for beach work, can no longer be relied upon even in fair weather.
Information just received that at least two such flotillas have turned back tonight
Saturday.
2328/1
30. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty
False information and orders to return are being given to our inshore units by 5th
Column scoots or other vessels. Endeavour to keep our small vessels to their duty on the coast.
2335/1
Sunday, 2nd June
31. ADMIRALTY (D.N.I.) to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Your 2335/1: Please supply any information regarding the ships suspected of
5th Column activities.
1834/2
Monday, 3rd June
32. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
Your 1834/2. Following is information to date:
On the morning of the 1st June it was reported that a number of small craft had left Dunkirk beaches. An M.T.B. was sent out to round them up and send them back. A signal was intercepted from Leda en route to Dunkirk saying that she had met boats returning, and she was ordered to send them back.
171

INDEX
Discipline. See British Expeditionary Force and French troops.
Disembarkation ports, 25.
Docksey, Capt. T. E., 21.
Doggersbank, 20, 29n, 32, 45, 47n, 64, 72, 107n.
Dolphin's power boats, 72n.
Donald, Lt. Cdr. C. G. W. Died of wounds, 10.
Dorienta, 71n.
Doris, 71n, 94 (sunk).
Dorrien Rose, 24, 29, 62.
Dove, Cdr. J. S., 50n (reports Dunkirk blocked), 59.
Dover, mined, 38.
Dowling, Lt. Cdr. D. B., 82.
Drifters, 23, 24 (flare burning).
Drogou, Lt. de V., 73.
Duchess, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Duchess of Fife, 28n, 54n, 101, 107n, 109.
Du Guesclin, 62n, 73n.
Dundalk, 86, 107я, 109.
Dunkirk, S.N.O. See Tennant, Capt. W. G.
Dunkirk: water supply destroyed, 8; demolitions, 8, 19, 106; inundations, 12; bridgeeasier, munications 27, 30; limitations, 48; reported blocked, 50; ships not to close, 51; comhead, 15, 18, 35; damaged, 15, 18; out of action, 23; reported fallen, 24; conditions established with Dover, 51; reduced number of ships sent, 61-2 bombarded, 70; harbour deserted, 87; harbour full of ships, 88; growing number of wrecks described, off, 117. 94; pier damaged, 97; blocking of inner harbour, 111-112, 119-20 piers
Duperre, 73.
Dwarf, 60.
Eastbourne Queen, 74.
E-boats, activity). 27-8, 36, 37n, 49 (fail to discover change of route), 68-9, 85 (recrudescence of
Edmond René, rams Kingfisher, 116.
Edvard Nissen, 111-12.
Edward Z. Dresden, 114n.
Eggington, Ldg. Sea., 119.
Eileen Emma, 23n, 83n (damaged), 95 (sunk).
Eilla II, 71n, 74.
Elizabeth Green, 53, 114n.
Ellwood, Cdr. M. 0. D. (i/c Communications), 67.
Emerald Wings, breaks down, 111.
Emile Deschamps, sunk, 119.
Emma, 73.
Emperor of India, 28n, 47n, 54n, 100.
Empire Henchman, 7In.
Endeavour, 73n.
Enterprise, 72n, 75n.
Epervier, 99.
Escaut, 60.
Esk, 28n, 49, 79 (takes across R.A. Dover and Beach parties), 54n, 55, 58, 64n, 92, 97,
102, 107n.
Ethel Everard, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Evans, W. L., 110.
Excellent's A/A M.B., 72n, 75n.
Excellent's 35 ft. M.B., 71n, 75n.
Exhaustion of ships' crews, 29, 113.
Express, back 28n, 41-2, 54n, 55, 59 (flag of R.A. Dover), 62n, 83 (slightly damaged), 109 (sent empty), 112n, 114n, 118.
Fagalde, General, 12, 68, 85.
Fairplay I, 71n.
Fair Breeze, 60, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Feasible, 71n, 73 (disabled).
Fenella, 34, 43 (sunk), 46.
Fidget, 32n, 51n.
"Fifth Column", 24, 100.
198