Details

Details

Details

ESCAUT (.15)
(ex-Belgian) canal boat
M
28th May
This vessel was lost BRILLED during Operation Dynamo.
R.N.
2040
company with the on Express. Dover
in
Bailed from Dowey by route Y, under the
orders or Caps 0.16 (walcolm),
also in company.
the dre. henress. Salkori and Scimites
29th May
0015
Arrived off Bray beach- Boate lowered.
Embarkation commenced.
-
Embarked about 400 troops from a shoot
[probably the Hildal.
-
Proceeded.
-
Arrived Dover. Disembarked 100 troopa.
1700
Embarked 12 small beach parties and
R.A. Dover.
2100
Left Dover, and was followed to Dunkirk
by Mr. Vanquisher.
30th May
0100ce
Dunkirk, Disembarked R.A. Dover and
the beach parties.($ Embarked troops.
1130
Proceeded with about 900 on hourd.
1500ca
Doyer. Disembarked 884 typese. (1)
1600ca
Proceeded.
1930
Entered Dunkirk harbour. substituted about
1200 troops,
-
Proceeded.
31st May
0430
Dover, Disembarked 1,041 treate(1)
-
Proceeded.
-
Arrived Bray. Enburked troops. One
wheler loat inshore,
pollo
shore One soldier
killed, six wounded. Some damage to
Esk. Proceeded. Air attacks is
Dunkirk channel.
Dover, Disembarked 100 (2)
1st June
0500ca
Proceeded.
0900cm
orr Dunkirks Air attock.
Entered the herbour. Embarked a fee
troops. Ordered to assist P/V Presse
which however could not be founds
while searching, sighted 2/V Scotts
on fire and singing) embarked from
her about 1,000 French troops, during
Captain, and proceeded, leaving the
air attack. Embarized
093008
Scotta's survivors in boats to be
collected by the traulers which had
Arrived by then Doysr. arrived. Disembarked 979 EPOODS.
2nd June
2030
Proceeded.
3rd June
00300A
Arrived Dunkisk assbarked about
500 Franch troops.
Proceeded. Arrived Dover. Disemberred 500 troops.
Total 3,204
(1) D.B.
(2) Not mentioned
End
293

Details

Page 3.
OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART I - BRITISH SHIPS (continued)
PORTSMOUTH A/P YACHTS
AHOLA
CARYANDA
NONETA
ANLAH
EILA II
SERIOLA
ANKH
LAHLOO
THELE
BOUNTY
MASAYRU
MISCELLANEOUS H.M. SHIPS (small craft)
A.L.C. 5
GREY MIST (Dan-laying
A.L.C. 15
Vessel)
-
A.L.C. 16
# GRIVE (F.A.A. Yacht)
A.L.C. 17
KINDRED STAR (Drifter)
ALOUETTE II
# KING ORRY (Armed Boarding
(Echo Sounding Yacht)
Vessel)
# AMULREE (Harbour Defence
LLANTHONY (Examination
Patrol Craft)
Service Vessel)
ARONIA (Yacht)
LORMONT (Armed Boarding
BEN AND LUCY (Drifter)
Vessel)
BLUEBIRD (M.B.)
MONARDA (Drifter)
BYSTANDER
MONA'S ISLE (Armed Boarding
(Echo Sounding Yacht)
Vessel)
CALETA (Harbour Defence
ST. OLAVES (Rescue Tug)
Patrol Craft)
TARRET (A/S Yacht)
CHRYSTOBEL II (Harbour
THRIFTY (Drifter)
Defence Patrol Craft )
V. 4 ("Vernon' s" pinnace)
"DOLPHIN'S" MOTOR-BOAT
VELIA (Armed Trawler)
EVELYN ROSE Trawler)
VERNON I
"EXCELLENT'S" A/A MOTOR-BOAT
VIVIANA (A/S Trawler)
GAVA (Trawler)
Ambleve.
Escaut.
transferred
GLALA (Harbour Defence Patrol
Meuse.
from
Craft)
Sambre.
Semoise.
page 9.
yser.
DUTCH SKOOTS (Commissioned with Naval Crews)
ABEL TASMAN
DOGGERSBANK
PACIFIC
PASCHOLL
AEGIR
FREDANJA
PATRIA
ALICE
FRISCO
PRINCESS JULIANA
AMAZONE
GORECHT
REIGER
ANTJE
HEBE
RIKA
ATLANTIC
HILDA
RUJA
BART
HONDSRUG
BORNRIF
HORST (Abandoned)
SAN ANTONIO
SURSUM CORDA
BRANDARIS
JAVA
TILLY
CARIBIA
JUTLAND
TINY
DELTA
KAAPFALGA
TUNG
DEMOK I
LENA
TWENTE
DENEB
ORANJE
VREDE
DESPATCH II
ORANGE YREESWIJH
ZEUS
(Continued)
# Sunk

Details

CONTENTS
Page
Introduction
xiii
CHAPTER I
Preliminary Events, 10th to 18th May, 1940
Germany invades Holland and Belgium
1
Allies reach River Dyle
1
German thrust on French 9th Army front
1
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
2
Germans cross Meuse
2
Dutch Army surrenders
2
Allies withdraw to River Escaut
2
French 9th Army front broken
3
Allied rail communications severed
3
CHAPTER II
The week before Operation "Dynamo", 19th to 25th May, 1940
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
4
...
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
4
...
Vice-Admiral Dover, represented at War Office Conference
4
Channel ports the German objective
4
Gerneral Weygand directing Allied operations
5
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
5
Naval Staff at Dover considers large scale evacuation
5
Provision of small craft considered
5
Counter-attack south of Arras
6
Germans approach Boulogne
6
Organisation of the canal line
7
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
7
Canal line occupied
7
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
7
"The Operation will be known as 'Dynamo' "
7
Enemy within 20 miles of Dunkirk
8
Calais cut off
8
i

Details

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. I
13TH MAY
Occupation of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland imminent
in accordance with their plans, and by the May, units of the latter
Movements of the main bodies of the French 13th Ist and 7th Armies continued
north of Antwerp on the Dutch border. It was, however, becoming in-
of Walcheren and Zuid Beveland, which was developing from the north-east.
creasingly evident that they would be unable to prevent the enemy occupation
northern forces to the general line Louvain-Antwerp.
During the day and the following night the Belgians were withdrawing their
14TH MAY
Germans cross Meuse
May the 14th was crucial, for on that day the enemy penetrated the French
9th Army front, and crossed the Meuse between Sedan and Mézières.¹ (See
Plan 1).
15TH MAY
Dutch Army surrenders
On the 15th May the Dutch Army laid down its arms. The immediate effect
of this on the operations of the B.E.F. was small, but "I anticipated says
Lord Gort, "that this would come as a shock to the Belgian Army".2
The French 7th Army withdrew its advanced formations to the neighbour-
hood of Antwerp, and the French divisions on the B.E.F.'s left flank were
ordered to move across the British rear to fill the gap which had been created
on the French 9th Army's front. This move did not, however, actually take
place till some 3 days later,² and it then left the Belgian Army responsible for
the security of the British left flank.
On the British front the day passed quietly on the whole. The 1st Corps
[Lt.-Gen. M. G. H. Barker] was not attacked in strength; 3rd Division [Maj.-
Gen. B. L. Montgomery] of 2nd Corps [Lt.-Gen. A. F. Brooke] was attacked
north-west of Louvain, and its forward positions were penetrated, but a counter-
attack successfully restored the original line.
and, in spite of British support, some ground was lost.
At about 1800, however, the enemy penetrated the French 1st Army's front,
16TH MAY
Allies withdraw to river Escaut
was were impracticable,3 because the French 1st the B.E.F.'s right flank
By the 16th May it became clear that a prolonged defence of the Dyle position
withdrawal unlikely to make good the ground lost on Army the on and a further
It seemed likely to be forced on them by events previous in day the south.³
on night of Senne and one day on the River Escaut, spending on the
the was River therefore decided to withdraw to the River one day
began. 16th-17th May, the 15 to 20 miles withdrawal Dendre. to Accordingly, the Senne positions
2 1 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 22.
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 23. 24.
2

Details

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's
front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured
and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was
a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British
rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and
weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the
defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers,
and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their
localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved
or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed
to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was
also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right
flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on
the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued
without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and
prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its
withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was
soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the
river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the
opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern
area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off
from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed
this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were
actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin),
who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all
theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May),
now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from
the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens,
attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because
it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually
in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately
followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption
by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was
unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two
divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this
attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and
it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely fore-
seen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider
the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting,
which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control
and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and
small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations
and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of
evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very
gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was
considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated
could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports
must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised
that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took
place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and
the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation
and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats
required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5

Details

CHAP. II
THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
21ST MAY
Counter-attack south of Arras
Mechanised He had Division, co-operation but the movements of the Corps and a byLord Cort
was begun the of the French Cavalry Major-General H. by Lord Gort
The counter-attack this day under with 2 the divisions command south of of Arras planned
did not materialise. Furthermore, serious attack
widely divisions to of the French as 5th Corps would also the The hot develop two
the flanks General Franklyn had latter did
through wear¹. were now troubles developed beak troubles developed beak bubles developed break
the British overworked tanks, whose tracks mechanical troubles developed to
that Although the attack the objectives would not of maintain the day its were therefore reached, it became
and supported by the French on its left¹. momentum unless it was reinforced clear
enemy direction.¹ pressure "Thus compelled concluded the Allied force to withdraw - and in an 23rd
During the 22nd May General the Franklyn held his ground, but on the
had valuable defence of Arras," said Lord Gort, easterly
blocked imposed a vital a road centre".¹ delay on a greatly superior force against which it ... had It
Germans approach Boulogne
military situation, for, in the afternoon, an enemy column of all arms the
In the meantime, the 21st May had marked a still more serious change in
approaching the Germans Boulogne.² The military situation was rapidly deteriorating; was
completely Allied severing our line of communications.³ A quarter of
were across the Somme² and had cut the railway at Abbeville,
tons of troops now lay north of the Somme, cut off from the daily flow a of million
decision ammunition and supplies essential to their maintenance. 2,000
"was to maintain the force through the northern ports", said Lord 'The
established at Dunkirk.
finally taken on 21st May and the headquarters of a Base Sub-Area Gort,
A conference of the Allied Commanders was essential, and at 2000 Lord Gort
went He to Ypres where he met the King of the Belgians and General Billotte.4
river explained the situation developing on the Escaut, where the water in the
and decided back As the to was it was a that line line SO evident low the be in withdrawn rear, Escaut that that General it should no sooner to longer Billotte the or be later abandoned formed Belgian the a frontier Belgian tank on the obstacle. Army defences.⁵ night would of It 22nd-23rd was have thereupon to swing May,
if on he to were the forced to withdraw from the asked positions the on King the of the he Belgians would whether, fall back
the line of the Yser SO as to continue to Lys, of
days B.E.F.⁵ later His Majesty agreed that maintain touch with the left five
the Yser the Belgian command decided no that alternative the idea line of the existed, withdrawal but to
must be ruled out".
I 2 Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 33.
General Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
General Lord Blanchard Gort's Billotte Second succeeded was Despatch, fatally him injured in para. para. command in 37 35. a motor of the accident French returning First Group from of this Armies. conference.
6

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
Organisation of the Canal line
On the 21st May, also, steps were taken to defend the south-western flank
of the Allied force by organising the defence of the canal line from the Escaut
to La Bassée, and to continue it to St. Omer and the sea at Gravelines.¹
From this date all arrangements for air co-operation with the B.E.F. were
made by the War Office in conjunction with the Air Ministry, the air liaison
work being carried out in England at Hawkinge.2
Emergency evacuation again considered at the War Office
Meanwhile, in London, a meeting was held at the War Office at which, once
again, the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces, now
100ming close ahead, was under consideration.³
22ND MAY
Canal line occupied
By the 22nd May the 85 miles of canal line from Gravelines, through St. Omer
and Aire, to the Escaut (west of St. Amand) had been occupied, so far as was
possible, with the 10,000 men available. This line was divided into sectors,
for each of which a British commander was responsible,¹ but the number of
anti-tank weapons was barely adequate to cover all the crossing places, and no
effective watch could be kept against small parties of infantry crossing the
canal between the bridges.¹
Boulogne cut off, Calais threatened
The ports of Boulogne and Calais were now no longer working and con-
sequently the supply situation had grown worse than ever. It was found too
that, at such short notice, the port of Ostend could not be adapted to military
requirements.4
Boulogne was, in fact, by this time completely cut off, and by the evening
enemy armoured forces were within 9 miles of Calais.⁵ At Merville, the last
remaining advanced landing ground available for the R.A.F. Component was
abandoned.
On the night of 22nd/23rd May, according to plan, the Allied withdrawal
to the Belgian frontier defences was carried out.⁶
" The operation
...
will be known as Dynamo'
Meanwhile, the Admiralty had begun to make definite preparations for an
evacuation from the Continent. There were at this time, lying at Poole and
in the Port of London, some 50 Dutch skoots (schuyts), 200 ton-motor coasters
which had escaped from Holland. On the 22nd May the Admiralty, after
allocating 8 of these vessels to the War Office for use as supply ships, directed
the Commanders-in-Chief Portsmouth and the Nore to take over and man the
remainder, arrange for their organisation and assembly, and report the names
of the vessels as they became ready for service. At the same time it was in-
timated that, when ready, the skoots would be placed at the disposal of V-A.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 34.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 29.
D.R.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 37.
5 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 36.
6 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 39.
7

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. VII
heavy craft, nor even by small craft similar in a pier lop, was it was invaluable
ing troops into small boats. A was completed and commenced in use on the morning of later for embark-
the 30th May at La Panne, and by the the same day the the same same d the morning day the morning day
(See p. 47).
2 or 3 motor yachts and paddlers to
Bray; none proceeded east of the Bray pier, where the
Captain Howson goes on to say that arrived in the and afternoon anchored one Fortwo skoots and the weskoots and
waited many hours patiently. One tried or two without destroyers or sloops passed from had
the westward to La Panne, and he he success with a lamp to
Admiral Wake-Walker asking him to arrange for this. Captain Howson also
them to anchor off the pier. Eventually managed to get a signal to Rear- tell
sent an officer to Dunkirk to represent learned the urgent need for destroyers off Bray.
It was not until 2 days later that he that all the destroyers, etc., had
been given specific instructions as to which beach they were to anchor off.
Later a certain number of destroyers, sloops and skoots anchored off Bray and
the embarkation proceeded satisfactorily. Unfortunately, time after time,
owing to a lack of naval ratings, he saw a procession of boats going off loaded
with troops, only to be cast adrift and left floating empty out to seaward¹.
Later that evening Captain Howson got in touch with Rear-Admiral Wake-
Walker, then in the Worcester, and obtained permission to embark the following
day in a motor boat off the beaches SO as to prevent a recurrence of this waste
of beaching craft².
In spite of the difficulties and shortcomings emphasised in the above reports
great progress was being made. In fact, beach evacuation reached its peak
on this day; 29,500 troops were lifted from the beaches (as against 24,300
from the harbour) ; and some 50 ships, including destroyers, minesweepers,
skoots, trawlers, drifters, personnel and special service vessels, were engaged
continuously in the arduous work.
The armada grows, but service of ships to Dunkirk is slowed up
Meanwhile the build-up of ships continued, and some 31 additional craft
reached of Dunkirk and the beaches this day. They included two minesweepers
of the 8th M.S.F.³, the Fleet Air Arm training vessel Grive, 4 yachts and a drifter
the Dover M/S Command4, the corvette Kingfisher, (with the ex-Belgian
canal the boat Sambre in tow), the Yarmouth Examination Service yacht Laroc,
and M/V Scottish Co-operator, the S/M tender Dwarf, the drifters Fair Breeze
minesweeper barge Skipjack), the motor coasters Seine and Sheila, (in the coasting
Ocean Breeze, the ex-Belgian canal boats Ambleve and Escaut tow of the
the Viking, the ex-Dutch eel-boat Johanna (in tow Lady of the skoot Jutland),
water, and (R.N.L.I.) lifeboat Prudential (towing barges 7 Sark and with fresh
Ramsgate sailing barge Beatrice Maud, and the dumb Shetland. hopper The
the oyster dredging smacks Seasalter and Vanguard, the steam W.24,
borough, the punt Carama), and the Margate wherries loaded Lord South-
wherries. were The manned by their own crews, but (R.N.L.I.) naval lifeboat manned the
appeared on the scene. and picked up 244 troops. Another A/S patrol, to
Bray beach in error trawler Olvina, which should have been on ratings went
I At long last a dozen of the long awaited important motor contingent boats
R.O.III, p.396.
2 R.O.III, p.397.
4 3 The The Glen Avon and Glen Gower.
and 5 The the danlaying danlaying Constant yachts drifter Gulzar and Sargasso, the echo and Conidaw
Triton, Silver Pauleter Adventuress, and sounding Ma Black Joie. yachts Arrow, Chico Sunshine, Reda,
60

Details

Details

INDEX
Discipline. See British Expeditionary Force and French troops.
Disembarkation ports, 25.
Docksey, Capt. T. E., 21.
Doggersbank, 20, 29n, 32, 45, 47n, 64, 72, 107n.
Dolphin's power boats, 72n.
Donald, Lt. Cdr. C. G. W. Died of wounds, 10.
Dorienta, 71n.
Doris, 71n, 94 (sunk).
Dorrien Rose, 24, 29, 62.
Dove, Cdr. J. S., 50n (reports Dunkirk blocked), 59.
Dover, mined, 38.
Dowling, Lt. Cdr. D. B., 82.
Drifters, 23, 24 (flare burning).
Drogou, Lt. de V., 73.
Duchess, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Duchess of Fife, 28n, 54n, 101, 107n, 109.
Du Guesclin, 62n, 73n.
Dundalk, 86, 107я, 109.
Dunkirk, S.N.O. See Tennant, Capt. W. G.
Dunkirk: water supply destroyed, 8; demolitions, 8, 19, 106; inundations, 12; bridge-
easier, munications 27, 30; limitations, 48; reported blocked, 50; ships not to close, 51 ; com-
head, 15, 18, 35; damaged, 15, 18; out of action, 23 ; reported fallen, 24; conditions
established with Dover, 51; reduced number of ships sent, 61-2 bom-
barded, 70; harbour deserted, 87; harbour full of ships, 88; growing number of
wrecks described, off, 117. 94; pier damaged, 97; blocking of inner harbour, 111-112, 119-20 piers
Duperre, 73.
Dwarf, 60.
Eastbourne Queen, 74.
E-boats, activity). 27-8, 36, 37n, 49 (fail to discover change of route), 68-9, 85 (recrudescence of
Edmond René, rams Kingfisher, 116.
Edvard Nissen, 111-12.
Edward Z. Dresden, 114n.
Eggington, Ldg. Sea., 119.
Eileen Emma, 23n, 83n (damaged), 95 (sunk).
Eilla II, 71n, 74.
Elizabeth Green, 53, 114n.
Ellwood, Cdr. M. 0. D. (i/c Communications), 67.
Emerald Wings, breaks down, 111.
Emile Deschamps, sunk, 119.
Emma, 73.
Emperor of India, 28n, 47n, 54n, 100.
Empire Henchman, 7In.
Endeavour, 73n.
Enterprise, 72n, 75n.
Epervier, 99.
Escaut, 60.
Esk, 28n, 49, 79 (takes across R.A. Dover and Beach parties), 54n, 55, 58, 64n, 92, 97,
102, 107n.
Ethel Everard, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Evans, W. L., 110.
Excellent's A/A M.B., 72n, 75n.
Excellent's 35 ft. M.B., 71n, 75n.
Exhaustion of ships' crews, 29, 113.
Express, back 28n, 41-2, 54n, 55, 59 (flag of R.A. Dover), 62n, 83 (slightly damaged), 109 (sent
empty), 112n, 114n, 118.
Fagalde, General, 12, 68, 85.
Fairplay I, 71n.
Fair Breeze, 60, 71n, 95 (sunk).
Feasible, 71n, 73 (disabled).
Fenella, 34, 43 (sunk), 46.
Fidget, 32n, 51n.
"Fifth Column", 24, 100.
198

Details

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German
break-through
on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th " :
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut
a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675

Details

Details