TNA ADM 234 360

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris; an extract is quoted below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received from the Secretary of State for War:
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced "!. These were some of the facts:-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice, in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard, that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counterattack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
11

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
had all come under fire from the shore guns at Calais and Gravelines. At
0415 on the 28th May the Queen of the Channel, loaded with 904. troops, was attacked by one aircraft; 3 or 4 bombs were dropped, which straddled the ship abaft the mainmast and broke her back, the starboard propeller shaft and the rudder. By good fortune the Dorrien Rose, en route for Dunkirk, was in the vicinity and rescued the troops: the Queen of the Channel sank about 1/2 hour later. The St. Seiriol, which left Dunkirk at about 0415 with 494 troops, reached Folkestone in safety.
Civilian crews feel the strain
Some 45 personnel vessels were used during operation "Dynamo"
Of these eight were sunk, at least six were so damaged by bombing or gunfire as to render them unfit for further use during the operation, and two were damaged in collision. Nine of the largest of these personnel vessels had been engaged prior to "Dynamo" in operations at Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and their Captains and crews were beginning to feel the strain when Operation
"Dynamo" started.
Thus it was that the Master of the Canterbury, which had already completed
2 round trips to Dunkirk in operation "Dynamo", reported, on the 28th May, that he was too worn out to make a third trip. The P.S.T.O. went on board and explained the gravity of the situation to the Master, and the Canterbury sailed at 0930 the next day. On her return voyage from Dunkirk she was bombed and damaged, and after landing her 1960 troops went into dock for repairs. In the 3 trips she made the Canterbury brought back 4,416 troops;
her Master, Captain C. A. Hancock, was awarded the D.S.C.
Personnel vessels not to be employed during full daylight
On the 28th May, however, it had become apparent that development of the German air threat over the evacuation area, and the increasing artillery fire from shore batteries covering the sea approaches to Dunkirk, prohibited the employment of personnel and similar vessels during daylight, until the position was restored, and that evacuation from Dunkirk by day must for the moment be confined to warships and small vessels².
It was not, therefore, until later in the day, that the P/V Royal Daffodil sailed for Dunkirk, and eight other personnel vessels and a hospital carrier³
received their sailing orders during the afternoon and evening.
The northern Route Y was by this time in general use⁴, but ships proceeding from Dover to Dunkirk were ordered to use the southern and shorter Route Z, if the passage from Calais Bell buoy to Dunkirk could be made in darkness.
N.O.I.C. Ramsgate responsible for servicing skoots
In these circumstances some 20 skoots reached Dunkirk, or arrived off the beaches during the day and evening of the 28th May; others were on the way.
Their speed varied, but most of them were very slow. Eight of them went into Dunkirk harbour⁵, and four to Bray beach⁶. The Abel Tasman, loaded with ammunition, the Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with food, and three
I This number includes 3 store ships, 3 motor vessels and a few freighters, coasters and tramps.
2 D.R. p. 4, para. 13.
3 The Scotia, Malines, Prague, Manxman, Royal Sovereign, Tynwald, Lochgarry, Killarney and the H.C. Paris.
4 Appendix K.1.
5 The Caribia, Fredanja, Friso, Jutland, Tilly, Patria, Sursum-Corda, and Twente.
6 The Amazone, Doggersbank, Hilda, and Oranje.
29

DUSK TO DUSK, 1ST-2ND JUNE
CHAP. X
very clear and the Rear-Admiral decided to get the ships away at 0300
now of 0330 as originally planned. The Admiralty orders that evacuation
Dunkirk Pier was to continue until 0700 did not apparently Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker not receive the orders which went by Dunkirk (Appendix did R.20, 23); and it is to be preout from the Admiralty at 0115/2, that destroyers were to continue the evacuation until 0700 (Appendix R.21). Although men were still coming down the the Rear-Admiral was unwilling to run the risk of having ships sunk alongside pier, and blocking the pier and harbour. Accordingly he told the ships to leave and himself followed out of harbour the last of them, apparently the destroyers Winchelsea and Whitshed about 0300.
British rearguard held up
Meanwhile, a most disquieting message had been received at Dover. At
0040 on the 2nd the Lydd, while embarking troops off Malo beach, was requested by the Brigadier of the brigade then embarking to transmit to Rear-Admiral
Wake-Walker a message from Major General Alexander reporting that on account of French congestion on the mole at Dunkirk a considerable number of British troops were held up and further arrivals were still expected. It was essential that the rearguard of the B.E.F. should embark from the beaches east of the mole, where they were expected to arrive by 0230.
What had happened was, that French troops had cut into the flow of British making their way along the road to the East Pier, by a converging route; and both
British and French troops were now being embarked at the pier.
Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker apparently never received the message and knew nothing of the state of affairs at the East Pier until he arrived there at
0200.
Vice-Admiral Dover, who received the message at 02001, at once sent orders to all destroyers of Force K still on the coast, the minesweepers, and the gunboat Locust which was off Bray supporting the evacuation by covering fire, to endeavour to embark the British rearguard from the beach, remaining after 0300
if necessary. The coding and transmission of the message took some time, and the orders apparently went out too late; all ships had sailed, and the rearguard could not get away that night. Only the personnel vessel Portsdown was left on the coast. This was an undegaussed ship manned by a naval crew, which had anchored off Malo at 2205/1. After running to death her own two dinghies ferrying troops she got hold of a large motor boat, and she sailed about 0400. On the way home the ship collected further troops from a French vessel aground off Dunkirk, and from two further vessels encountered, and she eventually disembarked at Dover 168 British and 450 French.
Bombing of the hospital ships Worthing and Paris. (App. S)
There was a large number of wounded in Dunkirk because no hospital ships had sailed for 24 hours, orders having been given to evacuate fit men in preference, since, other considerations apart, embarking wounded would have taken up too much valuable time. The cessation of daylight sailings rendered it possible for hospital ships to occupy berths alongside, without detriment to the operation, and jt was decided to get some of the wounded away in daytime in hospital ships, in the hope that the Germans would respect them.
In order to afford the enemy no excuse to attack a warning signal was sent
0120. I Dover Report, p.27. The time of receipt on the flimsy of the decypher appears to be
103

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. X
clearly marked as hospital ships. Neither of the two ever reached Dunkirk.
were despatched from Dover, the Worthing at 1255 and the Paris at 1648, both we should scrupulously observe the Two hospital carriers part en clair asking for hospital ships to be Geneva sent across Convention. and stating that for our
At 1433 the A/S trawler Grimsby Town, on patrol on Route X, reported that had bombed a hospital ship. This was Worthing. Visibility was good.
12 aircraft bearing 90° South Foreland 27 the miles (between V and W buoys)
Nine bombs were dropped and the the Calcutta ship was sent machine the gunned, she was slightly damaged by near misses and corvette Mallard to stand by her. The Worthing returned to harbour.
near W buoy, when two aircraft attacked her, near misses putting out of action
The Paris, after running into thick fog, was in clear visibility at about 1900, her engines and extinguishing all lights. About an hour later the ship was attacked again by 3 aircraft, and received further damage. She was abandoned by all but the Captain and some of the officers, who were shortly afterwards taken off by a fast motor boat which also rescued men from some of the Paris's lifeboats that had been wrecked by bombing. Three tugs, the Sun XV, Sun IV
and Lady Brassey attempted to tow the ship; but at 0400 on 3rd June, after a further air attack, the Paris sank 1 mile east of W. buoy.
Evacuation figures, 2nd June
A total of 26,256 men were landed in England on 2nd June, 19,561 from
Dunkirk harbour and 6,695 from the beaches. Of these totals, French ships working only from the harbour carried 1634, and Belgian trawlers carried 313.
The accumulated total of men evacuated to this date was 285,305.
104

APPENDIX B
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
Part V. List of Dutch Ships.
TRANSPORTED
Demok I (yacht)
M.74 (motor boat)
(Lt. Cdr. H.G. Boys-Smith, R.N.R. from Kestrel 1st June)
214
(L/Sea. R. W. Legg, Coxswain)
Part VI. List of Norwegian Ships.
S.S. Hird
(Capt. A. M. Fredhjem)
3,500
APPENDIX B
NAMED SHIPS AND VESSELS LOST AND DAMAGED DURING
OPERATION "DYNAMO "
(Dates in brackets)
Note: Large numbers of unnamed boats were also lost and damaged.
Part I. Ships and vessels lost
BY AIR ATTACK
DESTROYERS
GUNBOAT
Basilisk (1/6)
A.B./V.
Mosquito (1/6)
Grenade (29/5)
King Orry (30/5)
Havant (1/6)
Keith (1/6)
MINESWEEPERS
TRAWLERS
Brighton Queen (1/6)
DRIFTERS
Devonia (31/5)
Calvi (29/5)
Nautilus (29/5)
Boy Roy (27/5)
Gracie Fields (30/5)
Paxton (27/5)
Skipjack (1/6)
Polly Johnson (29/5)
Waverley (29/5)
PERSONNEL VESSELS
Clan Macalister (29/5)
HOSPITAL CARRIER
SEAPLANE TENDER
Crested Eagle (sp. S/V) (29/5)
Paris (3/6)
S.T. 243 (2/6)
Fenella (29/5)
Lorina (29/5)
Normania (29/5)
Queen of the Channel (28/5)
Scotia (1/6)
MOTOR LIGHTERS
X.149 (31/5)
LANDING CRAFT
TUGS
X.213 (31/5)
A.L.C. 16 (29/5)
St. Abbs (1/6)
St. Fagan (1/6)
BARGES
Lady Rosebery (1/6)
SMALL CRAFT
Doris (1/6)
Commodore (31/5)
Mirasol (1)
Southern Queen (P.L.17) (1)
DESTROYERS
BY TORPEDOES (E-BOATS)
Grafton (29/5)
TRAWLERS
Wakeful (29/5)
Argyllshire (1/6)
Stella Dorado (1/6)
I Date not known.
158

APPENDIX S
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
There remain to be evacuated night 2/3 probably 5,000 British and approximately
30,000 French.
Request M.A/S boats. Sappers, General, S.N.O.
Request more transport for tomorrow's operation than was provided for tonight.
personnel (will leave?) 2300 hours.
T.O.R. 0704/2
25. GENERAL LLOYD to WAR OFFICE M.O.4
Information is difficult to obtain and often contradictory. General Martel reports little pressure on his front yesterday but there is less reliable evidence to show that pressure on some points elsewhere was severe.
Most personnel evacuated last night were from pier. Shell fire on beach was apparently bad as have been given names of 3 officers killed there.
Estimated numbers so far reported landed Dover and Ramsgate since midnight
10,600 of which about 1/3 French.
Three personnel ships and many smaller craft not reported 0800 hours.
Numbers remaining 458 area impossible estimate. Might be in region 2,000
British.
0815/2
APPENDIX S
SIGNALS RE DELIBERATE ATTACKS ON HOSPITAL SHIPS ON 2nd JUNE
Sunday, 2nd June
1. DUNKIRK to DOVER W/T [Sent en clair]
Wounded situation acute. Hospital ships should enter during day.
Geneva Convention will be honourably observed. It is felt that the enemy will refrain from attack.
0730/2
2. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY
Hospital carriers Worthing and Paris have been deliberately bombed and severely damaged identity. today by Germans in circumstances admitting of no mistake of their
2016/2
APPENDIX T
SIGNALS RE THE EVACUATION OF THE BRITISH
REAR GUARD ON NIGHT 2nd/3rd JUNE
Sunday, 2nd June
1. H.M.S. LYDD to REAR-ADMIRAL (R) V.A. Dover, Force K, Minesweepers
Brigadier tells me that C.-in-C. says it is essential that rear guard B.E.F. embarks from beaches east of mole on account of French congestion on mole. Considerable number of British troops still on mole. Military are (? expecting) further arrivals there. Rear guard expects to arrive on beach by 0230.
0040/2
2. S.N.O. DUNKIRK to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER (R) War Office
About 5,000 British remain Sporting chance of embarking tonight. Maximum number of fast motor boats at 2130 at inner end of long pier would assist.
T.O.R. 0830/2
186

INDEX
Mosquito,44,727, 74, 88 (damaged), 92-3 (sunk).
Motor boats Control sunk Organisation, 5, 25.
93. to salvage pulling boats, 60-61,; follow Capt. Howson to England 74.
Movements 119-120.
M.T.B.67, 66n, 67.
M.T.B.16, 28, 113.
M.T.B.68, 66n, 71, 75.
M.T.B.107, 66n, 111, 119 (in operation CK).
M.T.B.102, 66n, 90, 108, 115.
Naiad Errant, 72n, 92.
Nautilus, sunk, 36, 42, 47.
Nanette II, 72n.
Nelson's, picket boa+, 72n: motor boat, 107n, 119.
Nayland, 32n, 47n, 114n.
Netsukis, 23n, 107n.
Nettle, Lt., 49.
New Britannic, 32n, 47n.
Newhaven, 102, 107n, 109, 112n, 114n.
Newhaven, sends small craft, 61.
New Prince of Wales, damaged, 74.
Ngaroma, 16.
Nicolle, General, 101.
Niger, 61, 86, 100 (meets small craft returning empty), 101, 107n, 109 (rams a French ship).
Noakes, Mr. W. H., killed, 73.
N.O.I.C. Beaches, see Capt. Howson.
Noneta, 71n.
Nord, Admiral. see Abrial, Admiral.
Nore C. in C., 8, 17 (to cover Dynamo); provision of boats, 51; M.T.B.'s, 70.
Normania, sunk, 44.
Ocean Breeze, 60, 71n.
Ocean Cock, 71n.
Ocean Reward, 28n, 34 (sunk).
Olivier, Mr. G. D., 73.
Olvina, 60 (goes to France in error), 91.
O.L.V. van Vlaandaren, 73n, 110 (lost).
Operations: CK Blocking of Dunkirk, 111-2, 119-20; XD (E) Dunkirk demolitions, 8,
19, 106; XD (G) Boulogne demolitions, 8-9.
Oranje, 20, 24, 29n, 47n, 100.
Oriole, 28n, 47 (beached to form pier), 107n.
Osborne, Mr. F. W., 73n.
Osborne, Mr. L. V., 73n.
Ostend, unsuitable for military requirements, 7; captured, 27.
Otway-Riven, Cdr. H. J. O., 49, 80n.
Our Bairns, 34.
Overfalls, 71n.
Pacific, 30n.
Pacifico, 119-120.
Pangbourne, 28n, 41 (damaged), 42, 97, 107n, 120.
Paris, 29n, 103-4 (sunk).
Parminster, Brigadier, 22.
Pascholl, 30n, 114n, 115-7.
Patria, 20n, 24, 29n, 46.
Patricia, 20.
Patrols: air, see Royal Air Force; Naval of the routes, 20, 23, 28, 33-34 (ships taken off),
34 (strengthened), 85 (inshore channel).
Pauleter, 60n.
Paxton, 23n, 31 (damaged).
Pellag II, sunk, 95.
Persia, 71n, 90.
Personnel vessels: vulnerability, 28; not to be employed in daylight, 29, 99; strain
Pharailde, 73n.
on, 48; sailings suspended, 70; heavy losses, 98-9.
203