TNA ADM 234 360

SOURCES
The principal sources on which this account of Operation "Dynamo" is based, are as follows:-
M.011883/40 Operation "Dynamo." Report of Proceedings. (Report of
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, F.O.C. Dover, referred to in this narrative as D.R.)
M.020721/40
List of ships which took part in Operation "Dynamo," 26th
May to 4th June (From F.O.C. Dover, 26/10/40).
M.017681/40
Ships lost during Operation "Dynamo" - Report (From F.O.C.
Dover, 5/9/40).
M.017978/41
Report of Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker on the evacuation from Dunkirk, 29th May to 4th June, 1940. (Rear-Admiral
Dover's Report).
C.W.29685/40
Operation "Dynamo." Recommendations for Honours and
Awards. (From F.O.C. Dover, July 1940).
Case 5458
Operation "Dynamo." Evacuation of troops from Dunkirk,
[6 volumes]
May to June 1940. (Contains reports of individual ships,
Admiralty
"Dynamo" Maintenance Officer, S.N.O. Dunkirk, etc.) Re-
Record Office ferred to as "R.O.I - VI."
Enclosure
Contains signals connected with the operation.
Box No. 370
Admiralty
Record Office
Admiralty War Diary. (Signals).
M.011431/40
Blocking of Dunkirk Harbour (Operation C.K.)
M.010977/40
Demolitions carried out at Dunkirk (Operation X.D.)
Case 6256
H.M. Ships lost during the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk.
Admiralty
Record Office
H. & A.8/42
Evacuation from Dunkirk Norwegian S.S. Hird. Recommendations for awards.
M.016146/40
Dutch coasters. List of commissioned for "Dynamo," etc.
M.010932/40
Report of Proceedings of Riflemen landed to cover Demolition
Party at Boulogne on 23/5/40.
M.010824/40
Evacuation of Boulogne. Report by Major C. F. L. Holford,
Royal Marines (with M.010932/40).
M.3422/40
Particulars of [Belgian] men and craft from the Dartmouth area who assisted in Dunkirk evacuation. (From C. in C.
Western Approaches, 14/7/40).
M.011882/40
Operation "Dynamo" Work of Personnel Vessels. (From
F.O.C: Dover, 18/6/40).
M.014793/40
Reports of Operations off Dutch, Belgian and French Coasts
[Evacuation of Boulogne.]
xi

CHAP. II
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
21ST MAY
Counter-attack south of Arras
Mechanised He had Division, co-operation but the movements of the Corps and a byLord Cort was begun the of the French Cavalry Major-General H. by Lord Gort
The counter-attack this day under with 2 the divisions command south of of Arras planned did not materialise. Furthermore, serious attack widely divisions to of the French as 5th Corps would also the The hot develop two the flanks General Franklyn had latter did through wear¹. were now troubles developed beak troubles developed beak bubles developed break the British overworked tanks, whose tracks mechanical troubles developed to that Although the attack the objectives would not of maintain the day its were therefore reached, it became and supported by the French on its left¹. momentum unless it was reinforced clear enemy direction.¹ pressure "Thus compelled concluded the Allied force to withdraw - and in an 23rd
During the 22nd May General the Franklyn held his ground, but on the had valuable defence of Arras," said Lord Gort, easterly blocked imposed a vital a road centre".¹ delay on a greatly superior force against which it... had It
Germans approach Boulogne military situation, for, in the afternoon, an enemy column of all arms the
In the meantime, the 21st May had marked a still more serious change in approaching the Germans Boulogne.² The military situation was rapidly deteriorating; was completely Allied severing our line of communications.³ A quarter of were across the Somme² and had cut the railway at Abbeville, tons of troops now lay north of the Somme, cut off from the daily flow a of million decision ammunition and supplies essential to their maintenance. 2,000
"was to maintain the force through the northern ports", said Lord 'The established at Dunkirk.
finally taken on 21st May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area Gort,
A conference of the Allied Commanders was essential, and at 2000 Lord Gort went He to Ypres where he met the King of the Belgians and General Billotte.4
river explained the situation developing on the Escaut, where the water in the and decided back As the to was it was a that line line SO evident low the be in withdrawn rear, Escaut that that General it should no sooner to longer Billotte the or be later abandoned formed Belgian the a frontier Belgian tank on the obstacle. Army defences.⁵ night would of It 22nd-23rd was have thereupon to swing May, if on he to were the forced to withdraw from the asked positions the on King the of the he Belgians would whether, fall back the line of the Yser SO as to continue to Lys, of days B.E.F.⁵ later His Majesty agreed that maintain touch with the left five the Yser the Belgian command decided no that alternative the idea line of the existed, withdrawal but to must be ruled out".
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 33.
General Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
General Lord Blanchard Gort's Billotte Second succeeded was Despatch, fatally him injured in para. para. command in 37 35. a motor of the accident French returning First Group from of this Armies. conference.
6

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Dover.¹ It was added that "Dynamo"2 the operation the for first which these ships were prepared word. would be known as mention of the now famous being
18 lying at Poole were London were commissioned Portsmouth on of these,
As a result of this direction, commissioned 40 skoots by the in all C. were in C. commissioned;
the May, 25th and and 22 lying 27th at May. by the C. in C. Nore between
23RD MAY
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
May which (see to have changed enemy hands twice bridgeheads at Aire, at St. 23rd
Over in Plan France, 2), and the situation the on established the canal line deteriorated during the mediately east of St. Omer), and, during the forest of Clairmarais
German seems tanks were reported harbouring during in the the day"3), and near Watten. Omer vehicles within 3 miles of Hazebrouck; day, hostile armoured (im-
Dunkirk. enemy was then within some 20 miles these of movements came had been checked,3 the and though by the evening fighting
Calais cut off gallant was conducted under the orders of the War Office". of
Calais defence was now of Calais finally cut off, and, said Lord Gort, the remainder the
Dunkirk, available though for its water supply was destroyed,⁴ was by this time the and port small unloading supplies. Even the small supply by air of only craft arms ammunition now ceased, as it had become impossible rations
(Licut.-General to land. Accordingly, on the advice of the Quarter-Master-General for air-
During completed. day the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. rations.⁴ was the W. G. Laidsell), Lord Gort put the B.E.F. on half
Dunkirk Naval demolition parties were ready at the Nore, and one was landed
XD(E)). during the day to prepare the locks for demolition. (Operation at
Boulogne evacuated
Comdr. Early A. on E. the same day a demolition party (Operation XD under
Buttercup", destroyer Vimy, to Boulogne, together with despatched, in the P. Welman, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N., (Retd.), was (G) also Lieut.-
consisted Major of C. F. L. Holford, R.M. was in cover the demolition party; to restore control of the docks area and a force known as Force guns and a medical 4 platoons of seamen, 2 Marine platoons command with a of section this force, of machine and it attacked battery drawn When to had "Force by the been enemy Buttercup" sent tanks party. on the and Two arrived, previous battalions the day. and town the of Irish was under Guards shell and fire an and anti-tank being orders jetty in readiness infantry, for Army forces were being with-
I during the afternoon that the evacuation, troops were although to stay the and War fight Office it out⁵. sent
2 Appendices F.1 and F.2.
Appendix F.3.
4 5 3 Lord Lord Gort's Gort's Second Despatch,
Admiralty Second Despatch, para. 39.
Message 1422/23, War para. Diary 37. 23.5.40, p. 356.
8

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Communication with England was cut, and all messages had to be sent by destroyers.
By 1530 the Germans had occupied the whole of Boulogne except a bridgehead, all anti-tank guns were out of action, and half of Major Holford's force were estimated to be casualties. The destroyers Keith (D. (19), Captain D. J.R.
Simson) and Whitshed went over to Boulogne during the afternoon, and were followed later by the Venetia, Venomous, Vimiera, Wild Swan and Windsor.
The arrival of the first two destroyers was followed by an enemy air attack, together with close range mortar, machine gun and rifle fire, which caused damage and casualties, including Captain D. (19) who was killed, and necessitated breaking off, the work of evacuating wounded and withdrawing temporarily from the port. Fortunately, No. 92 Squadron of the R.A.F. (12
Spitfires) soon encountered the large enemy formation and, with some loss to themselves and much to the enemy, gained a measure of control of the situation;
and by 1955 the destroyers were back in harbour and carrying out the evacuation of the Welsh Guards. The Keith had received a signal at 1749 ordering all troops to be evacuated.
About 2000, while Lieut.-Comdr. Welman was on the point of firing the last of the demolition charges, German tanks towing field guns appeared over the hill north of the harbour and opened heavy fire at the three destroyers coming in to take off Force Buttercup." An amazing engagement, described by eye-witnesses as magnificent, ensued between the German field guns and the destroyers. The Venetia was hit while in mid-channel, but she was got under control and out of the harbour, thus avoiding blocking in the Venomous and Wild who were embarking " Force Buttercup" and the Irish Guards while engaging the enemy tanks and field guns with every gun they had.
It was low water when the destroyers eventually backed out of harbour, loaded down with troops. When the Venomous backed out her wheel jammed and she had to steer with her engines; the Wild Swan, following her, grounded for a moment, but both ships got off and both reached Dover safely. When, at 2234 some 3,000 troops had been brought off, the Wild Swan reported that although a considerable number remained further evacuation was impracticable.
The Windsor, however, which had been ordered at about 2030 to help in the evacuation, arrived after the rest of the destroyers had left; she entered the harbour after dark, filled to capacity and sailed again without damage or much difficulty. On clearing the harbour, the Windsor informed V.-A. Dover that further evacuation under cover of darkness was still possible and that two more destroyers could lift all the soldiers still left at Boulogne.
Vice-Admiral, Dover, therefore, despatched the Vimiera at 0015 on the 24th to try to bring off the remaining troops. She arrived at Boulogne at 0130, and found all silent. At length the Commanding Officer's hail was answered, and it was found that there were more than 1000 troops waiting for a ship.
Going alongside the jetty, the destroyer was crowded to the tiller flat by 0230, the only space left being round the guns; and when she slipped at 0245 she was compelled to leave some 200 men behind. Five minutes later shore batteries opened fire on the jetty, and at 0255 a bomber passed close and a bomb exploded 20 yards away. The Vimiera was so over-loaded that even five degrees of helm made the ship list unpleasantly. She reached Dover safely at 0355
and landed some 1400 men, including Belgian and French troops and some
I The Whitshed had been at Boulogne helping to evacuate wounded from 0630 to 1045
when she left with two transports for Calais.
9

CHAPTER VIII
FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
EVACUATION REACHES ITS ZENITH
Lord Gort hands over his Command to Major-General Alexander
(2nd Corps) to withdraw to the The 50th 5th Divisions
Orders had been issued on the the beaches 30th May and for Dunkirk. the 3rd, 4th and began to take place on the morning of 31st May.
the British Base staff at Dunkirk, to come the 1st Corps. These moves with to fall back to the French defences on Belgian under frontier and, together
This meant that the remnant of the B.E.F., on being withdrawn inside the area of the French defences, came under the orders of Admiral Abrial; the ance with the instructions he had received.² He selected Major-Generalthe selected Major-Generl the time had therefore arrived for Lord Gort to hand over
Hon. H. R.L. G. Alexander to remain in France in command of the 1st Corps, now numbering less than 20,000 men in all; and, on taking over command of the Ist Corps, Major-General Alexander handed over command of the Ist
Division to Brigadier M. B. Beckwith-Smith.
Lord Gort agreed with Major-General Alexander that a provisional date for evacuating his force was to be the night of 2nd/3rd June.
On the 31st May therefore, Lord Gort's headquarters closed at 1800, and, after handing over command to Major-General Alexander, Lord Gort embarked with his A.D.C. in the Hebe's whaler, which had been towed in by the motor yacht Lahloo to a point a little west of La Panne beach. He proceeded to the
Lahloo and thence to the Hebe. During the embarkation an enemy attack was made by about 40 aircraft and considerable shelling was directed on to
La Panne beach itself. With Lord Gort on board, the Hebe proceeded to La
Panne beach and continued to embark troops.
It was not, however, till about midnight, that the motor yacht Bounty with
Cdre. Stephenson on board proceeded to transfer Lord Gort from the Hebe to the Keith. At about the same time, however, the M.A/S.B.6, having embarked Lord Gort's chief staff officer General Leese from the Keith, was sent to the Hebe with orders from Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker to embark Lord Gort.
On finding that he had left the Hebe, the M.A/S.B.6 returned to the Keith, embarked Lord Gort, and sailed at 0304 on the 1st of June for Dover which she reached at 0547 the same evening.
It had been the intention of the Admiralty that Lord Gort and his staff should be embarked in M.T.B.'s and at 1522 V.A. Dover had informed Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker by signal that 4 of these vessels would be available for this V.A. Dover's did not reach R.A. Dover4, and other and signal all four back at Dover by Speaking of the non-receipt uses; of indeed Dover's were signal, Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker reached says, The signal informing V.A. of this, like many others, never me At 1543/30 Rear-Admiral me Wake-Walker had asked that he
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, a M.T.B's. Gort's Second Despatch, para.57.
R.A. 67, 107, 68 and 102. para. (See 58.
M.017978/41, Dover-Report p.18. of Proceedings (R.O. Appendix III. para. G.30). 19).
66

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Headquarters and the various was venience, French Messages as employment except best done station by they because taken for despatch of transmission could at semaphore. by the the hand riders, with Bastion coding down the to for Beach of or, Dover help the messages the parties, for pier parties distances of the by for sake nor W/T between of were greater too one great party and cars. con- the lished was a French, laborious Reception a very by and 2300 business slow decoding on on the business. that naval which the day, type W/T first but necessitated of set code owing which (the to sent arrived the Anglo a through the French Statim French) the the Frestroyers Station by destroversion in use message at that estab- This date into was munication mission broke was down not established with the Dover defective transmitter.ful defective transmitter.ful comof sand in the generator. altogether on evening of 1st June, probably on account
On the 1st June the Royal Corps of Signals established a W/T station in lorry by the Bastion, as well as telephone communication between the Bastion a and the Headquarters Signal Station. The intense bombing and shelling by the Germans that day severed the line more than once.
In view of the possibility of the arrival of enemy forces on the 2nd June all signal forms and records were destroyed on that day.
British Sector to be held till midnight 1st/2nd June
Meanwhile, on taking over command of the 1st Corps, Major General
Alexander proceeded to Dunkirk to interview Admiral Abrial who informed him that he intended to hold the perimeter till all the troops were embarked. A
French Corps on the right was to hold the sector from Gravelines to Bergues
(though Gravelines had not apparently been in French hands for some days)
and a mixed French and British Corps under command of Major General
Alexander was to hold a line from Bergues to Les Moeres and thence to the sea¹.
that in his view this plan did not take account of the true naval and condition
Major General Alexander at once told the Admiral and General military Fagalde situation of the was now such that prolonged resistance was out of the the question, night of which serious and deteriorating rapidly. The fighting troops was front could not in his opinion be maintained after beach and and the present furthermore, the line to be held was so close to the by short to 1st/2nd Dunkirk June; that the enemy might soon stop all further evacuation range War, Major and General received Alexander a reply that gave the the British same French force opinion troops should to being the be Secretary withdrawn embarked Abrial of as State in rapidly equal and for artillery fire¹.
as possible from on a that basis time of British onward. and This he showed to Admiral allotted to him till numbers midnight General Fagalde, 1st/2nd stating June, and that then he would withdraw hold under the sector cover of darkness, which they agreed was the only plan feasible¹.
Cyclone damaged
Day and night our by patrols torpedo were maintaining subjected their to E-boat vigil attacks. northward, but the on this day two
French destroyers were
I Appendix to Lord Gort's Second Despatch.
68

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VHI
Isabelle The French carrying trawlers food, also Marie went hit and to and Dunkirk. Pierre exploded carrying While and unloading munitions, under and shell the Ste.
was the Pierre's still on fire munitions when her were consorts left Dunkirk at 1100. the ship caught fire. She fire
Captain Howson returns to Dover about 1930 some 30 others bombed the and
Meanwhile the having enemy been made made the last at 1415-1500 of his three major air of the other two bombers escorted by fighters small went on craft². to bomb Dunkirk, and likely to up the 'rough treatment", Captain Howson decided unalso through stand the stern to further glands. Being opinion that the would be received some damage of making
The yacht Ankh, which from a Captain near miss Howson and started was using as his headquarters, some to Rear-Admiral seaward, failing light Captain Howson was then return 2 to Dover, 3 miles ordering to in yacht the Amulree to keep company. Being to to signal to closed the Wake-Walker in the Keith. The yachts Eilla unable II
Caryandra the latter that Ankh the former reported that she was short of fuel and in she was damaged and short of lubricating oil, so they returned and company with the Ankh to Dover.
reduced to of the Vivacious from the beach) found that her tiller wire by
It tow was the at boats about this time, 2000, that the yacht Glagla (which was standing shelling R.N. in which had been going on continuously, became intense. A Captain and to a single strand. Her Commanding Officer said, The bombing was ordered yacht No. 1 of the Solent Patrol [i.e. Captain Howson in the Ankh], us to make for the open sea, and all the smaller craft followed him out.
It was in the above circumstances that a number of power boats started withdrawal Walker to Dover, and that at 0611 on the 1st June Rear-Admiral Wake- a boats had found it necessary to report to V.A. Dover that all craft used for towing left during the night, and to urge that they be sent back³.
Ankh, was rammed and sunk by the Vimy in the vicinity of the Gull. Her crew
At about 0145 on the 1st June the yacht Amulree, which was escorting the were R.N., picked up. The Commodore-in-Charge, Sheerness, Captain H. R. Marrack, she this vessel [the Amulree] was diverted from the valuable work regret which that D.S.C., in a report to V.A., Dover, says that it was a matter for seemingly rammed minor administrative duty which indirectly resulted in carry her being was performing in towing out pontoons from the very beaches, to out a
The and sunk by a British destroyer in the Downs".
Ankh arrived at Dover at 0815 on the 1st June.
Casualties to towing craft
Commodore Of the motor boats lost this day, 2 lost action. The M/B
machine ferried troops to the Worcester were off by enemy eventually bourne gunned, holed and abandoned. Her Malo. She was Eastshore Queen. The M/B New Prince of Wales crew was embarked in the a shell M/B from a crew of the crew were wounded. killed, The vessel and S/Lt. was abandoned P. H. E. and the
R.N. and battery. 2 Two able-seamen were damaged by Bennett, embarked in the M/B Triton.
I 2 R.A.F. Narrative, p.336.
3 4 Captain Appendix Howson's H.26. Report (R.O.IV, p.119).
R.O.III, p.551.
74

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
At least fourteen other motor boats¹ were lost by misadventure, e.g. engine failure, grounding, swamping, damaging rudders and/or propellers on floating or submerged wreckage, or breaking adrift and being lost when on tow. The seaplane tender No. 291 managed to get back to England in spite of the damage she had sustained, but was unable to take any further part in "Dynamo".
Conflicting news of La Panne
Meanwhile, as the tows of boats (which Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker now saw for the first time at 1900 on the 31st May), arrived off Dunkirk they were directed to the beaches by Lt. Cdr. Wynne-Edwards, first from M.T.B.68 and later at about 2100, from M.A/S.B. 6. It was found, however, that in the growing darkness, and with no lights to help them, there was a tendency for the boats to stop at the first place they came to where other craft were assembled.
At about 1930 the Codrington, then off, Bray, was warned by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker to send on the boats detailed for La Panne, but the bulk of them did not get further than Bray.
The night was dark, and Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker stayed off La Panne,
"wondering how things were going. Everything was black, ships and boats and shore showed no lights", although arrangements had been made for a light to be shown to seaward to guide boats inshore. Shelling was continuous and seemed to be falling among the ships at the anchorage. News was conflicting;
a message from the shore said that thousands of men were waiting but there were no boats, while messages came from ships that their boats could find no one on the beach. the ships and the boats were there, and the troops ashore, and one could do no more.
I do not know to this day", says Rear-
Admiral Wake-Walker, what really took place there".
La Panne beach 31st May/1st June
It is not easy to discover what happened at La Panne, but the following account, based on a report by Lt. Cdr. J. W. McClelland, R.N., who with a party of signalmen reached La Panne in the minesweeper Gossamer at 1930 on the 30th May, gives the main course of events. He was S.N.O., La Panne, for the seven hours prior to its abandonment as a place of embarkation at about
0200 on the 1st June.
About 1600 on May 31st Captain Tennant, who had been visiting Lord Gort at La Panne, decided to return to Dunkirk, but he first instructed Lt. Cdr.
McClelland to arrange for the evacuation of Lord Gort and his staff, to carry out the duties of S.N.O., La Panne³, and to join Major General B. L. Montgomery, then in command of 2nd Corps.
At that time, says Lt. Cdr. McClelland, an enemy battery near Nieuport, assisted by 2 kite balloons, had found the range of the beach and the off lyingships, which had accordingly withdrawn to the westward. Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker asked for the balloons to be shot down, and aircraft came over for that purpose; at times the balloons were hauled down-but they always re-appeared.
I A.L.C.8, A.L.C.15, Enterprise, Excellent's 35 ft. M|B, Excellent's A/A M|B, Golden
Spray II, Princess Lily, St. Patrick, and the Seaplane tender 243 and A.M.C.3; the Sea
Falcon, Sunshine, Triton and the Two Rivers.
2 M.017978/41, p.21.
3 Lt. Cdr. McClelland speaks of the final evacuation of A, B and C beaches La Panne, but this is evidently an error as the beaches were lettered from West to East (See Plan 3)
and must therefore have been M, N and O Beaches.
M.017978/41, p.16.
75

CHAP. VIII
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
that could be found, the intention at Panne 1600-being boats the past 24 hours². Parties were organised the time-about collect all the oars and for wood R.N.¹ and the 12th Lancers to marshalling the beaches
Work was commenced on a second who lorry had pier been at La Panne by Lieut. Greatthe embarkation of troops from La would at 2030 be with two ships, to recommence hoped the fire of the Nieuport battery less effective3.
westward of La Panne, which considered would be out
Dover for the embarkation of Lt. Cdr. McClelland at about 1800 from a point 2 miles V.A.
At about 1630, arrangements Lord were Gort made from La Panne direct with range of the Nieuport battery. In the event, however, Lord Gort embarked of in the Hebe's whaler nearer to La Panne.
were already filled put off. No additional boats arrived, however, and the
At 2030 two ships arrived off La Panne⁴, and the beaching craft there which rate fell to about 150 an hour. With about 7,000 men awaiting embarkation of embarkation was no more than 300 an hour; indeed, as darkness set in, rate the before 0400 the next morning (when the beach would be exposed to gunfire, and might even be in the hands of the enemy) a rate of at least 1,000 an hour was the necessary. for Urgent representations were made to V.A., Dover, and to ships however, in response to this signal that at 2223 the Keith asked V.A., Dover, to to urgently and that they lacked ships and boats⁵. It was probably, informed clear Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that La Panne had reported 6,000 troops in vicinity more boats, but none came, although at 2130 V.A., Dover, tell S.N.O., Dunkirk, that troops must be moved down to Bray, as tows of boats got Panne. intercepted at Bray in the dark, with a resulting shortage of boats at La
During darkness hostile low-flying aircraft were patrolling continually overhead and bombing promptly all lights shown, which no doubt explains why lights. Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker in the Keith did not see the pre-arranged shore
By 2200 the situation at La Panne had become serious; only about 600
troops had been embarked and the few boats available, which had to be handled and pulled in the darkness by troops inexperienced in this work, had dwindled to three. At this time, as the telephone to Dover was still working, Lt. Cdr.
McClelland destroyed the W/T set.
At about 2300 the situation was becoming critical, as troops for whom there were no boats were piling up on the beach, and the military withdrawal which would full leave La Panne in no-man's-land by 0400 the following morning was in on the crowded beach, causing casualties with almost every shell.
swing. To make matters worse the Nieuport battery opened a slow fire
D.G. Johnson, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., Commanding the 4th Division, who in turn
Lt. Cdr. McClelland discussed the situation with the G.O.C., Major-General conferred the with the Duty Captain at Dover, and it was finally decided to march being reached after Lt. Cdr. McClelland had made reconnaissance
6,000 men remaining at La Panne to Dunkirk, via Bray-Dunes, the decision right had along the beaches, without finding any more ships a personal or boats, and after he not arrives. informed the G.O.C. in reply to a direct question that he thought they would
List. I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report. The name Greatwood is not in the May 1940 Navy
2 3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
Appendix Q.16.
4 Probably the Worcester and Hebe.
5 Appendix H.16.
76

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Thereupon, at about 0050 on the 1st June Lt. Cdr. McClelland informed
Dover that he was closing down the telephone line as the headquarters were now being abandoned.
While this decision was being arrived at further batteries had come into action on the town of La Panne, and by 0100 the rate of fire on the beach was increased. Lt. Cdr. McClelland says that he had by that time lost touch with
Major-General Montgomery, who had left earlier and subsequently embarked in the Codrington at Dunkirk at 0525 on the 1st June.
By 0130 it was low water, and about half a mile walk to the end of the piers which were now high and dry. While walking there with the intention of assisting in the embarkation of the few men who had not been ordered to march to Dunkirk, Lt. Cdr. McClelland was twice knocked down by shell bursts a splinter smashed the box signalling lantern he was carrying, and another slightly injured his ankle. Several houses on the front were now blazing fiercely.
On reaching the embarkation point Lt. Cdr. McClelland was told that no boats had been in for over half an hour, and that the naval beach party had left-apparently in accordance with his orders that they were to leave in the last boat.¹ As will be seen later, the beach parties at Bray also embarked early on the 31st May.
There being neither ships nor boats now at the beaches, Lt. Cdr. McClelland ordered a general retirement westward of all the groups on the beaches with the object of getting them inside the defended perimeter outside Bray-Dunes before 0400.
At 0200, two or three miles down the beach towards Bray, three ships2 at anchor and some troops had been trying unsuccessfully to attract their attention by firing their rifles. Further on, as other large groups were waiting for boats,
Lt. Cdr. McClelland decided to swim off and report on the situation. He managed to get close enough to the Gossamer, which was anchored 4 cables from the shore, to pick up a lifebelt on a line brought to him by one of the ship's company.
He was just able to gasp out his message to the Captain of the Gossamer before collapsing, but he had told of the 4th Division's change of plan and of the state of the beaches and had asked that Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker and
Vice-Admiral Dover be informed. The former was evidently informed at
0215³, and at 0235, the Gossamer signalled V.A. Dover that 6,000 British were marching from La Panne through Bray on Dunkirk⁴.
Being very exhausted and no longer able to walk because of the pain from the wound in his ankle, Lt. Cdr. McClelland remained in the Gossamer.⁵
Sub.-Lieut. E. C. Croswell's report on La Panne confirms that of Lt. Cdr.
McClelland. He says On Friday [31st May] embarkation at La Panne was slowed up as shelling caused some ships to move westward to Bray-Dunes.
The rest camp in the rear of La Panne beach and a small arms ammunition hut were hit during bombing attacks which continued throughout Friday, and ships also suffered shell fire
On Friday evening German gunners found the range of the beach and were aided by 2 observation balloons which we did not manage
I Lt. Cdr. McClelland's report (R.O.III, p.392).
2 The Codrington, Ivanhoe and Gossamer.
3 M.017978/41, p.21.
4
Appendix H.20.
5
Lt. Cdr. McClelland received a mention in despatches.
77

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VIII
Lieut. Wells says that at 0100/31 he was continued. informed that Some naval personnel would
Division, original have the The to Brigadier' shelling party evacuate who was had of the at [?Major embarked already dawn beach left, General if continued, at the and about shelling W. at 0330. 0300/31 embarkation and G. Holmes] (says he Lieut. swam in command Wells) out to officers fetch the of not a order the boat in 42nd was his for passed from Headquarters that as the would probably be over dawn the following day [Ist June], all naval personnel were to embark forth- at with". Lieut. Wells accordingly remained in the Halcyon, where he had taken the Brigadier". The Halcyon arrived at Dover at 0845/31.
There is clearly some connection between the above order from Headquarters' and Captain Howson's arrangement for embarking naval personnel during the early hours of the 31st May.
The only other account of the activities of the beach parties comes from Cdr.
H. du P. Richardson, R.N., who worked with Lt. Cdr. D. B. Dowling, R.N., and a naval platoon at Malo beach from 2000 on May the 27th until the beach was cleared of troops at about noon on the 28th May.
S.N.O. Dunkirk then ordered him to Bray beach to embark 5,000 troops, and he arrived there at about 1700 on the 28th May, with Cdr. Ken² [?Kerr] and
16 men. They found about 30,000 troops, stretching from Bray to the eastward, awaiting embarkation. Cdr. Richardson's beach party, as will be seen, also returned on the 31st May.
At 0130 on the 29th May a high wind got up which made beach embarkation almost impossible. Cdr. Richardson therefore sent off about 20,000 troops to
Dunkirk in batches of 1000.
During the night of 29th/30th May another naval embarkation party arrived on the beach to the eastward³, and this reduced the limits of Cdr. Richardson's beach.
Early on the morning of the 30th May Cdr. Richardson went to Brigade
H.Q.4 at Bray and suggested that piers be built by running lorries into the sea.
This, he says, was quickly done and proved successful.
Between 1800 and 2000 on the 30th May the enemy directed accurate artillery fire on to the beach, and continued firing throughout the night. Cdr. Richardson's beach was completely evacuated by allied soldiers. " No boats", he says,
" had now been in for 16 hours on our beach".
During the night of the 30th/31st May, the weather became bad once more, and a heavy surf was running. By about 0300 on the 31st May it was impossible to carry out embarkation from the beaches.
Cdr. Richardson's men were by now showing signs of extreme exhaustion, and as it was impossible to communicate with the S.N.O. he decided to take over S.N.O. a whaler they had salved and go to the nearest destroyer to report to the
They waited for high water, and at about 0730 put to sea. There was a very heavy surf running, and they had an uneven set of oars, rope crutches and only
Two other destroyers passed at about 7 cables, but paid no attention.
an oar to steer by. They approached 2 destroyers, but both got underway.
2 I Cdr. There Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.367).
3 is no officer of this name in the May 1940 List.
These Evidently the party landed at E.F.G.H., Cdre. Hallett's Navy sections of the beach.
headquarters 4 were probably (p. 59). the same H.Q. as those referred to by Capt. Howson as Corps
82

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
After about an hour the Margate life-boat, the Lord Southborough, appeared.
All destroyers were now under way, and as the life-boat was returning to Margate the party went back in her¹. She reached Margate at 1450 on May 31st.
Thus, by about 0830 on the 31st May all the beach parties of which there are any records had returned or were on their way to England.
Devonia is beached
At 1035 Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker had informed V.A. Dover that he would beach a ship in the hope of improving conditions for boat work, which was then being made difficult by a lop and he instructed Cdre. Stephenson accordingly.
Cdre. Stephenson, then in the yacht Bounty off. La Panne, boarded the minesweeper Devonia at 1600 and gave orders to beach the ship. The
Devonia, already much damaged by near misses at 1230, was beached at full speed off La Panne, and at 1930, on account of the shelling and bombing, she was abandoned. Fortunately by 1700 the weather off the beaches had much improved.
Casualties to H.M. Ships
With the exception of the Devonia none of H.M. ships was lost on this day, but the following were slightly damaged: the Vivacious was damaged by a shell hit and had 3 dead and 12 wounded; the Hebe received slight damage from a near miss; the Wolsey was in collision with the P/V Roebuck; the
Impulsive damaged a propeller on uncharted wreckage; the Malcolm was in collision with Dunkirk pier; and the Scimitar was in collision with the Icarus and later with a drifter².
Air patrols
During the 31st May Fighter Command carried out patrols, as on the 30th
May, at an average strength of three to four squadrons. Eight patrols in all were flown, involving 289 sorties. The periods in the day when the Dunkirk area was not covered were 0620-0800, 0830-1110, 1510-1615, and 1745-1915³.
Coastal Command patrolled the line North Goodwins-Gravelines-Ostend throughout the day, patrols being of one section strength, involving in all
37 sorties⁴.
Shortly before 0930 the Air Ministry intercepted a meassage indicating that the enemy air force had been ordered not to attack the town or harbour of
Dunkirk but to concentrate attacks on shipping at sea, or leaving the coast³.
It was at about 1230 that, off La Panne, the Devonia received extensive damage to her hull from 4 near misses, but the first major attack on our ships occurred about 1415-1430 when one of our squadrons estimated the enemy strength as about 100 aircraft (bombers and fighters). Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker says, "a terrific air battle took place overhead and it seemed to go against us". Actually, we lost 9 aircraft and claimed 7 enemy shot down.6
Air attacks then followed at half-hourly intervals between 1530 and 1730, and at about 1717 the Ivanhoe, Whitehall and Express off Dunkirk harbour were attacked by about 50 bombers. The Whitehall received some damage and the Express slight damage from near misses. At this time also the Hebe was attacked off La Panne by 4 bombers and was damaged by near misses;
I Cdr. Richardson's report (R.O.III, p.370).
2 Probably either the Gervais Rentoul or the Eileen Emma which both returned damaged as the result of collisions.
3 R.A.F. Narrative, p.334.
4 R.A.F. Narrative, p.336.
5 M.017978/41, p.17.
6 R.A.F. Narrative, p.335.
83

CHAPTER IX
SATURDAY, 1ST JUNE
GERMANS RENEW THEIR HEAVY AIR EFFORT
E-Boat activity: sinking of the Stella Dorado and Argyllshire
During the night of 31st May-1st June there was a recrudescence of enemy
E-boat activity. After the torpedoing of the destroyers Grafton and Wakeful off Nieuport in the early hours of the 29th May M.T.B. patrols had been established during the dark hours to prevent enemy E-boats from using the inshore channels.
It was, however, in the less confined waters along Route Y that the enemy obtained their successes, despite intensive air and surface patrols. Route Y
was patrolled that night by 2 corvettes and 6 trawlers, while Coastal Command provided 6 aircraft with bombs and parachute flares; and owing to magnetic mines ships evacuating troops were given permission in the early hours of 1st
June to use that route as well as Route X.
At 0230 on the 1st June the A/S trawler Stella Dorado, which 24 hours earlier had picked up 55 survivors from the Siroco, torpedoed by an E-boat near
T buoy, was herself torpedoed in the same position and sunk whilst on patrol.
About a quarter of an hour later the A/S trawler Argyllshire, on patrol in company with the Lord Melchett and Stella Rigel about 2 miles east of S buoy, commenced an attack on what appeared to be a submarine. Within 5 minutes she was struck by a torpedo fired by an E-Boat and sank immediately. Five survivors, including her Captain, Sub-Lieutenant J. S. Weddle, R.N.R., S.O.
11th A/S Striking Force, were picked up by the trawler Malabar.
At the time there were many trawlers and other small craft in the neighbourhood, and one of the two E-Boats responsible for these sinkings was reported to have been disguised as a sailing boat.
Final evacuation postponed
Already on the afternoon of the 31st May ships in Dunkirk road had come under fire from guns on shore at Mardyck, and early on 1st June it became evident that Major General Alexander's force could not be evacuated completely on the night of 1st/2nd June. At 0800, therefore, he agreed on a modified plan with Admiral Abrial and General Fagalde which involved holding his present line till midnight 1st/2nd June, so as to cover Dunkirk and to enable the French to evacuate as many of their troops as possible. Subsequently
Major General Alexander was to withdraw to a bridgehead round Dunkirk with all available A/A and anti-tank guns and such troops as had not yet embarked.
Embarkations over Bray beaches
It was not only in Dunkirk roads that the ships had been under fire on the previous day; off Bray they had the same experience. Troops were moving westward, and embarkation at La Panne was no longer possible. It was clear to Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker that beach work at Bray would be costly, and he so informed Vice-Admiral, Dover (0235/1), who concurred, whilst pointing out the necessity of using the beaches up to the last possible moment.
85

CHAPTER x
THE NIGHT OF 1ST - 2ND JUNE AND
FROM DAYLIGHT TO DUSK ON 2ND
Situation ashore on evening of 1st (Plan 3)
During the Ist June heavy enemy attacks developed the of the line, and our forces had to give some THE a a the enemy advance had been checked on a thence due east of the frontier and along the frontier sea.
was to withdraw through this line which the French would continue to hold.
French troops were holding a line in rear of ours, and the British rearguard
Two divisions of French Territorial troops reduced in strength, in addition to part of the British 1st Corps and rearguard of 4,000 men, still remained to be evacuated on the evening of the 1st. The War Office, aware that they were not in a position to judge the local situation, did not set a period to the evacuation but ordered Major-General Alexander to hold on as long as possible in order that the maximum number of French and British might be embarked. It left to the General, in close co-operation with Admiral Abrial, to decide was the moment when evacuation must come to an end.¹
Plan for the night 1st-2nd June (See Plan 4)
Early in the afternoon of the 1st June the only remaining Route x came under the fire of German guns, and it was judged impossible to carry out any further evacuation by day. There was hope both at Dover and at the War Office that it would be possible to complete the evacuation of the B.E.F. during the dark hours of the night 1st/2nd June, by using both sides of Dunkirk harbour, pier and eastern beach. The War Office asked General Weygand to urge Admiral
Abrial to co-operate in completing the evacuation of the French this night.
Evacuation was to be confined to the period between 2100 and 0330. It was estimated that British vessels could lift about 17,000 men, probably in the proportion 50 per cent British and 50 per cent French, during these hours, as follows:-(Appendix R8):-(a) From the beach between Dunkirk and 11 miles to the eastward between 2100/1 and 0300/2, 9,000 men. (b) At the East Pier between 2100/1 and 0330/12, 7,000 men. This time might be extended.
(c) On the east side inside the harbour, between 2200/1 and 0300/2, 1,000 men.
It was intended to withdraw all naval personnel this night3.
All minesweepers, both fleet and paddle, and skoots and all small craft except certain flotillas specially organised, were to lift from the beach stretching eastward 100 1½ miles from Dunkirk, and it was hoped to employ here also about
French small beach fishing craft and drifters. Personnel ships up to 7 in
2 I The Report of Captain W. Tennant, S.N.O. Dunkirk, Record Office Case 5458 Vol. 3, p.357.
written 0330 or from by hand, and the time has been altered by the exceptionally) either typed from 0300 to read originator's copy of this signal is (rather instead of being was intended 0330 to read 0300, though it is not possible typewriter, to with which figure
Admiral to be sent. The time was received at the say certainty at 0330, and Rear
S.N.O. Wake-Walker in his Report, M.017978/41 p.32 Admiralty 0330 intended.
giving details of the plan until 0430/2.
Dunkirk reported, however (Appendix R.24) says that he did was not receive the message
96

CHAP. x
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
of by the the French B.E.F. troops would also have on been lifted. night, by which time most was consequently would be completed the following in the late afternoon to of sail the during 1st June daylight with and General that Alexander's concurrence that no ships were to cease at 0300 on 2nd. If the
0700 and, evacuation if necessary was then still possible. Only between June until dark to tine any of tontine any of the three also from 1730 on the 2nd was to to tine any of
The Admiralty, channels however, during daylight decided hours, that, should evacuation it be possible light there would be sailings. They intended to be 0700 and 1730
evacuation 2nd was possible no in daylight as late as 0700. the arbiters as to whether on the
Admiral to Ramsay casualties now being caused to all of therne instructions of therne Instructick Vice-
At 2114, an hour informed and a the half Admiralty after the and receipt had owing ordered withdraw before shipping followed been this signal to at 2329 by daylight on the up situation he a knew message to the detail Y the Z shipping under fire as of German it. All three channels to Dunkirk, some maining which daylight route into X, action had that to be suspended on account of a new re-
X, and were now had batteries, for traffic on the last battery Vice-Admiral came evening and was maintaining a enemy heavy barrage¹. Ramsay's information (not altogether correct)
that a total of 16 transports (personnel vessels invaluable in the work of evacua- was tion) were now out of action, 8 being lost and 8 disabled, and that two of the sinkings had been caused by enemy shell fire on Route X. It was now difficult to compel the crews of the remainder to face the conditions which existed.
This had been a day of very heavy naval sinkings coupled with losses of troops from drowning. It is obvious that at some point losses incurred in continuing daylight evacuation would more than counterbalance the gains it seems clear that Vice-Admiral Ramsay considered that this point had now been reached, and, in accordance with the Admiralty's own direction sent to him earlier in the evening, he now informed them that any attempt to continue the evacuation in daylight was unwise and he asked permission to withdraw all his forces at
0300 until the following night. In this, he told the admiralty, Major General
Alexander concurred.
The Admiralty, however, were unwilling that evacuation should cease altogether at daylight and directed that it was to continue up to 0700, but only by destroyers unless further experience showed that enemy gunfire was rendering the channel prohibitively dangerous.
Danger to personnel ships
It is impossible to resist the conclusion that in the difficulty of obtaining accurate reports of conditions on the routes and estimating the true causes of the mounting losses of ships the danger from shell fire was magnified in the minds of those at Dover. By some means enemy the planners had been informed that two personnel ships had already been sunk by shell fire in the fairway near No. 5 buoy. Not only was this but in point of fact no ship of any kind was lost from gunfire the incorrect, routes the 1st June the only sinking by shell fire on that day on during Lord Cavan, depot ship of other S.N.O. Dunkirk hit as she quitted was the the drifter at Dunkirk, whilst the only ship to be hit was the personnel vessel pier St. Helier. This ship arrived at
German
I The War guns." Office 1330/1 reported Only remaining channel now coming under fire of
98

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
very clear and the Rear-Admiral decided to get the ships away at 0300
now of 0330 as originally planned. The Admiralty orders that evacuation
Dunkirk Pier was to continue until 0700 did not apparently Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker not receive the orders which went by Dunkirk (Appendix did R.20, 23); and it is to be preout from the Admiralty at 0115/2, that destroyers were to continue the evacuation until 0700 (Appendix R.21). Although men were still coming down the the Rear-Admiral was unwilling to run the risk of having ships sunk alongside pier, and blocking the pier and harbour. Accordingly he told the ships to leave and himself followed out of harbour the last of them, apparently the destroyers Winchelsea and Whitshed about 0300.
British rearguard held up
Meanwhile, a most disquieting message had been received at Dover. At
0040 on the 2nd the Lydd, while embarking troops off Malo beach, was requested by the Brigadier of the brigade then embarking to transmit to Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker a message from Major General Alexander reporting that on account of French congestion on the mole at Dunkirk a considerable number of British troops were held up and further arrivals were still expected. It was essential that the rearguard of the B.E.F. should embark from the beaches east of the mole, where they were expected to arrive by 0230.
What had happened was, that French troops had cut into the flow of British making their way along the road to the East Pier, by a converging route; and both
British and French troops were now being embarked at the pier.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker apparently never received the message and knew nothing of the state of affairs at the East Pier until he arrived there at
0200.
Vice-Admiral Dover, who received the message at 02001, at once sent orders to all destroyers of Force K still on the coast, the minesweepers, and the gunboat Locust which was off Bray supporting the evacuation by covering fire, to endeavour to embark the British rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300
if necessary. The coding and transmission of the message took some time, and the orders apparently went out too late; all ships had sailed, and the rearguard could not get away that night. Only the personnel vessel Portsdown was left on the coast. This was an undegaussed ship manned by a naval crew, which had anchored off Malo at 2205/1. After running to death her own two dinghies ferrying troops she got hold of a large motor boat, and she sailed about 0400. On the way home the ship collected further troops from a French vessel aground off Dunkirk, and from two further vessels encountered, and she eventually disembarked at Dover 168 British and 450 French.
Bombing of the hospital ships Worthing and Paris. (App. S)
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk because no hospital ships had sailed for 24 hours, orders having been given to evacuate fit men in preference, since, other considerations apart, embarking wounded would have taken up too much valuable time. The cessation of daylight sailings rendered it possible for hospital ships to occupy berths alongside, without detriment to the operation, and jt was decided to get some of the wounded away in daytime in hospital ships, in the hope that the Germans would respect them.
In order to afford the enemy no excuse to attack a warning signal was sent
0120. I Dover Report, p.27. The time of receipt on the flimsy of the decypher appears to be
103

CHAPTER XI
THE NIGHT 2ND 3RD JUNE
B.E.F. EVACUATED 2330/2
Plan for the night 2nd-3rd June
During the forenoon of the 2nd June considerable doubt existed at Dover to the numbers remaining to be evacuated from Dunkirk. Captain Tennant thought as that about 5,000 British and 30,000 French remained, but it was estimated at Dover, that in addition to the rearguard of 4,000, (who had been withdrawn according to plan, from the front line), a further 2,000 British troops might be found in Dunkirk; while the estimated number of French troops remaining increased during the forenoon from 25,000 quoted on the previous evening to figures in the region of 50,000 to 60,000. Admiral Nord himself estimated the French remaining to number 65,000 of which he hoped that 30,000 might be evacuated on the night 2nd-3rd and the remaining 35,000, who were holding the bridgeheads, on the following night.
Major-General Alexander intended that all British troops should be evacuated by 2400 on 2nd, and Captain Tennant asked for the maximum number of transports to be sent over. During the forenoon of the 2nd a joint
Naval and Military conference was held at Dover, attended by Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker who came over from Dunkirk in the early hours, and by Commander J. C. Clouston, Pier Master at the East Pier, to devise a plan to accomplish this. The French Admiralty wished daylight evacuation to be resumed, but Vice-Admiral Ramsay refused to countenance it. The suspension of traffic in daylight hours had the advantage of enabling all transport resources to accumulate during the day and to be held available for a massed descent"
upon Dunkirk harbour during the night. By making provision for increased pier and berthing parties and control of traffic in the harbour channels by motor boats, it was hoped to berth all craft that were available between the hours of 2100 on 2nd and 0300 on 3rd.
At 1052 Vice-Admiral Dover made a signal to the destroyers and minesweepers, which practically amounted to a call for volunteers for the night's work (Appendix T.3):-
"The final evacuation is staged for tonight, and the Nation looks to the Navy to see this through.
I want every ship to report as soon as possible whether she is fit to meet the call which has been made on our courage and endurance".
The replies showed that there was no lack of willing spirit. Ships were fit and ready", ready and anxious to carry out your orders", ship unfit but
...
officers and ship's company are willing to serve in any capacity: so the replies came in. Only the paddle minesweeper Medway Queen, which had returned to Ramsgate three hours earlier on her fifth evacuation trip, was unable to sail owing to the exhaustion of her crew, and was sent on to Dover where additional officers and crew were lent from the Sandown, which, like the destroyer Javelin, was not degaussed and was consequently forbidden to sail.
It was hoped to avoid on this night the situation which occurred on the previous night, when more ships could have used the pier had they been available, by working out a programme whereby personnel ships, destroyers, fleet
105

SIGNALS
APPENDIX o
I have sent Capt. Bush by M.T.B. with an appreciation.
There is little food or water in Dunkirk. This should be sent as soon as possible
Armies are quite unable to help or organise anything. Keep on sending any ships.
A good medical officer with staff should be despatched
1001/29
4. ADMIRALTY to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER C.-IN-C. PORTSMOUTH
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A., Dover for command of seagoing ships and vessels off the Belgian coast, and is to hoist his flag in such ship as V.A. Dover shall direct.
1748/29
5. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES NORE & DOVER (R) Admiralty
C.-in-C. Portsmouth, C.-in-C. Nore
My 1748/291, 1321/29 and 1832/29 to Hebe only:
Authority for operation Dynamo under V.A. Dover is as follows:
R.A. Wake-Walker has been appointed as R.A. Dover for command of seagoing ships and vessels off the Belgian coast.
R.A. Dover has hoisted his flag in Hebe. Captain Tennant has been appointed as S.N.O. Dunkirk and is responsible under R.A. Dover for all shore organisation.
1328/30
6. ADMIRALTY to SHIPS & AUTHORITIES IN AREA A (R) C.-in-C. Portsmouth C.-in-C. W.A.
During present operations on Belgian coast where many small craft are present, destroyers are not repetition not to stop to render assistance to ships in distress. 1105/29
7. Ivanhoe to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
From S.N.O. Dunkirk-enemy shelling pier with shore batteries from S.E.
Request bombers to counter. Vital.
1105/29
and later
8. B.N.L.O., C.-IN-C. NORTHERN NAVAL FORCES to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER
My
1105 cancel request. Consider possible retaliation would be to our disadvantage.
1200/29
SIGNALS RE EVACUATION 29TH MAY
9. MAJOR GENERAL LLOYD to MAJOR GENERAL DEWING, D.M.O., WAR OFFICE
Morale of troops landing is remarkably high partly no doubt due to arrival home.
Approximately half armed. Percentage of officers small. All drawn from units promiscuously, mostly Third Corps
1204/29
10. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to GENERAL LINDSELL [Q.M.G.], S.N.O. DUNKIRK
Stores and supply craft have had to return undischarged owing to lack of assistance from shore.
Must press you to organise parties for unloading purposes; Naval beach parties will indicate when and where required.
1432/29
I V.A. Dover's 1748/29 cannot be traced. Probably Admiralty Message
1748/29 (see Appendix O, 9c) is meant.
G
177