TNA ADM 234 360

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IV
round trip from 80 to 172 miles, and the for route the had to be swept before it and thence into the Dunkirk Impulsive, the THE
be used. Orders were therefore given the North Goodwin route (the middle Route X), from road, and at 1140
commenced by the destroyer Vessel Patricia. This advantage of shortening the round trip to 108 miles.
Halcyon, and the Trinity House from 172 route X had the great and
Helier¹ and Royal Daffodil, which left at 1054 under escort of the des- St.
Among the earliest ships to use the Dover northern Route Y were the P/V's
The convoy was joined en route by the hospital carriers St. Andrew and St.
troyer Vimy; in company was the destroyer Anthony, escorting the S.S. Kyno.2
Julien. Route Y was certainly, at that time, out of range of gunfire, but two bombing attacks were made on the hospital carriers between the West Hinder and Kwint Bank buoys, and when the convoy arrived off Dunkirk heavy air attacks were in progress there. The Royal Daffodil and the St. Helier entered the harbour, but the latter was ordered to withdraw, and she and the 2 hospital carriers returned empty to the Downs under escort of the Vimy. The Royal
Daffodil embarked 840 troops before returning to Dover.
Sea and Air Patrols
The principal patrol line covered in the morning of the 27th May by Fighter
Command, was Calais-Dunkirk, as it was not known that the Calais garrison had ceased fire. From 1450 onwards, however, Calais fell out of the picture, and it became possible to concentrate fighter protection more exclusively on the work of evacuation³. Sixteen squadrons, varying in strength from 9 to 20
aircraft, were engaged on these activities from 0500-2130; patrols were, however, limited to squadron strength. Most squadrons carried out 2 patrols, and 287 sorties in all were flown during the day.4
To cover the passage of ships between Dunkirk and the Downs destroyer patrols had been established to the northward during the forenoon, and Vice-
Admiral, Dover, asked for 6 additional destroyers to strengthen the Dover forces. The Admiralty immediately ordered 4 destroyers from the Western
Approaches Command, and 2 from the Portsmouth Command, to proceed to Dover.⁵
Ex-Dutch skoots for Dunkirk
Other vessels were on their way to Dunkirk during the day, among them being 15 skoots⁶. Of these the Lena, Hebe II, and later the Oranje, arrived off the beaches and embarked troops during the night of 27th/28th May the
Abel Tasman, Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with ammunition and food, arrived off La Panne early in the morning of 28th May; the Hilda and Doggersbank reached Dunkirk by noon the 28th May, and were sent to the beaches;
while the remainder⁷, in error, returned to the Downs, after having got within a few miles of Dunkirk.
2 Off R buoy the Anthony, with the Kyno, was ordered back to the Downs and sub-
I Eleven of the St. Helier's crew had been replaced by naval ratings.
sequently 3 to Portsmouth. The Kyno took no further part in Operation "Dynamo".
R.A.F. Narrative, p. 319.
5 4 R.A.F. Narrative, P. 320.
Scimitar were sent.
Appendices D. 1 and D. 2. The Wakeful, Mackay, Worcester, Montrose, Shikari and
6 7 See Appendix F.
The Bornrif, Brandaris, Hondsrug, Jutland, Patria, Tilly, and Twente.
20

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IV
from the St. Seiriol and Queen of the Channel, in addition to the drifters'
beaches during the night dinghies, enabled these drifters of the to 27th/28th lift some May. 2,000 troops from Malo and Bray own
Results of S.N.O. Dunkirk's 2005/27
assembling off the beaches on 1 cruiser, 27th/28th May the Wolfhound,
As a result of the action taken the on night S.N.O. of Dunkirk's signals, there
3 Channel skoots and (the the Lena, St. Hebe Seiriol). other II and All small Oranje) these ships boats, were ordered to use Queen of thers, their own
Wolsey and 6 other destroyers¹, a pulling boats, were yet available.
boats for ferrying, as no power cutters, whalers or other
S.N.O. Dunkirk's signals had therefore a big result; but owing to the difficulty of passing orders at night in a shattered harbour his decision to divert vessels to the beaches had unforeseen repercussions, and it was associated with a false report that Dunkirk had fallen, and the failure of one personnel vessel and 7 skoots to reach the beaches that night. The circumstances are described below.
The P/V Canterbury, which had entered Dunkirk harbour at 2000, left at
2058 with 457 troops, including 140 stretcher cases. Before leaving, she was ordered by the Sea Transport Officer to turn back ships attempting to enter Dunkirk the order, evidently intended to divert ships to the beaches, was misunderstood. In the Dunkirk road, the Canterbury passed the order to the P/V Maid of Orleans and to the H/C's Isle of Thanet and Worthing, and those vessels thereupon turned back to Dover. Later the order became definitely garbled, for the skoot Tilly (which was in company with the 4 skoots
Hondsrug, Jutland, Patria and Brandaris) met the Canterbury (in company with the 2 hospital carriers) 8 or 9 miles from Dunkirk, and received from her the signal "Dunkirk is in enemy hands. Keep clear." This signal was variously recorded by some of the other skoots, as Dunkirk has fallen. Return"; and all five of them, as well as the skoots Bornrif and Twente, did in fact return to the Downs, although the Jutland and the Patria first closed
Nieuport Bank buoy in an unsuccessful endeavour to obtain more definite information. Some of the skoots, in turn, promulgated this false report to other ships, notably to the P/V Dorrien Rose; this ship, which received the signal, unsafe to approach Dunkirk," did at first alter course to the northward, but, shortly after, again set course for Dunkirk. It was subsequently thought by some of the vessels concerned that the false information had been passed by fifth columnists," though there is very little proof of this.³
Chronic shortage' of beaching boats
Such was the beginning of the great build-up of ships4 and of the inauguration of beach evacuation. The successful development of the latter was necessarily good in into I the The of northern situation the dependent chronic having sector shortage changed on between the by continuation the south-west of beaching and of boats⁵. fine north-east weather, A wind would and and of any Wakeful the have strength making made went from Dunkirk. The Windsor remained time they arrived, Anthony the Gallant had not yet returned
2 Portsmouth whither she had escorted on the patrol. S.S. Kyno. The
Canterbury's report.
4 3 See Appendices H.30 and H.32.
5 Appendices D, E and F.
D.R. page 3, para. 11.
24

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP V
While a situation that could only mean surrender was now visualised in
England as possibly a stark necessity, General Weygand sent an urgent telegram to Lord Gort appealing to him personally to ensure that the British
Army took a vigorous part in any counter-attack thought necessary; the situation, said General Weygand, made it essential to hit hard.
Lord Gort, who saw the situation more clearly, observes, when he [General
Weygand] sent this message, he could have had no accurate information of the real position or of the powers of counter-attack remaining to either the
British or French."
Germans take Ostend
That evening, at 2030, the Admiralty informed the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that Ostend was reliably reported to be captured. Dunkirk was the only port left in Allied hands.
Situation at Dunkirk becomes easier
Nor were the prospects at Dunkirk very hopeful. When the Wolfhound and the Wolsey left Malo beach for Dover just after midnight on the 27th May the whole of the port appeared to be ablaze¹.
At 0125 the cruiser Calcutta, en route for La Panne, was missed by a torpedo
100 yards astern fired from an E-boat. No further attack took place, and the
Calcutta arrived off La Panne beach an hour later to find that the destroyers
Grafton, Greyhound and Impulsive, and the paddle-minesweepers Sandown and
Gracie Fields, were already there.
Ever since 0030 destroyers making their first trip to the evacuation area had been arriving off the beaches, and only two - the Gallant and the Wakeful -
went to Dunkirk. The Vivacious and the skoot Hebe II reached Malo beach at about 0030, and the Sabre at 0120. The Hebe II, unable to find any troops, entered Dunkirk harbour and embarked 150 from the east pier; the Sabre embarked troops from two drifters. At 0320 the Vimy arrived off the beach at Zuydcoote, 3 miles east of Dunkirk, and sent her boats to assist in filling up the minesweeper Brighton Belle, which was embarking troops with the assistance of the ex-Belgian canal boat Yser and a small pulling boat. The skoot
Lena had been off Zuydcoote since the previous evening and in the early hours of the 28th May transferred the 120 troops she had embarked to a destroyer;
the minesweeper Medway Queen, off La Panne since 2300/27, sailed with 600
troops on board.
By 0400 the situation in Dunkirk harbour appears to have eased, and at
0436 S.N.O. Dunkirk was asking for all vessels to go alongside the east pier.
At 0445 the Vimy, leaving her boats with the Brighton Belle, went into Dunkirk harbour and embarked 613 troops. At 0955 the destroyer Mackay reached
Dunkirk from the Irish Sea, and picked up 600 troops in an hour from the seaward end of Dunkirk east pier, giving up her berth to the destroyer Montrose.
The Sabre, which had in the meantime returned to Dover with a load of 158
troops from Malo beach, berthed outside the Montrose. An hour later, the destroyers Worcester and Anthony arrived, and berthed ahead of the Montrose.
The pier was crammed with troops and several aircraft, attempting to bomb it, were driven off by the destroyers' gunfire. Vast columns of smoke were drifting westwards from the burning oil tanks ashore, and houses on the sea front were bursting into flames from time to time².
I Report by the Wolfhound.
2 Report by the Montrose.
27

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. V
off Dunkirk at 1315. They had picked up that morning from arrived
The destroyers Codrington, Jaguar and Javelin, 33 survivors diverted from patrol,
S.S. Abukir, which had been torpedoed by United an E-boat while returning the about 200 evacuees from Ostend to Grenade the which Kingdom; these survivors with
Javelin Dunkirk. were transferred using The their Codrington to own the boats, destroyer went embarked into Dunkirk troops harbour, from subsequently Bray while beach. the went Jaguar At on 1730 and to the Grenade left Dunkirk with 1,000 troops on board.
skoot Lena. The Vimy also made a second
359 troops from Zuydcoote, assisted by ships' a the second.t.Bip,embarked
Between 1230 and 1815 the Vivacious, a her
Dunkirk harbour.
More ships were on the way. From 1230 onwards 19 minesweepers were sailed from Harwich, from Dover and the Downs, for Dunkirk and the beaches.
By 2130 five of them had arrived off Bray beach I, and four off La Panne²;
three reached Dunkirk by 2140³.
Four other minesweepers arrived off the beaches late on the night of
28th/29th May4, and two more reached the beaches at 0600/29⁵.
Early on the 28th May the eight ships of the 7th and 8th minesweeping flotillas had been ordered from Rosyth to Harwich, to work under the orders of the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁶; they could not, however, reach the beaches until about 72 hours later.
During the forenoon and afternoon of the 28th May the call went out for more and more destroyers, and seven reached the evacuation area next day⁷.
In the signals from the Admiralty and the Vice-Admiral, Dover, summoning them there sounds the same note of extreme urgency, traceable to S.N.O.
Dunkirk's message⁸ declaring that evacuation on the night of 28th/29th May was problematical. "If the older class destroyers and other vessels cannot compete with the situation signalled the Admiralty, destroyers of all classes are to be used for bringing men off'.9 Every available destroyer" in the
Western Approaches and Portsmouth Commands was to be sailed to Dover.
Destroyers on patrol or on escort duty were to be diverted to Dunkirk or the beaches.¹¹
Vulnerability of personnel vessels
The vulnerability of the personnel vessels, with their large troop-carrying capacity, was a cause of anxiety. On the 27th May the Biarritz and Archangel, the Mona's Queen, King Orry, Sequacity, Yewdale, and the Isle of Thanet12,
I The Albury, Gossamer, Leda, Kellett and Sutton.
2 The Salamander, Halcyon, Skipjack and Waverley.
3 The Ross, Pangbourne and Lydd.
4 The Hebe, Sharpshooter, Duchess of Fife snd Emperor of India.
5 The Oriole and Marmion.
6
A.M.0163/28.
7 The Verity, Harvester, Esk, Malcolm, Express, Shikari and Scimitar.
8 Appendix M.4.
9 A.M.0754/28.
10 A.M.1229/28.
11 Appendices D.4, D.5 and D.7.
collided with the Examination Service Vessel leaving Ocean Reward, which sank
12 At 0254, on 28th May, shortly after Dover for Newhaven, the Isle of Thanet
Assisted by the tug Lady Brassey, a search was made for survivors, but none was found.
28

CHAP. VI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
straddled by bombs for and 35 minutes), the seeing burning that Grenade traffic all along the east proceeded out of harbour, out of a into drifter in the Calvi, had ceased, cast off, skirting grounding slightly on sunk and the sunken pier
The troops now of began the Piermaster climbing Cdr. J. one C. Clouston, ship restored the instructions order.
having arrangements of his in the clear of the fairway,', R.N.,
At 1815 made the Grenade was abandoned with the Piermaster and her Captain, to tow her Cdr. R. C. Boyle, embarked with some ship's company Crested Eagle.
Polly Johnson sunk to the five remaining her Oropesa and the John Cattling was instructed on
The burning wreck of the Grenade trawlers. did, The in fact, commence to drift down attempt vivors to pull clear, out of the remaining harbour 4 trawlers, with troops and to on board, proceeded towards the beaches. A surlater, of the near Nieuport caused Bank buoy, miss the in Polly Johnson, leaking badly as a result little engine, was abandoned; Arley embarked her crew and troops and sank damage by a the near the first air attack, and with damaged her by gunfire.
Grenade blown up
She burned fiercely for some hours and then blew up.
The Grenade was guided into a pocket to the westward of the main channel.
Crested Eagle blazing, is beached swung clear of the east pier and proceeded on an easterly course. Shortly
Meanwhile, when the Verity left the harbour at 1755, the Crested Eagle afterwards, she however, she was hit by 4 bombs and caught fire; out of control, about she might transfer her troops; but the Crested Eagle could not stop. At that continued under way. The Verity instructed the Crested Eagle to stop so in Eagle ran aground west of Bray beach. The 200 survivors, who could be seen
1830, blazing fiercely fore and aft (she was a wooden ship) the Crested to the the water, were heavily machine-gunned from the air, and the ships that came rescue were bombed. Some of the survivors, several with severe burns,
Captain and other survivors of the Grenade, by the minesweeper Albury.
were picked up by the minesweepers Hebe and Lydd; others, including the
Among those picked up by the Sabre was the Second Engineer of the Crested
Eagle and a stoker from the Grenade.
Normania sunk gunboat Ross took Mosquito, but then began to sink. The Mosquito and the minesweeper by by a bomb off 11 W buoy. She was towed clear of Dunkirk channel was the
In the course of this third air attack the personnel vessel Normania hit sank off off the crew and the few troops that on board. The Normania
11 W buoy at about 0245 the following were day.
Saladin and attacks The 2000. fourth off severely Ships Bray air attack, returning beach damaged, which to was England Lorina widespread, sunk were bombed. took place There between were about continuous 1830
was so company there were attacked; the destroyers attacked Sabre, 10 times,
Saladin in and its vicinity; the Verity and severely damaged in the engine room by Saladin, a near miss that she had to
44

WEDNESDAY, 29TH MAY
CHAP. VI
Calcutta contacts Lord Gort
On receipt of this signal at 0345 the Calcutta, which had already been embarking troops from La Panne beach, sent her boats in again, in charge of Mr. F.J.
March, Gunner. Mr. March made personal contact with Lord Gort about
8 miles inland, and placed the Calcutta at his disposal for his or his staff's evacuation. Lord Gort, however, courteously refused to be evacuated at this stage¹.
La Panne beach cleared of troops
Meanwhile the Calcutta was proceeding with the embarkation, having enlisted the assistance of the minesweepers Sutton and Salamander, the tug Java, five drifters2, and three motor launches³. By 1357 the Calcutta had embarked
1200 troops, with whom she proceeded to Sheerness.
In addition to the ships assisting the Calcutta, 7 minesweepers4, 4 skoots5, and 5 destroyers⁶ also embarked troops from La Panne beach. Of the destroyers, the Greyhound was bombed and severely damaged (see p.42).
The minesweepers embarked, in all, 3415 troops, the skoots 1137 and the destroyers 2100. The tramp Yewdale and the motor vessels Beal and Bullfinch between them brought off 1,854. The assault landing craft A.L.C.15 ferried about 750 troops from the beaches to off-lying ships, and finally transported
25 to Dover; the A.L.C.5 also ferried troops throughout the day.
The paddle-minesweeper Oriole had beached herself at La Panne at about
0600, thus permitting about 2,500 troops to pass over her decks to be embarked by other ships before she refloated at about 1800. In this connection, Sub-
Lieut. Croswell, who had been landed at La Panne at about 0600 with a small beach party in the Harvester's motor skiff, says: " On the beach we found
14 boats which we launched. A line ferry was established from a paddlesteamer [the Oriole] which was aground close inshore, and this steamer served as a pier alongside which other boats were able to come.
Throughout the day embarkation continued."
Later in his report, Sub-Lieut. Croswell says " About 1400
bombing commenced - there were no casualties though 8 heavy bombs fell within 100
yards of the place of embarkation. A supply ship [the danlayer Nautilus]
to the right of the beach was fired and destroyed by a near miss, and a destroyer
[the Greyhound] was hit by an incendiary bomb [in fact she was severely damaged by a near miss] but continued in action. I joined up with the Army
Staff controlling evacuation - there were no other naval officers at La Panne.⁷
About 2300
I requested that piers should be built but was told nothing could be done that night.
Lord Gort arrived on the beach on Thursday morning [30th May] and asked what could be done to assist. I again suggested erection of piers, and under Colonel Porter's direction this was begun, the pier at La Panne being ready and in use by 1400".
I Calcutta's report.
2 The Golden Sunbeam, Lord Rodney, Lord Keith, Lord St. Vincent, and Lord Collingwood.
3 The Angler II, Nayland and New Britannic.
4 The Emperor of India, Gracie Fields, Halcyon, Hebe, Oriole, Princess Elizabeth and
Waverley.
5 The Reiger, Doggersbank, Jutland and Oranje.
6 The Shikari, Harvester, Anthony, Sabre and Greyhound.
7 Sub. Lt. Croswell was not given orders by his commanding officer to remain ashore.
He says as at La Panne there was no liaison between Army and Navy, I realised I could do a much more useful job by remaining there," and he stayed there until 1st June. Commenting on this, Lt. Cdr. M. Thornton, R.N., Captain of the Harvester says: " This young officer wisely accepted responsibility of missing his ship and then took charge of the beaches and embarkation.
(C.W.23187/40.)
47

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
should take charge Rear-Admiral off La Panne Wake-Walker, and Commodore that Hallett the off Bray. It hardly go on for more than a he had or very little idea of what was expected to be could then thought, says day two, and each day embarkation was last. At this time, he says, about it.4 it was going to the be possible to do, or how to set and Dover Forces," and to Captain Bush, Nore
As early as 1321 V.A. S.N.O., Dover Dunkirk, had informed that all "Ships vessels and Authorities, were the Admiralty's to report for appointment orders of Rear-Admiral
Dover sent a further signal, at 1943, informing the Hebe and Hebe
S.N.O., Dunkirk, in charge of all embarkation the arrangements². of
R. A. Wake-Walker was proceeding to to carry out the duties that day, the 30th May, presumably to clarify authorities situation, the On the Admiral
Dover sent the following signal³ to all concerned:
"
Authority for Operation Dynamo under V.A. Dover is as follows:
R.A. Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A. Dover, for command of seagoing ships and vessels off the Belgian coast.
R.A. Dover has hoisted his flag in Hebe. Captain Tennant has been appointed as S.N.O. Dunkirk, and is responsible under R.A. Dover for all shore organisation.
T.O.O. 1328/30."
Plan for the night 29th/30th May
Meanwhile, at 1906, the Vice-Admiral, Dover promulgated the plan for the night by signal⁴ as follows
"Evacuation of British troops to continue at maximum speed during the night.
If adequate supply of personnel vessels cannot be maintained craft to Dunkirk east pier embark from beach which is extended from one to one destroyers will be sent there as well. All other mile east except of hospital Dunkirk carriers to mile east of La Panne. Whole length is divided into 3 equal parts referred each to as La
Panne, Bray, Malo, from east to west with a mile gap between in part. Malo La at
Panne and Bray have troop concentration points each end and middle; this each end. These points should be tended by inshore craft. Pass message by V/S to ships not equipped W/T as opportunity offers. 1906".
Dunkirk harbour reported blocked
Almost at the same time he received (through the War Office and the the effect Admiralty) that Dunkirk harbour was blocked by damaged ships, and that a telephone message from La Panne military headquarters all to evacuation must therefore be effected from the beaches.⁵
" Pier undamaged", but impossible.
embark.
troops'
time this telephone message came through a bombing, corrupt message sinking, one transport with troops on board damaged
About from the same S.N.O., Dunkirk, as was received, stating: continuous and imone possible destroyer at present to embark more troops, though pier undamaged".
2 M.017978/41, It was not until p.3. 0100/30 that Admiral Wake-Walker found the Hebe, and he took over from Captain Bush at 0400. (Report by Admiral Wake-Walker).
3 Appendix O.5.
Appendix 0.11. Dunkirk harbour had p.350). been telephoned 4 5 D.R. Apparently p.10, by para. Cdr. incorrect Dove 33. The from information destroyer La Panne." as was to presumably the (S.N.O. blocking Dunkirk's the of report, R.O.III,
Note:
S.N.O. did p.394). not Dunkirk return The corrupt to went Dunkirk to La until Panne referred about by motor 2100 to by (Report boat V.A. at Dover by was therefore message his absence.
50

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VI
and returned to harbour; the remainder Chantecler reached and the La Panne at 0500/30.
Dutch eel-boats Johanna and Chantecler M.B. Golden Lily also The and Ramsgate " compass at which 2200/29. was reached situated The the over beaches, the was engine. however, only capable revolved at 0900 of slowly 4 knots, round and and left her she had no charts, lost way 30th Later darkness, and returned to and brought back 30 troops. her in the Downs in the get over on May, round"¹. She The Johanna did not on the 30th
Ramsgate on the morning of the May. on that day she was towed to the beaches by the skoot Jutland.
Troops transported on 29th May reduction in the number of destroyers available and with failure to achieve
The 29th May closed with a formidable list of ships lost or damaged, a marked the high rate of evacuation hoped for. The effect of the day's occurrences even more marked next day, when instead of the 50,000 to 60,000 British was troops which had been calculated as the probable achievement, only 48,000 odd were in fact transported.²
Nevertheless, 47,310 troops (including some 2,000 casualties) were landed in England on the 29th May (see Table 2), 13,752 having been lifted from the beaches and 33,558 from the harbour. Only about 11 per cent of these were
French troops³, whose organised evacuation had not yet begun. (See Appendices Y.2 to Y.5).
During the morning and forenoon of the 29th May, when there was no bombing of Dunkirk harbour, 1Q personnel vessels⁴ lifted 14,760 troops from the east pier; during the afternoon, in spite of the bombing, the Canterbury lifted a further 1,960.
The development of beach evacuation is indicated by the fact that nearly
21 times the number of troops were lifted from the beaches on 29th May as compared with the number lifted on the previous day. Seventeen destroyers each made one round trip during the 24 hours of the 29th May and an eighteenth destroyer, the Icarus, made two such trips. On these trips the 18 destroyers embarked and transported to England 10,694 troops of which 6,198 were lifted from the beaches and 4,506 from Dunkirk harbour. Nine minesweepers⁶
together lifted 2,426 troops from the beaches although one of them, the Albury did not land her troops in England until the next day.⁷ Among other ships which brought back troops from the beaches was the cruiser Calcutta with
1,200.
The record of troops landed in England now stood as follows:-
From the
From the
Total for beaches harbour the day
26th May
Nil
Nil
Nil
27th May
Nil
7,669
7,669
28th May
5,930
11,874
17,804
29th May
13,752
33,558
47,310
I Report by Chantecler.
40,724. This figure probably puts does not include troops carried by foreign ships (See Prague,
3 2 D.R., D.R. p.11, which para. incidentally 38. the total of troops and casualties landed on 29th Table May 2). as
The Côte d'Argent, Killarney, King George V, Maid of Orleans, Manxman,
Javelin, Malcolm, Express, Verity, Wolsey and Marmion
Royal 5 The Daffodil, Anthony, Royal Codrington, Sovereign, Esk, Scotia, and Tynwald. Greyhound, Harvester, Intrepid, Worcester. Ivanhoe,
6 The Albury, Duchess Sabre, of Scimitar, Fife, Emperor Shikari, of Vanquisher, India, Fitzroy, Halcyon, Hebe, Leda, and Sharpshooter.
7 See Table 3, in conjunction with the reports of ships' proceedings in Vol. II.
54

CHAP. VI
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Ramsgate at 2200/29. situated over the engine. capable of 4 knots, also and left
Dutch eel-boats Johanna The Chantecler was only M.B. Golden Lily The and returned to harbour; and the remainder Chantecler reached and the La Panne at 0500/30.
and brought back lost troops. her in the Downs in the get over on May, and round"¹. She 30 The Johanna did not on the 30th and compass which was reached the beaches, however, revolved at 0900 slowly round her
Ramsgate on the morning on that day she was towed she had no charts, of way the 30th May. Later darkness, and returned to to the beaches by the skoot Jutland.
Troops transported on 29th May reduction in the number of destroyers and with failure to
The 29th May closed with a formidable available list of ships lost or damaged, a marked the high rate of evacuation hoped for. The effect of the day's occurrences achieve even more marked next day, when instead of the 50,000 to 60,000 British was were in fact transported.²
troops which had been calculated as the probable achievement, only 48,000 odd
Nevertheless, 47,310 troops (including some 2,000 casualties) were landed in England on the 29th May (see Table 2), 13,752 having been lifted from the beaches and 33,558 from the harbour. Only about 11/2 per cent of these were
French troops³, whose organised evacuation had not yet begun. (See Appendices Y.2 to Y.5).
During the morning and forenoon of the 29th May, when there was no bombing of Dunkirk harbour, 1Q personnel vessels⁴ lifted 14,760 troops from the east pier; during the afternoon, in spite of the bombing, the Canterbury lifted a further 1,960.
The development of beach evacuation is indicated by the fact that nearly
2½ times the number of troops were lifted from the beaches on 29th May as compared with the number lifted on the previous day. Seventeen destroyers⁵
each made one round trip during the 24 hours of the 29th May and an eighteenth destroyer, the Icarus, made two such trips. On these trips the 18 destroyers embarked and transported to England 10,694 troops of which 6,198 were lifted from the beaches and 4,506 from Dunkirk harbour. Nine minesweepers6
together lifted 2,426 troops from the beaches although one of them, the Albury did not land her troops in England until the next day.⁷ Among other ships which brought back troops from the beaches was the cruiser Calcutta with
1,200.
The record of troops landed in England now stood as follows:-
From the
From the
Total for beaches harbour the day
26th May
Nil
Nil
Nil
27th May
Nil
7,669
7,669
28th May
5,930
11,874
17,804
29th May
13,752
33,558
47,310
I Report by Chantecler.
3 D.R., which incidentally puts the total of and casualties landed on 29th Table May 2). as
2 D.R. p.11, para. 38.
40,724. This figure probably does not include troops carried by foreign ships (See Prague,
4 The Côte d'Argent, Killarney, King George troops V, Maid of Orleans, Manxman,
Royal Daffodil, Royal Sovereign, Scotia, and
Javelin, Malcolm, Sabre, Scimitar, Verity, Wolsey and Worcester. Marmion
5 The Anthony, Codrington, Esk, Express, Tynwald. Greyhound, Harvester, Intrepid, Ivanhoe,
6 The Albury, Duchess of Fife, Emperor Shikari, of Vanquisher, India, Fitzroy, Halcyon, Hebe, Leda, and Sharpshooter.
7 See Table 3, in conjunction with the reports of ships' proceedings in Vol. II.
54

CHAP. VII
ferring By 0100 to her Rear-Admiral from single-minded come face to be of spoken incredible such a THE EVACUATION
gress situation, Captain the water of Bush. and up to of their From the the waists. ghastly him, Esk, Wake Walker Lound sight He had of the the more trans- from as a seemed then Commodores seen, to embarkation", detect but I in did his not voice". says feel Rear-Admiral that I could accept Wake-Walker to the note of terribly standing in despair I had pro- not
Stephenson and
Bray. proceeding to take charge off-shore Hallett at were La Panne, transferred and the to drifters, latter off-shore the which former I
groups he had of to work. all He saw the beaches. a dark line of men the
Wake-Walker By dawn the was Hebe able was to off glimpse La Panne, for the and first in the growing light Readmul at stern completely men blown over off and Off Bray the Bideford was ashore and large off the beaches Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested the Locust was trying to take her in tow. with her were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while Lying were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There men was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men filed down the sand dunes, and at the back of our minds all the time", says line
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence boats.²
could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was
Twice during contact Captain Tennant. With his staff these ships in the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk he transferred in unsuccessful efforts to to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, home as in the Hebe from the Hebe with troops. Captain Bush took passage large numbers were to turn " to stress filled the up vital necessity for boats and crews if any The Rearbenches".³
would Admiral come There off arrive was was the great hampered at beaches difficulty by and in lack start exercising of means loading; The control urgency of getting and off of a the beaches. Ships everything⁴. desirable, At 2000 would on the be 30th May was at La La Panne discussed Panne at and where 1800 arrangements next he met day, Lord and were Commodore Gort made and for of Stephenson identifying Tennas embarkation fre of the beaches seaward it. was
On this evening a
method
M.017978/41, p.4.
R.A. Dover's report (M.017978/41).
(R.O.III, p.374).
R.A. R.A. Dover's Report
Dover's Report (M.017978/41).
58

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
and miracle. unpredictable difficulties, as a such courage, energy and single-mindedness, that it has since and in come the face to be of such incredible found the
Hebe situation, Captain the ferring By water 0100 to Bush. and her up Rear-Admiral to from "of their From the the waists." ghastly him, Esk, Wake-Walker Rear-Admiral Rear-Admiral he sight He took had of over the had the shore, Wake-Walker, Wake-Walker to duties watch black of with the off S.N.O. heard terribly standing in Bray, (Afloat) and, trans- from gress of embarkation", says I could the which I had proseemed to detect in his voice".¹
then seen, but I did not feel that accept note of despair which not I
proceeding to take charge off-shore at Panne, and the latter off-shore at
Commodores Stephenson and Hallett were La transferred to drifters, the former
Bray.
Wake-Walker was able to glimpse for the first
By dawn the Hebe was off La Panne, and in the growing light Adminal the growing lear Readminl he had to work. He saw a dark line of men at the water's edge, and large groups of men all over the beaches. Off Bray the Bideford was ashore with her stern completely blown off and the Locust was trying to take her in tow. Nearer
Dunkirk the Crested Eagle was high and dry on the beach-burnt out. Lying off the beaches were destroyers, sloops, drifters and other craft, while men were making their way off in whalers, motor boats and pontoon craft. There was a slight swell which made landing difficult, and many boats were lying broached-to and stranded by the tide.
As daylight illumined the scene Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker saw that the beaches were packed with troops, who were orderly and under proper control.
To anyone with an appreciation of the practical difficulties of embarking in small boats with a long pull to seaward, the sight of that beach black with troops was indeed almost dismaying. The numbers increased steadily as more men filed down the sand dunes, and "at the back of our minds all the time", says
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker, "was the question of how long the defence line could hold and the weather remain fair." The crux of the matter was boats.²
Twice during the day Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker went to Dunkirk in unsuccessful efforts to contact Captain Tennant. With his staff he transferred from the Hebe to the Windsor and thence to the Worcester, as these ships in turn " filled up with troops. Captain Bush took home in the Hebe come off the benches".3
to stress the vital necessity for boats and crews if passage any large numbers were to would Admiral was hampered by lack of means of about quickly". Ships
There was great difficulty in exercising control off the beaches. The Reardesirable, everything would be impracticable. The urgency of a the moment governed arrive at beaches and start loading; getting and redistribution, though where At 2000 he on the 30th May Rear-Admiral Panne and met Lord Gort and Captain Tennant. Wake-Walker landed at La discussed
1800 arrangements next were made for Lord Gort's The situation was Panne at
On this day, and Commodore Stephenson embarkation from of La it.
1 evening a method of identifying was the put beaches in charge from seaward was
2 2 R.A. report
M.A. Dover's p.4.
R.A. Dover's Dover's Report Report (M.017978/41). (M.017978/41). (R.O.III, p.374).
58

CHAPTER VIII
FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
EVACUATION REACHES ITS ZENITH
Lord Gort hands over his Command to Major-General Alexander
(2nd Corps) to withdraw to the The 50th 5th Divisions
Orders had been issued on the the beaches 30th May and for Dunkirk. the 3rd, 4th and began to take place on the morning of 31st May.
the British Base staff at Dunkirk, to come the 1st Corps. These moves with to fall back to the French defences on Belgian under frontier and, together
This meant that the remnant of the B.E.F., on being withdrawn inside the area of the French defences, came under the orders of Admiral Abrial; the ance with the instructions he had received.² He selected Major-Generalthe selected Major-Generl the time had therefore arrived for Lord Gort to hand over
Hon. H. R.L. G. Alexander to remain in France in command of the 1st Corps, now numbering less than 20,000 men in all; and, on taking over command of the Ist Corps, Major-General Alexander handed over command of the Ist
Division to Brigadier M. B. Beckwith-Smith.
Lord Gort agreed with Major-General Alexander that a provisional date for evacuating his force was to be the night of 2nd/3rd June.
On the 31st May therefore, Lord Gort's headquarters closed at 1800, and, after handing over command to Major-General Alexander, Lord Gort embarked with his A.D.C. in the Hebe's whaler, which had been towed in by the motor yacht Lahloo to a point a little west of La Panne beach. He proceeded to the
Lahloo and thence to the Hebe. During the embarkation an enemy attack was made by about 40 aircraft and considerable shelling was directed on to
La Panne beach itself. With Lord Gort on board, the Hebe proceeded to La
Panne beach and continued to embark troops.
It was not, however, till about midnight, that the motor yacht Bounty with
Cdre. Stephenson on board proceeded to transfer Lord Gort from the Hebe to the Keith. At about the same time, however, the M.A/S.B.6, having embarked Lord Gort's chief staff officer General Leese from the Keith, was sent to the Hebe with orders from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to embark Lord Gort.
On finding that he had left the Hebe, the M.A/S.B.6 returned to the Keith, embarked Lord Gort, and sailed at 0304 on the 1st of June for Dover which she reached at 0547 the same evening.
It had been the intention of the Admiralty that Lord Gort and his staff should be embarked in M.T.B.'s and at 1522 V.A. Dover had informed Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker by signal that 4 of these vessels would be available for this V.A. Dover's did not reach R.A. Dover4, and other and signal all four back at Dover by Speaking of the non-receipt uses; of indeed Dover's were signal, Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker reached says, The signal informing V.A. of this, like many others, never me At 1543/30 Rear-Admiral me Wake-Walker had asked that he
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, a M.T.B's. Gort's Second Despatch, para.57.
R.A. 67, 107, 68 and 102. para. (See 58.
M.017978/41, Dover-Report p.18. of Proceedings (R.O. Appendix III. para. G.30). 19).
66

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
be embarked in a ship capable of keeping 2 wireless lines for communication purposes, and at 0645/31 he embarked in such a ship, viz. the flotilla leader
Keith, and thereafter (until she was sunk 24 hours later) kept her free from troops so that his movements should be unrestricted¹.
One of the four M.T.B.'s, viz: M.T.B.67, had been ferrying troops to the gunboat Mosquito at 1915 from La Panne beach, and her commanding Officer,
Lieut. C. C. Anderson, R.N., says, It is desired to express appreciation of an unknown soldier, who, although severely wounded about the face and head and on the point of collapse, remained quietly in the water watching M.T.B.67
draw away because he thought we looked full up and might not want him.
This man was of course taken on board".
Meanwhile anxiety was felt at Dover at the non-appearance of Lord Gort and at 2336, the Admiralty sent a peremptory signal to Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker demanding an explanation. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker says,
" About 2300 I received an urgent signal from Admiralty asking where Lord
Gort was and why I had detailed the M.T.B.'s sent for him to other work.
As the M.A./S.B. [i.e. M.A/S.B.6] had just returned with [Lt. Cdr.] C. J. Wynne-
Edwards², I sent it off at once to Hebe to collect Lord Gort it came back almost at once to say that Lord Gort had just left Hebe in a motor launch. It was very dark and Hebe could not be seen though we knew where she was, and
I waited anxiously for the boat to arrive. Presently out of the dark a boat appeared and came alongside, still not the right one, and I had a bad moment thinking of the boat getting lost. However, to my relief, after what appeared about half an hour, the right boat, in charge of [Commodore] Stephenson once more, found us at last. Apologising to Lord Gort for keeping him waiting so long, I transferred him to the M.A/S.B. and sent him off to Dover with General
Leese".³
In the meantime, a little before 1800, Lord Gort's staff had been embarked during an air attack by the Keith's boats at a point 2 miles west of La Panne.
Signal communication established between Dunkirk and Dover⁴
At daylight on the 31st full signal communication was at length established between Dunkirk and Dover.
On the 26th May the destroyer Wolsey had been despatched to Dunkirk to act as W/T link. The S.N.O., Dunkirk, on arrival next day, decided, however, that conditions in the port made it impossible for a destroyer to lie there. On the morning of the 27th May Commander M. O. D. Ellwood, R.N., who had been placed in charge of communications in Operation Dynamo", proceeded to Dunkirk in the Wolfhound that afternoon with a signal party consisting of one yeoman of signals and 24 signalmen, who were distributed between Naval headquarters at Dunkirk (one yeoman and 8 signalmen) and the beach parties
(2 signalmen each). The only equipment available other than hand flags was one Aldis lamp, which was taken over from the British Naval Liaison Officer and made to function with the help of a battery acquired from a French motor car.
A Headquarters signal station was established at the shore end of the East
Pier for communication with ships arriving, but until 30th May, when one
Naval wireless set arrived, there was no means of communication between
I R.A. Dover - Report of Proceedings (R.O.III, p.374, para. 19).
2 He had been engaged in directing the then arriving tows of boats to the beaches.
3 M.017978/41, page 21.
4 R.O. Case 5458, Vol. III, p.417.
67

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
several wrecks close inshore. vessels one to and boats, motor launches and yachts About aground mile and, out in most cases, abandoned, most cases, abandoned, numerous boats were destroyers running and between other the shore waiting and these ships. the but scarcely quiet any except for occasional shelling and intermittent between 0800 and 1315 Lt. Col. Hutchins about 250 ferried about 450
pulsive off Malo, and thereafter, about 1800 troops to the off Bray.
the
The Swallow sailed for Ramsgate at with 30 troops on board.
beaches were very bad owing to a freshening in on-shore wind; that the majority small of pulling boats were no crews that
At 1035 Rear-Admiral broached-to Wake-Walker and informed had V.A. Dover that the majority that the majority that the majon smity numbers were being embarked even daylight; that motor boats could get close in, and that under present conditions any large scale embarkation not a ship to form a lee and SO improve conditions¹.
of embarking any number was at Dunkirk, that he would attempt to beach from the beaches was quite impracticable. but He considered that the only hope
Sailing of personnel vessels suspended
Simultaneously with this bad news came a signal from S.N.O., Dunkirk, to the effect that Dunkirk was being continuously and heavily bombarded; that the enemy artillery were gradually finding the range of the loading berths and that only ships necessary for the flow of troops should enter². This signal personnel vessels to Dunkirk until the number of those en route had been confirmed the V.A. Dover in a decision he had made to suspend the sailing of reduced. There were at this time no less than 9 personnel vessels and 3 hospital carriers known to be on the round trip U.K.-Dunkirk and back, and one other personnel vessel had been ordered to sail during the night but her whereabouts was unknown. In addition, 3 other personnel vessels were under orders to sail between 0900 and 1030.
Military plan changed
B.E.F. beach on the 30th May, was to lift the B.E.F. rearguard of 4,000, R.N.
The plan, arranged between V.A. Dover and representatives of the C.-in-C., been parties, on the night of 31st May/Ist June; and naval plus had been made³. The minesweepers had received their orders4 arrangements instructions had all available X; and C.-in-C. Nore, and F.O.I.C. Harwich, were to
Route issued for the special tows to leave Ramsgate at 1300/31 for Dunkirk via as possible. M.T.B.'s to escort this convoy for as much of requested the outward provide at Dover Speed of advance 6 knots⁵. A party of Naval officers assembled passage
At 1000 to embark in these tows were given detailed instructions evacuation. the Hebe arrived off La Panne beach carrying the plans on the for plan. this
Military In the afternoon of the 31st May, however, Dover covering plan had been changed, as it was was informed that the withdrawn embarkation. Instead, the finally to withdraw to the beaches position for to be held by 4,000 troops no who longer were possible for the original was to be westward from the La Panne easternmost Division was to boats be
I used to lift this force from the beaches. area, and At the the special same time flight the of troops
Appendix Q.6.
2 Appendix Q.7.
5 Appendix Q.1.
4 3 Appendices Q.1, G.29.
Appendix G.29.
70

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
that could be found, the intention at Panne 1600-being boats the past 24 hours². Parties were organised the time-about collect all the oars and for wood R.N.¹ and the 12th Lancers to marshalling the beaches
Work was commenced on a second who lorry had pier been at La Panne by Lieut. Greatthe embarkation of troops from La would at 2030 be with two ships, to recommence hoped the fire of the Nieuport battery less effective3.
westward of La Panne, which considered would be out
Dover for the embarkation of Lt. Cdr. McClelland at about 1800 from a point 2 miles V.A.
At about 1630, arrangements Lord were Gort made from La Panne direct with range of the Nieuport battery. In the event, however, Lord Gort embarked of in the Hebe's whaler nearer to La Panne.
were already filled put off. No additional boats arrived, however, and the
At 2030 two ships arrived off La Panne⁴, and the beaching craft there which rate fell to about 150 an hour. With about 7,000 men awaiting embarkation of embarkation was no more than 300 an hour; indeed, as darkness set in, rate the before 0400 the next morning (when the beach would be exposed to gunfire, and might even be in the hands of the enemy) a rate of at least 1,000 an hour was the necessary. for Urgent representations were made to V.A., Dover, and to ships however, in response to this signal that at 2223 the Keith asked V.A., Dover, to to urgently and that they lacked ships and boats⁵. It was probably, informed clear Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that La Panne had reported 6,000 troops in vicinity more boats, but none came, although at 2130 V.A., Dover, tell S.N.O., Dunkirk, that troops must be moved down to Bray, as tows of boats got Panne. intercepted at Bray in the dark, with a resulting shortage of boats at La
During darkness hostile low-flying aircraft were patrolling continually overhead and bombing promptly all lights shown, which no doubt explains why lights. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in the Keith did not see the pre-arranged shore
By 2200 the situation at La Panne had become serious; only about 600
troops had been embarked and the few boats available, which had to be handled and pulled in the darkness by troops inexperienced in this work, had dwindled to three. At this time, as the telephone to Dover was still working, Lt. Cdr.
McClelland destroyed the W/T set.
At about 2300 the situation was becoming critical, as troops for whom there were no boats were piling up on the beach, and the military withdrawal which would full leave La Panne in no-man's-land by 0400 the following morning was in on the crowded beach, causing casualties with almost every shell.
swing. To make matters worse the Nieuport battery opened a slow fire
D.G. Johnson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., Commanding the 4th Division, who in turn
Lt. Cdr. McClelland discussed the situation with the G.O.C., Major-General conferred the with the Duty Captain at Dover, and it was finally decided to march being reached after Lt. Cdr. McClelland had made reconnaissance
6,000 men remaining at La Panne to Dunkirk, via Bray-Dunes, the decision right had along the beaches, without finding any more ships a personal or boats, and after he not arrives. informed the G.O.C. in reply to a direct question that he thought they would
List. I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report. The name Greatwood is not in the May 1940 Navy
2 3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
Appendix Q.16.
4 Probably the Worcester and Hebe.
5 Appendix H.16.
76

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
After about an hour the Margate life-boat, the Lord Southborough, appeared.
All destroyers were now under way, and as the life-boat was returning to Margate the party went back in her¹. She reached Margate at 1450 on May 31st.
Thus, by about 0830 on the 31st May all the beach parties of which there are any records had returned or were on their way to England.
Devonia is beached
At 1035 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker had informed V.A. Dover that he would beach a ship in the hope of improving conditions for boat work, which was then being made difficult by a lop and he instructed Cdre. Stephenson accordingly.
Cdre. Stephenson, then in the yacht Bounty off. La Panne, boarded the minesweeper Devonia at 1600 and gave orders to beach the ship. The
Devonia, already much damaged by near misses at 1230, was beached at full speed off La Panne, and at 1930, on account of the shelling and bombing, she was abandoned. Fortunately by 1700 the weather off the beaches had much improved.
Casualties to H.M. Ships
With the exception of the Devonia none of H.M. ships was lost on this day, but the following were slightly damaged: the Vivacious was damaged by a shell hit and had 3 dead and 12 wounded; the Hebe received slight damage from a near miss; the Wolsey was in collision with the P/V Roebuck; the
Impulsive damaged a propeller on uncharted wreckage; the Malcolm was in collision with Dunkirk pier; and the Scimitar was in collision with the Icarus and later with a drifter².
Air patrols
During the 31st May Fighter Command carried out patrols, as on the 30th
May, at an average strength of three to four squadrons. Eight patrols in all were flown, involving 289 sorties. The periods in the day when the Dunkirk area was not covered were 0620-0800, 0830-1110, 1510-1615, and 1745-1915³.
Coastal Command patrolled the line North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend throughout the day, patrols being of one section strength, involving in all
37 sorties⁴.
Shortly before 0930 the Air Ministry intercepted a meassage indicating that the enemy air force had been ordered not to attack the town or harbour of
Dunkirk but to concentrate attacks on shipping at sea, or leaving the coast³.
It was at about 1230 that, off La Panne, the Devonia received extensive damage to her hull from 4 near misses, but the first major attack on our ships occurred about 1415-1430 when one of our squadrons estimated the enemy strength as about 100 aircraft (bombers and fighters). Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker says, "a terrific air battle took place overhead and it seemed to go against us". Actually, we lost 9 aircraft and claimed 7 enemy shot down.6
Air attacks then followed at half-hourly intervals between 1530 and 1730, and at about 1717 the Ivanhoe, Whitehall and Express off Dunkirk harbour were attacked by about 50 bombers. The Whitehall received some damage and the Express slight damage from near misses. At this time also the Hebe was attacked off La Panne by 4 bombers and was damaged by near misses;
I Cdr. Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.370).
2 Probably either the Gervais Rentoul or the Eileen Emma which both returned damaged as the result of collisions.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p.334.
4 R.A.F. Narrative, p.336.
5 M.017978/41, p.17.
6 R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
83

SIGNALS
APPENDIX E
8. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Sabre
Last chance of saving B.E.F. is tonight. Proceed with all despatch to beach one to three miles east of Dunkirk and embark troops using own boats. Route from
Dover is by No. 6 Calais buoy, south of Dunkerque B.W. buoy and French coastal route. Return by Zuydcoote Pass Q.Z.F.3. and Q.Z.S.60. Other British ships will be off the beach. You should leave at your discretion and anyhow not later than 0330.
2305/27
SIGNALS RE BUILD UP OF DESTROYERS
Thursday, 30th May
9. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY, C.IN-C. NORE
Dover 30th May, departures: Javelin, Impulsive, Havant, Harvester, Icarus,
Intrepid, Ivanhoe, at 0515, for Sheerness.
0538/30
Note: This followed a decision to withdraw the 7 modern destroyers from Operation
Dynamo.
10. C.-IN-C. NORE to Harvester, Havant, Ivanhoe, Impulsive, Icarus, Intrepid (R) C.S.
S/H, V.A. Dover.
Raise steam forthwith and proceed to Dunkirk by Route x for X-ray.
1531/30
Note: The decision to withdraw. the modern destroyers was revoked.
11. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. NORE (R) Ajax, Hotspur, V.A. Dover, Lynx
A spare destroyers crew is to be sent to Dover as soon as possible to provide temporary reliefs in crews of destroyers operating off Belgian coast.
2341/30
APPENDIX E
SIGNALS RE BUILD-UP OF MINESWEEPERS
Note. 36 minesweepers took part in Operation Dynamo and were drawn from the following flotillas: 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 12th.
Sunday, 26th May
1. ADMIRALTY to C.IN-C. HOME FLEET, (R) A.C.O.S., V.A. Dover, M/S 1, M/S 6
Owing to casualties, 6 M.S.F. at Dover has been reduced to two effective ships.
Oil-burning fleet sweepers are urgently required there to maintain channel for communication with B.E.F.
Request two ships of 1st M.S.F. may be spared from your command and sailed to join 6 M.S.F. at Dover forthwith¹.
1833/26
I Hebe and Sharpshooter arrived Dover 1723/28.
Monday, 27th May
2. C.-IN-C. NORE to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
5th M.S.F. can sail from Harwich at daylight.
Would they be of use to you at Dunkirk.
2345/27
Reply
3.
No thank you very much.
0044/28
Tuesday, 28th May
Note: Admiralty message 1063/28 [not available] ordered the 7th and 8th M/S
Flotillas (which were at Rosyth) to Harwich, under the orders of the Vice-
Admiral, Dover.
4. C.-IN-C. NORE to F.O.I.C. HARWICH, (R) V.A. Dover, Admiralty
12th M.S.F. is to proceed to arrive off La Panne at 2200 today, Tuesday
5th M.S.F. is to proceed to arrive off beach between Zuydcoote and Malo-les-Bains at 2200 today Tuesday
0939/28
T.O.R. 1036
163

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
APPENDIX F
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Emperor proceed of India, direct Princess minefield Elizabeth [10th M.S.F.] (R)
troops. Emperor of India is to over to La Panne to embark C.M.S.
northward to be at your discretion depending place. clear to
Princess of Elizabeth Gravelines is to Point proceed where over enemy minefields batteries to may Dunkirk be in keeping well troops. Return route on the state
APPENDIX F
SIGNALS RE BUILD-UP OF SKOOTS
22nd May
F.1. ADMIRALTY V.A. to Dover C.-IN-C. PORTSMOUTH, (R) F.O.I.C. Portland, F.O.I.C. Southampton,
200-300 tons, are to be sent immediately These to Docks, Southampton, where
From the following list of Dutch coasters lying New in Poole, four empty and of about will be loaded with military supplies. will be manned by naval crews after they arrival at Southampton, and will work under the War Office.
manned by naval crews and ready will be at the disposal of V.A. Dover.
2. As many of the remainder when as are in light condition will be taken over and of these vessels reporting names of vessels as they became ready for service.
3. C.-in-C. Portsmouth, is requested to arrange for the organisation and assembly
Chart Depot.
4. Arrangements are being made for sets of charts to be sent to Portsmouth
5. Further signal will be made regarding provision of naval personnel and disposal of Dutch crews on taking over.
6. It is a matter of great importance that these vessels should be got ready for service as soon as possible.
7. Despatch II
Horst
Brem'
Jaba
Sursum Corda
Bockelo'
Ruja
Abel Tasman
Hebenobel1
Java
Virgo
Kaapfalga
Friso
Alice
Aldo'
Dourswold
Nottingham1
Fredanja
Hebe II
1703/22
F.2. ADMIRALTY to C.-IN-C. NORE (R) F.O.I.C. London, V.A. Dover in Wharf ballast and of about 200-300 tons, are to be sent immediately to Victualling
1. From the following list of Dutch coasters lying in the Port of London, four after Deptford to load military supplies. These will be manned by naval crews arrival at Deptford, and will work under the War Office.
over manned by naval crews.
2. and As many of the remainder which [?as] are in light condition are to be taken these 3. C.-in-C. Nore is requested to for the and assembly of vessels which when ready will be arrange placed at the disposal organisation of V.A. Dover.
4. Names of ships to be reported as they became ready for service.
Sheerness. 5. Arrangements are being made for sets of charts to be sent to Chart Depot personnel 6. Further for manning. signal will be made re dispoasl of Dutch crews and provision of
I Was not available.
164

SIGNALS
APPENDIX G-
14 ADMIRALTY to C.-in-C. Sheerness. PORTSMOUTH, C.-in.-C. NORE (R) V.A. Dover, N.O.I.C. Ramsgate, Cdr. i/c
Investigate as a matter of urgency provision of additional small craft which can be made available within 48 hours from all ports in your command for Operation
Dynamo including X-lighters and other self-propelled lighters. Any available in
Portsmouth Command to be sent to Dover forthwith.² Those in Nore Command to be sent to Ramsgate. V.A. Dover to be kept informed.
All craft are to be provided with charts and if necessary manned by naval crews.
S.T.O.'s have been informed and have full requisitioning powers.
1115/29
15. (ADMIRALTY) D.S.V.P. to C.-in-C. Portsmouth, Nore, Vice-Admiral, Dover (R), N.O.I.C.-
Ramsgate, C.S. Sheerness, S.N.O. Yarmouth, S.N.O. Newhaven.
My 0940/29 and Admiralty 1115/29:
Officers of S.V.P. now in area mentioned have been ordered to co-operate with your organisations.
They are to supply records from S.V.P. of boats available, and to send boats as ordered in Admiralty 1115/29 and not repetition not as in my 0940/29.
1130/30
16. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) C.-in-C. Nore.
20 Thames barges in tow of 5 tugs expected to arrive Ramsgate 1700 today May
29th
It is for consideration that they be used as piers.
1255/29
17. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Hebe for CAPTAIN BUSH
20 Thames barges in tow are being sent. Can they be usefully used as piers for loading troops at points on the beaches or do you consider they would be more usefully employed for ferrying troops
1456/29
18. C.-in-C. NORE to A/S CHATHAM, COMMODORE IN CHARGE, Sheerness, D.M.O. (R),
N.O.I.C. Ramsgate.
All available X-lighters which can be released without disorganising dockyards are to be sent to Ramsgate forthwith.
1210/29
19. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to C.-in-C. PORTSMOUTH
All small craft should be route-ed direct to Ramsgate and not repeat not to Dover.
1618/29
Thursday, 30th May
20. C.-in-C. PORTSMOUTH to ADMIRALTY, N.O.I.C. Ramsgate, Vice-Admiral, Dover
Small craft for Belgium operations due Ramsgate approximately as follows:
0600 3 fast M/B's.
0700 Dutch Mok I.
0900 2 fast paddle steamers, 1 M/B, 1 Picket boat.
1000 H.M.S. Dwarf, tug Grappler towing lighter and launches, tug Emprise towing launch, and 2 coaling tugs.
1100 3 Hopper barges.
1200 2 picket boats, 1 diesel boat.
1300 2 small cargo carriers, 1 launch, 1 small tug.
1400 1 Dutch M/B and 2 M/B's.
1500 2 I.O.W. car ferries and 2 drifters.
1600 1 small tug towing launch.
1900 5 Hoppers.
2400 2 launches.
All above times are 30th May. No ships are degaussed.
0005/30
21. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Hebe.
Rear-Admiral [Dover] from 1st Sea Lord.
Report conditions on beaches and whether boats are distributed to best advantage.
1019/30
2 See Appendix G.22.
167

SIGNALS
APPENDIX o
I have sent Capt. Bush by M.T.B. with an appreciation.
There is little food or water in Dunkirk. This should be sent as soon as possible
Armies are quite unable to help or organise anything. Keep on sending any ships.
A good medical officer with staff should be despatched
1001/29
4. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER C.-IN-C. PORTSMOUTH
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A., Dover for command of seagoing ships and vessels off the Belgian coast, and is to hoist his flag in such ship as V.A. Dover shall direct.
1748/29
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER (R) Admiralty
C.-in-C. Portsmouth, C.-in-C. Nore
My 1748/291, 1321/29 and 1832/29 to Hebe only:
Authority for operation Dynamo under V.A. Dover is as follows:
R.A. Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A. Dover for command of seagoing ships and vessels off the Belgian coast.
R.A. Dover has hoisted his flag in Hebe. Captain Tennant has been appointed as S.N.O. Dunkirk and is responsible under R.A. Dover for all shore organisation.
1328/30
6. ADMIRALTY to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES IN AREA A (R) C.-in-C. Portsmouth C.-in-C. W.A.
During present operations on Belgian coast where many small craft are present, destroyers are not repetition not to stop to render assistance to ships in distress. 1105/29
7. Ivanhoe to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
From S.N.O. Dunkirk-enemy shelling pier with shore batteries from S.E.
Request bombers to counter. Vital.
1105/29
and later
8. B.N.L.O., C.-IN-C. NORTHERN NAVAL FORCES to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
My
1105 cancel request. Consider possible retaliation would be to our disadvantage.
1200/29
SIGNALS RE EVACUATION 29TH MAY
9. MAJOR GENERAL LLOYD to MAJOR GENERAL DEWING, D.M.O., WAR OFFICE
Morale of troops landing is remarkably high partly no doubt due to arrival home.
Approximately half armed. Percentage of officers small. All drawn from units promiscuously, mostly Third Corps
1204/29
10. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to GENERAL LINDSELL [Q.M.G.], S.N.O. DUNKIRK
Stores and supply craft have had to return undischarged owing to lack of assistance from shore.
Must press you to organise parties for unloading purposes; Naval beach parties will indicate when and where required.
1432/29
I V.A. Dover's 1748/29 cannot be traced. Probably Admiralty Message
1748/29 (see Appendix O, 9c) is meant.
G
177

INDEX
Greatwood, Lt., 76.
Grenade, 28, 43-4 (damaged), 46, 50n (reported sinking), 55 (sunk).
Greyhound, 13 (bombards Calais); in Dynamo, 23, 27, 42 (damaged), 47 (remains in action), 54n, 55n.
Grey Mist, 13.
Grimsby Town, 104, 110.
Grive, 38, 93 (sunk), 60, 90-1.
Grouse, 72n.
Guillemot, 114n, 117.
Gula, 71n.
Gulzar, 17, 60n, 114n, 118.
H.A.C., 71s.
Haig, 72n, 90.
Halcyon, 20, 28n, 45, 47n, 54n, 82, 86 (attacked), 91, 107n, 109, 114n, 117.
Hallett, Vice-Admiral T. J., (act. Cdre.), 49 (takes charge off Bray), 58, 79; leaves, 80;
effect of his arrival, 126.
Hancock, Capt. C. A., 29.
Handy Billie, 81.
Hanora, abandoned, 53: sunk, 55.
Harris, Cdr. W. V. H., 13.
Harvester, 28n, 35-6, 47, 54n, 55n.
Harwich, F.O.I.C., 70; assistance to ships at, 94.
Havant, 46, 55n, 91 (sunk), 93.
Hawkinge, 5, 7.
Hebe, 44, 47n, 49, 50 (flag of R.A. Dover), 54n, 58 (hoists flag), 66, 67, 70, 76 (Whaler),
76n, 83 (slightly damaged), 84 (shoots down Heinkel).
Hebe II, 20, 24, 27, 28n.
Hemans, Lt. M. A., 81.
Henderson, Comdr. H. P., 22.
Hilda, 20, 29n, 32, 72n, 78, 90.
Hird, 37.
Hirschfield, A. B., C.A.L., 93.
Holford, Maj. C.F. L., R.M., 8.
Holkham, Capt. A., 38.
Holland, 111-2.
Holland, invaded, 1; surrenders, 2.
Holland-Martin, Lt. Cdr. D. E., 21.
Holmes, Maj.-Gen. W. G., 82.
Hondsrug, 20n, 24, 102, 114n, 116-7.
Hospital carriers, attacked, 16, 17, 43, 45, 104; space too valuable for them, 87.
Hound, 72n.
Howson, Capt. J. M.: S.N.O. Beaches, 49, 59; stops waste of boats, 60; returns to
Dover, 74; orders beach parties to embark, 79, 80; effect of his arrival, 126.
Hutchins, Lt. Col. R. L., 69-70.
Hythe, 32, 72n.
Icarus, 37-8 (damaged), 54 (makes two trips in 24 hours), 55n, 69, 83 (in collision), 87, 97
101 (in collision).
Impulsive, 20, 23, 27, 55n, 64n, 70, 83 (damages propeller).
Indépendence, 73n.
Ingénieur Cachin, 73.
Intrepid, 37, 38, 43 (damaged), 54n, 55n, 61n.
Inverforth, 34.
Ironside, General Sir Edmund (CIGS), 5.
Isle of Guernsey, 17, 45 (damaged).
Isle of Thanet, 19, 22n, 24, 28, 34 (sunk).
Ivanhoe, 37n-8, 54n, 55n, 77n, 83 (bombed), 86, 90-1 (damaged), 93.
Jackal, hunts submarine, 69.
Jacketa, 32n, 51n.
Jaguar, 28, 39, 41 (damaged), 42, 61n (in need of repair).
Java, 32, 42, 47.
Javelin, 28, 37-8, 54n, 55n, 61n, 105 (forbidden to sail).
Jeannie MacIntosh, 71n.
Jeune France, 62n, 73n.
200