TNA ADM 234 360

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again conferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris; an extract is quoted below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received from the Secretary of State for War:
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had to be faced "!. These were some of the facts:-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice, in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard, that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counterattack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
11

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. IV
round trip from 80 to 172 miles, and the for route the had to be swept before it and thence into the Dunkirk Impulsive, the THE
be used. Orders were therefore given the North Goodwin route (the middle Route X), from road, and at 1140
commenced by the destroyer Vessel Patricia. This advantage of shortening the round trip to 108 miles.
Halcyon, and the Trinity House from 172 route X had the great and
Helier¹ and Royal Daffodil, which left at 1054 under escort of the des- St.
Among the earliest ships to use the Dover northern Route Y were the P/V's
The convoy was joined en route by the hospital carriers St. Andrew and St.
troyer Vimy; in company was the destroyer Anthony, escorting the S.S. Kyno.2
Julien. Route Y was certainly, at that time, out of range of gunfire, but two bombing attacks were made on the hospital carriers between the West Hinder and Kwint Bank buoys, and when the convoy arrived off Dunkirk heavy air attacks were in progress there. The Royal Daffodil and the St. Helier entered the harbour, but the latter was ordered to withdraw, and she and the 2 hospital carriers returned empty to the Downs under escort of the Vimy. The Royal
Daffodil embarked 840 troops before returning to Dover.
Sea and Air Patrols
The principal patrol line covered in the morning of the 27th May by Fighter
Command, was Calais-Dunkirk, as it was not known that the Calais garrison had ceased fire. From 1450 onwards, however, Calais fell out of the picture, and it became possible to concentrate fighter protection more exclusively on the work of evacuation³. Sixteen squadrons, varying in strength from 9 to 20
aircraft, were engaged on these activities from 0500-2130; patrols were, however, limited to squadron strength. Most squadrons carried out 2 patrols, and 287 sorties in all were flown during the day.4
To cover the passage of ships between Dunkirk and the Downs destroyer patrols had been established to the northward during the forenoon, and Vice-
Admiral, Dover, asked for 6 additional destroyers to strengthen the Dover forces. The Admiralty immediately ordered 4 destroyers from the Western
Approaches Command, and 2 from the Portsmouth Command, to proceed to Dover.⁵
Ex-Dutch skoots for Dunkirk
Other vessels were on their way to Dunkirk during the day, among them being 15 skoots⁶. Of these the Lena, Hebe II, and later the Oranje, arrived off the beaches and embarked troops during the night of 27th/28th May the
Abel Tasman, Alice and Kaap Falga, loaded with ammunition and food, arrived off La Panne early in the morning of 28th May; the Hilda and Doggersbank reached Dunkirk by noon the 28th May, and were sent to the beaches;
while the remainder⁷, in error, returned to the Downs, after having got within a few miles of Dunkirk.
2 Off R buoy the Anthony, with the Kyno, was ordered back to the Downs and sub-
I Eleven of the St. Helier's crew had been replaced by naval ratings.
sequently 3 to Portsmouth. The Kyno took no further part in Operation "Dynamo".
R.A.F. Narrative, p. 319.
5 4 R.A.F. Narrative, P. 320.
Scimitar were sent.
Appendices D. 1 and D. 2. The Wakeful, Mackay, Worcester, Montrose, Shikari and
6 7 See Appendix F.
The Bornrif, Brandaris, Hondsrug, Jutland, Patria, Tilly, and Twente.
20

CHAP. IV
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
attacked misses, and, twice arrival by dive-bombers at Dunkirk en at route, 1655, receiving found some damage was in progress. on an air attack by 21 from aircraft near enveloped air raid casualties lying about depots the and The was investigate in the a vast pall of smoke from the oil area of Naval Headquarterters to
Captain Tennant local proceeded situation. ashore The whole to the Bastion with was blazing, masses of wreckage. were streets, which were littered town
Parminter; On arrival at Colonel the Bastion, Whitfeld, Captain Sub-Area Tennant Commandant; held a meeting and with Brigadier
H. P. Henderson, R.N., the B.N.L.O. It to was retain decided that the harbour Commander as a W/T link.
untenable, and that it was impracticable the Wolfhound at Dunkirk was
At 1900 Captain Tennant assumed the duties of S.N.O. Dunkirk, ordered the Wolfhound and Wolsey to proceed to the beach east of Dunkirk and and embark troops, using their own boats. This they proceeded to do, but did not get away unscathed; the Wolfhound grounded as she left Dunkirk harbour and received further damage from a bomb which struck the jetty six feet away. She made no more trips to Dunkirk, but on that evening she and the Wolsey became the pioneers of beach evacuation.
Beach evacuation begins
Meanwhile, during the afternoon, four personnel vessels and two hospital carriers had sailed for Dunkirk¹. Of these, the personnel vessels Queen of the
Channel and St. Seiriol left Dover at 1330, by Route Y, and entered Channel Dunkirk at about 1930, during an air raid. The Queen of the beaches. had At harbour barely embarked 50 troops when both boats ships were had started diverted ferrying, to the S.N.O. Dunkirk to troyers' passed 2230, boats, embark signalled however, which this motor 1,000 order were the boats. before men. Wolfhound manned to the the The The St. St. as Queen to Wolfhound, Seiriol's necessary Seiriol send of a beach by the personnel by then megaphone Channel, naval and with ship then, ratings the using to and Wolsey returning the or her commandeered east towed own off pier, to the by except boats, Dunkirk, Dunkirk the beaches des- em- the her she harbour, destroyers barked was about unfortunately picked Wolfhound 150 up troops a and further sunk Wolsey, from by 700 aircraft the to troops. embark early She next troops was morning from the first the (May ship, beaches, 28th) shortly though after leaving Dunkirk.
" tomorrow night is problematical "
S.N.O. local By 1958, Dunkirk, and Captain he sent Tennant this dramatic had arrived signal to at immediately.
Evacuation on 27th May, only an hour after he a the duties of the of situation, available craft to beaches T.O.Of.1988."kirk
" Evacuation tomorrow transmission, night is was not received until 2055, but in and the
Please send every problematical.
This I The signal, Queen delayed of the Channel, in St. Seiriol, Canterbury, Maid of Orleans, Isle of Thanet
Worthing.
22

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester, by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars
By about 0600, all destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any of them². Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval officers " who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, "I proceeded on a motor bicycle to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who took me to see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later the sky was overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend, for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed.
"During the forenoon on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claude5 high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and distribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I
Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6
This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
established-two lights being shown at La Panne and one at Bray-and Dover was informed accordingly.
Later that night Rear-Admiral Wake-Walker transferred from the Worcester, by that time full of troops, to the Express-his fourth transfer in twenty-four hours.
Captain Howson, N.O.I.C., Beaches
On the beaches the progress was better than appeared at the time. Captain
Howson, Naval-Officer-in-Charge of beaches, making his first acquaintance with conditions there, says that on the 30th May, off Bray, " in the lightening dawn, a number of destroyers, sloops and skoots were seen to be lying off, and embarkation was proceeding in such boats as were available. Several boats were aground, others were holed, and some had no oars.
By about 0600, all destroyers, sloops, etc., had cleared for England and there were no further ships available
Before leaving Dover he had understood that there would be 24 signal ratings along the beaches adequately supplied with Aldis lamps, but he never saw any of them². " Communication along so many miles of flat beaches was very difficult, if not impossible, with so many troops on the shore.
there was no communication until Thursday afternoon [30th May] between La Panne and
Bray³, and never any between Bray and Dunkirk⁴".
At about 0600 Captain Howson went to Corps Headquarters in a house at
Bray, where he met one of his party, Commander Gorton, and also some naval officers who had apparently been working on the beaches for some time before our arrival".
" About 0800", continues Captain Howson, " I proceeded on a motor bicycle to La Panne where I met Commander J. S. Dove, R.N., who took me to see Q.M.G. [Lieut. General Laidsell] with whom I discussed the position.
off La Panne " there were 2 or 3 destroyers and sloops, and embarkation appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily
On the return to Bray an hour later the sky was overcast and a Scotch mist prevailed which was a Godsend, for throughout the forenoon vast masses of French troops, quite apart from
British troops, were proceeding along the beaches, and had aircraft attacked the carnage would have been dreadful. No further ships arrived during the forenoon off Bray or La Panne and a great opportunity was missed for embarking troops undisturbed.
"
"During the forenoon on my way to Dunkirk I found the water lighter
Claudes high and dry, but with ample supplies of water, and on my return arranged with the military aurhorities for lorries and cans to collect and distribute this sorely needed requirement".
Meanwhile, during the forenoon also, the sappers and troops of the First
Division had built a long pier of lorries off Bray into the sea⁶ with plank decking.
This was an excellent piece of work, and though not strong enough for use by
I Report by S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N. (C.W.23187/40).
2 See p. 67.
3 S/Lt. E. C. Croswell, R.N., on shore at La Panne, says, Lt. Cdr. McCullough [?L. Cdr.
J.W. McClelland R.N.] and signal staff arrived at La Panne on the evening of 30th May.
(C.W.23817/40). The Gossamer reports that she embarked a party of signalmen for La
Panne on 30th May, and arrived there at 1930.
4 1st Corps had a H.Q. at Bray.
5 She had been towed over to Dunkirk on 25th May by the tug Fairplay I.
6 This was done at the suggestion of Cdr. H. du P. Richardson R.N., who was in charge of a section of Bray beach. (R.O.III, p.369).
59

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embarkthe 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time, owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour); and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers, skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc, and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland), water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24, borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord Southwherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

THURSDAY, 30TH MAY
CHAP. VII
SUMMARY OF TROOPS LANDED IN ENGLAND
From the
From the
Total for beaches harbour the day
26th May
Nil
Nil
Nil
27th May
Nil
7,699
7,669
28th May
5,930
11,874
17,804
29th May
13,752
33,558
47,310
30th May
29,512
24,311
53,823
By that date and time the Vice-Admiral knew that he would have available ocean-going tugs, ships' lifeboats and ships' power lifeboats which he could specially reserve for the climax of this critical operation.
The conference made the following decisions:
(a) That evacuation should proceed with the utmost vigour to ensure that by 0130 on 1st June the British forces ashore should have been reduced to the rearguard of 4,000.
(b) That special boats and tugs should be accumulated and held aside to ensure them being available in the early hours of 1st June.
(c) That the plan should provide for lifting the rearguard of 4,000, plus R.N.
beach parties, in one or more flights between 0130 and 0300 on 1st June.
(d) Final decision, based on the progress of the evacuation of the main body to be made by the Vice-Admiral at 1400 on Friday, 31st May, as to the possibility of adhering to the plan.
Other technical details were settled at the meeeting, and the Military staff were assured that the ever increasing rate of lifting made it probable that an affirmative decision would be reached at the critical hour of 1400 on the 31st
May. In the event, the Military plan was changed on the 31st May, as it was found to be impossible to hold the original covering position with 4,000
troops and then withdraw them to the beaches for embarkation by boat.
65

CHAPTER XII
THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD - - 4TH JUNE
Decision to terminate evacuation after night 3rd-4th June (Appendix V)
After the last ship quitted Dunkirk at daylight on 3rd June a large number of French troops still remained behind, and it was decided at Dover that the evacuation must continue.
There was no certainty that the coming night would see the end of the operation. Admiral Nord stated in a situation report timed 0403 June 3rd, that as enemy attacks were probable during the day the situation concerning munitions might become critical; but the message was much mutilated, and the possibility that exhaustion of ammunition might prevent the continuance of resistance after the night 3rd-4th June was apparently not taken into account at Dover.
Vice-Admiral Ramsay, who had no reliable information of the number of
French troops still to be evacuated but was aware that the figure was considerable and conscious that it was his duty to our Allies to continue evacuation as long as any French troops offered themselves for embarkation, was faced with a situation with which the forces remaining at his disposal might, with the best will in the world, be unable to cope.
The operation which had been in progress for the past nine days was of a nature unprecedented in naval warfare, and imposed on the crews of ships engaged an unprecedented strain. Officers and men had not only to cope with the ordinary hazards of the war-such as bombing on an unparalleled scale, frequent shelling, constant working in mined waters, and rescue work under most unpleasant conditions-but were also exposed to the exhaustion produced through having their mess decks and every other available space in their ships constantly crowded with troops. This precluded rest for the watch below, the preparation and enjoyment of proper meals, and such meagre amenities as a small ship operating in face of the enemy could offer. Stokers suffered equally with the seamen because, owing to the physical exhaustion of boats' crews after hours of work, relief crews of stokers were frequently provided from amongst the many who volunteered.
Even as early as the 28th May the strain was beginning to tell. Lieutenant
P. F. S. Gould, R.N. of M.T.B. 16, working off Bray Beach, reported: "Comparatively fresh appearance of troops.
contrasted increasingly as the evacuation progressed with the evidence of strain shown by ship's companies of H.M.
ships"¹. Exhaustion was particularly marked in the destroyer force, the remnants of which had been executing a series of round trips without intermission for several days. Some of the ships had been working off the coasts of France and the Low Countries for the two weeks preceding the beginning of Operation "Dynamo", engaged on various duties such as evacuating refugees and giving supporting fire to the army and evacuating Boulogne, work which had imposed an intense strain and resulted in heavy losses of ships and men. Vice-Admiral Ramsay consequently represented to the Admiralty that continuance after the night of 3rd-4th June of the demands made by the evacuation would subject a number of officers and men to a test that might be beyond the limit of human endurance, and he requested that fresh forces should be employed if evacuation continued after the coming night, any consequent delay being accepted.
I M.011883/40, p.38.
E
113

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675