Details

Details

Details

Details

Details

CU] 1 1
The situation on the front that evening, SO far as it
was known, was that the Tenth French Army, which included
the 157 Infantry Brigade of the 52nd Division, Armoured
) Division (less one Brigade) and BEAUMAN Force, was holding
a line from the Sea West of the SEINE to NEUBOURG and
thence to CONCHES. Between the Southern flank of the
157 Infantry Brigade and DAMVILLE, there was & gap of some
8 miles, which was only lightly held by elements of the
3rd D.L.M. South of this area the Army of Paris was
supposed to be holding & line from DREUX to BONNECOURT on
the SEINE, but there was no confirmation that this Army
was actually in position.
14 JUNE
5. At 0830 hours I saw General WEYGAND. He spoke most
frankly and explained the situation to me. He said that
the French Army was no longer capable of organised resistance,
that it had now broken up into four groups - one of which
was the Tenth Army (General ALTMAYER) with which the B.B.F.
was operating - and that considerable gaps existed between
the groups.
the orders The of their own Commanders, but co-ordinated
Armies he explained, would continue to fight action under
of the force as & whole would no longer be possible. out.
Reserves were exhausted and many formations worn
He then Allied Covernments, BRITTANY was vicinity to of
informed me that, in accordance with be at defended decision
taken by the line across the peninsula in the to General
GEORGES' RENNES. by holding Headquarters He & suggested to that discuss we should with him proceed the details of
this project.
/ We
BEAUMAN Division was an improvised was
FOOTNOTE: ( )
organised as follows:-
The formation which, on 13th June,
of personnel from auxiliary military
"B" Bde Bde - - THE
212 213 - - - Army Engineers.
"E" "E" "C" 4 Provisional reonnel. - the the (improvised). Engineers.

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6
15. At 0810 hours I considered that my position at LE MANS
was too exposed, since there was no known body of troops
covering that area. I therefore moved my Headquarters back
to VITRE, just west of LAVAL. I took with me the G.O.C.
L. of C. Area, a part of whose Staff I had amalgamated with
my own since I was entirely dependent of L. of C. Signals
for my communications. My own staff consisted only of 4
officers and 2 clerks, the remainder having been stopped at
ST. MALO and sent back to England.
16. At 1230 hours the C.I.G.S. telephoned to say that
the Prime Minister was anxious about the withdrawal of the
52nd Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army).
The Prime Minister wished the embarkation to be cancelled,
as he feared the effect of such a withdrawal on the morale
of the French.
I pointed out that my plans had already received
approval, that orders had been issued for the move, and that
CHERBOURG and might well endanger it. The C.I.G.S., however,
any alterations now would complicate the embarkation of at
said that the Prime Minister did not wish the division to be
embarked without the approval of His Majosty's Government.
of At whereabouts of the enemy on the LE MANS front towards caused
17. this time the complete absence of any information
me the as any penatration of enemy troops safety
LAVAL some and anxiety, RENNES would have seriously endangered the
of the B.E.F.
18. again to the C.I.G.S. at 2150 hours. and I I
more explained to on him the need to evacuate 52nd The
I spoke him the situation as I knew it, Division once
(less impressed with Tenth French Army).
necessary kept idle. The air situation was also at
the detachment shipping was available at CHEREOURG that and time was being
favourable.
half later the C.I.G.S. gave and permission other
details the infantry of 52nd of the Division. Orders implementing
to embark one Division which were not needed these
An hour and Field a Regiment, one Field Company to support
instructions were at once issued.
CORNWALL'S tank Guns from orders for the protection of
19. Later that 52nd Division were put under the CHERBOURG
night another battalion and General a troop MARSHALL- of Anti-
peninsula at ST. SAUVEUR.
of the enemy's movements moment could to have be
obtained, No information but he did not appear at the
exploited the gap at LE MANS.
were 20. During reported the to have been avacuated from
preceding 24 hours just over the 12,000 different troops
ports.
/ 16 JUNE

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16 JUNE
21. At 0700 hours the C.I.G.S. rang me up and said that all
arrangements could be made for the evacuation of 52nd
Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army), but
that no actual movement was yet to take place. At 0830
hours, however, he rang up again and confirmed that 52nd
Division (less the detachment with Tenth French Army) could
now begin to embark: NORMAN Force itself was to continue
to co-operate with the Tenth French Army. I then asked
the C.I.G.S. what the policy should be with regard to troops
of the French Army who might wish to embark at CHEREOURG.
He informed me that they would be allowed to do so.
Orders for the embarkation of 52nd Division (less the
detachment with the Tenth French Army) were issued.
I issued orders to G.O.C. L. of C. to the effect that
work of re-embarkation of personnel, stores, and vehicles
was to continue at all ports as long as the tactical
situation permitted.
and from NORMAN Force showed that the enemy was on contact
ance was possible, but reports from Motor Contact Officers
22. Owing, once more, to poor visibility no air reconnaiss-
with the Tenth French Army along its front but that be was
Further to the South enemy movement seemed to be directed
attacking seriously only against 157 Infantry Brigade.
on CHARTRES.
which Information that the Fourth German Army was to attack and FREST. that
was received later from captured orders
day with showed the ultimate object of gaining CHERBOURG
52nd The C.I.G.S. (less the detachment with Tenth unable to
23. telephoned at 1325 hours to French confirm Army) that
could now embark. the future of NORMAN Force, Tenth to
Division He said that he was still which was
continue in the out that that Army was carrying LAVAL
give orders as to meantime to co-operate with the out French the
Army. I pointed had been ordered to withdraw should on be and
RENNES. BRITTANY Plan therefore and asked that NORMAN Force
allowed to I disengage and withdraw on CHERBOURG.
decision, The ring him up my
was not prepared to again give on the
arrival at my
24. reached to REDON At REDON 1430 which hours, soon lies that after about I moved it 1615 had 30 my miles hours. been Headquarters decided N. of I ST. then that S.W. that NAZAIRE, rang NORMAN from Army up and VITRE the Force
C.I.G.S. who said the Tenth French Army MARSHALL-CORNWALL until
was to stay with when General either to
could started withdraw to disintegrate, his force for embarkation CHERBOURG
or the nearest available Port.
25.

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25. I had previously arranged that 90,000 rations, as well
as ammunition, should be sent up to CHERBOURG, as this was
the port on which NORMAN Force would be based. Any altera-
tions to this plan at this stage would have caused & break-
down in the supply arrangements which were very difficult
because the roads were congested and the railways working.
spasmodically.
26. During that evening I was in touch with Ma.jor-General
J.S. DREW commanding the 52nd Division. He informed me
that he had embarked one of his brigades and expected to
proceed to the United Kingdom with his second brigade.
get the other away the next day. I gave him orders to
) 27. Brigadier J.G. des R. SWAYNE, Head of No. 2 Mission,
reported to me on his way to the United Kingdom.
I also dispatched Brigadier N.M. RITCHIE, B.G.S., 2nd
Corps to the United Kingdom that night, as there was no
longer need for his services in France on account of the
reduction of the number of troops.
28. Throughout the day the Germans maintained evening their
pressure on received from General MARSHALL-CORNIALL in
the Tenth French Army. In the &
message which he was it as his opinion that the Tenth French This Army
would disintegrate gave if it were seriously attacked.
R. was R.T.R.) who called at my Headquarters front the
opinion confirmed by his G.S.O.1 (Lieutenant-Colonel about
German hours continued, and the gap between the Tenth miles
2300 Briggs, that night. On the rest of the
wide. Army German forces were in this gap it was impossible and
French advance and the Army of Paris was well over 50
air say, reconnaissance as no was much hampered by low
to What allied fighting troops were in cloud the area and
thunderstorms.
29. the previous 24 hours about 47,000 have troops been and
250 vehicles During of all kinds were reported to
embarked.
17 JUNE
30. morning I received a message from French General
was in full retreat troops to CHERBOURG. His own CHEREOURG. Headquarters
MARSHALL-CORNWALL on LAVAL and RENNES, and
Early that to the effect that the Tenth that he was Army
withdrawing his AVRANCHES and would go next explained to the
were At 1015 moving hours, to I spoke to the C.I.G.S. and
situation to him.
/ On
to
FOOTNOTE:
(
)
a
Operations).

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On receiving General MARSHALL-CORNWALL's report I
ordered Air Commodore COLE-HAMILTON - Commanding the Air
Component - to move with two fighter squadrons and his one
flight of reconnaissance aircraft to the Channel Islands
whence he was to co-operate with NORMAN Force by carrying
out reconnaissance tasks and by protecting the embarkation
of that Force at CHERBOURG. As soon as he had completed
these tasks he was to proceed to the United Kingdom. The
remaining Fighter Squadron was to operate from BREST to give
close protection to that port during the embarkation of the
B.E.F.
31. At 1130 hours, I spoke to Air Marshal BARRATT, and
explained my plan to him. I also discussed with him the
arrangements for the withdrawal from LA ROCHELLE of his
party, which was defending NANTES and ST. NAZAIRE during the
evacuation. He expressed himself as satisfied with the
arrangements that were being made.
32. At 1300 hours, the C.I.G.S. telephonedand informed me
that the B.B.C. had reported that the PETAIN Covernment had
asked the Germans for an Armistice (this was subsequently
confirmed by Capitaine MERIC of the French Mission). He
directed to getting personnel away and afterwards, if the
agreed that, in view of this, all efforts should now be
situation allowed it, as much material as possible. He
United Kingdom that evening. I said that I would ring up
further agreed that I should leave with my staff for the
again about 3 to see if there were any final orders
and that, if I p.m. should be unable to communicate owing to the
cable being out, I would embark as arranged.
Officer (Captain ALLEN, R.N.) explained the situation and
I then saw General de FONBLANQUE and the Senior Naval
ordered them to make every effort to get all personnel away,
and also as many guns and vehiclesas possible.
33. hours I rang up the C.I.G.S. as arranged, hours but I
he had At 1445 returned to the War Office. At 1530 all
communications up again, with LONDON had been cut with at RENNES, any port and except that
rang not but was informed by Signals that
NANTES. did it was at also 1615 I, hours impossible therefore, - and Senior to proceeded decided get Naval in with to touch Officer leave my staff REDON to a and - point which the G.O.C. about I
H.M.S. hours. for 4 L. 34. miles of At C. outside Area and ST. the NAZAIRE. ST. NAZAIRE There Western I in remained which the Approaches armed in had until carrying been trawler 2045 was
not sent
enemy time,
survivors remained my available aircraft in from the that raids harbour afternoon. took during place, the which The but night. "CAMERIDGESHIRE" no had damage been During sunk was that done, by
although three enemy a few air bombs were dropped ashore.
/ 18 JUNE