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TNA Unclassified 1

TNA Unclassified 1
Collection details

TNA Unclassified 1

A working collection of Operation Dynamo source material whose definitive National Archives catalogue reference is still being identified.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
Unclassified 1

Source: The National Archives, Kew, Unclassified 1. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

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II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood of
I the tide rose.
recognition signal the tables and the route the secured the charts and burnt boarded KaapFalga where I took over command before giving order to abandon ship, order, then refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping to receive our message. The destroyers were, however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk. and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard, which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still underlivered.
,Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to the Dynamo Operation Room.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga, which operation was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
During the unloading one Army Stevedore off the jetty in the dark and was drowned.
( A separate report has already been made.)
stand At Dunkerk leaving there not later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered to than 0300/2 by to go to this was the last night throttle of evacuation.
After as two hours funning at I to the had to be evacuated due a hot leading off the led close past the ready be used use fuel asphyxiating silencer. This pipe was engine room fumes and gmoke coming from red pipe tanks and and since pump it only slow speed fire. could
2130/1 Ship remained at anchor all effect night repairs even if owing to the serious anchored danger off Ramsgatea of at about as expert and aid could be obtained to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it was now impossible to reach I reckoned KaapFalga capable officers to block of the from The I maintaining sailed maximum for speed was Dover 5 imformed next knots. 50 empty to afternoon 70 ship. me degrees that were Engineer not the badly wishing engine, centigrade which above was normal, and the silencer that coked up'.
Kaap Falga was not therefore employed

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 69.

II.
16
hoping bullet holes therby I gave when to flood orders the to engine flood of
I the tide rose.
recognition signal the tables and the route the
secured the charts and burnt
boarded KaapFalga where I took over command
before giving order to abandon ship, order, then
refloating Kaap Falga.
from Liett Culmer R.N.V.R. who had succeeded in
It was now about 1630/29 and there
was no sign of life on the beaches as everyone was
still taking cover due to aidcraft overhead.
We proceeded due north from La Panne
over the sandbanks into Nieuport Roads, as I
had been imformed by Major P.De Havilland that
the Zudycote Channel was under fire.
The presence of enemy sircraft overhead
prevented the destroyers sighted from stopping
to receive our message. The destroyers were,
however, steaming in the direction of Dunkirk,
Which I assumed to be in German Hands and I
assumed that they had somehow heard of the fall of
Dunkirk. and were on their way to Bombard.
I then decided not to return to Bray
Beaches that night, because:-
1. According to my imformation there
would be no troops there to receive our stores.
2. If they wanted food at La Panne the
Alice was still aground with 250 tons aboard,
which I was unable to destroy by fire due to the
proximity of the Able Tasman with munitions aboard.
3. Major De Havilland's message was still
underlivered.
,Kaap Falga had a deck cargo of over 20 tons
and the crew of Alice and the other four soldiers
took up nearly all the available space.
Kaap Falga reported arrival in Downs at
0300/29th through H.M.S. Holdfast on examination
service.
NO orders were received and about 1200/31
I steamed Kaap Falga to Dover, where I reported to
the Dynamo Operation Room.
It was decided to unload Kaap Falga,
which operation was completed by 0900/1st fell June.
During the unloading one Army Stevedore
off the jetty in the dark and was drowned.
( A separate report has already been made.)
stand At Dunkerk leaving there not later
1600/1 KaapFalga was ordered to
than 0300/2 by to go to this was the last night throttle of evacuation.
After as two hours funning at I to
the had to be evacuated due a
hot leading off the led close past the ready be used use fuel
asphyxiating silencer. This pipe was
engine room fumes and gmoke coming from red pipe
tanks and and since pump it only slow speed fire. could
2130/1 Ship remained at anchor all effect night repairs even if
owing to the serious anchored danger off Ramsgatea of at about as
expert and aid could be obtained to Dunkirk by 0300/2.
it was now impossible to reach I reckoned KaapFalga
capable officers to block of the from The I maintaining sailed maximum for speed was Dover 5 imformed next knots. 50 empty to afternoon 70 ship. me degrees that were Engineer not the badly
wishing
engine, centigrade which above was normal, and the silencer that
coked up'.
Kaap Falga was not therefore employed