TNA ADM 234 360

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

CHAPTER IV
MONDAY, 27TH MAY
(See Plan 3)
The Dunkirk perimeter the organisation of the Dunkirk the bridgehead. Canal de la Its perimeter was to extend from
On the morning of 27th May, Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam commenced and thence by Furnes and Nieuport Gravelines to the Belgian coast. In fact, however,
Gravelines, south-eastward to Colme, along the canal to Bergues perimeter, and were falling back to the line of the Mardyck Canal, from the the French were already evacuating and the western part of the to Spyker on the Canal de la Colme. The French were to be responsible sea, for the defence of the western half of the perimeter as far as Bergues inclusive, and the British for the eastern half. The position of the Belgian Army was now so obscure that its inclusion in the bridgehead was not taken into account. I
The British sector of the Dunkirk perimeter had its right at Bergues, whence it followed the canals to Furnes and Nieuport. Immediately north of this line were the inundations; to the north of the inundations was low-lying land, and then the Dunkirk-Furnes Canal and the main lateral road from Furnes to
Dunkirk; finally, there was the narrow strip of dunes giving way to a wide open beach running the whole length of the position and shelving very gradually to the sea. There were no quays or piers whatever, except those at Dunkirk itself. At intervals of from 3 to 4 miles along the shore (from east to west) lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, La Panne, Braye-Dunes, and Malo-les-Bains
(adjoining Dunkirk).
During the day troops and their transport began to withdraw into the perimeter on the fronts of all three British Corps. Where the troops had received the necessary orders, vehicles were disabled and abandoned in the assembly areas; but owing to the shortage of troops for traffic control a great number of British and French vehicles were able to enter the perimeter and the town of Dunkirk², causing grave congestion on the roads. Beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray-Dunes and Malo-les-Bains, one beach being allotted to each of the 3 British Corps.³
Dunkirk had been bombed for some days, but the town and port received their most serious damage on 27th May. At least 12 attacks were made on
Dunkirk and the sea approaches between 0825 and 20004. Lorry columns had been set on fire in the town and a pall of black smoke from the burning oil tanks hung continuously over the town and docks, impeding the air defence.
Dunkirk was therefore cleared of all troops and they were sent to the dunes east of the town to await embarkation.³
The Belgain armistice
During the 27th May Lord Gort received a further telegram from the Secretary of State for War which read, " want to make it quite clear that sole
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47.
4 3 R.A.F. Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 50.
Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 49.
Narrative, p.320.
18

MONDAY, 27TH MAY
CHAP. IV
meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only a few minutes later:
" Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005."
To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from
G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might, indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.²
All ships diverted to the beaches
Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from
Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral
Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy, and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³
were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol, the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne.
The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of subsequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵
Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the
17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷, and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and
I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo'
the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040,
Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the beach at Malo-les-Bains.
This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into
3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap between each part. (Appendix O. 11).
2 D.R. page 3, para. 8.
3
The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields.
4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8.
5 D.R., p.3, para. 38.
6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden
Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, Yorkshire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II.
7 Appendix D.6.
23

SIGNALS
APPENDIX H
20. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, from DOVER La
6,000 British marching Panne through Bray on Dunkirk.
0235/1
21. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER west
We must have more boats of La Panne.
0243/1
22. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Gossamer
It is now impracticable to send more boats. You must do your utmost with 0334/1 yours.
23. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER, REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Situation on beaches is critical. Third Division marching to Dunkirk. More boats urgently required.
0345/1
24. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Thousands more (?moving) from La Panne westward. No boats.
0358/1
25. GENERAL WHITAKER to GENERAL DILL, WAR OFFICE
Absolutely essential provide many more small boats with motor boats to tow if grave losses are to be avoided and remainder B.E.F. cleared. Matter utmost urgency.
0430/1
26. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
All craft used for towing boats have returned in the night. They must be sent back.
0611/1
27. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Warn following ships to stop them.
2150/1
20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty
Reported that number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Essential to arrest this. Keep good lookout and force them back.
2201/1
20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
Owing to severe conditions and enormous wastage on Dunkirk coast, small boat flotillas, vital for beach work, can no longer be relied upon even in fair weather.
Information just received that at least two such flotillas have turned back tonight
Saturday.
2328/1
30. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty
False information and orders to return are being given to our inshore units by 5th
Column scoots or other vessels. Endeavour to keep our small vessels to their duty on the coast.
2335/1
Sunday, 2nd June
31. ADMIRALTY (D.N.I.) to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
Your 2335/1: Please supply any information regarding the ships suspected of
5th Column activities.
1834/2
Monday, 3rd June
32. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
Your 1834/2. Following is information to date:
On the morning of the 1st June it was reported that a number of small craft had left Dunkirk beaches. An M.T.B. was sent out to round them up and send them back. A signal was intercepted from Leda en route to Dunkirk saying that she had met boats returning, and she was ordered to send them back.
171

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675