TNA ADM 234 360

RESTRICTED
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY EVENTS
10TH-18TH MAY 1940 (See Plan 1)
10TH MAY
Germany Invades Holland and Belgium
On the 10th May, following the invasion of Holland and Belgium, the Franco-
British forces under General Georges, commanding the French Front of the
North East, crossed the Belgian frontier and began their advance to the River
Dyle,¹ according to plan.
11TH MAY
Allies reach River Dyle
During the afternoon and evening of the 11th May the leading infantry brigades reached the Dyle.
The news from the Belgian Army, of which King Leopold had assumed command on the outbreak of war, was not good. At Maastricht the Belgians had been unable to demolish important bridges over the Albert Canal and the river Meuse, and the enemy had begun to move across them; whilst the
Belgian anti-tank obstacle eastward had been reconnoitred by the French
Cavalry Corps and found to be not only badly sited but unfinished.²
12TH MAY
German thrust on French 9th Army Front
The Allied advance to the Dyle was successfully completed by the 12th May.
The B.E.F. was in position between Wavre and Louvain, with the French 7th
Army (General Giraud) on its left and the French 1st Army (General Blanchard)
on its right. On the right of the French 1st Army was the French 9th Army
(General Corap) of the French Southern Command. Disquieting news was, however, received from the south, where a German thrust with at least two armoured divisions¹ was reported as developing on the front of the French
9th Army.
This thrust eventually proved to be the beginning of the German breakthrough and their sweep westward, which cut off the Allied northern forces from the main French forces in the south, led to the capture of Boulogne and
Calais, and culminated in the evacuation of Dunkirk.
General Billotte was in command of the French First Group of Armies, which included the French 1st Army (with the French Cavalry Corps), and the French 7th Army. Between these two armies lay the Belgian Army
(under the independent command of their King), and the B.E.F., which, though under the command of General Georges, was not under that of General
Billotte. On this day, however, it was agreed to co-ordinate the action of the
British, French and Belgian forces, and General Billotte was appointed to perform this task.³
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 18.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 19.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch para. 22.
1

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors, for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and consequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was intimated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Dover.¹ It was added that "Dynamo"2 the operation the for first which these ships were prepared word. would be known as mention of the now famous being
18 lying at Poole were London were commissioned Portsmouth on of these,
As a result of this direction, commissioned 40 skoots by the in all C. were in C. commissioned;
the May, 25th and and 22 lying 27th at May. by the C. in C. Nore between
23RD MAY
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
May which (see to have changed enemy hands twice bridgeheads at Aire, at St. 23rd
Over in Plan France, 2), and the situation the on established the canal line deteriorated during the mediately east of St. Omer), and, during the forest of Clairmarais
German seems tanks were reported harbouring during in the the day"3), and near Watten. Omer vehicles within 3 miles of Hazebrouck; day, hostile armoured (im-
Dunkirk. enemy was then within some 20 miles these of movements came had been checked,3 the and though by the evening fighting
Calais cut off gallant was conducted under the orders of the War Office". of
Calais defence was now of Calais finally cut off, and, said Lord Gort, the remainder the
Dunkirk, available though for its water supply was destroyed,⁴ was by this time the and port small unloading supplies. Even the small supply by air of only craft arms ammunition now ceased, as it had become impossible rations
(Licut.-General to land. Accordingly, on the advice of the Quarter-Master-General for air-
During completed. day the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. rations.⁴ was the W. G. Laidsell), Lord Gort put the B.E.F. on half
Dunkirk Naval demolition parties were ready at the Nore, and one was landed
XD(E)). during the day to prepare the locks for demolition. (Operation at
Boulogne evacuated
Comdr. Early A. on E. the same day a demolition party (Operation XD under
Buttercup", destroyer Vimy, to Boulogne, together with despatched, in the P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.), was (G) also Lieut.-
consisted Major of C. F. L. Holford, R.M. was in cover the demolition party; to restore control of the docks area and a force known as Force guns and a medical 4 platoons of seamen, 2 Marine platoons command with a of section this force, of machine and it attacked battery drawn When to had "Force by the been enemy Buttercup" sent tanks party. on the and Two arrived, previous battalions the day. and town the of Irish was under Guards shell and fire an and anti-tank being orders jetty in readiness infantry, for Army forces were being with-
I during the afternoon that the evacuation, troops were although to stay the and War fight Office it out⁵. sent
2 Appendices F.1 and F.2.
Appendix F.3.
4 5 3 Lord Lord Gort's Gort's Second Despatch,
Admiralty Second Despatch, para. 39.
Message 1422/23, War para. Diary 37. 23.5.40, p. 356.
8

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Defences of Dunkirk
It was would be Dunkirk¹. Its local were under the only port du now obvious that if the B.E.F. defences was to be evacuated the available Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose command included the Boulogne, Calais and Dunin these areas to General Fagalde.
kirk, but on this day (24th May) he delegated command of military forces and comprised an inner and an outer sector; inner on
The French defences of Dunkirk extended only the as far as the Belgian frontier,
Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence to Bergues to the frontier and so to the the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer, thence by Cassel and Steen- sea voorde to the frontier.¹
the inundations which formed part of the defence scheme of Dunkirk.²
The French now took over the British posts on the Aa and began to operate
Belgian line penetrated
In the late evening the enemy attacked the Belgian line on the Lys, penetrating to a depth of 1] miles on a 13 mile front3 and endangering the security of the British left flank.
It had become a matter of vital importance to keep open the B.E.F.'s line of communication to the coast through a corridor of withdrawal which was hourly narrowing. The penetration of the Belgian line made it certain that before long the whole area east of the Yser canal would be in the hands of the enemy, with the serious risk of the Belgian right becoming separated from the
British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather than a westerly direction.³
25TH MAY
Enemy pincer attack
On the 25th May enemy activity intensified. He was across the canal at
St. Venant, and was developing the bridgeheads between that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, while further north the situation on the river Aa remained obscure.
During the day the Belgians continued to withdraw in a north-westerly direction under enemy pressure.
General Sir John Dill, who had now succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside as C.I.G.S., visited Lord Gort in the morning. He then informed the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State for War that there could be no disguising the seriousness of the situation.3
By 1800, says Lord Gort, "I was convinced that the steps I had taken to secure the north. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet the growing danger in held; ment the the south-west on Dunkirk had already and being
The from pattern of the enemy pincer attack was becoming clearer. One movebetween counterpart was now developing on the developed, front. was The gap the British left and the Belgian right which Belgian had been threatening
D.R.
3 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 41.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 42.
12

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
the whole day, might at any time become impossible to close; were this to happen, my last hope of reaching the coast would be gone".'
In order to secure the British northern flank Lord Gort decided to issue orders for the occupation, as quickly as troops could be made available, of the line of the Ypres - Comines canal and the positions covering Ypres. In the absence of General Blanchard, who was visiting the Belgian G.Q.G. at Bruges,
Lord Gort communicated this decision that evening to the Headquarters of the French First Group of Armies.¹
The necessity of evacuation was becoming a matter of paramount immediacy.
British destroyers bombard suburb of Calais
Meanwhile, on the 25th May, the trawler Lord Howe sailed to Calais with a cargo of ammunition². She entered the port and discharged part of her cargo in the face of heavy enemy fire from the dunes to the southward. In view of the risk involved, Commodore W. P. Gandell, R.N. (P.S.T.O., French Ports), who was on the quay, then ordered the Lord Howe to sail.
Outside Calais the destroyer Greyhound closed the Lord Howe, which was carrying a request for bombardment support of the town. At the same time, the Greyhound received a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover, ordering the bombardment of the Calais suburb of St. Pierre. The Greyhound opened fire, and at 2000, an H.A. battery east of Sangatte registered a hit on her, killing
2 and wounding 3. About this time the destroyer Grafton arrived and also opened fire. The 2 destroyers returned to Dover as darkness set in.³
Evacuation of Calais countermanded
At 2130 a force of seven trawlers⁴, three yachts⁵ and two drifters⁶, sailed for
Calais road, ready to evacuate troops from Calais, the moment an order was received to do so. Five of the trawlers towed motor boats. Commander
W. V. H. Harris, R.N. (Commander M/S, Dover), in the Grey Mist, was in command. The destroyers Windsor and Verity left Dover at 2300, to cover the withdrawal of this force.
On arrival off Calais, two of the motor boats were ordered into Calais harbour.
At about 0300/26, a signal was received that Calais was to be held at all costs;
furthermore, it was ordered that this signal was to be sent by hand to the
Brigadier commanding on shore. The Conidaw went in to deliver the signal.
All ships were then ordered back to the Downs, but the Botanic and Maretta remained behind until the two motor boats and the Conidaw returned.⁷
The Botanic and Maretta were damaged by gunfire when returning on the
26th May, and were unable to take part in Operation "Dynamo".
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 43.
2 Lieut. L. C. Whittle, R.N.R., in the Lord Howe, says it was the 24th May.
3 Vice-Admiral, Dover's 1907/25/5.
4 The Botanic, Fyldea, Maretta, Arley, Polly Johnson, Brock and Calvi.
6 The Grey Mist, Conidaw and Chico.
5 The Playmates and Willing Boys.
7 Report by Commander M/S, Dover (R.O. II, p. 497).
13

OPERATION "DYNAMO" IS COMMENCED
CHAP. III
you that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will inevitably be lost even in best circumstances".
Later in the day Lord Gort received a further telegram from the War Office which said, inter alia, not possible for French to effect junction with Northern Armies no course open to you but to fall back upon the coast you are now authorised to operate towards the coast forthwith in conjunction with French and Belgian Armies".
It will be remembered that on the evening of the 21st May the King of the
Belgians had agreed that, if forced to abandon the Belgian positions on the
Lys, he would withdraw to the Yser, maintaining touch with the left of the
B.E.F. Now, however, late on the morning of the 26th May, a note was received from General Michiels, the Chief of the Staff of the Belgian Army, which said, inter alia the Belgian Army is being attacked with extreme violence and the lack of Belgian reserves makes it impossible to extend our boundaries we have no longer any forces available to fill the gap in the direction of Ypres. As regards the withdrawal to the Yser, the idea must be ruled out since it would destroy our units more quickly than the battle.
The Belgian collapse was impending, if it had not actually taken place, and the task of defending the Allied line as far as the sea had fallen on the British and French troops.2
Dunkirk perimeter organised
Faced with this critical situation Lord Gort, on the evening of the 26th May, put in hand his plans for withdrawing in to the bridgehead at Dunkirk³. Orders had already been given for the embarkation of certain key personnel, and now all units not required for battle were being withdrawn. It was possibly at this juncture that, " owing to a misunderstanding, the personnel of certain anti-aircraft units had been embarked instead of being retained for the defence of the port of Dunkirk".⁴ The task of organising a bridgehead at Dunkirk was delegated to Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam, Bt., Commander of the
3rd Corps.⁵
The Admiralty signals, "Operation 'Dynamo' is to Commence"
Meanwhile, in the morning of 26th May, a meeting had been held at the
Admiralty to give further consideration to the provision of small craft, and the crews for manning both them and the ex-Dutch skoots. The meeting also examined the number of craft available for the evacuation. The port of
Dunkirk had already been so damaged by air attacks as to be no longer available for unloading supplies, which would now have to be landed on the beaches to the eastward.
Long before the operation was ordered, the Admiralty fully realized that large numbers of small craft would be required for a beach evacuation; but such was the secrecy of even the possibility of evacuation, that steps could not yet be taken to collect craft for the purpose.
During the afternoon of the 26th May, under the pressure of the acute military: situation, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that it was imperative for 'Dynamo' to be implemented with the greatest vigour,
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 44.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 45.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 55.
5
He handed over command of the 3rd Corps to Maj.-Gen. S. R. Wason.
15

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
The "build-up" of small craft commences
Early on the 27th May, the Ministry of Sea Transport had been asked by the Admiralty to find between 40 and 50 small craft, which were to assemble at Sheerness for a special requirement". The Director of the Small Vessels
Pool (Vice-Admiral Sir Lionel Preston, K.C.B.) supplied a list of what were thought to be suitable vessels, but it was soon found that a great number of these were not in a fit state for service. A meeting was therefore held at the
Admiralty which was attended by a representative of the Director of Sea
Transport, Mr. H. C. Riggs. On Mr. Riggs' suggestion, Admiral Preston agreed to send some of his officers to the various boat-yards from Teddington to
Burnham and Brightlingsea, to inspect and send to Sheerness all vessels fit for service¹. Forty motor boats or launches were thus obtained, and arrangements made for them to reach Sheerness by 28th May.2 Very few of these reached the Dunkirk beaches by the 29th May, but they were the forerunners of nearly 300 small craft, which were destined to play an important part in the embarkation from the beaches of some 99,000 troops, by ferrying them to offlying ships.
In the evening of the 27th the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, assumed by arrangement the duty of fuelling and despatching all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla.
Some delays occurred in the assembly at Ramsgate or in the Downs of small craft despatched from other commands, owing to many of them being routed to Dover in error, instead of to the Downs. Once despatched by the authorities no communication with these small vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination; this resulted in delays of up to 24 hours or more before assembly, because during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift owing to the moderate weather or collisions, and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight.
"Dynamo Maintenance Officer" appointed
To take charge of these small craft, Rear-Admiral, A. H. Taylor, O.B.E.,
(with the acting rank of Commodore), after getting final instructions from the
Vice-Admiral, Dover, proceeded to Sheerness on the 27th May to act as
Dynamo Maintenance Officer." He was responsible for the preparation of various vessels, small motor craft, and pulling boats, for service in Operation
'Dynamo his staff comprised Cdr. H. R. Troup, R.N., and Lt. Cdr. D. E.
Holland-Martin, R.N. The type of machinery fitted in many of the vessels and its defective state presented the Fleet Engineer Officer, Captain T. E.
Docksey, R.N., and Sheerness Dockyard with some difficult problems; but within a week, under Commodore Taylor's general direction, no less than 100
motor boats, 10 self-propelled lighters, 7 skoots, 1 oil tanker, 6 paddle steamers, and numerous pulling boats, were prepared for service and sent out from
Sheerness.
S.N.O. Dunkirk assumes duty 1900/27
Meanwhile, at 1315, Captain Tennant left Dover for Dunkirk in the destroyer
Wolfhound, with a naval beach and pier party of 12 officers and 160 ratings.
A communications staff was also taken, as it was intended that the Wolfhound should relieve the Wolsey at Dunkirk as W/T link. The Wolfhound was
I T.O. 9144/40.
2 Appendix G. 3.
21

CHAP. IV
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
attacked misses, and, twice arrival by dive-bombers at Dunkirk en at route, 1655, receiving found some damage was in progress. on an air attack by 21 from aircraft near enveloped air raid casualties lying about depots the and The was investigate in the a vast pall of smoke from the oil area of Naval Headquarterters to
Captain Tennant local proceeded situation. ashore The whole to the Bastion with was blazing, masses of wreckage. were streets, which were littered town
Parminter; On arrival at Colonel the Bastion, Whitfeld, Captain Sub-Area Tennant Commandant; held a meeting and with Brigadier
H. P. Henderson, R.N., the B.N.L.O. It to was retain decided that the harbour Commander as a W/T link.
untenable, and that it was impracticable the Wolfhound at Dunkirk was
At 1900 Captain Tennant assumed the duties of S.N.O. Dunkirk, ordered the Wolfhound and Wolsey to proceed to the beach east of Dunkirk and and embark troops, using their own boats. This they proceeded to do, but did not get away unscathed; the Wolfhound grounded as she left Dunkirk harbour and received further damage from a bomb which struck the jetty six feet away. She made no more trips to Dunkirk, but on that evening she and the Wolsey became the pioneers of beach evacuation.
Beach evacuation begins
Meanwhile, during the afternoon, four personnel vessels and two hospital carriers had sailed for Dunkirk¹. Of these, the personnel vessels Queen of the
Channel and St. Seiriol left Dover at 1330, by Route Y, and entered Channel Dunkirk at about 1930, during an air raid. The Queen of the beaches. had At harbour barely embarked 50 troops when both boats ships were had started diverted ferrying, to the S.N.O. Dunkirk to troyers' passed 2230, boats, embark signalled however, which this motor 1,000 order were the boats. before men. Wolfhound manned to the the The The St. St. as Queen to Wolfhound, Seiriol's necessary Seiriol send of a beach by the personnel by then megaphone Channel, naval and with ship then, ratings the using to and Wolsey returning the or her commandeered east towed own off pier, to the by except boats, Dunkirk, Dunkirk the beaches des- em- the her she harbour, destroyers barked was about unfortunately picked Wolfhound 150 up troops a and further sunk Wolsey, from by 700 aircraft the to troops. embark early She next troops was morning from the first the (May ship, beaches, 28th) shortly though after leaving Dunkirk.
" tomorrow night is problematical "
S.N.O. local By 1958, Dunkirk, and Captain he sent Tennant this dramatic had arrived signal to at immediately.
Evacuation on 27th May, only an hour after he a the duties of the of situation, available craft to beaches T.O.Of.1988."kirk
" Evacuation tomorrow transmission, night is was not received until 2055, but in and the
Please send every problematical.
This I The signal, Queen delayed of the Channel, in St. Seiriol, Canterbury, Maid of Orleans, Isle of Thanet
Worthing.
22

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only a few minutes later:
" Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005."
To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from
G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might, indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.²
All ships diverted to the beaches
Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from
Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral
Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy, and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³
were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol, the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne.
The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of subsequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵
Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the
17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷, and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and
I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo'
the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040,
Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the beach at Malo-les-Bains.
This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into
3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap between each part. (Appendix O. 11).
2 D.R. page 3, para. 8.
3
The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields.
4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8.
5 D.R., p.3, para. 38.
6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden
Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, Yorkshire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II.
7 Appendix D.6.
23

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
beach evacuation impossible; at no time did this happen, but it was not until the fifth day of the operation (May 30th) that small power boats and beach craft began to become available in adequate numbers.¹
The reason for this is to be sought mainly in the need for secrecy enjoined by the British and French Governments, even after the operation had been ordered. The necessity for avoiding any action that might have given rise to talk rendered the collection of small craft slow. It was not until 31st May that the British public learnt from the press that evacuation had begun.
Disembarkation ports designated
In these early days the limiting factors seemed likely to be the scale of enemy attacks at Dunkirk and on the beaches, and the difficulty of concentrating the ships and the troops at a common point or points².
Meanwhile, in order to ensure air protection, Blenheims maintained a patrol by single aircraft over the Dunkirk area during the night.³
At 2330, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, promulgated the names of ports for the disembarkation of troops in England as follows:-
The Calcutta at Sheerness;
destroyers at Dover;
drifters, minesweepers, skoots and coasters
___???___
At Margate or Ramsgate as directed by N.O.I.C. Ramsgate;
personnel vessels at Folkestone.
Throughout the whole course of the operation the despatch of troops from the points of disembarkation in England was directed by the War Office Movements Control Organisation, and proceeded with great smoothness⁴.
Summary of troops evacuated
The ships which had sailed for Dunkirk on the 26th May brought back
6,183 troops and 646 stretcher cases next day.
During the 27th May only two personnel vessels actually made the round trip, viz.: the Royal Daffodil, which brought back 840 troops from Dunkirk, and the St. Helier, which was ordered back before she could embark any troops.
The destroyers Wolsey and Wolfhound, which embarked 206 and 130 troops respectively from Malo beach on the evening of 27th May, did not sail for
England until shortly after midnight.
Thus, the total number landed in England from the commencement of
Operation "Dynamo" to midnight 27th/28th May was:
26th May - Nil;
27th May - 7,669, all of whom were lifted direct from Dunkirk harbour.
I D.R. covering letter, No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, paras. 3 and 5.
2 D.R. page 3, para. 11.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p. 320.
4 D.R. covering letter No. A.14/0/876/40, page 2, para. 6.
25

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP V
While a situation that could only mean surrender was now visualised in
England as possibly a stark necessity, General Weygand sent an urgent telegram to Lord Gort appealing to him personally to ensure that the British
Army took a vigorous part in any counter-attack thought necessary; the situation, said General Weygand, made it essential to hit hard.
Lord Gort, who saw the situation more clearly, observes, when he [General
Weygand] sent this message, he could have had no accurate information of the real position or of the powers of counter-attack remaining to either the
British or French."
Germans take Ostend
That evening, at 2030, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that Ostend was reliably reported to be captured. Dunkirk was the only port left in Allied hands.
Situation at Dunkirk becomes easier
Nor were the prospects at Dunkirk very hopeful. When the Wolfhound and the Wolsey left Malo beach for Dover just after midnight on the 27th May the whole of the port appeared to be ablaze¹.
At 0125 the cruiser Calcutta, en route for La Panne, was missed by a torpedo
100 yards astern fired from an E-boat. No further attack took place, and the
Calcutta arrived off La Panne beach an hour later to find that the destroyers
Grafton, Greyhound and Impulsive, and the paddle-minesweepers Sandown and
Gracie Fields, were already there.
Ever since 0030 destroyers making their first trip to the evacuation area had been arriving off the beaches, and only two - the Gallant and the Wakeful -
went to Dunkirk. The Vivacious and the skoot Hebe II reached Malo beach at about 0030, and the Sabre at 0120. The Hebe II, unable to find any troops, entered Dunkirk harbour and embarked 150 from the east pier; the Sabre embarked troops from two drifters. At 0320 the Vimy arrived off the beach at Zuydcoote, 3 miles east of Dunkirk, and sent her boats to assist in filling up the minesweeper Brighton Belle, which was embarking troops with the assistance of the ex-Belgian canal boat Yser and a small pulling boat. The skoot
Lena had been off Zuydcoote since the previous evening and in the early hours of the 28th May transferred the 120 troops she had embarked to a destroyer;
the minesweeper Medway Queen, off La Panne since 2300/27, sailed with 600
troops on board.
By 0400 the situation in Dunkirk harbour appears to have eased, and at
0436 S.N.O. Dunkirk was asking for all vessels to go alongside the east pier.
At 0445 the Vimy, leaving her boats with the Brighton Belle, went into Dunkirk harbour and embarked 613 troops. At 0955 the destroyer Mackay reached
Dunkirk from the Irish Sea, and picked up 600 troops in an hour from the seaward end of Dunkirk east pier, giving up her berth to the destroyer Montrose.
The Sabre, which had in the meantime returned to Dover with a load of 158
troops from Malo beach, berthed outside the Montrose. An hour later, the destroyers Worcester and Anthony arrived, and berthed ahead of the Montrose.
The pier was crammed with troops and several aircraft, attempting to bomb it, were driven off by the destroyers' gunfire. Vast columns of smoke were drifting westwards from the burning oil tanks ashore, and houses on the sea front were bursting into flames from time to time².
I Report by the Wolfhound.
2 Report by the Montrose.
27

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
had all come under fire from the shore guns at Calais and Gravelines. At
0415 on the 28th May the Queen of the Channel, loaded with 904. troops, was attacked by one aircraft; 3 or 4 bombs were dropped, which straddled the ship abaft the mainmast and broke her back, the starboard propeller shaft and the rudder. By good fortune the Dorrien Rose, en route for Dunkirk, was in the vicinity and rescued the troops: the Queen of the Channel sank about 1/2 hour later. The St. Seiriol, which left Dunkirk at about 0415 with 494 troops, reached Folkestone in safety.
Civilian crews feel the strain
Some 45 personnel vessels were used during operation "Dynamo"
Of these eight were sunk, at least six were so damaged by bombing or gunfire as to render them unfit for further use during the operation, and two were damaged in collision. Nine of the largest of these personnel vessels had been engaged prior to "Dynamo" in operations at Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and their Captains and crews were beginning to feel the strain when Operation
"Dynamo" started.
Thus it was that the Master of the Canterbury, which had already completed
2 round trips to Dunkirk in operation "Dynamo", reported, on the 28th May, that he was too worn out to make a third trip. The P.S.T.O. went on board and explained the gravity of the situation to the Master, and the Canterbury sailed at 0930 the next day. On her return voyage from Dunkirk she was bombed and damaged, and after landing her 1960 troops went into dock for repairs. In the 3 trips she made the Canterbury brought back 4,416 troops;
her Master, Captain C. A. Hancock, was awarded the D.S.C.
Personnel vessels not to be employed during full daylight
On the 28th May, however, it had become apparent that development of the German air threat over the evacuation area, and the increasing artillery fire from shore batteries covering the sea approaches to Dunkirk, prohibited the employment of personnel and similar vessels during daylight, until the position was restored, and that evacuation from Dunkirk by day must for the moment be confined to warships and small vessels².
It was not, therefore, until later in the day, that the P/V Royal Daffodil sailed for Dunkirk, and eight other personnel vessels and a hospital carrier³
received their sailing orders during the afternoon and evening.
The northern Route Y was by this time in general use⁴, but ships proceeding from Dover to Dunkirk were ordered to use the southern and shorter Route Z, if the passage from Calais Bell buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
N.O.I.C. Ramsgate responsible for servicing skoots
In these circumstances some 20 skoots reached Dunkirk, or arrived off the beaches during the day and evening of the 28th May; others were on the way.
Their speed varied, but most of them were very slow. Eight of them went into Dunkirk harbour⁵, and four to Bray beach⁶. The Abel Tasman, loaded with ammunition, the Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with food, and three
I This number includes 3 store ships, 3 motor vessels and a few freighters, coasters and tramps.
2 D.R. p. 4, para. 13.
3 The Scotia, Malines, Prague, Manxman, Royal Sovereign, Tynwald, Lochgarry, Killarney and the H.C. Paris.
4 Appendix K.1.
5 The Caribia, Fredanja, Friso, Jutland, Tilly, Patria, Sursum-Corda, and Twente.
6 The Amazone, Doggersbank, Hilda, and Oranje.
29

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
and Hilda), two power boats and Kellett a tow and pulling Leda, but boats; the(Doggersbank with the Calcutta¹, the Gallant, Wakeful, of Verity, two skoots was joined by the minesweepers the number there were insufficient boats and motor launches to cope with of troops on the beach.
Calcutta had already lost one of her two whalers2.
70 wounded (cot cases); heavy embarkation difficult and the
Off La Panne, at 2157, the Calcutta, surf assisted made by the skoot Reiger, embarked
By the 28th May beach evacuation had become a vitally essential part complete lack of small beaching craft, other than ships' boats - aftermath
Operation Dynamo". It was, however, severely restricted by the almost of the wish, already noticed, to prevent early information of the operation be- of coming known to the enemy; and an urgent and persistent cry for boats arose from the ships off the beaches.³
Beach craft are sailed for Dunkirk
Steps had already been taken, however, to begin the provision of small boats.
At 0800 on the 28th May, 8 motor boats were sailed from the Thames for the
South Downs. At noon the tug Sun V with 8 cutters and 2 whalers in tow, and the tug St. Clears with 11 cutters in tow, left Sheerness for Ramsgate, and both tugs sailed for Dunkirk late in the evening. Of these two tows, however, only 7 cutters reached the beaches, the remainder being lost en route.4
At 1500 the tug Java left Ramsgate for Dunkirk, in company with four drifters⁵ and 5 motor launches⁶. They arrived off Bray at 0100 on 29th May, and were the first arrivals of small motor craft off the beaches. With them, at 1500 on the 28th May, 5 drifters of the 1st Mine Recovery Flotilla left Ramsgate for Dunkirk⁷, and at 1845, 18 motor boats with 17 whalers left Sheerness for Dover.⁸
Supply of small craft is accelerated
These supplied only a portion of what was required. There was still a lack of small craft, and at 2002 V.A. Dover asked that every available shallow draft power boat should be sent to the beaches⁹. The Admiralty's vigorous reaction to this request became fully evident on the following day, the 29th May, when the Portsmouth and Nore Commands, the Thames estuary and the Port of
London Authority were combed for motor boats, lighters and barges¹⁰. To accelerate the journey arrangements were made to route them direct to the beaches, provided they had charts, food, fuel etc.¹¹, though some difficulty was experienced in providing the large number of charts required. Indeed, on the road map" to navigate on.
31st May the Master of the coaster Hythe states that he was given an army
I 2 The Calcutta reported she was off La Panne.
Appendix H.2.
3 Appendices H.1 and H.2.
Five gunfire from Clears' cutters were lost en morning route to Dunkirk a collision with the destroyer the result of enemy
4 The of the Sun St. V's tow was lost early next in Montrose.
up 5 by The the Sp. Gravelines Serv./V. Crested and Nieuport; Eagle. one of the 5 was, next however, day, as subsequently picked
6 The Lord Walker Rodney, I, Lord Keith, Lord Collingwood
7 8 9 The Appendix Lord Cavan, G.6. Walker Fidget, II, Jacketa, New Britannic, Silver Dawn Nayland, and and Fisher and Lord Angler Boy St. Vincent. (Appendix II. G.5).
Appendix G.7.
II 10 Appendices G.13 to G.18.
Appendix G.9.
32

CHAPTER VI
WEDNESDAY, 29TH MAY
FIRST HEAVY ENEMY AIR EFFORT
German bridgehead in Nieuport
Throughout the 29th May, the enemy attempted to cross the canal between the Frenco-Belgian frontier and Nieuport - and, indeed, succeeded in establishing a bridgehead in the town of Nieuport, although everywhere else he was driven back. Some of the enemy attempted to cross in rubber boats; others, disguised as civilians, with the refugees, horses and cattle. The few vital hours gained made it possible, against all expectation, to embark practically the whole British force¹.
Two-day traffic block in perimeter
Large numbers of French troops arriving in the perimeter brought a mass of transport which caused such traffic congestion that for two days the main road between La Panne and Dunkirk became totally blocked with vehicles three deep².
French evacuation not yet ordered
Admiral Abrial (whose headquarters were at Bastion No. 32, near Dunkirk
Mole) had apparently received no orders from his Government that the whole of the British troops were to be embarked, and he professed great surprise when he heard of Lord Gort's intentions. He imagined that British troops would stay and defend the perimeter to the last, side by side with the French².
Meanwhile, the French troops were expecting to embark along with their
British comrades, notwithstanding that only two French ships had so far been provided³; the beaches were becoming crowded with French soldiers, and difficulties might have occurred at any time.² Later in the day, however, three French torpedo boats and one minesweeper sailed to Dunkirk harbour to evacuate troops.4
Dunkirk perimeter established
On the evening of the 29th May the organisation of the perimeter was complete, and General Sir Ronald Adam, his task accomplished, embarked for
England that night.5
Mackay and Montrose out of action
The story of the 29th May is largely one of ships sunk or damaged. Our losses were very heavy and began very early. At 0005, the destroyer Mackay
(en route to Bray beach with the destroyer Harvester) ran aground at the western
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch para. 53.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 55.
3 So far, the French torpedo boat Cyclone had brought back 460 troops, and the minesweeper Commandant Delage 520 - both on 29th May, from Dunkirk harbour.
4 The torpedo boats Cyclone, Mistral and Sirocco and the minesweeper Commandant
Delage.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 57.
35

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VI
and machine gun platforms, a bulkhead wrecking was dished, them was severely shaken, and 13 killed, wounded; of the passengers, and orders killed and 2 men the ship's company, 3 officers 2 officers men and were 10 men were and 18
wounded. Then a fire broke out, further dive bomb were given to flood and burn the signal books. A anchored. attack took bombs fell wide. The Bideford and the tug St. Clears The in tow; she was,
The M/S Kellett came endeavoured alongside the to take Bideford, the Bideford and took off about 300 troops, in tow, but again the tow parted.
ever, fast aground, and the tow parted. dr. Havant then tried to take how-' her
Bideford towed to Dover embarked in the Bideford. from La Panne dawn, gunboat Locust, carrying 620
During the night of 29th-30th Near May, 350 the French and 50 British troops and at daylight she less than 21/2 knots course was set for
British and French troops floated - in tow. At beach, passed a tow to the Bideford,
Dover; en route, during the first 3 miles, the tow parted 3 times. Throughout the 30th May the Locust struggled on with her burden. During the night
French soldier jumped overboard, fully equipped. The tow was stopped, a buoy was dropped and a boat lowered; but, in spite of good visibility and a calm sea, the unknown soldier was not recovered although a search was made a at 1130 on the 31st May and disembarked 436 troops.
for 30 minutes. In spite of the tow again parting, the Bideford reached Dover
The momentous issues at stake in Operation "Dynamo" were not to be attained without grievous losses, but the Bideford's heroic voyage to safety marked a momentary respite from the rapidly mounting toll of lives and ships.
Twelve hundred troops wade out to a skoot
At about 2300 on the 29th May the skoot Patria arrived off Bray from Rams-
The Captain of the Patria, who decided to ground his ship, records that "The gate and, in the glow of the still burning Crested Eagle, saw troops on the beach.
troops, holding hands, waded out and clambered on board by nets, ladders and ropes' ends. The sight of two solid phalanxes of men, delineated by phosphorescence in the water and steadily advancing to the ship, will be memorable them Over 1,000 men were embarked in just over two hours." Among
Crested Eagle and the Fenella.
were naval ratings - casualties with severe burns from the Grenade, the
Dover unaware of losses filtered heavy Lord Lord to Little Earlier Dover, Gort bombardment Gort through information in and and the and at the day to 3rd 0127 Dover, 3rd of other and Corps the Corps the that important except disastrous Vice-Admiral, destroyers at La that information losses Panne it there was Dover, of known the were had, afternoon informed being that however, hit Dunkirk the and soon come Calcutta early after was through evening 1600. under that effort the beach was and to be embark made to the concentrate force. of the B.E.F. destroyers were and at La light Panne, craft and at that that end every of
I D.R.
46

CHAP. VII
ferring By 0100 to her Rear-Admiral from single-minded come face to be of spoken incredible such a THE EVACUATION
gress situation, Captain the water of Bush. and up to of their From the the waists. ghastly him, Esk, Wake Walker Lound sight He had of the the more trans- from as a seemed then Commodores seen, to embarkation", detect but I in did his not voice". says feel Rear-Admiral that I could accept Wake-Walker to the note of terribly standing in despair I had pro- not
Stephenson and
Bray. proceeding to take charge off-shore Hallett at were La Panne, transferred and the to drifters, latter off-shore the which former I
groups he had of to work. all He saw the beaches. a dark line of men the
Wake-Walker By dawn the was Hebe able was to off glimpse La Panne, for the and first in the growing light Readmul at stern completely men blown over off and Off Bray the Bideford was ashore and large off the beaches Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested the Locust was trying to take her in tow. with her were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while Lying were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There men was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men filed down the sand dunes, and at the back of our minds all the time", says line
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence boats.²
could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was
Twice during contact Captain Tennant. With his staff these ships in the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk he transferred in unsuccessful efforts to to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, home as in the Hebe from the Hebe with troops. Captain Bush took passage large numbers were to turn " to stress filled the up vital necessity for boats and crews if any The Rearbenches".³
would Admiral come There off arrive was was the great hampered at beaches difficulty by and in lack start exercising of means loading; The control urgency of getting and off of a the beaches. Ships everything⁴. desirable, At 2000 would on the be 30th May was at La La Panne discussed Panne at and where 1800 arrangements next he met day, Lord and were Commodore Gort made and for of Stephenson identifying Tennas embarkation fre of the beaches seaward it. was
On this evening a
method
M.017978/41, p.4.
R.A. Dover's report (M.017978/41).
(R.O.III, p.374).
R.A. R.A. Dover's Report
Dover's Report (M.017978/41).
58

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester, by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars
By about 0600, all destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any of them². Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval officers " who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, "I proceeded on a motor bicycle to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who took me to see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later the sky was overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend, for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed.
"During the forenoon on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claude5 high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and distribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I
Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6
This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
and miracle. unpredictable difficulties, as a such courage, energy and single-mindedness, that it has since and in come the face to be of such incredible found the
Hebe situation, Captain the ferring By water 0100 to Bush. and her up Rear-Admiral to from "of their From the the waists." ghastly him, Esk, Wake-Walker Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral he sight He took had of over the had the shore, Wake-Walker, Wake-Walker to duties watch black of with the off S.N.O. heard terribly standing in Bray, (Afloat) and, trans- from gress of embarkation", says I could the which I had proseemed to detect in his voice".¹
then seen, but I did not feel that accept note of despair which not I
proceeding to take charge off-shore at Panne, and the latter off-shore at
Commodores Stephenson and Hallett were La transferred to drifters, the former
Bray.
Wake-Walker was able to glimpse for the first
By dawn the Hebe was off La Panne, and in the growing light Adminal the growing lear Readminl he had to work. He saw a dark line of men at the water's edge, and large groups of men all over the beaches. Off Bray the Bideford was ashore with her stern completely blown off and the Locust was trying to take her in tow. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Lying off the beaches were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while men were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men filed down the sand dunes, and "at the back of our minds all the time", says
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was boats.²
Twice during the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk in unsuccessful efforts to contact Captain Tennant. With his staff he transferred from the Hebe to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, as these ships in turn " filled up with troops. Captain Bush took home in the Hebe come off the benches".3
to stress the vital necessity for boats and crews if passage any large numbers were to would Admiral was hampered by lack of means of about quickly". Ships
There was great difficulty in exercising control off the beaches. The Reardesirable, everything would be impracticable. The urgency of a the moment governed arrive at beaches and start loading; getting and redistribution, though where At 2000 he on the 30th May Rear-Admiral Panne and met Lord Gort and Captain Tennant. Wake-Walker landed at La discussed
1800 arrangements next were made for Lord Gort's The situation was Panne at
On this day, and Commodore Stephenson embarkation from of La it.
1 evening a method of identifying was the put beaches in charge from seaward was
2 2 R.A. report
M.A. Dover's p.4.
R.A. Dover's Dover's Report Report (M.017978/41). (M.017978/41). (R.O.III, p.374).
58

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester, by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, " in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars.
By about 0600, all destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any of them². " Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval officers who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, " I proceeded on a motor bicycle to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who took me to see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later the sky was overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend, for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed.
"
"During the forenoon on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claudes high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and distribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6 This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embarkthe 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time, owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour); and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers, skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc, and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland), water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24, borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord Southwherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
reached the beaches, and by retrieving the abandoned and drifting pulling boats they were able to do much to increase the rate of lifting¹.
Many more were on the way. The destroyers Basilisk and Venomous from the Western Approaches Command were making for Dover, and the mine sweepers Niger and Dundalk were coming down from the Humber. The attempt to maintain an adequate rate of lift with only the older destroyers soon proved unavailing, and all the modern destroyers of the H, I and J classes which had been withdrawn on the 29th May were ordered back to Dunkirk on the 30th².
Small craft were hastening up from Portsmouth, Newhaven and Sheerness;
six tugs were plodding along from Tilbury (towing 23 motor and 46 rowing lifeboats), and five others had left Gravesend (towing barges). Yachts, drifters and trawlers; launches, lighters and steam hopper barges; car ferries, coasters and cockle boats; train ferries, speed boats and picket boats; seaplane tenders, fishing craft and pleasure craft; steam pinnaces, sailing craft and a
Thames fire float-a host of vessels-were heading in ever-increasing numbers³, for Dover, the Downs, or Dunkirk direct, while the cry more ships, more boats", still went up off. the French coast.⁴
Set-backs were inevitable, but this concourse of ships, big and little, fast and slow, manned by willing and eager crews fired by one purpose of saving the British Expeditionary Force, continued to grow until it assumed the proportions of an armada.
Late on the previous evening the Bideford had sent a call for large quantities of rope for towing to be sent, and within a few hours 9 coils (1080 fathoms)
of 4-inch grass hawser were speeding by lorry from Chatham dockyard to
Ramsgate to help the skoots to haul boats off the beaches, thus speeding up the boat work and compensating for the shortage of boats, 'which would continue", says Vice-Admiral, Dover for at least another 24 hours "5.
Undoubtedly as a result of the messages and signals received on the 29th
May by V.A. Dover with regard to the harbour at Dunkirk, the number of ships sent there on the 30th May was curtailed, with a corresponding reduction in the volume of embarkation. After V.A. Dover's signal to Admiral Abrial late on the 29th May, asking whether it was possible for transports to berth alongside, further signals to the same effect were sent to the Vanquisher and the Codrington and to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker. Finally, at 1020, the
Wolsey was called upon for a detailed report of conditions alongside the east pier; and by 1524 V.A. Dover was able to inform destroyers that a good berth with bollards exists 400 yards from end of east pier".
In the meantime signals were coming in from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and from the Vivacious stating that the beaches were filling up rapidly and more ships and boats were urgently required there.⁶ Although it was known that the destroyers could use Dunkirk, it appeared, says V.A. Dover, that the best division of transport was to send the great majority of destroyers to the beaches, where urgent demands could not be ignored, and the personnel vessels to Dunkirk harbour, only an occasional destroyer being sent to Dunkirk from the reduced number available.⁷
I D.R. p.15, para. 49.
Javelin. 2 Appendices D.9, D.10. Except the Intrepid and Jaguar (in need of repairs) and the
3 Appendices G.20, G.27, G.28.
4 Appendices H.7 to H.10.
5 D.R. p.13, para. 41.
6 Appendices H.7, H.9 and G.22.
7 D.R. p.13, para. 43.
61

CHAPTER VIII
FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
EVACUATION REACHES ITS ZENITH
Lord Gort hands over his Command to Major-General Alexander
(2nd Corps) to withdraw to the The 50th 5th Divisions
Orders had been issued on the the beaches 30th May and for Dunkirk. the 3rd, 4th and began to take place on the morning of 31st May.
the British Base staff at Dunkirk, to come the 1st Corps. These moves with to fall back to the French defences on Belgian under frontier and, together
This meant that the remnant of the B.E.F., on being withdrawn inside the area of the French defences, came under the orders of Admiral Abrial; the ance with the instructions he had received.² He selected Major-Generalthe selected Major-Generl the time had therefore arrived for Lord Gort to hand over
Hon. H. R.L. G. Alexander to remain in France in command of the 1st Corps, now numbering less than 20,000 men in all; and, on taking over command of the Ist Corps, Major-General Alexander handed over command of the Ist
Division to Brigadier M. B. Beckwith-Smith.
Lord Gort agreed with Major-General Alexander that a provisional date for evacuating his force was to be the night of 2nd/3rd June.
On the 31st May therefore, Lord Gort's headquarters closed at 1800, and, after handing over command to Major-General Alexander, Lord Gort embarked with his A.D.C. in the Hebe's whaler, which had been towed in by the motor yacht Lahloo to a point a little west of La Panne beach. He proceeded to the
Lahloo and thence to the Hebe. During the embarkation an enemy attack was made by about 40 aircraft and considerable shelling was directed on to
La Panne beach itself. With Lord Gort on board, the Hebe proceeded to La
Panne beach and continued to embark troops.
It was not, however, till about midnight, that the motor yacht Bounty with
Cdre. Stephenson on board proceeded to transfer Lord Gort from the Hebe to the Keith. At about the same time, however, the M.A/S.B.6, having embarked Lord Gort's chief staff officer General Leese from the Keith, was sent to the Hebe with orders from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to embark Lord Gort.
On finding that he had left the Hebe, the M.A/S.B.6 returned to the Keith, embarked Lord Gort, and sailed at 0304 on the 1st of June for Dover which she reached at 0547 the same evening.
It had been the intention of the Admiralty that Lord Gort and his staff should be embarked in M.T.B.'s and at 1522 V.A. Dover had informed Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker by signal that 4 of these vessels would be available for this V.A. Dover's did not reach R.A. Dover4, and other and signal all four back at Dover by Speaking of the non-receipt uses; of indeed Dover's were signal, Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker reached says, The signal informing V.A. of this, like many others, never me At 1543/30 Rear-Admiral me Wake-Walker had asked that he
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, a M.T.B's. Gort's Second Despatch, para.57.
R.A. 67, 107, 68 and 102. para. (See 58.
M.017978/41, Dover-Report p.18. of Proceedings (R.O. Appendix III. para. G.30). 19).
66

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Headquarters and the various was venience, French Messages as employment except best done station by they because taken for despatch of transmission could at semaphore. by the the hand riders, with Bastion coding down the to for Beach of or, Dover help the messages the parties, for pier parties distances of the by for sake nor W/T between of were greater too one great party and cars. con- the lished was a French, laborious Reception a very by and 2300 business slow decoding on on the business. that naval which the day, type W/T first but necessitated of set code owing which (the to sent arrived the Anglo a through the French Statim French) the the Frestroyers Station by destroversion in use message at that estab- This date into was munication mission broke was down not established with the Dover defective transmitter.ful defective transmitter.ful comof sand in the generator. altogether on evening of 1st June, probably on account
On the 1st June the Royal Corps of Signals established a W/T station in lorry by the Bastion, as well as telephone communication between the Bastion a and the Headquarters Signal Station. The intense bombing and shelling by the Germans that day severed the line more than once.
In view of the possibility of the arrival of enemy forces on the 2nd June all signal forms and records were destroyed on that day.
British Sector to be held till midnight 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, on taking over command of the 1st Corps, Major General
Alexander proceeded to Dunkirk to interview Admiral Abrial who informed him that he intended to hold the perimeter till all the troops were embarked. A
French Corps on the right was to hold the sector from Gravelines to Bergues
(though Gravelines had not apparently been in French hands for some days)
and a mixed French and British Corps under command of Major General
Alexander was to hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres and thence to the sea¹.
that in his view this plan did not take account of the true naval and condition
Major General Alexander at once told the Admiral and General military Fagalde situation of the was now such that prolonged resistance was out of the the question, night of which serious and deteriorating rapidly. The fighting troops was front could not in his opinion be maintained after beach and and the present furthermore, the line to be held was so close to the by short to 1st/2nd Dunkirk June; that the enemy might soon stop all further evacuation range War, Major and General received Alexander a reply that gave the the British same French force opinion troops should to being the be Secretary withdrawn embarked Abrial of as State in rapidly equal and for artillery fire¹.
as possible from on a that basis time of British onward. and This he showed to Admiral allotted to him till numbers midnight General Fagalde, 1st/2nd stating June, and that then he would withdraw hold under the sector cover of darkness, which they agreed was the only plan feasible¹.
Cyclone damaged
Day and night our by patrols torpedo were maintaining subjected their to E-boat vigil attacks. northward, but the on this day two
French destroyers were
I Appendix to Lord Gort's Second Despatch.
68

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
in the Bray and Malo sectors were being thinned out by movements westward towards Dunkirk iteslf. This change of plan involved concentrating the special tows and the minesweepers to which they were to transfer the troops, into the stretch opposite the beach between Zuydcoote Sanatorium and one mile east of La Panne¹, and also advancing the commencement of the operation by one hour².
A risk was involved in this change of plan as the boat tows were not in communication with the Vice-Admiral, and it would therefore be necessary for minesweepers to see that the escorting M.A./S.B.'s shepherded the tows to the new positions It had been explained to the Naval officers in each tow that the minesweepers would be anchored so as to serve as guiding marks³.
" It was always impossible for me to do more than deal with the situation of the moment", says Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker. "I did not know what ships were coming or when-except for the pre-arranged plan of the sloops. Nor was it possible for Dover to give me much information. Ships got back there, unloaded, and were off again, the stream was constant but irregular and it was not possible to see any way ahead. My policy was always to keep only sufficient ships off the beaches and send all the others into Dunkirk, but the situation changed continually."4
Small craft arrive in hundreds
It was in such circumstances that, at about 1900, Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker had proceeded to Dunkirk in the Keith to see how the boat situation was getting on. There he saw for the first time that strange procession of craft of all kinds the story of which was to become famous-tugs, towing dinghies, life-boats and all manner of pulling boats5-small motor yachts, motor launches, drifters, Dutch skoots, Thames barges, fishing boats, pleasure steamers⁶. This was indeed the first time that the small craft had come over in hundreds⁷. Since noon Lt. Cdr. C. J. Wynne-Edwards, R.N. (of R.-A.
Dunkirk's staff), embarked in M.T.B.68, had been directing the tows to the various beaches.
I See Appendix Q.18, observing that D.R. p.20, para. 61 says the beach between Bray and 1 mile east of La Panne."
2 Appendix Q.19.
3 D.R. p.20, para. 61.
4 M.017978/41, p.17.
5 The following 14 tugs (their tows are shown in brackets) reached Dunkirk that evening:
The Racia (12 life-boats), Sun VIII (12 life-boats), Sun XV (6 life-boats), Vincia (3 lifeboats), Sun IV (9 boats), Tanga (6 boats), Ocean Cock (6 M/B's), Sun VII (seaplane tenders
243, 254, 276, 291 and A.M.C.3), Foremost 87 (two sailing barges), Fairplay I (sailing barge
Barbara Jean), Empire Henchman (sailing barge Aidie), Crested Cock (a lighter), Sun XI (a lighter), and the Sun XII (sailing barges Tollesbury and Ethel Everard).
In the early hours of 1st June 4 other tugs arrived. The St. Fagan (auxiliary barges
Pudge and Lady Rosebery, and the sailing barge Doris), St. Abbs (auxiliary barge Thyra and sailing barges H.A.C. and Duchess), Cervia (sailing barge Royalty), and the Persia
(sailing barge Glenway and Lark).
6 M.017978/41, p.19.
7 New arrivals off Dunkirk and the beaches on 31st May included the following The yachts Amulree, Aronia, Glagla, Caleta, Christobel II and Llanthony, the nine yachts of the
Portsmouth Inner Patrol, viz the Ahola, Ankh, Bounty, Caryandra, Eilla II, Lahloo,
Noneta, Seriola and Thele and from the R.N. Air Station, Ford, the yacht Andora.
The drifters Ben and Lucy (towing 4 boats), Dorienta (towing boats), Monarda, Renascent and the 13 drifters of the Yarmouth Base, viz Alcmaria, Feasible, Genius, Gula,
Jeannie MacIntosh, John and Norah, Lord Barham, Lord Hood, Overfalls, Reed, Rewga,
Swift Wing and Taransay. The drifters Fair Breeze and Ocean Breeze were again over, the former towing a motor life-boat and 3 life-boats.
The steam hopper barges Foremost 102 (towing the Excellent's 35 ft. fast motor boat and
71

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
Typical of the urge which characterised sailed from Ramsgate this movement at 0205 of small craft was escorting the trawler motor Strathelliot, boats, 8 which of which were disabled and in tow of on various the 31st May the M/B Skylark, disabled, was in tow of Strathelliot. At 0640 the Skylark's vessels towing bollard tore away and she was taken the in tow stern first. Then the M/B
embarked the Skylark in also the in became Strathelliot. tow-and damaged, later Shortly taken after in tow this stern the first-and M/B Malden crew Annie Lad ber, IV
crew were transferred to the Strathelliot and she and was Mary sunk after Rose was her sunk. Her
Mary Rose, which had been in tow of M/B the Rapid I, was damaged.
had to be taken she arrived water fast, and dritting on to the was She
Dunkirk beaches with her pumps beach choked, she bilge abandoned. full of rubbish fund making off useful purpose, however, by being used as a pier.
It is impossible to give the story of every ship, although each ship has its which went over on the 31st May in company with the lighters X. 217 (S/Lt.
story. Here, for instance, is the unvarnished history of the M/B Marsayru
R.A. W. Pool, R.N.) X. 213 and X. 149. They arrived off Malo beach at about
1600. During an air attack X. 213 and X. 149 were sunk. The Z. 217 was beached and, assisted by the dinghy, embarked 95 troops which were transferred to the yacht Llanthony. The X. 217 continued to embark troops using the
Marsayru and a cutter. At about 2100 that evening, with the Marsayru's skipper and crew and about 200 British and French troops on board, the X. 217
left for home towing the Marsayru and a cutter.
Shortly after sailing the Marsayru broke adrift, and in darkness could not be found. Next day, the 1st June, however, at 1400, S/Lt. T.E. Godman, R.N.V.R.
in a Naval steam pinnace, off La Panne, sighted the Marsayru drifting with the tide and unoccupied. She was found to be in working order; the engine was started up and Sub-Lieut. Godman took an A.B. and a soldier as crew. He left Petty Officer Morrison in charge of the steam pinnace with orders to lay off and wait for the return of the Marsayru.
With the dinghy in tow the Marsayru proceeded to the western end of the beach capacity. and anchored; the dinghy ferried 19 troops to her, which filled her to
In the meantime the crew of the steam pinnace had embarked in the skoot
Doggersbank and had left the steam pinnace anchored near Dunkirk harbour.
Sub-Lieut. Godman decided to leave her there and sailed in the Marsayru for
England; from her. he overtook the Doggersbank on the way and obtained some fuel and in tow waited for daylight. At 0430 on the 2nd June a trawler a took the Marsayru
At 2330 on the Ist June the Marsayru made fast to conical flashing buoy embarked. to Ramsgate, which was reached at 0800, and the 19 troops were disthe Queen's pleasure launches Enterprise and Wave Queen), the Foremost Southborough,
White Heather,Westeriey,A Lansdowne, hopper barge.26. The M/B's. Marsayru, and the 101, Lady Minotaur,
The motor coaster Hythe. M/B, the Dolphin's Balquhain, power Tigris boat, I, Rapid the Nelson's I, picket the motor X lighters launch 95, 149, 209 (towing a boat), 213, Sherfield, motor launches Grouse, Nanette II the lighter Y.C.63. The and War 217. The motor barge seven 30 knot eighth, The skoot the Pigeon, Hilda went Haig, over on Kestrel, 1st June. Marlborough, Swallow, Department's Wolfe and Vulture an
Gipsy Three King, more Golden of towed Spray over II the and motor two life-boats. boats Moss Rose, Rose Marie, Lady Haig, Britannic and the M.F.H. Pickford & Co. Ltd.'s motor vessels went over, viz the Chamois, Hound
72

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Thereupon, at about 0050 on the 1st June Lt. Cdr. McClelland informed
Dover that he was closing down the telephone line as the headquarters were now being abandoned.
While this decision was being arrived at further batteries had come into action on the town of La Panne, and by 0100 the rate of fire on the beach was increased. Lt. Cdr. McClelland says that he had by that time lost touch with
Major-General Montgomery, who had left earlier and subsequently embarked in the Codrington at Dunkirk at 0525 on the 1st June.
By 0130 it was low water, and about half a mile walk to the end of the piers which were now high and dry. While walking there with the intention of assisting in the embarkation of the few men who had not been ordered to march to Dunkirk, Lt. Cdr. McClelland was twice knocked down by shell bursts a splinter smashed the box signalling lantern he was carrying, and another slightly injured his ankle. Several houses on the front were now blazing fiercely.
On reaching the embarkation point Lt. Cdr. McClelland was told that no boats had been in for over half an hour, and that the naval beach party had left-apparently in accordance with his orders that they were to leave in the last boat.¹ As will be seen later, the beach parties at Bray also embarked early on the 31st May.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches, Lt. Cdr. McClelland ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beaches with the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside Bray-Dunes before 0400.
At 0200, two or three miles down the beach towards Bray, three ships2 at anchor and some troops had been trying unsuccessfully to attract their attention by firing their rifles. Further on, as other large groups were waiting for boats,
Lt. Cdr. McClelland decided to swim off and report on the situation. He managed to get close enough to the Gossamer, which was anchored 4 cables from the shore, to pick up a lifebelt on a line brought to him by one of the ship's company.
He was just able to gasp out his message to the Captain of the Gossamer before collapsing, but he had told of the 4th Division's change of plan and of the state of the beaches and had asked that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and
Vice-Admiral Dover be informed. The former was evidently informed at
0215³, and at 0235, the Gossamer signalled V.A. Dover that 6,000 British were marching from La Panne through Bray on Dunkirk⁴.
Being very exhausted and no longer able to walk because of the pain from the wound in his ankle, Lt. Cdr. McClelland remained in the Gossamer.⁵
Sub.-Lieut. E. C. Croswell's report on La Panne confirms that of Lt. Cdr.
McClelland. He says On Friday [31st May] embarkation at La Panne was slowed up as shelling caused some ships to move westward to Bray-Dunes.
The rest camp in the rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut were hit during bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday, and ships also suffered shell fire
On Friday evening German gunners found the range of the beach and were aided by 2 observation balloons which we did not manage
I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report (R.O.III, p.392).
2 The Codrington, Ivanhoe and Gossamer.
3 M.017978/41, p.21.
4
Appendix H.20.
5
Lt. Cdr. McClelland received a mention in despatches.
77

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
from the beach, apparently stragglers. A large rearguard party probe to Dunkink.of to the the men the 4th Division) marching along the beach decided
Bray Beach parties return to England
It was on this day that the majority of the beach parties returned to England.
that the enemy were closing in and that it might be expected that the final
Captain Howson records that on the evening of the 30th May he had learnt evacuation would take place during the following day (31st May) or night at latest". As he had received orders that beach parties were not to be taken prisoner², and anticipated that very many troops would be left ashore, he deemed it undesirable for all naval personnel to embark in the final rush".
Accordingly he arranged that half the naval personnel should embark during the early hours of Friday (31st May)3.
This arrangement to some extent accounts for V.A. Dover's 1229/31 to Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker saying that officers and men of beach parties had returned to Dover on instructions from Dunkirk, and that they must be retained to the last⁴; and his further signals notifying that more beach parties were being sent out with all despatch in the destroyer Worcester5.
An account of the activities of the beach parties at Bray has been given by
Lieutenants G. W. Vavasour and J. G. Wells, R.N. They were among the 12
officers and 60 ratings, who sailed from Dover in the Esk with Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker and Commodores Stephenson and Hallett on the 29th May
(Page 49).
On the way over the 12 officers were divided into 3 groups of 4 officers, and to each of the 12 officers was allocated a party of 1 P.O., 1 Leading Seaman,
2 Able Seamen and a Signalman. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker told the officers that on no account were their parties to be captured, and that with this in mind, they were to re-embark when they thought fit.
On arrival off the various beaches at about 2330 on May 29th the Esk stopped off each and the 3 beach parties were landed in whalers; one party went to
La Panne where Cdre. Stephenson was to be S.N.O., Afloat, off the beach⁶, one went west of Bray, and the third went to Bray where Commodore Hallett was to be S.N.O., Afloat, off the beach. There is no report available of the activities of the first two parties.
The 4 officers in Cdre. Hallett's section were Lieuts. Vavasour, Wells, Tibbits and Cameron, R.N., all of H.M.S. Excellent. Cdre. Hallett had previously explained to these officers that he himself would be afloat approximately in front of his sections (E, F, G and H) of the beach, and repeated the warning that the officers were to be the sole judges of when to evacuate the naval parties.
I Capt. Pim's report (R.O. IV, p.52), Italics not in original.
2 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker says that the V.A. Dover had stressed that Naval ratings
(in beach parties) were not to risk being taken prisoner (M.017978/41, p.3).
3 Capt. Howson's Report (R.O. IV, p.117).
4 Appendix Q.12.
6 5 Appendices Q.13 and Q.14.
Lt. Vavasour's report, R.O.III, p.422. Lt. Vavasour says that Cdre Stephenson was
S.N.O., A.B.C.D. Sections. But the beaches had been lettered A to O, from west to east and so the La Panne beach was L.M.N.O. It was probably because of the almost invariable confusion about the lettering of the beaches that this method of designating beaches was changed by signal at 1906/29 (Appendix 0.11), and the whole length was divided into 3
equal parts, referred to as Malo, Bray and La Panne, from west to east with a mile gap between each part.
79

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
she shot down one Heinkel aircraft in flames. in mixed Between 1630 and 1745 our air encountered many enemy this series of combats formations, we the largest patrols of about thirty. In lost 5 aircraft being
Rear-Admiral due to always re-appearedisid to definitely group shoot down destroyed¹. Wake-Walker, the enemy It was observation "at during times this hauled balloon latter down failed period but to that always re-appearedia find a squadron for enemy a
At 1800, when until Lord 1930. Gort was embark, there were a a which continued
Between 1920 and 1930 our patrols the were engaged with a formation of
At 1920, off Dunkirk, the Whitehall's after group shot down a bomber.
70 H.E.111's and M.E.109's. In encounter, Fighter Command lost about 3
craft and claimed 10 bombers and 6 fighters definitelydestroyed. Some of air-
Hurricane pilots complained on their return that they had been shot at by the the engaged about thirty M.E.109's, but no bombers were intercepted.
Spitfires¹. At 2010 six Hurricanes trying to locate the observation balloon at Nieuport
Final evacution of B.E.F. expected on night 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, at 1920, all ships in the Nore and Dover Commands were informed by the V.A., Dover, that the final evacuation of the B.E.F. was expected on the night 1st/2nd June, and that the evacuation of the French from Dunkirk and Malo beach would continue from the 1st June by both British and French ships². At 2309 General Lloyd informed the D.M.O. of the new plan and stated that
General Alexander had been placed in command of the final phase of the evacuation, that the composition of his force was not known, and that it was impossible now to state how long the French evacuation would take but that the Alexander force would remain till the last³.
Meanwhile, no firm information could be obtained from the French on the following matters4:-
(i) the number of French troops to be evacuated;
(ii) the nature and extent of French seaborne transport;
(iii) the French military plan for the defence of the perimeter and the final withdrawal of French troops.
Embarkation reaches its zenith
The main features of the day had been:-
(a) the increased enemy artillery activity on Dunkirk, La Panne beach and
(b) the change in the military plan as regards the locality and time of lifting the approach channels
(c) the set-back to beach evacuation that occurred during the the choppy afterthe final contingents of the B.E.F.
noon and evening, forenoon, when large numbers were lifted from the weather of the followed by an excellent recovery in western
22,942 total of were 68,014 lifted proved from to the be beaches the highest daily total of the
The rate of embarkation had, however, and 45,072 up from expectations:, beaches. come to A total of
I R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
2 Appendix Q.19.
3 Appendix Q.22.
4 D.R. p.21, para. 63.
84

CHAPTER x
THE NIGHT OF 1ST - 2ND JUNE AND
FROM DAYLIGHT TO DUSK ON 2ND
Situation ashore on evening of 1st (Plan 3)
During the Ist June heavy enemy attacks developed the of the line, and our forces had to give some THE a a the enemy advance had been checked on a thence due east of the frontier and along the frontier sea.
was to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold.
French troops were holding a line in rear of ours, and the British rearguard
Two divisions of French Territorial troops reduced in strength, in addition to part of the British 1st Corps and rearguard of 4,000 men, still remained to be evacuated on the evening of the 1st. The War Office, aware that they were not in a position to judge the local situation, did not set a period to the evacuation but ordered Major-General Alexander to hold on as long as possible in order that the maximum number of French and British might be embarked. It left to the General, in close co-operation with Admiral Abrial, to decide was the moment when evacuation must come to an end.¹
Plan for the night 1st-2nd June (See Plan 4)
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June the only remaining Route x came under the fire of German guns, and it was judged impossible to carry out any further evacuation by day. There was hope both at Dover and at the War Office that it would be possible to complete the evacuation of the B.E.F. during the dark hours of the night 1st/2nd June, by using both sides of Dunkirk harbour, pier and eastern beach. The War Office asked General Weygand to urge Admiral
Abrial to co-operate in completing the evacuation of the French this night.
Evacuation was to be confined to the period between 2100 and 0330. It was estimated that British vessels could lift about 17,000 men, probably in the proportion 50 per cent British and 50 per cent French, during these hours, as follows:-(Appendix R8):-(a) From the beach between Dunkirk and 11 miles to the eastward between 2100/1 and 0300/2, 9,000 men. (b) At the East Pier between 2100/1 and 0330/12, 7,000 men. This time might be extended.
(c) On the east side inside the harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, 1,000 men.
It was intended to withdraw all naval personnel this night3.
All minesweepers, both fleet and paddle, and skoots and all small craft except certain flotillas specially organised, were to lift from the beach stretching eastward 100 1½ miles from Dunkirk, and it was hoped to employ here also about
French small beach fishing craft and drifters. Personnel ships up to 7 in
2 I The Report of Captain W. Tennant, S.N.O. Dunkirk, Record Office Case 5458 Vol. 3, p.357.
written 0330 or from by hand, and the time has been altered by the exceptionally) either typed from 0300 to read originator's copy of this signal is (rather instead of being was intended 0330 to read 0300, though it is not possible typewriter, to with which figure
Admiral to be sent. The time was received at the say certainty at 0330, and Rear
S.N.O. Wake-Walker in his Report, M.017978/41 p.32 Admiralty 0330 intended.
giving details of the plan until 0430/2.
Dunkirk reported, however (Appendix R.24) says that he did was not receive the message
96

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
number and 8 destroyers were to enter Dunkirk harbour and go alongside the
East Pier, where British troops were. Only by using this pier would it be possible to evacuate large numbers, and there was considerable apprehension lest the Germans should shell it heavily and damage it or render it impossible for ships to lie alongside. The pier had already been damaged by the armed boarding vessel King Orry when she secured alongside at 1730 on 29th May with her steering gear out of order and all instruments shattered by air attack, but the gap had been bridged. Drifters and other small craft were to be sent into the inner harbour at Dunkirk, to lift troops from the Quay Félix Faure, in the Tidal Harbour, the North Quay, in the shipyard, and the quay in the new outer harbour.
The French troops assembled on the west side of the harbour, and it was intended that French vessels, including torpedo boats, should serve the West
Quay in the new outer harbour, whilst private small boats used the Quay Félix
Faure.
Assembly of shipping
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June Vice-Admiral Dover recalled all destroyers to harbour and minesweepers of the 1st, 4th, 5th and 6th M/S Flotillas were warned for duty only ships having degaussing equipment were to sail.
Five vessels, the Sharpshooter, Albury, Kellett, Ross, and Leda were unable to comply; the compasses of another the Pangbourne, were unreliable, though her D.G. gear was functioning; and in the event, she sailed, led by a Dutch skoot, though she was too late to go to the beaches, and accordingly proceeded along Route Y as far as T buoy, looking for any ships in need of assistance.
The destroyers designated Force K, were to proceed in pairs at hourly intervals to berth at the East Pier in Dunkirk harbour, returning to Dover when loaded.
If there was no vacant berth at the pier when a pair of destroyers arrived, they were to assist at the beach instead. Four pairs were detailed, viz. the
Windsor and Icarus, Codrington and Sabre, Shikari and Esk, Winchelsea and
Whitshed. The Esk, however, which had been running almost continuously since 27th May, was unable to sail and was given 24 hours stand off.
Preparations to assemble the requisite small craft for working off the beach commenced early in the forenoon of 1st June, when a number of Senior Officers were despatched from Dover in fast motor boats to round up all stray motor boats in the Downs and along the routes, and direct them back in the evening to the beach 11 miles east of Dunkirk. A flight of 30 motor boats and 34 lifeboats with 3 tugs, the last three large tugs left in London, was sent during the early hours of 1st June from London to Ramsgate where they were prepared for beach work, naval crews being placed in the lifeboats that lacked crews and extra towage provided. Motor boats were also sent from Harwich and Sheerness. A number of flotillas under Commodore A. H. Taylor and Captain the
Hon. G. Frazer were re-organised for the night's effort.
Abandonment of daylight evacuations (Appendix R)
It was decided to abandon daylight evacuation after 1st June, because the scale of enemy air attack experienced on that day, and the fact that the Germans could by now command the newly swept central route at its point of junction with Dunkirk Roads by gunfire from the shore, rendered it too costly.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, when drawing up the plan for the night, intended sailings to cease at 0300 or 0330; and Captain Tennant at Dunkirk, who did not yet know of the plan arranged for the night, independently gave orders,
97

CHAP. x
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
of by the the French B.E.F. troops would also have on been lifted. night, by which time most was consequently would be completed the following in the late afternoon to of sail the during 1st June daylight with and General that Alexander's concurrence that no ships were to cease at 0300 on 2nd. If the
0700 and, evacuation if necessary was then still possible. Only between June until dark to tine any of tontine any of the three also from 1730 on the 2nd was to to tine any of
The Admiralty, channels however, during daylight decided hours, that, should evacuation it be possible light there would be sailings. They intended to be 0700 and 1730
evacuation 2nd was possible no in daylight as late as 0700. the arbiters as to whether on the
Admiral to Ramsay casualties now being caused to all of therne instructions of therne Instructick Vice-
At 2114, an hour informed and a the half Admiralty after the and receipt had owing ordered withdraw before shipping followed been this signal to at 2329 by daylight on the up situation he a knew message to the detail Y the Z shipping under fire as of German it. All three channels to Dunkirk, some maining which daylight route into X, action had that to be suspended on account of a new re-
X, and were now had batteries, for traffic on the last battery Vice-Admiral came evening and was maintaining a enemy heavy barrage¹. Ramsay's information (not altogether correct)
that a total of 16 transports (personnel vessels invaluable in the work of evacua- was tion) were now out of action, 8 being lost and 8 disabled, and that two of the sinkings had been caused by enemy shell fire on Route X. It was now difficult to compel the crews of the remainder to face the conditions which existed.
This had been a day of very heavy naval sinkings coupled with losses of troops from drowning. It is obvious that at some point losses incurred in continuing daylight evacuation would more than counterbalance the gains it seems clear that Vice-Admiral Ramsay considered that this point had now been reached, and, in accordance with the Admiralty's own direction sent to him earlier in the evening, he now informed them that any attempt to continue the evacuation in daylight was unwise and he asked permission to withdraw all his forces at
0300 until the following night. In this, he told the admiralty, Major General
Alexander concurred.
The Admiralty, however, were unwilling that evacuation should cease altogether at daylight and directed that it was to continue up to 0700, but only by destroyers unless further experience showed that enemy gunfire was rendering the channel prohibitively dangerous.
Danger to personnel ships
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that in the difficulty of obtaining accurate reports of conditions on the routes and estimating the true causes of the mounting losses of ships the danger from shell fire was magnified in the minds of those at Dover. By some means enemy the planners had been informed that two personnel ships had already been sunk by shell fire in the fairway near No. 5 buoy. Not only was this but in point of fact no ship of any kind was lost from gunfire the incorrect, routes the 1st June the only sinking by shell fire on that day on during Lord Cavan, depot ship of other S.N.O. Dunkirk hit as she quitted was the the drifter at Dunkirk, whilst the only ship to be hit was the personnel vessel pier St. Helier. This ship arrived at
German
I The War guns." Office 1330/1 reported Only remaining channel now coming under fire of
98

CHAP. X
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
arranged from 801 and 806 Command been of them (Appendix 0830 until J.7). 1100 Air on protection 2nd June, by and Coastal Fighter Command had
Command three aircraft during of Nos. these 206, hours, 235, to cover Route Squadrons X. operated under patrols Coastal of
Fifth column activities (Appendix H27-32)
such "Dynamo", effective fifth use during the war. type time during Operation
On the Ist June column there came activities to notice, of the for the of first empty, the to keep a look out and turn such
Sutton in and company, orders were met sent a out from Dover power to the and small the Dunkirk with thing boats return the boats returning boats returning
At 2150 on the 1st the Minesweeper number of Niger, boats en route to
Apparently the severe minesweepers, conditions it was at in and first from enormous believed the S.N.T.O. at wastage Dover on that the small French boats boats and were Belgian to daunted their coasts; duty. by but a report came about the Ramsgate during the evening that fifth column skoot was going first beaches at Dunkirk giving false informa- a tion and orders to return. The example to come to notice was at 1300
the 1st when the skoot Oranje, off Dunkirk Channel, was informed by another on sufficient ships in Dunkirk Harbour, and that the Oranje's boats were not skoot that evacuation from the beaches was complete, that there were already required. The Oranje remained where she was, however, in case the four boats turned for home about 1515, subsequent to air attack.
she had towed over were needed, and until all ships in her neighbourhood
Although on the night of the 1st-2nd June the services of a number of small craft were lost to the coast, there actually were a sufficient number off the beaches to cope with the troops available.
Embarkation from the beaches
The first ships of the night flight to arrive off the beaches were minesweepers, which began to anchor off Malo about 2000 on 1st. Here there were already some 3 or 4 Thames barges, besides the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen which had arrived some four hours earlier and had been engaged in filling up with troops ever since. The skoot Lena had been there since 1300 on the 1st.
embarking 340 B.E.F. and 6 French troops; she was slightly damaged by air attack during the day, and sailed at 2145 for Ramsgate. By midnight on the
1st-3nd June there were anchored off the beaches the minesweepers Marmion,
Snaefell, Niger, Glen Avon, Emperor of India, Glen Gower and Lydd, besides the personnel ship Portsdown and the special service vessel Royal Eagle. Loading was a slow process, for there were more ships lying off the beaches than could be loaded by the boats available. Only one ship finished in 3 hours, most of them taking nearly twice that length of time.
with 213 troops. She left behind her, abandoned the beach, the R.N.L.I.
The Emperor of India was apparently the first ship to sail from Malo, at 0238, motor lifeboat Mary Scott which had ferried troops on and towed the Emperor of
India's whalers from the shore until she broke down. Queen left shot at troops boat, 0245, down and and after an some nearly enemy details, Il aircraft hours including at on anchor the 10 beach Spanish during west which refugees of Dunkirk. the The rescued ship Medway claimed from She took an to have open 426
down the crews of two motor boats, the whose engines broke unrecorded, like SO many small craft which came to grief in the course of renderafter some hours of ferrying troops and one, towing, Aura, and another, with name
100

CHAPTER XI
THE NIGHT 2ND 3RD JUNE
B.E.F. EVACUATED 2330/2
Plan for the night 2nd-3rd June
During the forenoon of the 2nd June considerable doubt existed at Dover to the numbers remaining to be evacuated from Dunkirk. Captain Tennant thought as that about 5,000 British and 30,000 French remained, but it was estimated at Dover, that in addition to the rearguard of 4,000, (who had been withdrawn according to plan, from the front line), a further 2,000 British troops might be found in Dunkirk; while the estimated number of French troops remaining increased during the forenoon from 25,000 quoted on the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000. Admiral Nord himself estimated the French remaining to number 65,000 of which he hoped that 30,000 might be evacuated on the night 2nd-3rd and the remaining 35,000, who were holding the bridgeheads, on the following night.
Major-General Alexander intended that all British troops should be evacuated by 2400 on 2nd, and Captain Tennant asked for the maximum number of transports to be sent over. During the forenoon of the 2nd a joint
Naval and Military conference was held at Dover, attended by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker who came over from Dunkirk in the early hours, and by Commander J. C. Clouston, Pier Master at the East Pier, to devise a plan to accomplish this. The French Admiralty wished daylight evacuation to be resumed, but Vice-Admiral Ramsay refused to countenance it. The suspension of traffic in daylight hours had the advantage of enabling all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent"
upon Dunkirk harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and control of traffic in the harbour channels by motor boats, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100 on 2nd and 0300 on 3rd.
At 1052 Vice-Admiral Dover made a signal to the destroyers and minesweepers, which practically amounted to a call for volunteers for the night's work (Appendix T.3):-
"The final evacuation is staged for tonight, and the Nation looks to the Navy to see this through.
I want every ship to report as soon as possible whether she is fit to meet the call which has been made on our courage and endurance".
The replies showed that there was no lack of willing spirit. Ships were fit and ready", ready and anxious to carry out your orders", ship unfit but
...
officers and ship's company are willing to serve in any capacity: so the replies came in. Only the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen, which had returned to Ramsgate three hours earlier on her fifth evacuation trip, was unable to sail owing to the exhaustion of her crew, and was sent on to Dover where additional officers and crew were lent from the Sandown, which, like the destroyer Javelin, was not degaussed and was consequently forbidden to sail.
It was hoped to avoid on this night the situation which occurred on the previous night, when more ships could have used the pier had they been available, by working out a programme whereby personnel ships, destroyers, fleet
105

CHAP. XI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
79, Of these 808 and 211,137 casualties were 1,129. Allied fit numbered 305,078.
At noon on the 3rd June British the fit total and of 13,004 troops casualties. evacuated had reached
Naval losses 2nd June harbour at from motor boat sunk off Malo, and by enemy action,
The brightest Dunkirk feature had been of the carried night out was without that embarkation disturbance in the and apart one losses off by enemy act from small craft from collision or other misadventure, sinkings were confined to
In marked contradistinction attack the from 2nd. the heavy This losses of the 1st June only ship was sunk from by air Calshot R.A.F. on station, which was the fast motor boat Seaplane one at 1500 with Commander from J. C. the Clouston, situation R.N., pier master of the mole,
Tender 243, sailed from Dover for Dunkirk was returning discussing with the staff at Dover, and a who embarkation that the party; boats should she was be in used company with S.T. 276, the intention naval being
Walker during the night's work. At 1855, about 6 miles from Gravelines, 4
two as runners" for Rear-Admiral Wakeenemy aircraft attacked S.T. 243, which received severe damage from a miss and was abandoned in a sinking condition. Commander Clouston ordered near
S.T. 276 to proceed as the enemy aircraft were still continuing to attack, and she subsequently arrived at Dunkirk though too badly damaged to be of service.
rating from S.T. 243 were picked up and saved.
Commander Clouston was seen later, drowned, and only one officer and one
The transport Royal Daffodil nearing Dunkirk from England was attacked all movable gear to port and filling boats with water she was listed to bring by aircraft about an hour after S.T. 243. The ship was holed but by shifting the damage above water. The engineers, J. W. Coulthard and W. L. Evans kept the motors running although the water had risen in the engine room, and the ship returned to Margate under her own steam. Another personnel ship, the Ben-My-Chree, was in collision on the evening of the 2nd shortly after leaving Folkestone for Dunkirk, and took no further part in the operation.
Two further ships were sunk by mines on Route Y on the 2nd June, although it was at first thought they had been torpedoed. At about 1600 the trawlers
Blackburn Rovers and Westella were on patrol near T buoy, when the former blew up on a mine and sank instantly. As the Westella closed the position, explosions from the Blackburn Rovers' depth charges lifted the ship out of the water and put her asdic installation and pumps out of action. About 40
minutes later the Westella was herself blown up by a mine between S and T
buoys, and commenced to sink. Her depth charges were set to 'safe', and the trawlers Saon and Grimsby Town sank her and picked up her survivors and those of the Blackburn Rovers, some badly injured. (Appendix J.9, J.10).
Two other trawlers met with misadventure on the 2nd, but neither was sunk.
Details are lacking but it is known that the Spurs and another trawler, probably either the Kingston Alalite or Kingston Olivine, were both damaged by gunfire.
The Spurs was on the patrol line, and it is not known how she came close enough to the coast to be damaged by shore gunfire. Gunfire also sank the
Gallant's motor boat off Malo at 0210.
known. These were the Getuigt Vor Christus, the O.L.V. van Vlaandaren,
Three Belgian trawlers were lost on th 2nd June, though no details are and the Sunny Isle.
Air co-operation, night 2nd-3rd June
The R.A.F. flew a patrol over the approaches to Dunkirk from about 2010
110

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. XIII
the The factors variations recorded in the in the daily following figures paragraphs. are believed to have been influenced by average waiting time normal. This probably norm, due the number of the
28TH MAY. Beaches. corresponded Although the to rate the estimated of lift was average (1: 1), and ing boats. Destroyers, 356 were new to the lifted per trip was below which made 8 was of the 13 trips, to shortage of beach- men and their lift per trip was only Calcutta's as lift against reduced a destroyer aveage of 504 work wounded (cot cases) which she the whole operation. The embarked. was by the large number over of
HARBOUR. Although the average lift was the above normal, the long waiting
The figures of waiting time are not, however, entirely satisfactory only 10
time reduced the men: minutes ratio to estimated norm for the operation.
ships provided data, three of which waited for periods greatly in excess of the average.
HARBOUR. The increase in average lift without corresponding rise in waiting time is accounted for by the great increase in the number of personnel ships employed and the average lifts made by them on this day. The average lift per personnel ship, which on the 28th May was only 552, rose to 1,520 today.
30TH MAY. Beaches. The increase of 25 per cent in the figure for average lift without corresponding rise in waiting time, resulting in the highest men minutes ratio achieved at the beaches during the operation, is believed to have been due to:-
(a) better organisation consequent upon the arrival of R.A. Dover as
S.N.O. on the French coast and of Captain Howson as N.O.I.C. Beaches, together with the employment of two Commodores to take charge off shore at La Panne and Bray; (b) better discipline amongst the troops on the beaches; (c) employment as beaching craft of the A.L.Cs. which began to arrive on the 29th, and the arrival of 12 motor boats for retrieving abandoned pulling boats; (d) absence of enemy air attacks.
Harbour. Although the rate of lift deviated little from the average, both lift and waiting time declined. This was probably the effect of the disastrous air attacks of the previous day on shipping, which resulted in only one destroyer at a time being allowed to enter Dunkırk during the forenoon and early afternoon and perhaps engendered a feeling of insecurity and a wish to get the ships away as quickly as possible.
31ST MAY. Beaches. A considerable reduction in average waiting time and a normal. boats slight rise This above was normal due probably in average to the lift fact gave that a rate greater of lift numbers slightly of better beaching than were available. Although during the forenoon conditions on the beaches were very bad they improved greatly during the afternoon and evening. On the beaches, after 1600, the piers of pontoons were largely responsible for the rapid evacuation of troops.
Harbour. minutes Lift was average, but waiting time high and reduced the men be rate of lift. No valid reason was discovered, and it should noted that all the figures agree closely for this with can the be estimated norm.
" 0943 I This The belief moment is based on the final sentence in Situation Report by S.N.O. Dunkirk at 0950 timed the If single this weather destroyer persists allowed bombing I want to enter starts a ship would all every must remain half shove hour," alongside off "; which and for would only on the half seem signal an to hour. imply that
126

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX J
to return the to effect England. that a was at Dunkirk telling Margate boats to
During the evening skoot of the 1st going June a along report the was beaches recieved from S.N.T.O.
Antje The intended Antje was to hailed get confirmation and told with to from survivors return. her, when A warship the troop was carrier Scoficinity, sarrier Scoticinity, and skoot Oranje with boats in tow was England and complied.
close to her; so Antje filled up told to return and to returned. is understood sunk that another skoot was of these details. was hands. It has not occasion been
In view of these informed reports, message that Dunkirk 2335/1 was in sent German out. On an earlier possible to get confirmation
2332/3
APPENDIX J
SIGNALS RE PATROLS IN THE NORTH SEA SOUTH AND ON THE
ROUTES TO DUNKIRK
Sunday, 26th May
1. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. NORE, (R) V.A. Dover, F.O.I.C. Harwich, F.O.I.C. Humber
All available forces are to be used for covering operation Dynamo tonight Sunday.
1937/26
2. Widgeon to C.-IN-C. NORE
Siroco was torpedoed by 2 M.T.B.'s
0200/31
Saturday, 1st June
3. Malabar to ANY-BRITISH MAN-OF-WAR
explosion 2 miles? S buoy.
Argyllshire sunk by torpedo. Survivors report submarine submerged before
0310/1
4. Kingston Galena to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Capt. A.P.
to Dover.
Stella Dorado torpedoed. Picked up 5 survivors, 1 badly injured. Proceeding
0430/1
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMAND
Magnetic mines reported to have been laid vicinity of buoy F.G. on route X.
2310/1
Sunday, 2nd June
6. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Epervier (R) Léopard, Savorgnan de Brazza.
N. Goodwin L.V. 8 miles. Caused by shell fire. Vanquisher left Dover 1305 B.S.T.
Three aux. patrol vessels reported out of action at 1214 B.S.T. in position 090°
to investigate and report.
1315/2
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Calcutta, (R) C.-in-C. Nore, Admiralty, Savorgnan de Brazza patrol to that carried out today Sunday is to be carried out tomorrow Monday,
Return to Sheerness and revert to 1 hours notice for steam. An exactly similar provided patrol line. C.-in-C. Nore can provide a screen. Inform the French vessels on your
1247/2
were was not already sufficient ships in Dunkirk harbour and that was Oranje's complete, tow of 4 boats,
I A skoot informed Oranje that beach evacuation that there required. About an hour later the Oranje did in fact return to England.
172

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX L
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
came into action this evening suspending on only remaining daylight Toute,
Channels to Dunkirk now all under traffic fire of German batteries.
namely X, maintaining heavy barrage
2329/1
2nd June
6. Venemous to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Dunkirk approach channel is under fire from the shore guns.
2110/2
3rd June
7. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER COMMANDS
close to Southern channel buoys.
Route X. From F.G. buoy steer 172 degrees for No. 3 W buoy and thence keep
1635/3
APPENDIX L
SIGNALS RE REQUESTS FOR FIGHTER COVERS
Monday, 27th May
1. B.N.L.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Pass to War Office from O.C. Dunkirk:
Complete fighter protection over Dunkirk now essential if a serious disaster is to be avoided.
1655/27
2. AIR LIAISON DUNKIRK to FIGHTER COMMAND (R) Air Ministry
Unless fighter protection is provided continually from dawn tomorrow result will be very serious. Embarkation on beach east of 892 [?] Dunkirk.
2350/27
Tuesday, 28th May
3. (C.A.S.) AIR MINISTRY to FIGHTER COMMAND, COASTAL COMMAND etc.
Today is likely to be the most critical day ever experienced by the British Army.
The extreme gravity of the situation should be explained to all units. I am confident that all ranks will appreciate that it is the duty of the R.A.F. to make their greatest effort today to assist their comrades of both the Army and Navy.
0125/28
1 Chief of the Air Staff.
4. B.N.L.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Continuous bombing and machine gunning on beaches. Only maximum air protection can alleviate situation at dawn.
0225/28
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to COASTAL COMMAND, FIGHTER COMMAND, (R) 16 Group, 11
Group, Dover Forces, Admiralty, Air Ministry
Request maximum fighter protection throughout today 28th as follows:
line Fighter North Command, Dunkirk and adjacent beaches. to Skuas Nord from and Detling are patrolling
Suggest Coastal Command patrol line Ostend Sandettie Bank.
Goodwin to Nieuport from 0800 to 1300.
0855/28
174

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX R
still remains evacuation will recommence 1700 evening. If so, strong continuous
Last boat in the morning will leave Dunkirk in the before 0700 hours. If part of garrison patrols should be carried out over area from to 2100 hours, when operations hours of darkness. Fighter patrols out over area in area during will terminate night 1st/2nd June. should Night fighters be routed should patrol same ships are working between N. Foreland and Dunkirk, and on return journey should fly low on the same routeing to give vessels maximum protection against low flying bomb and machine gun attack.
1930/1
15. ADMIRALTY to REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER STRAITS, S.N.O. DUNKIRK (R) V.A. Dover
(A) Should there be a channel which it is possible to use during daylight hours, from 2130 tonight Saturday until 0700 tomorrow Sunday.
it is intended that evacuation from Dunkirk should proceed continuously
(B) Continuous air protection will be provided from daylight tomorrow Sunday until 0830 by fighters, and from 0830 until 1100 by Coastal Command.
(C) It will be decided tomorrow Sunday forenoon in the light of the naval and night. military situation as to whether evacuation is to continue tomorrow Sunday
(D) It may also be necessary to carry out evacuation from 1730 tomorrow Sunday until dark, should evacuation in daylight still be possible.
(E) From the above it will be seen that there will be no ships proceeding to Dunkirk between 0700 and 1730 tomorrow Sunday.
(F) Request you will inform Admiral Abrial and General Alexander of the above arrangements.
(G) Should it be impossible to use any of the 3 Channels from Dunkirk owing to shell (R) shell fire from coast batteries you are to inform Admiralty
....
T.O.D. 2021/1
16. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
(a) Embarkation of troops from Dunkirk is to proceed continuously from 2130
today Saturday until 0700 tomorrow Sunday.
(b) Strong and continuous fighter protection will be provided from 0430 until
0830 tomorrow Sunday.
(c) Protection by Coastal Command will be provided from 0830 until 1100.
(d) It is hoped that the evacuation may be completed tonight but should this not be night. possible, you should be prepared for further evacuation tomorrow Sunday
(e) It may be necessary to carry out evacuation from 1730 tomorrow Sunday in addition to the night evacuation.
(f) Should it be decided that the conditions are such that evacuation cannot be carried out between 0300 tomorrow Sunday and 0700 tomorrow Sunday, you will be informed.
T.O.D. 2025/1
T.O.R. 2044/1
17. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to S.N.O. DUNKIRK
cease at 0300.
Evacuation tonight Saturday from west end of beach and from harbour only, to destroyers will enter harbour.
Can embark about 9,000 from beach if weather remains calm. Lighters and
2045/1
184

SIGNALS
APPENDIX R
18. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY, S.N.O. C.-IN-C. NORTHERN NAVAL FORCES
GENERAL ALEXANDER, DUNKIRK
My 1609/1 [Appx. R.8] and S.N.O. Dunkirk 1754/1 [Appx. R.11]:
Casualties to shipping are now being caused by heavy artillery. All shipping has been ordered to withdraw before daylight tomorrow Sunday.
2214/1
19. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
A.M. 2025/1 [Appx. R.16] paras. (a) to (f), S.N.O. Dunkirk 1754/1 stating
General concurs that evacuation for transports is to cease at 0300:
Channels to Dunkirk now all under fire of German batteries. New battery came into action this evening, suspending traffic on only remaining daylight route, namely X, maintaining heavy barrage, sinking transports Mona's Queen and
Brighton Queen1 and a trawler in the fairway near No. 5 buoy.
French destroyer nearby turned back Royal Daffodil and " Royal Scot' [?Royal
Sovereign]. Eight transports have now been lost and eight disabled. Crews of others difficult to keep on service.
The above facts coupled with recent naval losses and also military losses by drowning have convinced me that any attempt to continue evacuation during the day is unwise. Permission is therefore requested in accordance with A.M. 2021/1
[Appx. R.15] para. (G) to withdraw all forces at 0300 until the following 2329/1 night.
Sunday, 2nd June
20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to S.N.O. DUNKIRK
Admiralty has directed that evacuation by personnel steamers from Dunkirk pier shall continue until 0700.
0055/2
21. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) R.A. Dover Straits, S.N.O. Dunkirk
Your 2329/1
(a) Evacuation up to 0700 in accordance with Admiralty telegram 2025/1 to
V.A. Dover, and 2021/1 to R.A. Dover Straits and S.N.O. Dunkirk, is to be carried out using destroyers only.
(b) Destroyers to be ready to open fire on any batteries.
(c) If further experience shows that the channel is prohibitively dangerous due to gunfire, evacuation by day is to cease and Admiralty informed immediately.
0115/2
22. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K
Evacuation by destroyers is to continue until 0700 from Dunkirk harbour. Transports are to leave Dunkirk at 0300. Destroyers inform transports. Fire of shore batteries should be returned.
0125/2
23. Winchelsea to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Your 0055 and your 1729/1 not passed to S.N.O. Dunkirk.
0416/2
24. S.N.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) Admiralty, War Office
Your 1609/1/6 [Appendix R.8] not received until 0430. Large proportion naval personnel evacuated. Estimated approximately 20,000 British and French evacuated, greater (proportion?) being French.
I No transports were sunk by gunfire on 1st June. The Mona's Queen was sunk by magnetic mine on 29th May the A.B/V Mona's Isle was straddled by shore guns on 1st June and sustained some damage. The minesweeper Brighton Queen was sunk by aircraft on 1st June. The minesweeper Sandown came under fire of
Nieuport guns on 31st May.
185

APPENDIX Y
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Transport for General will be sent as you asked for.
as pier master with details of plan. Good luck to you all.
Arrange for Lewis to direct ships at entrance again. Clouston' is coming over
1251/2
13. S.N.O. to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) War Office
French still maintain front line except for front east of Bergues where the Germans have penetrated 2 miles on a 2 mile front. Counter attack being made at 1500. In port, no movement. Present situation hopeful.
1538/2
and later
14.
Military situation: French counter-attack postponed until 2000. Remainder of front quiet. Bombers will probably be (playing?) evening (hymn?).
1840/2
15. ADMIRAL NORD to ADMIRAL DOVER
Part One. If during night of 2nd/3rd June 30,000 men can be evacuated, I
hope to be able to try on the night of 3rd/4th June to withdraw the 35,000 men who are defending the bridgehead.
Part Two. In order to embark these troops quickly after retirement, numerous boats will be required along east pier, Embecquetage, and Quai Felix Faure; also boats and small craft to embark 6,000 men on the beach between Malo-les-Bains and Malo Terminus.
Part Three. This evening all British officers will leave Dunkirk but the help of
British naval Officers will be essential during the night of 3rd/4th June to direct
British ships.
Part Four. If this programme could be carried out, the blocking of harbour could take place at the end of the night of 3rd/4th June.² I will keep you and
Rear-Admiral Dover Straits advised of my intentions.
Part Five. I shall require help of British fast motor boats to assist in the conduct of aged. operations of evacuation, a great number of French fast motor boats being dam-
1610/1
16. S.N.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Have promised French I will press for shipping for them tomorrow night when they hope to evacuate 15,000. Reply Admiral Nord.
1735/2
17. WAR OFICE to GENERAL ALEXANDER (R) S.N.O. Dunkirk
Understand from French that another night will be required to complete the evacuation altogether. If British troops are entirely evacuated tonight, conclude this is with concurrence of Admiral Nord.
2037/2
Monday, 3rd June
18. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER in M.A/S.B.10 to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Four ships now alongside east pier but no French troops.
[Here see Appendix Y.22].
0030/3
I Seaplane tender 243, in which Cdr. Clouston was taking passage, was bombed en 2 route and sunk. Cdr. J. C. Clouston, R.N., was lost.
See Appendix Z.3.
192