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TNA / ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360

TNA ADM 234 360
Collection details

TNA ADM 234 360

Naval Staff History No. 41, the official historical study of the evacuation from Dunkirk during Operation Dynamo, 26 May–4 June 1940, dated 1949.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 234 360
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Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234/360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 20–30 of this collection
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20 Page 20 Log in to enlarge

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. I
13TH MAY
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent in accordance with their plans, and by the May, units of the latter
Movements of the main bodies of the French 13th Ist and 7th Armies continued north of Antwerp on the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming inof Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, which was developing from the north-east.
creasingly evident that they would be unable to prevent the enemy occupation northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp.
During the day and the following night the Belgians were withdrawing their
14TH MAY
Germans cross Meuse
May the 14th was crucial, for on that day the enemy penetrated the French
9th Army front, and crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Mézières.¹ (See
Plan 1).
15TH MAY
Dutch Army surrenders
On the 15th May the Dutch Army laid down its arms. The immediate effect of this on the operations of the B.E.F. was small, but "I anticipated says
Lord Gort, "that this would come as a shock to the Belgian Army".2
The French 7th Army withdrew its advanced formations to the neighbourhood of Antwerp, and the French divisions on the B.E.F.'s left flank were ordered to move across the British rear to fill the gap which had been created on the French 9th Army's front. This move did not, however, actually take place till some 3 days later,² and it then left the Belgian Army responsible for the security of the British left flank.
On the British front the day passed quietly on the whole. The 1st Corps
[Lt.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker] was not attacked in strength; 3rd Division [Maj.-
Gen. B. L. Montgomery] of 2nd Corps [Lt.-Gen. A. F. Brooke] was attacked north-west of Louvain, and its forward positions were penetrated, but a counterattack successfully restored the original line.
and, in spite of British support, some ground was lost.
At about 1800, however, the enemy penetrated the French 1st Army's front,
16TH MAY
Allies withdraw to river Escaut was were impracticable,3 because the French 1st the B.E.F.'s right flank
By the 16th May it became clear that a prolonged defence of the Dyle position withdrawal unlikely to make good the ground lost on Army the on and a further
It seemed likely to be forced on them by events previous in day the south.³
on night of Senne and one day on the River Escaut, spending on the the was River therefore decided to withdraw to the River one day began. 16th-17th May, the 15 to 20 miles withdrawal Dendre. to Accordingly, the Senne positions
2 1 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 22.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 23. 24.
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30 Page 30 Log in to enlarge

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
Defences of Dunkirk
It was would be Dunkirk¹. Its local were under the only port du now obvious that if the B.E.F. defences was to be evacuated the available Nord, Admiral Abrial, whose command included the Boulogne, Calais and Dunin these areas to General Fagalde.
kirk, but on this day (24th May) he delegated command of military forces and comprised an inner and an outer sector; inner on
The French defences of Dunkirk extended only the as far as the Belgian frontier,
Mardyck Canal to Spyker, thence to Bergues to the frontier and so to the the outer on the line of the river Aa to St. Omer, thence by Cassel and Steen- sea voorde to the frontier.¹
the inundations which formed part of the defence scheme of Dunkirk.²
The French now took over the British posts on the Aa and began to operate
Belgian line penetrated
In the late evening the enemy attacked the Belgian line on the Lys, penetrating to a depth of 1] miles on a 13 mile front3 and endangering the security of the British left flank.
It had become a matter of vital importance to keep open the B.E.F.'s line of communication to the coast through a corridor of withdrawal which was hourly narrowing. The penetration of the Belgian line made it certain that before long the whole area east of the Yser canal would be in the hands of the enemy, with the serious risk of the Belgian right becoming separated from the
British left at Menin, and of the Belgian Army being forced to fall back in a northerly, rather than a westerly direction.³
25TH MAY
Enemy pincer attack
On the 25th May enemy activity intensified. He was across the canal at
St. Venant, and was developing the bridgeheads between that place and Aire and also at St. Omer, while further north the situation on the river Aa remained obscure.
During the day the Belgians continued to withdraw in a north-westerly direction under enemy pressure.
General Sir John Dill, who had now succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside as C.I.G.S., visited Lord Gort in the morning. He then informed the Prime
Minister and the Secretary of State for War that there could be no disguising the seriousness of the situation.3
By 1800, says Lord Gort, "I was convinced that the steps I had taken to secure the north. my left flank would prove insufficient to meet the growing danger in held; ment the the south-west on Dunkirk had already and being
The from pattern of the enemy pincer attack was becoming clearer. One movebetween counterpart was now developing on the developed, front. was The gap the British left and the Belgian right which Belgian had been threatening
D.R.
3 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 41.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 42.
12