TNA ADM 234 360

INTRODUCTION
The Dunkirk evacuation looms large in the history of the war. It involved the dual problem of lifting a mass of hard-pressed troops from a continually shrinking perimeter under uncertain conditions of wind and sea, the menace of heavy attacks by air, and the onrush of a great hostile army; and then of transporting them to England in the face of air attacks, shore bombardments, torpedoes, mines, and the dangers of unlit shoals and wreck-strewn channels.
Despite the heavy losses suffered from all these perils, no less than 239,000
troops were embarked from the shattered quays of a wreck-encumbered harbour; while some 99,000 more were lifted from the 10 miles stretch of shoaling beach north-east of the harbour. This was no light task. The evacuation from the beaches was performed by many hundreds of shallow-draught motor boats, fishing craft, lighters, barges, sailing and pulling boats, manned partly by civilian volunteers - which ferried the weary troops to the destroyers, mine-sweepers, skoots, personnel vessels, tugs and other ships lying off in deeper water.
Operation "Dynamo" was essentially a combined operation, requiring the devoted co-operation of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and the cheerful courage and steadiness of an exhausted Army waiting on the beaches with hardly anything to eat or drink.
It must at once be said that the stupendous success which crowned Operation
"Dynamo," in the face of the determined onslaught of numbers of hostile bombers, could not have been achieved without the air cover provided by
Fighter and Coastal Command, which performed its task almost invariably against superior numbers, and with the serious handicap of having no base nearer than England. In spite of the most strenuous efforts, however, the inadequate numbers of aircraft available precluded the possibility of continuous cover, and it is significant that the losses of ships by air attacks were greater than the aggregate of losses from all other enemy action, while their severity varied proportionately with the strength of our fighter cover at the time.
I The following five naval aircraft squadrons also operated under Coastal Command
801
815
806
Skuas
825
Swordfish
826 Albacore
These aircraft were the only available British dive bombers They carried out attacks on tanks, transport, batteries, gun emplacements, enemy positions in the Calais and Dunkirk areas, and E-boats. In spite of their relative inadequacy for the purpose the Skuas were also detailed for fighter escort for ships. (M.011883/40)
The incidence of losses by enemy action is given in the two following tables xiii

TUESDAY, 28TH MAY
CHAP. V
In spite, however, of every effort as more and more ships were drawn into
Operation Dynamo", the pressing demand for beaching craft grew, almost hourly, more insistent. A climax was reached on 1st June¹, when, in spite of the number sent over, the inshore flotilla " - crippled by weather, accidents, mechanical breakdowns, exhaustion of crews and enemy action - was still unable to meet requirements, and the minesweeper Gossamer's urgent request for boats received the curt reply It is now impracticable to send more boats.
You must do your utmost with yours². A perusal of the "Dynamo" signals brings sharply to notice the great driving force of the Vice-Admiral, Dover;
the clamorous signals for more boats" were an indication of the great strain to which he was being subjected.
Beach and harbour evacuation compared
There can be little doubt that had not valid reasons prevented more beach ferrying craft from being made available for the first 5 days of the evacuation, a greater number of troops could have been evacuated. The initial problem", says the Vice-Admiral, Dover, "called for a maximum effort over a limited period, regardless of the future, and accordingly all resources in the way of small boats were thrown on the beaches, before adequate provision had been made for their maintenance off the coast in such matters as relief of the personnel and the provision of large beach parties.
" It was only due, to the foresight of the Admiralty in making arrangements for a continued flow in ever increasing numbers of small power boats and beach craft, which became available on the fifth day onwards, that the continued evacuation from the beaches remained a reasonable proposition after the initial crisis had passed.
A perusal of the signals that passed between Dover and the French coast here reveals the many occasions on which the responsible officers stationed on the coast considered so little had been achieved from the beaches that they advocated restriction of evacuation to Dunkirk harbour. Many complaints of no boats', no ships' might lead a detached observer to the conclusion that the great effort that was being made was proving abortive.
" At Dover, where the whole operation could be viewed in truer perspective because the number and origin of the troops being landed in England was always to hand, it was clear that the evacuation from the beaches required by the military situation was, in fact, achieving a considerable success."3
Admiral Ramsay's view is borne out by these recorded figures: Of the 251,000
troops landed in the United Kingdom between May 28th and June 1st inclusive
- the period during which Dunkirk and the beaches eastward were available day and night except for enemy interference - 90,000 were lifted from the beaches, while 55,000 were lifted by personnel ships and hospital carriers, and
106,000 by other vessels, direct from Dunkirk harbour (see Table 2).
Anti-submarine patrols are maintained
While the lifting of troops from Dunkirk and the beaches was progressing with ever-increasing speed, anti-submarine patrols had been maintained from the North Goodwin to Kwint Bank; but on the 28th May all destroyers except
I Appendices H.17 to H.25.
2 Appendix H.22.
3 Letter from V.A. Dover (A.14/0/876/40 of 18/6/40) covering his Report on Operation
" Dynamo". Italics not in original.
33

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embarkthe 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time, owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour); and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers, skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc, and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland), water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24, borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord Southwherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

FRIDAY, 31ST MAY
CHAP. VIII
Cyclone, was on her way to Dunkirk when, apparently between T buoy and the
West Hinder, the track of a torpedo was seen at 0121 crossing from port to starboard 10 yards ahead; a minute later another track was seen to port, and although avoiding action was taken the torpedo struck forward and considerably damaged her, but the Cyclone was still able to steam and she proceeded back to Dover at 4 knots escorted by an English vessel; later, the
French torpedo boat Bouclier and then the French minesweeper Arras took over the duty of escort. The Cyclone reached Dover at 1600, having transferred two serious casualties to an English M/B while on passage. She took no further part in "Dynamo".
Siroco sunk
At 0145, some 20 minutes after this attack, the French destroyer Siroco, on her way to Dover with 770 troops from Dunkirk, was hit near T buoy by 2
torpedoes fired by an E-boat which had stopped and was unseen in the darkness; the destroyer Vega, on patrol 4 miles to the south-east, saw a column of flame 200 feet high. The Siroco capsized shortly after. Survivors to the number of 252 were picked up, 50 by the trawler Wolves, 21 by the trawler
Stella Dorado, 166 by the corvette Widgeon and 15 by the Polish destroyer
Blyskawica.
At 0700, the Vega, which had been on patrol since noon 28th May, was relieved by the destroyer Jackal.
It was on this morning that clear evidence of the presence of enemy submarines was obtained, for the Vimy, en route to Dunkirk, sighted the periscope and conning tower of one between the North Goodwin buoy and the North-
West Goodwin buoy. A depth charge was dropped, and a hunt began in which the trawlers Westella and Spurs, the corvette Sheldrake, and the Jackal joined, but without success.
Conditions on the beaches
Meanwhile, conditions on the beaches were by no means favourable. Already at 0400 a lop had started. At about 0600 the R.N.L.I. life boat Lord Southborough was ferrying troops to the destroyer Icarus off Bray. 'There was a nasty surf," said the coxswain of the life boat. "Troops were rushing out to us from all directions and were being drowned close to us and we could not get to them it seemed to me we were doing more harm [than good] by drawing the men off the shore, as with their heavy clothing, the surf was knocking them over and they were unable to get up.
The whaler from the destroyer.
was swamped, so was the motor pinnace that was working with the whaler, and so it was all along the sands as far as I could see, both sides of us, and there was not a boat left afloat".
At 0600 also, Lt. Col. R. L. Hutchins, M.C., Grenadier Guards, in command of the War Department motor launch Swallow, arrived off Dunkirk, and described the situation as follows: Dunkirk was under a pall of smoke from fires which appeared to be mainly to the south and west of the port. There were numerous wrecks outside the harbour, and along the beaches. There were large numbers of troops on the shore as far as it was possible to see to the eastward, and the beach was strewn with all forms of motor transport. Along the foreshore were a very large number of pulling boats, aground, capsized or damaged, and abandoned. There were also a considerable number of motor
I Appendix J.2.
69

THE FINAL NIGHT, 3RD-4TH JUNE
CHAP. XII
Admiralty, and at 1423 on the 4th June a message went out from the Admiralty:
" Operation Dynamo now completed."
Vice-Admiral Ramsay was aware that the aftermath of the operation would probably be a number of open boats, barges and so forth drifting about in the
Channel with troops on board. Air reconnaissances were accordingly carried out on the 4th and 5th. On the 4th a transport was reported lying on its side between Dunkirk and Gravelines and a barge was sighted east of the Goodwins with survivors on board. Two M.T.B.s. despatched by C.-in-C. Nore searched for the transport without success.
Air reconnaissance was carried out on the morning of the 5th but nothing was reported. However, an R.A.F. speedboat carried out a sweep south of a line Goodwins - Boulogne and recovered 33 French troops and two naval ratings. During the day, patrols picked up French troops and brought them in to Dover, Margate and Ramsgate; and troops also arrived in French and
Belgian trawlers. It is reported that in all about 1,100 men were brought in during the 5th June.
121

ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATION
CHAP. XIII
England was sent to Dunkirk; until then messages had either to be sent through the French station in an unsuitable code, or fortuitously via any destroyer which might be lying alongside, necessitating a messenger forcing his way along the narrow crowded footway of the pier.
In. the absence of efficient communication it was impossible to distribute ships to the best advantage off the beaches or between Dunkirk harbour and the beaches; whilst the uncertainty as to whether the harbour was blocked on the 29th May was responsible for a reduction of 10,000 men in the possible lift during the night 29th-30th.
Air Co-operation
There is no doubt that the R.A.F. carried out, as far as their available resources permitted, all the tasks which they were asked by the Navy to undertake. The odds at which our airmen fought were very long, four or five to one.
Formations of single squadron strength or less would boldly attack German groups of forty or fifty machines, usually with success out of all proportion to the odds against them. It was a direct test of British against German quality.
Numbers did not, however, permit of a continuous patrol being maintained over the scene, though the whole Metropolitan Air Force, our last sacred reserve, was used. Sometimes the fighter pilots made four sorties a day'.' Unfortunately, the troops on the beaches and on Dunkirk piers saw but little of the fighting in the air, for much of the weight of the effort of the Royal Air Force was directed against objectives far inland, to prevent or break up enemy raids before these reached the beaches and ships. It was the ships that took the brunt of the German attack. Galling though it was to our troops to be bombed and machine gunned with little or no opportunity to defend themselves their losses, grievous enough, were yet never of such severity as to jeopardise the entire operation, as did the losses of ships. However, the system of co-operation in force at that early date, which did not permit of direct contact with R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command, rendered difficult complete co-ordination of effort with naval requirements on the spot.
Evacuation figures analysed²
In analysing the evacuation figures it is necessary to consider separately the rates of lift from day to day and the daily total figures of troops lifted.
The former naturally affected the latter; but the days which showed the best rates of lift were not necessarily those giving the highest evacuation total, since circumstances affected the two sets of figures differently and factors which affected one set often had no effect whatever on the other.
The following table shows the number of men from the beaches and the harbour landed daily in England by British ships, and the number of round trips undertaken. Evacuations of wounded by hospital carriers have been omitted, as have also the liftings from the beaches on 3rd and 4th of June, which were largely fortuitous.
1 Churchill, The Second World War Vol. II.
2 The figures employed in this analysis are those of H.S./T.S.D. The total differs by
397 (= 0.0013%) from the military figure. See Note to Tables 1-3 which will be found before the appendices at the end of this book.
123