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Source: Lloyd’s Register Foundation, Heritage & Education Centre, Lloyd’s Register of Yachts 1939, digitised via Internet Archive. Licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. Images have been converted, resized and watermarked for web display; machine-generated table OCR has been added.
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Imaged document collections containing pages whose OCR text or table data has been tagged with the name Grave. Open a collection to view the page images and transcriptions.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 116 4649. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Page 83 Operation "DYNAMO" Fatt Recommendations of Personnel. M.Drifter SHIPMATES. Temporary Skipper Herbert Edward Ward, W.S. 3195. Herbert Cuthbertson, Mate, LT/JX.1858584. his conduct and leadership were at all times of the In the absence of a Skipper during the operations highest order. Recommended for decoration. H.M. Drifter YORKSHIRE LASS - Temporary Lieutenant Edward Henry Godfrey Hope, R.N.V.R. Stoker John J. Collins, LT/KX.105201. Displayed great coolness under fire and willing- ness to help others apart from his own duty. His conduct at Dunkirk was exemplary. Recommended for decoration. Seaman Samuel William George Bauldry, LT/JX.181750. (Acting 2nd Engineman.) Was outstanding down in the engine room on occasions when YORKSHIRE LASS was under fire. He was warmly praised by his crew for his courage, and his conduct at Calais and Dunkirk was magnificent, Recommended for decoration. Lieutenant Joseph Cox, R.N.R. Lieutenant T. P. Graham, R.N.R. Commended for service in action as Unit Officers of Drifters. Both these officers completed several trips to Dunkirk, and in addition did good work at Calais and Boulogne. Their conduct throughout operations was exemplary and they set a very good example to Skippers and their crews. Recommended for decoration. Commander Reginald Wastell English, R.N. Commander English was severely injured by explosion of depth charges when swimming in the water after his ship was sunk. Picked up by WESTELLA, he used his utmost exertion to save the lives of both crews by getting out boats when WESTELLA was sunk subsequently. Later, after being rescued for the second time, by SAON, insisted on the need for WESTELLA being sunk to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy and then collapsed, due to internal injuries. He is now in hospital and his condition gives cause for grave anxiety.
Page 100. Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued). performed courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly gallant and meritorious service. Recommended for decoration. otor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant G. A., Cadell. R.N. Recommendations. (Retired). FFICERS: Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N. troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs On the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French WISHART. 24 Finally, when all ships were leaving, and embarked any British remained. Then encountered a series see of French soldiers, having searched the Quay to if mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home himself at one time or another falling overboard. attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into hands Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly enemy about the Channel for many hours before being rescued. Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no coolness and effic) ency. doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, Recommended for mention. Cadet Rating G. R. Price. Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted. He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK. Recommended for early promotion, Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier. Recommendations. OFFICER: Skipper G. D. Olivier. With a civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, R. N. sailed from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. On arriving off the beaches spent more than 48 hours on ferrying work, and in salving craft; and in towing off ships aground. Underwent the common experience of being stormed by French troops and having to repel these boarders in order to save his ship. When isolated, attacked by 4 Messerschmitts with machine-guns for about half an hour, and at other times was under sporadio gun- fire. Ferried off a total of about 400 French troops. This civilian displayed a complete disregard of danger and showed a high order of seamanship. Recommended for decoration.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199 790. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Dynams 61. DOVER. - 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S."LYNX". Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report in regard to the passage of R.A.F.Motor Boats No. 243 and 270, in which the former boat was sunk. 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in R.A.F.Motor Boat No. 243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to ers and two French 5491 Binld ason to the British Dyuamo 178 S off Grave Lines, These attacked us FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". My boat avoided the I saw that Commander DATE: 5th June, 1940 om a bomb, and was TO : FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER. S, I was fully oid the attacking ok round for the other SINKING OF R.A.F.MOTOR BOAT NO. 243 id the whole crew were on, and slowed down to ouston ordered me to at full speed to Dunkirk. Sub.Lieutenant R.Wake's report on the above incident is forwarded 3 shortly afterwards tack, my boat was herewith. e-gun bullets, and my ion. The speed of the set a mean course for out half an hour after Love Dawson he enemy aircraft left rriving there at 2100, r Boat No.243 to Rear- CAPTAIN, R.N. ers alongside were ICE ADMIRAL ommander Clouston and at only Sub. Lieutenant 6- JUN 1940 armaham are the only * up. Aircraftsman DOVER nder Clouston dead in picked up. had remained to pick boat, which would have e top of the canopy, as out of action and the L have made our arrival continued.
Dynam 61. DOVER. 179 5 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, 270, in which the former boat was sunk. in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and I have the honour to submit the following report 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British Party. 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, and reported the loss of Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that only b.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. up 7. survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our arrival at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued
Dyrams 61. DOVER. à 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and 270, in which the former boat was sunk. 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British Party. 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. and reported the loss of F. Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that only Sub.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. up 7. survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action arrival and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199 792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
VERY SECRET 928 WAR REFUGEES 6 While nothing in this memorandum should be taken as indicating that H.M. Government has any special reason to suppose that the possibilities with which it deals are imminent, considerations of humanity and prudence have led the Departments concerned to consider what steps would have to be taken to deal with an influx of refugees from Belgium or Holland in the event of a German invasion of those countries. During the last war nearly 250,000 Belgian refugees were accommodated here without insuperable difficulty, but it is estimated that at least 500,000 might be expected to escape on this occasion. ,In addition to this great increase in numbers, the problem of accommodation has been very greatly complicated by the danger of large scale air raids and the necessities of existing evacuation schemes. The French Government has indicated that although it would be prepared to do all in its power to assist in the evacuation of refugees from Belgium, it could not undertake to retain any substantial number owing to the grave problems arising from the evacuation of the population of Northern France and the presence in that country of the British Expeditionary Force as well as the French Army. For obvious reasons, any appeal to the public is impossible at present but energetic steps are being taken to prepare emergency schemes for accommodation in public buildings etc., in neutral areas. The resources of reception areas are already fully taxed and it would be undesirable to send large numbers of refugees - especially women and children - to evacuation areas, where they might be expected to be subjected to severe air raids. It is doubted, however, whether this course can be avoided if the total should prove to be as large as is now feared. H.M. Government is therefore anxious to explore all the possibilities of accommodation outside Great Britain and semi-official approaches have already been made to the Channel Islands, Isle of Man, and Northern Ireland. The advantages to the unfortunate people concerned of being placed in an area free from enemy attack will at once be apparent. The purpose of this note is to bring the problem to the notice of /the
Statement of the operations of Commander Dove's party at Dunkirk. Prefatory Note. The party consisted of Commander Dove, b.Lieutenant Field, and Sub.Lieutenant Addis, R.N.V.R. The object was to erect a lethal kite barrage round the port of Dunkirk. Commander Dove sailed with "Boy Roy" and "Natsuki" on May 2004 with 200 sets of lethal kite gear. Sub,Lieut,Field and Sub.Lieut Addis left Daver with H.M.D. "Gervais Rentaul". On instructions from Captain A/P took command of the Drifter (skipper Mr.Burgess,R.N.R) Report. Sub.Lieut Field and Addis, sailed from Dover 6345 Friday May 25th with 9 tons high explosives for the demolition party, 4 tons of medical stores, 1 Medical officer Major Russell, 1 Army liaison officer Captain Hill, and 3 signal ratings. After an uneventful passage, we arrived off Dunkirk 0930 to find a large scale air attack by the enemy in progress. We noted then, and for the whole time we were in Dunkirk that in spite of the courage and persistence of the shore A.A.units the great majority of their salvoe were well astern of their targets. We immediately entered the harbour and made fast alongside the South Quay. Army Officers and signal ratings, we reported to Cdr. Henderson B.N.L.O. who order "Gervais Rentaul" to keep clear of the harbour to avoid the aerial bombardment which had recommenced. We then reported to Cdr. Banks of the demolition party that we had brought his explosives, and shortly afterwards made contact with Cdr. Dove who had taken charge of a portion of a demolition party. Cdr.Dove now signalled the G.R. to re-enter the harbour and took in tow two sinking tugs which were threatening to block completely the South Quay. If this had not been done at once it would have been difficulty if not impossible for the hospital and personnel ships to make fast to the South Quay. The, "Gervaise" was man- eeuvred to a small lock on the south side to avoid the risk of her being hit and exploding the ammunition in the fairway. Ammunition medical stores were then unloaded and handed over to Cdr. Banks who up to that time had not received any primersor detonators for the depth charges. Cdr.Dove then signalled in two hospital ships which were in the offing and the work of loading these was just put in hand inmediately. As there was no. labour dock available at any time during our stay in Dunkirk Commander Dove himself and with help of his officers organised and carried out the necessary work. Now the South Quay was cleared it was possible for further hospital and personnel ships to enter and load. During these operations Cdr. Dove reached the conclusion that the situation in Dunkirk was so grave that we should have neither the opportunity nor the facilitie to erect a kite barrage round Dunkirk. Furthermore there was a re- grettable lack of wind and no low or dive bombing until Monday 27th At midday dr.Henderson told Cdr. Dove that there was no water in Dunkirk and we therefore commandeered a car and bought sufficient vichy and perier water from estaminets which were still open in Malo form H.Q.staff. We made tour of inspection and found that up to date the damage done to property and personnel was surprisingly little, although the oil tanks on the south side of th town were blazing flercely and threatening the railway and timber yards. There was a light uir from S. to S.W. which blew a pall of smoke over the harbour and made the scene appear far worse than reality. During the afternoon and evening the work of loading shi went on smoothly but there were already a large number of noncom- batant forces crowded into the harbour besides an increasing number* of ambulances lined up on the south quay. The night was quiet except for one air-raid when German planes circledthe town for over (ca hour before dropping a comparatively small mimber of bombs. Early next morning May 26th, r.Burgess who had been instructed by Cdr. Dove to anchor outside the harbour for safety, reported that magnet mines had been laid near the entrance and that a French merchantmen had been blown up. dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'
3 ried us four hours to do scale normally bombardment 20 minutes. This ide to fly another work which takes (made in Germany) which was entirely kite deserted from a except large floating for Bank's crane party. We THE decided There so cases similar to key this that our uninterrupted and large to wind which continued Owing to return a contrary to H.Q. We found our the efforts proved of IM car presumably the result of about 2 miles and our were of fifth many column activity. We made way times on the way, especially on the We reported leading that H.Q. it it was back to H.Q. on foot, a distance road to were bombed several H.Q. the position seemed extremely from grave. the South Quay. Cdr. was Henderson hardly informed us that G.H.Q. intended taking to be over evacuation bastion At practicable to embark troops the and the extreme shortage of supplies. We were and to sail as soon as that all superfluous personnel would have therefore ordered owing by to Dove to go aboard the "Gervaise Rentual" most of the bombardment permitted. The air force personnel, onboard. We demolition the party were, we were informed, already and QZS.60. were On arrival also at the ship we found we had no charts and to the our given a new route order via Zuydcoote Passage therefore made way bastion. At the bastion we found that a number of soldiers, the obviously a back as quickly as we could through the bombardment unnerved by the relentless attack, were approaching H.Q. in went out in the midst of the bombardment, without steel helmets, destroy- or fire threatening manner with their rifles. Cdr.Dove and Cdr. Henderson arms which had just entered harbour, arrived. The situation control and and parleyed with them until a naval landing party from which a might " have er developed seriously was immediately brought under take we informed that the evacuation of the town of Dunkirk was to were forthwith. We were therefore given new orders by Cdr.Dove. found We place able to collect a chart and return to the ship where we were Cdr. Bankes. He told us to collect as many small craft as possible and take them and the drifter round to the beaches on the north side of the town to pick up soldiers. We tried to commandeer two Belgian tugs and manage to secure two launches byt on investigation both were too badly a picket boat but the French naval commander objected strongly. We did damaged to be serviceable. One had its steering gear rendered useless one by bombs, and the other, a diesel engine, had no fuel, and no knew how to work it. We now had onboard four air force officers, 10 re moment four drifters arrived in the entrance, two of which were in a soldiers, the majority of the demolition party and Cdr. Bankes. At this sinking condition owing to bombing and machine-gunning, These two the "Bola Roy" and the "Paxton" were sunk by gun-fire from the "Gervaise Bentual", clear of the fairway, after all personnel had been taken on- board, the drifters "Playmates" and "Gervaise Rentual." The remaining 2 drifters were ordered by Cdr. Bankes to tie off the beaches and they proceeded thereforthwith. We were now helded from the South Quay and on crossing there found Cdr. Dove who was the last person to leave the South Quay. We took him aboard and landed him and Cdr. Bankes on the North Jetty, where they met Captain Tenant, Cdr. Dove insisted on returning to the bastion to the end of the pier, within hail for an hour. Captain Tenant then told find out if there were anyone left there and instructed us, to be off us to extend those orders until midnight. It was now about dark and air activity was intense. Huge fires light up the town and later numer- believed we heard artillery. After standing off for about 1 hour, ous parachute flares were dropped by the enemy. For the first time we gun us, we received enemy a morse message from the beach, to come alongside in which time the enemy dropped magnetic mines and attempting to machine the North Jetty, There we found Naval Commander whose name was not ascertained, other Captain drifter and tell any personnel ships to come along- from Tenant's party, who ordered us to make con- side the North We spoke to the Queen of the Channel (?) to this effect Jetty. drifters who were Lying some way to the north and were difficult and to the locate. Another morse message asked us to use and found all possible a despatch. to After this we ?) returned ship alongside to the North and fully Jetty loaded. were We took personnel (Queen of Channel and children and some soldiers, and hound aboard which written) was was destroyer, continuing "Unless and complete W/T dubies. fighter The protection gist of this can be message provided (which only to proceed a home to Dover also an urgent despatch to H.M.S. "Wolf- ordered aboard about 30 women after delivering women and children before dawn, the situation will become extremely grim'
Page 83 Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. H.M.Drifter SHIPMATES.- - Temporary Skipper Herbert Edward Ward, W.S. 3195. Herbert Cuthbertson, Mate, 1858584. his and leadership were at all times operations of the conduct In the absence of a Skipper during the highest order. DSM : Recommended for decoration. Drifter YORKSHIRE LASS - Temporary Lieutenant Edward Henry Godfrey Hope. R.N.V.R. Stoker John J. Collins, LT/KX.105201. Displayed great coolness under fire and willing- ness to help others apart from his own duty. His conduct at Dunkirk was exemplary. D.S.M. Recommended for decoration. Seaman Samuel William George Bauldry, LT/JX.181750. (Acting 2nd e n t DSM Engineman.) Was outstanding down in the engine room on occasions when YORKSHIRE LASS was under fire. He was warmly praised by his crew for his courage, and his conduct at Calais and Dunkirk was magnificent, Recommended for decoration. Lieutenant Joseph Cox, R.N.R. DSC Lieutenant T. P. Graham, R.N.R. D.S.O. DSC Commended for service in action as Unit Officers of Drifters. Both these officers completed several trips to Dunkirk, and in addition did good work at Calais and Boulogne. Their conduct throughout operations was exemplary and they set a very good example to Skippers and their crews. ASO Recommended for decoration. Commander Reginald Wastell English. R.N. D.S.O Commander English was severely injured by explosion of depth charges when swimming in the water after his ship was sunk. Picked up by WESTELLA, he used his utmost exertion to save the lives of both crews by getting out boats when WESTELLA was sunk subsequently. Later, after being the for WESTELLA being sunk to prevent her falling internal into rescued for the second time, by SAON, insisted on the need of the enemy and then collapsed, due to injuries. hands He is now in hospital and his condition gives cause for grave anxiety.
Page 100. Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. M.B. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued). performed gallant and meritorious service. courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly Recommended for decoration. Motor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant a. A. Cadell. R.N. Recommendations. (Retired). OFFICERS: X Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N. D.S on the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs and WISHART. Finally, when all ships were leaving, embarked 24 French soldiers, having searched the Quay to see if any British remained. Then encountered a series of mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and himself at one time or another falling overboard. Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into enemy hands Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly about the Channel for many hours before being rescued. Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, coolness and effic) ency. M. Recommended for mention. Cadet Rating G. R. Price. Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted. He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK. turing stered ivors Recommended for early promotion, was whom Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier. Recommendations. OFFICER: Skipper G. D. Olivier. 3 D.S.M. With a civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, R. N. sailed from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. On arriving off the beaches spent more than 48 hours on ferrying work, and in salving craft; and in towing off ships aground. Underwent the common experience of being stormed by French troops and having to repel these boarders in order to save his ship. When isolated, attacked by 4 Messerschmitts with machine-guns for about half an hour, and at other times was under sporadic gun- fire. Ferried off a total of about 400 French troops. This civilian displayed a complete disregard of danger and showed a high order of seamanship. Recommended for decoration.
Page 83 Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. H.M.Drifter SHIPMATES. - Temporary Skipper Herbert Edward Ward, 3195. Herbert Cuthbertson, Mate, LT/JX.1858584. In the absence of a Skipper during the operations his conduct and leadership were at all times of the highest order. Recommended for decoration. H.M. Drifter YORKSHIRE LASS - Temporary Lieutenant Edward Henry Godfrey Hope, R.N.V.R. Stoker John J. Collins, LT/KX.105201. Displayed great coolness under fire and willing- ness to help others apart from his own duty. His conduct at Dunkirk was exemplary. Recommended for decoration. Seaman Samuel William George Bauldry, LT/JX.181750. (Acting 2nd Engineman.) Was outstanding down in the engine room on occasions when YORKSHIRE LASS was under fire. He was warmly praised by his crew for his courage, and his conduct at Calais and Dunkirk was magnificent, Recommended for decoration. Lieutenant Joseph Cox, R.N.R. Lieutenant T. P. Graham, R.N.R. Commended for service in action as Unit Officers of Drifters. Both these officers completed several trips to Dunkirk, and in addition did good work at Calais and Boulogne. Their conduct throughout operations was exemplary and they set a very good example to Skippers and their crews. Recommended for decoration. Commander Reginald Wastell English. R.N. Commander English was severely injured by explosion of depth charges when swimming in the water after his ship was sunk. Picked up by WESTELLA, he used his utmost exertion to save the lives of both crews by getting out boats when WESTELLA was sunk subsequently. Later, after being the for WESTELLA being sunk to prevent her to falling internal into rescued for the second time, by SAON, insisted on the injuries. hands He is now in hospital and his need of the enemy and then collapsed, condition due gives cause for grave anxiety.
Page 100. Operation "DYNAMO" - Recommendations of Personnel. CONSTANT NYMPH (continued). performed gallant and meritorious service. courage and disregard of danger, and undoubtedly Recommended for decoration. Motor Boat LADY CABLE: - Acting Sub. -Lieutenant G. A. Cadell. (Retired). R.N. Recommendations. OFFICERS: Acting Sub. Lieutenant G. A. Cadell, R.N. On the night of June 2nd ferried about 200 French troops from Dunkirk Inner Harbour off to tugs and WISHART. Finally, when all ships were leaving, embarked 24 French soldiers, having searched the Quay to see if any British remained. Then encountered a series of mishaps with his engines, and on the voyage home attempted to salve W. D. craft HAIG, all his crew and himself at one time or another falling overboard. Finally broke down at mid-day on the 3rd, close to the Coast, and was in grave peril of falling into enemy hands Southwest of Dunkirk. LADY CABLE drifted helplessly about the Channel for many hours before being rescued. Sub. Lieutenant Cadell, suffering from a weak heart, underwent considerable physical strain, and there is no doubt that he and his crew displayed remarkable courage, coolness and efficiency. Recommended for mention. Cadet Rating G. R. Price, Acted as first lieutenant to Sub. -Lieutenant Cadell, whom he ably assisted, He had previously been in command of the Motor Boat SKYLARK. Recommended for early promotion. Motor Yacht MASAYRU: - Skipper G. D. Olivier. Recommendations. OFFICER: Skipper G. D. Olivier. R. N. sailed off the beaches spent more than and 48 in hours towing on With a from Sheerness 0400/31 in convoy. civilian crew of 3 and one Leading Seaman, On arriving ships ferrying boarders half stormed attacked aground. by work, by in THE and Underwent troops in salving and the of having craft; common to 400 under When experience repel French sporadic isolated, these for danger troops. of about gun- being off This fire. Forried off a total disregard of and Recommended for decoration.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199 795. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
376 350 4. 1/6 after she was hit in the after Bodler Room and started to settle down. Captain Berthon then anchored her and M.T.B. 102, which had just arrived, came alongside. I embarked in her with my Staff, and after telling 2 tugs to stand by KEITH I went into Dunicirk to see General Alexander. Dive Bombing and Maching Gun attacks were made on the N.T.B. on the way there. 35. General Alexander was away from the H.Q., but I saw a Staff Officer and discussed the situation. At that time I gathered that the plan was to evacuate during the next night from the Western Beach only and Dunkirk. The Rearguard were to withdraw at dawn and make their way to Dunkirk. As this meant continuing the embarkation for some hours of daylight I had grave fears of heavy losses after that morning's experience. 36. As there was nothing more I could do at Dunicirk and all ships were returning I decided to return to Dover to make contact. M.A/S.B. 37. 10. At Dover I was able to discuss the plans for the night I reached Dover at 1130 in N.T.B. 102 and left again at 1730 in to operations which was invaluable, and thereafter I returned each day for this purpose. 0330 38. from the 18 miles of beach East of Dunicirit, for which large mmbers of The plan for this night was, roughly, to embark between 2100 and small craft were to be towed out. In addition Personnel Ships were to embark from Dunkirk. sailed early in M.A/S.B.10 and landed at Dusirink at 1900, visited 39. the S.N.O. and I the Ceneral, and gave them details of the plan. French I then learnt and to my great relief that the Rearguard were being relieved by the withdrawing during the night. started to arrive and from then onwards I moved 40. between the At beaches 2100 ships and Dunkirk, continually senting ships which The were as loading slowly off the beaches into Dunicirk to fill - there. plan very originally made would not have made full use of Dunkink. I went alongside the root of the East ydar in Donkirk there until to 41. off At 0200 of the Naval Ratings of the Shore Party, and There I lay was 0245 when I proceeded of the Harbour at this time and a Trawler was instead sunk. of As bring some round all ships barthed in harbour. considerable shelling clear morning I decided to get ships away by 0300 some of the it was a very this put into effect I left for Dover: later hour. 0330, small craft and having however, seen continued their work off the beaches to & 42. Night - Sunday 2nd - Monday 3rd June. it was understood that there was sere to 5000 embark British from still Dunkirk ashore and over 30,000 some French local beach made any East- At this stage French, and the plan arranged craft from the beach close ward. entirely Actually except a strong for wind and heavy shelling on the embarkation there impossible. 43. Minesweepers A very large and carrying Schoots capacity was outside. provided in Personnel in addition Ships, to Destroyers, Drifters and Paddlers, Flotillas of boats working from Tugs time also the French had collected from a large quays up mmber the harbour. of fishing 44. vessels, Trawlers, By this and small steamers which worked bombing I arrived at Dunkirk in M.A/S.B. 10. at 2030, after a 45. /attack
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 234 360. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
PRELIMINARY EVENTS CHAP. I 17TH MAY French 9th Army front broken By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹ The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers, and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved or ordered to withdraw. These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued without pause.³ 18TH MAY Allied rail communications severed By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge. During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies' bases. On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F. completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British 1st Corps). Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French; unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle. After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F. and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed this opinion to have been fully justified. I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24. 2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25. 3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26. 4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30. 3
CHAPTER IV MONDAY, 27TH MAY (See Plan 3) The Dunkirk perimeter the organisation of the Dunkirk the bridgehead. Canal de la Its perimeter was to extend from On the morning of 27th May, Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Adam commenced and thence by Furnes and Nieuport Gravelines to the Belgian coast. In fact, however, Gravelines, south-eastward to Colme, along the canal to Bergues perimeter, and were falling back to the line of the Mardyck Canal, from the the French were already evacuating and the western part of the to Spyker on the Canal de la Colme. The French were to be responsible sea, for the defence of the western half of the perimeter as far as Bergues inclusive, and the British for the eastern half. The position of the Belgian Army was now so obscure that its inclusion in the bridgehead was not taken into account. I The British sector of the Dunkirk perimeter had its right at Bergues, whence it followed the canals to Furnes and Nieuport. Immediately north of this line were the inundations ; to the north of the inundations was low-lying land, and then the Dunkirk-Furnes Canal and the main lateral road from Furnes to Dunkirk; finally, there was the narrow strip of dunes giving way to a wide open beach running the whole length of the position and shelving very gradually to the sea. There were no quays or piers whatever, except those at Dunkirk itself. At intervals of from 3 to 4 miles along the shore (from east to west) lay the seaside resorts of Coxyde, La Panne, Braye-Dunes, and Malo-les-Bains (adjoining Dunkirk). During the day troops and their transport began to withdraw into the perimeter on the fronts of all three British Corps. Where the troops had received the necessary orders, vehicles were disabled and abandoned in the assembly areas; but owing to the shortage of troops for traffic control a great number of British and French vehicles were able to enter the perimeter and the town of Dunkirk², causing grave congestion on the roads. Beaches were organised at La Panne, Bray-Dunes and Malo-les-Bains, one beach being allotted to each of the 3 British Corps.³ Dunkirk had been bombed for some days, but the town and port received their most serious damage on 27th May. At least 12 attacks were made on Dunkirk and the sea approaches between 0825 and 20004. Lorry columns had been set on fire in the town and a pall of black smoke from the burning oil tanks hung continuously over the town and docks, impeding the air defence. Dunkirk was therefore cleared of all troops and they were sent to the dunes east of the town to await embarkation.³ The Belgain armistice During the 27th May Lord Gort received a further telegram from the Secre- tary of State for War which read, " want to make it quite clear that sole 2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 47. 4 3 R.A.F. Gort's Second Despatch, para. para. 50. Lord Gort's Second Despatch, 49. Narrative, p.320. 18
MONDAY, 27TH MAY CHAP. IV meantime at 2025, the Vice-Admiral, Dover, received another signal sent only a few minutes later : " Port continuously bombed all day and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches east of harbour A.B.C.D.¹ Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering Wolfhound to load there and sail. T.O.O.2005." To the Vice-Admiral, Dover, the situation must have appeared critical when, later that evening, he received a report from two military officers from G.H.Q., that the plight of the B.E.F. was precarious and that the enemy might, indeed, succeed in cutting it off from Dunkirk.² All ships diverted to the beaches Such was the grim picture presenting itself to the Vice-Admiral, Dover, that night - the B.E.F. in grave and very real danger of being cut off altogether from Dunkirk, and possibly only a bare 24 hours available for its evacuation. Admiral Ramsay reacted to these dire tidings with characteristic drive and energy, and a period of intense activity ensued. Every effort was concentrated on sending as many craft as possible to the beaches without delay². Order followed order in rapid succession. Personnel ships were diverted to the beach, code letters A, B, C and D (i.e. Malo beach). Four paddle minesweepers³ were sailed from the Downs to La Panne beach. Destroyers were rushed to the beaches and urged to embark as many British troops as possible, as this was the last chance of saving them "; the Gallant, and Vivacious, then on patrol, the Windsor, Vimy, Anthony, Impulsive, Sabre and the cruiser Calcutta, were all ordered to proceed with the utmost despatch to the beach at Malo-les-Bains and the beach at Zuydcoote, just east of it; the Grafton and Greyhound, on patrol between Fairy Bank and Kwint Bank buoys, and the Wakeful, just arrived at Dover from Plymouth, were hurried to the beach at La Panne. The wording of some of the signals4 conveying these orders reflects the desperation felt that night, a desperation which, in spite of the course of sub- sequent events, was at the time only too well-founded. " Had the situation appeared less critical," observes Admiral Ramsay, an organised flow of large and small craft, working in reliefs, would have been arranged."⁵ Yet a further batch of vessels arrived off the beaches that evening; the 17 available flare-burning drifters of the Dover Auxiliary Patrol⁶ had sailed for Dunkirk during the afternoon, and on arriving were diverted to the beaches by the Wolfhound, in accordance with a signal from the Vice-Admiral, Dover⁷, and anchored close inshore. The boats from the Wolfhound and Wolsey, and I These letters refer to an arrangement, whereby at the commencement of Dynamo' the Dunkirk beaches were described by a letter code referring to Map G.S.G.S. 4040, Sheet 29, 1/50,000. The lengths of beach lying in each 1000 metre map square were lettered, west to east, commencing with "A" at square 2686 in sequence to "0" at square 3990. (Appx. N. 10). Under this arrangement, A.B.C.D. actually refers to the beach at Malo-les-Bains. This arrangement appears to have fallen into disuse on and after 29th May, when the stretch of beach, one mile east of Dunkirk to one mile east of La Panne, was divided into 3 equal parts, referred to as La Panne, Bray and Malo, from east to west, with a mile gap between each part. (Appendix O. 11). 2 D.R. page 3, para. 8. 3 The Sandown, Medway Queen, Brighton Belle and Gracie Fields. 4 See Appendices D. 3, D. 4, D. 5, D. 7, and D. 8. 5 D.R., p.3, para. 38. 6 They were the Netsukis, Lord Howard, Lord Howe, Golden Sunbeam, Midas, Golden Gift, Girl Pamela, Paxton, Boy Roy, Eileen Emma, Girl Gladys, Forecast, Ut Prosim, York- shire Lass, Young Mun, Shipmates and Torbay II. 7 Appendix D.6. 23
SIGNALS APPENDIX H 20. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, from DOVER La 6,000 British marching Panne through Bray on Dunkirk. 0235/1 21. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER west We must have more boats of La Panne. 0243/1 22. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to Gossamer It is now impracticable to send more boats. You must do your utmost with 0334/1 yours. 23. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER, REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER Situation on beaches is critical. Third Division marching to Dunkirk. More boats urgently required. 0345/1 24. Gossamer to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER Thousands more (?moving) from La Panne westward. No boats. 0358/1 25. GENERAL WHITAKER to GENERAL DILL, WAR OFFICE Absolutely essential provide many more small boats with motor boats to tow if grave losses are to be avoided and remainder B.E.F. cleared. Matter utmost urgency. 0430/1 26. REAR-ADMIRAL, DOVER to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER All craft used for towing boats have returned in the night. They must be sent back. 0611/1 27. Niger to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER Number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Warn following ships to stop them. 2150/1 20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty Reported that number of towing and small boats are returning empty. Essential to arrest this. Keep good lookout and force them back. 2201/1 20. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY Owing to severe conditions and enormous wastage on Dunkirk coast, small boat flotillas, vital for beach work, can no longer be relied upon even in fair weather. Information just received that at least two such flotillas have turned back tonight Saturday. 2328/1 30. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to FORCE K AND MINESWEEPERS (R) Admiralty False information and orders to return are being given to our inshore units by 5th Column scoots or other vessels. Endeavour to keep our small vessels to their duty on the coast. 2335/1 Sunday, 2nd June 31. ADMIRALTY (D.N.I.) to VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER Your 2335/1 : Please supply any information regarding the ships suspected of 5th Column activities. 1834/2 Monday, 3rd June 32. VICE-ADMIRAL, DOVER to ADMIRALTY Your 1834/2. Following is information to date : On the morning of the 1st June it was reported that a number of small craft had left Dunkirk beaches. An M.T.B. was sent out to round them up and send them back. A signal was intercepted from Leda en route to Dunkirk saying that she had met boats returning, and she was ordered to send them back. 171
PLAN 2 Scale ofMiles to 5 o 10 20 30 40 N The Allied withdrawal into 18th MAY the Dunkirk KENT GSTEND . 30ᵗMAY BRUGES ANTWERP PANNE perimeter on the + NIEUPORT 23rd MAY 30th May May + 4. FURNES MALINES Yser GAND BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH LINES C GRAVE STATES BERGUES R.Lys ALOST R WORMHOUTE LOUVAIN CHANNEL YPRES COURTRAI Escant R.Dyle WATTE MENIN BRUSSELS . R St. OMER CASSEL COMINES Dandre WAVRE BOULDONE . ZEBROUCK INS ARMENTIERES R. R AIRE MERVILLE ATH LILLE 23rd:MAY Meuse 23rd MAY St. AMAND NAMUR . BASSEE CARVIN . 18th MAY R. Sambre St.POL . VALENCIENNES DOUAI BARRAS Escaut a CAMBRAI OULLENS BEVILLE B ALBERT R.Somme PERONNE him AMIENS StQUENTIN French 10th Arm MEZIERES SEDAN R.Oise Mause The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May. Allied line on 18th Щау French 3rd Army R.Aisne Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May German progress shewn in blue TSD/HS (ESG) C.B.H.16675
Source: The National Archives, Kew, MT 40 66. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
79 1 ml EN LINE STEAMERS 1940. TRACT OF LETTER FROM CAPTAIN EDGAR JONES, S.S. "YEWDALE", SHEERNESS, UNDER DATE 2nd JUNE, 1940. 128 There is a great deal of damage to this ship, caused by shrapnel from bombs. These have penetrated through the ship's side into holds, bunkers and engine room, also Mate's room has been badly damaged shrapnel having penetrated through about 14" of steel at doubling plate and has damaged cabin and Master's room. The Wheelhouse is badly damaged and compass completely wrecked. There are several burst pipes and defects in engine room. The shrapnel that penetrated stokehold has also damaged boiler but we do not think that marks on boiler are very deep. We broughtabout 900 men across, 7 of whom were killed and 77 injured. Mate who was in Wheelhouse with Bo'sun and myself was struck below the knee by shrapnel and is in grave danger of losing his leg. I have not been able to find out what hospital he is in, but he is neither at Ramsgate or Deal. I have written to his wife and forwarded his wages. We obtained some satisfaction in these raids however, as we brought down one enemy bomber which we Saw plunging headlong into the sea half a mile ahead of us. When we arrived at the spot we could see nothing but oil. dd The great TWIS a bi., varge were rowing off in their boat towards us. I picked them up, also boat and crew of barge "DUCHESS" that had anchored in the Roads, and then the next wave of bombers were overhead. (Continued)
ons at G.W.R. 49 20113 STATE When G.W.Rly Docks Manager's Dep to Newhaven via Dover Marine Section, Fishguard Harbour. SEAL were CDM.C/3077/S. was 20th 181 June 1940. On the B.25/272. that was from Dris sts. 'St. David". loss of EVACUATION OF TROOPS FROM FLANDERS. Dear Sir, and in the It has been reported to me that the "st. David" under the command of Captain Joy on the 24th May was ordered to Dunkirk, via Dover, to evacuate wounded from thatarea. She arrived at that Port on the morning of the 25th and lay alongside receiving wounded until that evening, During the whole of the time the town and quays were being subjected to severe bombing. On her way out, when passing along the Grave- lines shore, she came under heavy gun fire, and one large calibre shell fell within less than the Ship's length ahead of her. at The vessel was then manoeuvred out of the Channel to avoid gun fure. Later on, air craft (apparently French) escorted her until she was clear of danger. About midnight she arrived at Newhaven, where all here wounded were landed. to The next morning she proceeded to the Downs, and the day after, the 28th May, received orders to proceed to Dunkirk once again to evacuate more wounded. difficult owing to the lack of the usual aids to navigation and The weather was very misty, and navigation made very the fact that many vessels had been sunk in the fair-ways since her last leaving that Port. At 8.00'clock that evening she entered Dünkirk, where she remaired until the next morning. were subjected to terrific bombardment by air and land, and it During the whole of the night, the town, quays, etc. became necessary, owing to the lack of R.A.M.C. ashore, for the board receiving the wounded and placing them in the cots etc. carrying them down the quay as required, with the Medical Staff on geamen, Firemen, Stewards etc. to load the wounded themselves, we This work was exceedingly difficult, as the whole 1g was for in a bad condition, and there was not even any gangways available area nd constructed passing the stretcher cases on board, However, the Engineers n e whole a wide and useful gangway, which was used during the SC time of the embarkation. et
Source: The National Archives, Kew, Unclassified 1. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
Dynams 61. DOVER. à 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S."LYNX". Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report in regard to the passage of R.A.F.Motor Boats No. 243 and 270, in which the former boat was sunk. 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in R.A.F.Motor Boat No. 243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to ers and two French 5491/14 Bin/d ason to the British Dyudmo 61 178 S off Grave Lines, These attacked us FROM: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". My boat avoided the I saw that Commander DATE: 5th June, 1940 om a bomb, and was TO : FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING DOVER. S, I was fully oid the attacking ok round for the other SINKING OF R.A.F.MOTOR BOAT NO. 243 id the whole crew were on, and slowed down to ouston ordered me to at full speed to Dunkirk. Sub. Lieutenant R.Wake's report on the above incident is forwarded 3 shortly afterwards tack, my boat was herewith. e-gun bullets, and my ion. The speed of the set a mean course for out half an hour after Love Wawson he enemy aircraft left rriving there at 2100, r Boat No.243 to Rear- CAPTAIN, R.N. ers alongside were 10E ADMIRAL ommander Clouston and at only Sub. Lieutenant 6- JUN 1940 armaham are the only * A up. Aircraftsman DOVER nder Clouston dead in picked up. had remained to pick boat, which would have e top of the canopy, as out of action and the L have made our arrival continued.
Dynam 61. DOVER. 179 5 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, 270, in which the former boat was sunk. in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and I have the honour to submit the following report 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British Party. 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, and reported the loss of Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that only b.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. up 7. survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our arrival at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued
Dyram 61. DOVER. 179 4th June, 1940 TO: COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.S. "LYNX". Sir, 270, in which the former boat was sunk. in regard to the passage of Motor Boats No. 243 and I have the honour to submit the following report 2. The two boats left Dover under the command of Commander Clouston R.N. in R.A.F.Motor Boat No.243. The complements of the two boats consisted of the R.A.F. personnel and the Naval embarkation party on passage to Dunkirk, with two Naval French Officers and two French Party. Petty Officers who were acting as liason to the British 3. At 1900, when about 6 miles off Grave Lines, eight Junkers 87 planes were sighted. These attacked us with machine-gunsand small bombs. My boat avoided the first attack, but, on looking round, I saw that Commander Clouston's boat had a "near miss" from a bomb, and was heeling heavily to starboard. 4. During the next ten minutes, I was fully occupied in navigating my boat to avoid the attacking planes. When I next had time to look round for the other boat, only her bows were visible, and the whole crew were in the water. I closed the position, and slowed down to pick up survivors, but Commander Clouston ordered me to leave them immediately and proceed at full speed to Dunkirk. 5. I increased speed, and was shortly afterwards attacked again, and, during this attack, my boat was repeatedly hit by incendiary mandine-gun bullets, and my starboard engine was put out of action. The speed of the boat was reduced to six knots. I set a mean course for Dunkirk, and shortly afterwards, about half an hour after the commencement of the attacks, the enemy aircraft left us. 6. I proceeded to Dunkirk, arriving there at 2100, and reported the loss of R.A.F.Motor Boat No.243 to Rear- Admiral Wake Walker. Two Destpoyers alongside were warned to keep a good lookout for Commander Clouston and his crew, but I regret to report that unly Sub.Lieutenant Solomon R.N.V.R. and Aircraftsman Carmaham are the only survivors known to have been picked up. Aircraftsman Carmaham reported that he saw Commander Clouston dead in the water some hours before he was picked up. 7. In my opinion, if my boat had remained to pick up survivors, the extra load in the boat, which would have necessitated men being seated on the top of the canopy, added to the fact that one engine was out of action and the boat was making water slowly, would have made our arrival at Dunkirk most unlikely. continued
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