TNA ADM 234 360

CONTENTS
Page
Introduction xiii
CHAPTER I
Preliminary Events, 10th to 18th May, 1940
Germany invades Holland and Belgium
1
Allies reach River Dyle
1
German thrust on French 9th Army front
1
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
2
Germans cross Meuse
2
Dutch Army surrenders
2
Allies withdraw to River Escaut
2
French 9th Army front broken
3
Allied rail communications severed
3
CHAPTER II
The week before Operation "Dynamo", 19th to 25th May, 1940
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
4
...
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
4
...
Vice-Admiral Dover, represented at War Office Conference
4
Channel ports the German objective
4
Gerneral Weygand directing Allied operations
5
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
5
Naval Staff at Dover considers large scale evacuation
5
Provision of small craft considered
5
Counter-attack south of Arras
6
Germans approach Boulogne
6
Organisation of the canal line
7
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
7
Canal line occupied
7
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
7
"The Operation will be known as 'Dynamo' "
7
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
8
Calais cut off
8
i

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. I
13TH MAY
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent in accordance with their plans, and by the May, units of the latter
Movements of the main bodies of the French 13th Ist and 7th Armies continued north of Antwerp on the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming inof Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, which was developing from the north-east.
creasingly evident that they would be unable to prevent the enemy occupation northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp.
During the day and the following night the Belgians were withdrawing their
14TH MAY
Germans cross Meuse
May the 14th was crucial, for on that day the enemy penetrated the French
9th Army front, and crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Mézières.¹ (See
Plan 1).
15TH MAY
Dutch Army surrenders
On the 15th May the Dutch Army laid down its arms. The immediate effect of this on the operations of the B.E.F. was small, but "I anticipated says
Lord Gort, "that this would come as a shock to the Belgian Army".2
The French 7th Army withdrew its advanced formations to the neighbourhood of Antwerp, and the French divisions on the B.E.F.'s left flank were ordered to move across the British rear to fill the gap which had been created on the French 9th Army's front. This move did not, however, actually take place till some 3 days later,² and it then left the Belgian Army responsible for the security of the British left flank.
On the British front the day passed quietly on the whole. The 1st Corps
[Lt.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker] was not attacked in strength; 3rd Division [Maj.-
Gen. B. L. Montgomery] of 2nd Corps [Lt.-Gen. A. F. Brooke] was attacked north-west of Louvain, and its forward positions were penetrated, but a counterattack successfully restored the original line.
and, in spite of British support, some ground was lost.
At about 1800, however, the enemy penetrated the French 1st Army's front,
16TH MAY
Allies withdraw to river Escaut was were impracticable,3 because the French 1st the B.E.F.'s right flank
By the 16th May it became clear that a prolonged defence of the Dyle position withdrawal unlikely to make good the ground lost on Army the on and a further
It seemed likely to be forced on them by events previous in day the south.³
on night of Senne and one day on the River Escaut, spending on the the was River therefore decided to withdraw to the River one day began. 16th-17th May, the 15 to 20 miles withdrawal Dendre. to Accordingly, the Senne positions
2 1 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 22.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 23. 24.
2

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin), who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May), now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens, attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely foreseen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting, which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5

CHAP. II
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
21ST MAY
Counter-attack south of Arras
Mechanised He had Division, co-operation but the movements of the Corps and a byLord Cort was begun the of the French Cavalry Major-General H. by Lord Gort
The counter-attack this day under with 2 the divisions command south of of Arras planned did not materialise. Furthermore, serious attack widely divisions to of the French as 5th Corps would also the The hot develop two the flanks General Franklyn had latter did through wear¹. were now troubles developed beak troubles developed beak bubles developed break the British overworked tanks, whose tracks mechanical troubles developed to that Although the attack the objectives would not of maintain the day its were therefore reached, it became and supported by the French on its left¹. momentum unless it was reinforced clear enemy direction.¹ pressure "Thus compelled concluded the Allied force to withdraw - and in an 23rd
During the 22nd May General the Franklyn held his ground, but on the had valuable defence of Arras," said Lord Gort, easterly blocked imposed a vital a road centre".¹ delay on a greatly superior force against which it... had It
Germans approach Boulogne military situation, for, in the afternoon, an enemy column of all arms the
In the meantime, the 21st May had marked a still more serious change in approaching the Germans Boulogne.² The military situation was rapidly deteriorating; was completely Allied severing our line of communications.³ A quarter of were across the Somme² and had cut the railway at Abbeville, tons of troops now lay north of the Somme, cut off from the daily flow a of million decision ammunition and supplies essential to their maintenance. 2,000
"was to maintain the force through the northern ports", said Lord 'The established at Dunkirk.
finally taken on 21st May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area Gort,
A conference of the Allied Commanders was essential, and at 2000 Lord Gort went He to Ypres where he met the King of the Belgians and General Billotte.4
river explained the situation developing on the Escaut, where the water in the and decided back As the to was it was a that line line SO evident low the be in withdrawn rear, Escaut that that General it should no sooner to longer Billotte the or be later abandoned formed Belgian the a frontier Belgian tank on the obstacle. Army defences.⁵ night would of It 22nd-23rd was have thereupon to swing May, if on he to were the forced to withdraw from the asked positions the on King the of the he Belgians would whether, fall back the line of the Yser SO as to continue to Lys, of days B.E.F.⁵ later His Majesty agreed that maintain touch with the left five the Yser the Belgian command decided no that alternative the idea line of the existed, withdrawal but to must be ruled out".
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 33.
General Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
General Lord Blanchard Gort's Billotte Second succeeded was Despatch, fatally him injured in para. para. command in 37 35. a motor of the accident French returning First Group from of this Armies. conference.
6

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors, for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and consequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was intimated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embarkthe 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time, owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour); and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers, skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc, and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland), water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24, borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord Southwherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

INDEX
Discipline. See British Expeditionary Force and French troops.
Disembarkation ports, 25.
Docksey, Capt. T. E., 21.
Doggersbank, 20, 29n, 32, 45, 47n, 64, 72, 107n.
Dolphin's power boats, 72n.
Donald, Lt. Cdr. C. G. W. Died of wounds, 10.
Dorienta, 71n.
Doris, 71n, 94 (sunk).
Dorrien Rose, 24, 29, 62.
Dove, Cdr. J. S., 50n (reports Dunkirk blocked), 59.
Dover, mined, 38.
Dowling, Lt. Cdr. D. B., 82.
Drifters, 23, 24 (flare burning).
Drogou, Lt. de V., 73.
Duchess, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Duchess of Fife, 28n, 54n, 101, 107n, 109.
Du Guesclin, 62n, 73n.
Dundalk, 86, 107я, 109.
Dunkirk, S.N.O. See Tennant, Capt. W. G.
Dunkirk: water supply destroyed, 8; demolitions, 8, 19, 106; inundations, 12; bridgeeasier, munications 27, 30; limitations, 48; reported blocked, 50; ships not to close, 51; comhead, 15, 18, 35; damaged, 15, 18; out of action, 23; reported fallen, 24; conditions established with Dover, 51; reduced number of ships sent, 61-2 bombarded, 70; harbour deserted, 87; harbour full of ships, 88; growing number of wrecks described, off, 117. 94; pier damaged, 97; blocking of inner harbour, 111-112, 119-20 piers
Duperre, 73.
Dwarf, 60.
Eastbourne Queen, 74.
E-boats, activity). 27-8, 36, 37n, 49 (fail to discover change of route), 68-9, 85 (recrudescence of
Edmond René, rams Kingfisher, 116.
Edvard Nissen, 111-12.
Edward Z. Dresden, 114n.
Eggington, Ldg. Sea., 119.
Eileen Emma, 23n, 83n (damaged), 95 (sunk).
Eilla II, 71n, 74.
Elizabeth Green, 53, 114n.
Ellwood, Cdr. M. 0. D. (i/c Communications), 67.
Emerald Wings, breaks down, 111.
Emile Deschamps, sunk, 119.
Emma, 73.
Emperor of India, 28n, 47n, 54n, 100.
Empire Henchman, 7In.
Endeavour, 73n.
Enterprise, 72n, 75n.
Epervier, 99.
Escaut, 60.
Esk, 28n, 49, 79 (takes across R.A. Dover and Beach parties), 54n, 55, 58, 64n, 92, 97,
102, 107n.
Ethel Everard, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Evans, W. L., 110.
Excellent's A/A M.B., 72n, 75n.
Excellent's 35 ft. M.B., 71n, 75n.
Exhaustion of ships' crews, 29, 113.
Express, back 28n, 41-2, 54n, 55, 59 (flag of R.A. Dover), 62n, 83 (slightly damaged), 109 (sent empty), 112n, 114n, 118.
Fagalde, General, 12, 68, 85.
Fairplay I, 71n.
Fair Breeze, 60, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Feasible, 71n, 73 (disabled).
Fenella, 34, 43 (sunk), 46.
Fidget, 32n, 51n.
"Fifth Column", 24, 100.
198

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German break-through on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th ":
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675