Details

AMETHYST
A/S Trawler (?)
01000
30th May
On patrol, 9.2.5.60 (see Appx. J,
1st June
2300
Sailed
signal from J.16a and J.20).
2nd June
2nd June
On the patrol line with the tr. Spurs
1035
and another trawler (see Appx. J,
signals J.40 and 41) when they from
university
Di came under fire from shore guns.
1700
Salled. Ust for 11. Goodwin and
route X as for se Dunkirk west
channel.
3rd June
0010
Observed the first of the returning
transports, end escorted her.
0150
Opened fire on a plane.
0250
Opened fire on a plane.
0430
Pound 8 wooden M/S from Dunkirk with
100 Prench troops on board. This
ship, demaged in collision, had lost
her any, her crew being overshelmed
and unable to pull themselves
together.
The Amlena put a petty officer and
three men on board, and they brought
the vessel to Dover.
0900
Anchored off Dover.
2000
Sailed with the name orders as before.
yog very thick; compelled to return
and anchor off the N. Goodein.
4th June
0450
Bailed, to essort the transports from
Dunkirk which bed anchored in the
vicinity of the Amiens.
1850
Ordered to proceed under orders of the
dr. Spervier, and in company with the
Bl. Amiral Houches, to find and
take in LOW the French motor boat
V.T.B.26.
2100
Under orders of the Knervier.
Arrenged to sail in search of the
V.T.B. as about dawn [0400].
During the night, was informed that
V.T.B.26 had arrived at Clacton.
5th June
0600
Sent the Mouchet to Ramegate, and
proceeded to Largate.
N11
Authority - French Admiralty record, Polio No.22.
(1) Not mentioned in D.R.'s list of ships.
46

Details

AMIENS
French sloop (Aviso)
Capitaine de corvette
Monick.
1st June
2300
Sailed from Cherbourg.
2nd June
1035
Anchored off Dover. Received orders
to protect transports returning from
Dunkirk.
1700
Sailed. Set course for N. Goodwin and
route X as far as Dunkirk west
channel.
3rd June
0010
Observed the first of the returning
transports, and escorted her.
0150
Opened fire on a plane.
0250
Opened fire on a plane.
0430
Found a wooden M/S from Dunkirk with
100 French troops on board. This
ship, damaged in collision, had lost
her way, her crew being overwhelmed
and unable to pull themselves
together.
The Amiens put a petty officer and
three men on board, and they brought
the vessel to Dover.
0900
Anchored off Dover.
2000
Sailed with the same orders as before.
Fog very thick; compelled to return
and anchor off the N. Goodwin.
4th June
0450
Sailed, to escort the transports from
Dunkirk which had anchored in the
vicinity of the Amiens.
1850
Ordered to proceed under orders of the
dr. Epervier, and in company with the
sl. Amiral Mouchez, to find and
take in tow the French motor boat
V.T.B.26.
2100
Under orders of the Epervier.
Arranged to sail in search of the
V.T.B. at about dawn [0400].
During the night, was informed that
V.T.B.26 had arrived at Clacton.
5th June
0600
Sent the Mouchet to Ramsgate, and
proceeded to Margate.
Nil
Authority - French Admiralty record, Folio No.22.
47

Details

V.T.B.25
V.T.B.26
French fast M/B's (Vedettes)
3rd June
1500
Rear sloop Admiral Landriau (on board
ordered Savorgnan de Brazza at Dover) the
these two new French
Cherbourg, to proceed to Dunkirk and
vedettes, which had just arrived from
2200
report to Admiral Abrial.
The two vedettes arrived at Dunkirk and
2300
Admiral Abrial sailed for Dover in
secured alongside the Chasseur 11.
V.T.B.25. En route, this vessel
struck a wreck and damaged a propeller
but speed. was able to proceed at slow
4th June
0400ca
Near the North Goodwin, the V.T.B.25
assisted in picking up survivors
from the Belgian trawler Marechal
Foch. The dr. Malcolm, which was also
there, embarked Admiral Abrial, and
took V.T.B.25 in tow to Dover.
The V.T.B.26 with a damaged engine,
finished by securing to a buoy in
the mouth of the Thames. (1) No. of
passengers, if any, not known.
Authority - French Admiralty record, Folio No.9.
(1) The Amiens was ordered to search for the V.T.B.26 and states
that during the night of 4th/5th June, she was informed
that the V.T.B.26 had arrived at Clacton.
88 290

Details

30
ORKNEYS AND SHETLANDS COMMANDS-continued.
30A
KIRKWALL.
KIRKWALL
Base Ship.-Pyramus,
Armed (Trawlers.) Boarding Vessels.
SUMMARY OF MINOR FRENCH VESSELS.
Ship.
Type.
Crew.
Proposed
Service.
Ship.
Type.
Crew.
Proposed
[34] D Aquamarine A-
Service.
24th A/S Group (Trawlers).
[34] D Kingston Beryl D
At Portsmouth.
At Plymouth-contd.
Kirkwall.
[34] D Kingston
[34] Pentland Firth (S.O.) A D
Jacinth D
Chevxeuil A
-
Mine-
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
Pedrant
-
-
Trawler
British
sweeper
Portsmouth.
L/L Sweep.
[34] Arctic Explorer AD
Aberdeen.
Gaston Riviere
-
[34] D Kingston Onyx
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep.
La Capricieuse A
Mine-
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
[34] Hugh Walpole A D
Left Scapa 17 July.
A
sweeper
Portsmouth.
Andree et Louis -
Trawler
British
[34] P Kingston Peridot
L/L Sweep.
-
[34] Scalby Wyke A D
Aberdeen.
Patrol
British
D
Auxiliary Patiol,
Arras
Pessac
-
-
Boat
Portsmouth.
Auxiliary
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
[34] P Kingston
Portsmouth.
[34] Tekoura A D
-
Aberdeen.
Sapphire D
-
-
Patrol
British
Epinal
Auxiliary Patrol,
[34] P Kingston Topaz
Boat
Portsmouth.
Sauterne -
-
Auxiliary
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
Portsmouth.
D
[34] P Kingston
Diligente
-
Patrol
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
Boat
Portsmouth.
Turquoise D
Lucien Gougy
-
Auxiliary
-
Conversion
Under Pink.C.NorthernPat
W.L/L.
See
Amiens
-
Patrol
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
M/S Trawler (Ungrouped).
[34] D Northern Chief D
Boat
Portsmouth.
Groeland
-
Auxiliary
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
[34] Lune X D
-
Aberdeen. Repairs. Date
Lucienne Jean
-
Trawler
French
M/S Nore.
W.A.
uncertain.
[34] D Northern Duke
(L/L)
AD
Trawler
French
M/S Nore.
Poulmic
-
Auxiliary
1
[34] D Northern Foam D
Congre
-
-
1
Mine Watching,
(L/L)
Plymouth.
Beaulne-Verneuil
Boom
No
Asie A
-
-
Trawler
British
A/S trials,
[34] D Northern Gift D
Portsmouth.
Vessel
decision
La Frene
1
-
Tug
Contraband Control Service.
[34] D Northern Isles A D
Reine des Flots A
Trawler
British
A/S trials,
Portsmouth.
Peuplier - -
Tug
(Vessels of C.C. are being considered for reallocation to
other services.)
[34] P Northern
Quentin Roosevelt
Trawler
French
Auxiliary Patrol,
No
Princess A
Portsmouth.
Caporal Peugeot
Tug
decision
[34] P Northern Reward
Pierre Audre
-
Trawler
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
No. 4
1
-
Tug
Portsmouth.
[34] P Northern Sky A D
No. 5
-
Tug
La Nantaise A
-
Trawler
British
27 A/S Group.
C.C.S. Drifters.
[34] P Northern Sun A D
Phase
-
Marie Elena
-
Drifter
British
L/L Sweep.
At Falmouth.
Kirkwall
Rose Valley
Port Duties.
-
Lydd II D -
-
Kirkwall.
Commandant
Mine-
French
Nore.
At Plymouth.
Domine
sweeper
La Moqueuse
-
Mine-
French
Nore.
Rescue Tug.
Commandant
Mine-
French
Nore.
sweeper
Duboc
Conquerante
Patrol
British
Falmouth.
sweeper
-
Auxiliary Patrol,
St. Mellons D
-
Examination Vessels.
Coucy
Patrol
-
No decision.
Boat
W.A.
-
mood
Boat
Belle o' Moray
Belfort
Patrol
-
No decision.
Jaques Morgan
-
Trawler
British
Auxiliary Patrol,
-
-
W.A.
-
Boat
Beryl II - -
LERWICK.
Pomerol
-
-
Patrol
Polish
Tyne.
Nadine
-
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep.
Boat
Rambler Rose
Kirkwall.
Drifter.
Medoc
-
-
Patrol
Polish
Tyne.
Autioche
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep,
-
[33] Seabreeze
Boat
Strenuous
Listrac A
-
Trawler
British
A/S trials,
Dutch
-
(Flag F.O.I.C
Lerwick.
Jean Frederick
Trawler
Holyhead,
Plymouth.
Lemnos
Shetland)
L'Atlantique A
Trawler
British
A/S trials,
Notre Dame
Trawler
Dutch
Holyhead,
-
Aberdeen.
-
-
Repairs.
uncertain.
Date
Examination Service.
Plymouth.
De france
Jeanne Antoine
Trawler
No
Fear Not
Ambrose Pase A
Trawler
British
A/S trials,
decision
-
Lerwick.
Plymouth.
La Belle Poule
-
Schooner
No
decision
Heather Belle
-
Aiglon
-
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep.
-
L'Etoile
-
Schooner
No
decision
[34] St. Sunniva
Accommodation Ship.
Roche Velen
-
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep.
President T.
Survey
French
Nore.
Aberdeen.
Tissier
Ship
SULLOM VOE.
Louis et Marie
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep.
Notre Dame
f
Drifter
de Lourdes
No
Base Ship-Fox.
Nazareth
-
Trawler
British
L/I. Sweep.
decision
Armed Boarding Vessel.
Harbour Defence Patrol Craft.
Cambre
-
Drifter
Monique Audrer
Trawler
British
L/L Sweep.
[34] P Discovery II Under See Pink V.A.C. List. Northern Patrol.
[23] Aliped VF
-
Sullom Voe.
[23] Learig F
-
-
(C38488)

Details

Details

Details

APPENDIX 'B'
SURMARY OF OPERATIONS ON B.E.F. IN FRANCE
FROM 1ST TO 18TH JUNE 1940
1. After the evacuation of the main British Expeditionary
Force from Flanders in the first week of June the only
British troops remaining in France were the 51st Division,
which had been holding 3 sector of the Sarre Front, and
the incomplete 1st Armoured Division, which had begun its
disembarkation on 20th May and had been rushed up piscemeal
in a desperate effort to relieve the sorely tried right
flank of the B.E.F. By the 1st June this attenuated
Division, which was incomplete when disanbarked and had
lost heavily in its first engagement on the Somme, could
only muster roughly one third of its quota of tanks.
2. These two formations, the 51st Division and the 1st
Armoured Division, the only British fighting formations
General Altmayer, commanding Tenth French Army, which held
remaining in France, were placed under the orders of
the left sector of the Some front from Amiens to the S88.
The handling of the British troops, which had been delegated
to General Altmayer by General leygand, was co-ordinated
and supervisied by a British ilitary Mission at Tenth Army
Headquarters.
Somme sector was sixteen miles in-extent, an excessive
3. The frontage allotted to the 51st Division on the
Fre ch divisions were holding at the time owing to
amount, but probably not much greater than that which their many
action the Sarre front, and had had & long and arduous On
depleted resources. The Division had already been in
4th June the 51st Division Commander was ordered which to carry
journey on from the Eastern frontier to its new sector.
out the Abbeville bridgshead, for
operation an attack the newly on arrived French 31st Division and was 8 placed
under as well PS 160 French tanks
of was effective co-operation between British notice,
however, considerable not a success, ainly owing to the and
his orders, reinforcement of French artillery. difficulty The attack,
French arranging guns and tanks at such casualties... short and
the 51st infantry, Division suffered fairly heavy
4. On the following against the whole front to the
day (5th June) the Garmang held launched by the
Seventh a powerful and offensive Tenth French Armies, from in an St. exhausted uentin condition, sea.
Tenth The The after from too Division 51st wide the Army 12 a days Division front, Commander, front fought of replied to continual was bravely, be when by able that widely this asked movement to but he time resist scattered had was to no relieve and forced effectively. reserves battle, posts. back the available. Division and by Owing German was The holding
to infiltration the extent between of its frontago its the division had no depth
/in its

Details

in its defences, had had no time to organize rearward
defences, nor any reserves with which to counter-attack.
It was forced back to the line of the river Bresle, the
next natural obstacle, 15 miles in rear.
5. Meanwhile the 1st Armoured Division was refitting
south of the Seine. Its tanks were in poor mechanical
condition, owing not only to battle casualties but also to
the long road distances they had been forced to cover,
and to the lack of opportunity for adequate maintenance.
It was in fact in no condition for offensive operations.
6. On the 7th June the Garmans out in & smashing attack
with their 5th and 7th Amoured Divisions on the point of
junction between the two Corps of the Tenth French Army.
This drive was directed from west of Amiens on Rouen and
the lower Seine, with the object of splitting the Tenth
Army and cutting off its IX Corps between the Saina
Estuary and Dieppe. The IX French Corps than comprised
the British 51st Division on the extrema left, and then
further east the 31st and 40th French Divisions and the
2nd and 5th Light Cavalry Divisions. The wh le of this
force was completely sundered from the X Corps on its
right by the penetration of the German tanks.
British base at Rouen, General Sir Henry Karslake, 0.0.0.
7. Meanwhile, owing to the threat developing to the
the Lines of Communication, had scraped together an
improvised force for its local defence. This force
comprised nine infantry battalions of a sort; they
out to France for pioneer duties and partly of composite
consisted partly of second line Territorial units sent
base. They had no war equipment except rifles and &
units made up from miscellaneous reinforcements at the
never fired before. guns They were without artillery, wans
few odd Bren and enti-tank weapons, which they had
District, units were of the formation, this transport command heterogeneous thus was Lines misled given complete of and Brigadier the of signal into Communication. collection with t tile thinking equipment. artillery Besuman, of had of Division; that untrained been in and Vary it They charge given was ancillary unfortunately were The $ and the of righting French the placed task ill-aquipped services. orth of under
Beauman's holding back so-called line along Division the Rivers Bethung and Andella the
covering a Rouen, and had done good work in organizing
defence of this position.
on While the Cerman of the 7th June, General Weygand personally impressed
8. armoured attack was at its height
visited the afternoon Headquarters east of Rouen and the
on Tenth Army and on General Evans commanding holding the
German attack Armoured on the Seine at all costs as this
British General Altmayer, Division, the necessity for was "the
decisive battle of the war.
/It

Details

It was now becoming obvious that to enable the IX Corps
to fall back in good order to the line of the Lower Seine,
a cover position would have to be held along. the River
Andelle, some 12 miles east of Rouen. General Evans, there-
fore, at once ordered his 3rd Armoured Brigade (in fact
reduced to some four weak squadrons of 30 tanks in all)
to stiffen up the right flank of Beauman's defensive line.
9. On the 8th June the German amoured drive continued
on the Axis Amiens - Rouen, and succeeded in penetrating
the weak British defences on the watershed butween the
Rivers Andelle and Bethune, west of Forges-Les-Baux.
Beauman's ill-equipped units, with the British tanks
supporting them, fell back to the line of the Soino.
That night German armoured units penstrated into Rouen,
and the French Tenth Army lost all touch from then onward
with its IX Corps in the Pouen - Dieppe cul-de-sac.
10. The 51st Division was thus completely cut off from
its proper line of retirement via Rouen. This was mainly
due to the failure or inability of the French High Command
to withdraw their left wing while there was still time
and space for this manoeuvre. Throughout all these
operations it was becoming clear that the French High
Command was issuing "die in the last ditch orders, which
their troops had no intention of carrying out. From this
time onwards, until the final evacuation of the B.E.F. on
was crushed and that it had little Intention of offering
the 18th, it was obvious that the spirit of the French Aray
serious resistance. This spirit was also shared by the
Headquarters literally ceased to function for 48 hrs; It
higher commanders; on the 8th June the Tenth French Army
had lost all touch, and its X Corps was broken and in full
retreat.
11. The had on the 9th June reached the line of
The 3rd Armoured and Brigada and Beauman's fragmentary units
the Seine Germans had ustablished bridgeheads at several points.
which had been refitting at Louviers, was put in to support
were withdrawn to reorganize, and the 2nd Amounted Brigade,
General hold de la Laurencie's south III Corps of Rouen. which was It was trying now to
being apparent to the 12. drive Tenth the It employed was Seine Laurie, that south-west French at sent an the elsewhere, this crossings able was out Army German critical towards and rushed to from France. cool-headed armoured while the up On Alencon juncture and the Armee three Its units ni placed with commander, de leading ht that Army Paris. and of & under Corps the view 12th/13th air brigade, 52nd Brigadier the to force were separating Division orders June were detached the
or it the Tenth Freuch right Army. sector of the III Corps frontenst of 8 miles of
Conches, took over the very exposed position, with & battalions gap on
on its right, in a and two newly arrived French
its left west of Evreux.
/AS

Details

PRELIMINARY EVENTS
CHAP. I
17TH MAY
French 9th Army front broken
By the early morning of the 17th May, the situation on the French 9th Army's
front had become grave. The French line was broken, and enemy armoured
and mobile forces had crossed the river Oise. East of St. Quentin, there was
a gap of at least 20 miles in which there appeared to be no organised resistance.¹
The enemy break-through was now offering an imminent threat to the British
rear G.H.Q. at Arras, to the communications over the Somme at Amiens and
Abbeville, and to the base areas. To meet this, every available man and
weapon were collected. A mobile bath unit, for example, took part in the
defence of St. Pol; General Construction Companies of the Royal Engineers,
and many units of the Royal Army Service Corps, set to work to place their
localities in a state of defence, and manned them until overwhelmed, relieved
or ordered to withdraw.
These numerous delaying actions, though small in themselves, all contributed
to gain the time required for the withdrawal of the main forces.2 A force was
also organised to guard against a more immediate threat to the B.E.F.'s right
flank; and, as a further precaution against the risk of being out-flanked on
the right, the withdrawal to the Dendre and thence to the Escaut was continued
without pause.³
18TH MAY
Allied rail communications severed
By the merning of the 18th May the Belgians had effected a junction with the
B.E.F. left flank at Alost, on the Dendre. From the B.E.F.'s right flank the
French line ran through Mons and Maubeuge.
During the day, the enemy, pounding westward, had penetrated as far as
Amiens in sufficient strength to sever rail communications with the Allies'
bases.
On the night of the 18th-19th May, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Corps of the B.E.F.
completed their withdrawal to the line of the Escaut without interference, and
prepared to defend the line of that river. (The French 1st Army completed its
withdrawal by the following day and was in touch with the right of the British
1st Corps).
Meanwhile, inundations were being carried out southward by the French;
unfortunately however, without regard to the front of the B.E.F.,4 where it was
soon found that the level of water in the Escaut was becoming so low that the
river was fast ceasing to form a serious obstacle.
After a conference that night with General Billotte, Lord Gort formed the
opinion that there was an imminent danger of the forces in the north-eastern
area - that is the French forces next to the sea, the Belgian Army, the B.E.F.
and the bulk of the French 1st Army on its right - being irretrievably cut off
from the main French forces in the south.⁴ The event three days later showed
this opinion to have been fully justified.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 24.
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 25.
3 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 26.
4 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
3

Details

CHAPTER II
THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO,"
19TH - 25TH MAY, 1940
19TH MAY
Compulsory withdrawal of B.E.F. foreseen
Gort was forced to the conclusion Continent possibility of a compulsory with-
A crisis was now approaching. After that considering the various alternatives, Lord
General Staff, Lieut-General H. the R. War Pownall, telephoned to the Director
drawal of the B.E.F. from the must be faced, and so his Chief of the
Military Operations and Plans at Office and discussed this possibility. of
at Abbeville were still holding, but there was little doubt that enemy armoured
On this 19th day of May communications by road and rail over the Somme
forces in that area would shortly break through to the coast. The force could
then no longer be supplied through in the ports south of the Somme, and the great
be available for maintaining replacements.¹
bulk of the reserves, which were the rearward areas, would shortly cease to
R.A.F. Component begins return to England
The growing failure of communications had now made it impracticable for
the British air organisation to function, and by the evening orders had to be
given for a large proportion of the R.A.F. Component of the B.E.F. (Air Vice-
Marshal C.H.B. Blount) to return to England.
Equally serious was the fact that, by the evening, German troops had arrived
in Amiens. The picture was no longer that of a line bent or temporarily
broken, but of a besieged fortress.²
Vice-Admiral, Dover, represented at War Office conference
Meanwhile, in London, following the receipt of General H. R. Pownall's
message, a meeting had been held at the War Office at which Vice-Admiral
B. H. Ramsay (Vice-Admiral, Dover), was represented.
This meeting discussed the temporary maintenance of the B.E.F.-and the
evacuation other of its personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Among
questions considered was the possiblity of "the hazardous evacuation of
known very large forces." So little, apparently, was the true military situation then
seven of days later it developed into Operation "Dynamo". "The main decision
in London that this problem was regarded as "unlikely," though only
delegated disposal." to the Vice-Admiral Dover, and available shipping placed at his
this meeting," says Vice-Admiral Ramsay, "was that the control must be
Channel ports the German objective
enemy down the armoured forces appeared to be directed deepened
On the 20th May the breach south of Arras and widened; the
the Channel valley ports. of the Somme on Abbeville, the on other two main doubtless objectives - making one for
2 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 30.
2 I Lord Lord Gort's Second Despatch,
Gort's Second Despatch, para. para, 31. 32.
4

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
General Weygand directing Allied operations
During this day also, Lord Gort became aware that Allied operations were
actually being directed by General Weygand (successor to General Gamelin),
who announced later, on 23rd May, that he was Commander-in-Chief in all
theatres of war.¹
The first move in this so-called "Weygand plan," (see under 23rd-24th May),
now became apparent when General Sir Edmund Ironside, the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, arrived at Lord Gort's G.H.Q. with instructions from
the British Cabinet that the B.E.F. was to move southward upon Amiens,
attacking all enemy forces encountered and taking station on the left of the
French Army. This move, Lord Gort pointed out, was impracticable because
it would involve the disengagement of seven British divisions which were actually
in close contact with the enemy on the Escaut, and would be immediately
followed up by the enemy. In any case, owing to the prospective interruption
by the enemy of the B.E.F.'s line of supply, imminent at any moment, it was
unlikely that the B.E.F. could undertake sustained offensive operations.
Lord Gort had, however, already made plans to counter-attack with two
divisions southward of Arras, and now proposed that they should make this
attack on the following day. The C.I.G.S. agreed with this action.¹
R.A.F. Component to set up rear H.Q. at Hawkinge
Meanwhile, the evacuation of the R.A.F. Component was proceeding, and
it was decided to set up its rear headquarters at Hawkinge, in England.2
Naval Staff at Dover considers large-scale evacuation
At Dover, the possiblity of a large-scale evacuation was now definitely fore-
seen for a meeting of the Naval Staff was held there during the day to consider
the emergency evacuation across the channel of very large forces. This meeting,
which was attended by Liaison Officers from the War Office Movement Control
and the Ministry of Shipping, considered the number of personnel vessels and
small craft available; it agreed that the air protection of sailings, embarkations
and disembarkations was to be arranged by Vice-Admiral, Dover, direct with
Fighter Command; and it called attention to the necessity, in the event of
evacuation, for a large number of small boats to carry the troops from the very
gradually shoaling beaches to the off-shore ships. Furthermore, as it was
considered extremely doubtful whether the whole of the troops to be evacuated
could be lifted from the beaches, it was urged that if at all possible, the ports
must be used as well"3. It is evident that, at this date, it was not yet realised
that the only port available for the evacuation would be Dunkirk.
Provision of small craft considered
After this meeting at Dover, a long series of telephone conversations took
place between the V-A. Dover, the Admiralty, the Ministry of Shipping and
the C. in C. Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evacuation
and the provision of naval personnel for manning the skoots⁴ and small boats
required for transport and ferrying.
I Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 32.
2 R.A.F. Narrative.
3 D.R.
4 Dutch schuyts or coasters.
5

Details

THE EVACUATION FROM DUNKIRK
CHAP. II
refugees who got on board. The numbers evacuated by the destroyers con-
cerned were approximately :-
Keith
180
Vimy
...
...
150
Whitshed
...
...
580
Vimiera
...
...
Wild Swan
1955 403 (in two trips)
...
...
Windsor
...
600
Venomous
...
500
Total
...
4368
The Venetia, damaged, did not get alongside a quay. During the night
22 23rd May, before the evacuation under fire, the Verity took off two General
Officers and some 150 troops.
In addition to the Venetia, the Wild Swan, Whitshed, Keith and Venomous
all received damage during the evacuation. The Keith lost Captain D. (19) and
7 ratings killed, and had 28 wounded; the Vimy had one officer killed and her
Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Comdr. C. G. W. Donald R.N. was seriously
wounded and died subsequently ; the Whitshed lost one officer killed and had
12 ratings wounded; the Venetia had 20 ratings killed or missing and 11
wounded; the Commanding Officer of the Verity, Lt. Cdr. A. R. M. Black R.N.
was wounded and subsequently died.
23RD 24TH MAY
The "Weygand" Plan
In the midst of this changing panorama of events, on the 23rd May, General
Weygand became Commander-in-Chief in all theatres of war". He had,
however, previously formulated the ' Weygand plan". This plan contem-
plated a counter-offensive on a large scale¹ and, briefly, it consisted of 3
operations:- :-
(a) An attack south-westward from the north, by the French 1st Army
and the B.E.F., with the Belgian Cavalry Corps supporting the
British right.
(b) An attack northward from the line of the Somme, which line the newly
formed Third French Army Group was reported to be organising.
(c) Operations on the line of the Somme west of Amiens, by a new Cavalry
Corps which was assembling south of the river near Neufchatel.
On the 23rd May Lord Gort received a telegram from the British Prime Minister
to extract:- the French Prime Minister, M. Reynaud, of which the following is an
"Strong Salvation enemy armoured forces have cut Armies.
gand's plan. of these I Armies can only be obtained communications by immediate of execution Northern of Wey-
north Not could feeling sure that the situation armies in the
to General be accurately appreciated developing for the Lord Allied Gort telegraphed
I Sir John Dill asking him to except fly over on the that spot, day.
Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38
10

Details

THE WEEK BEFORE OPERATION "DYNAMO"
CHAP. II
On the following day (24th May), however, the Prime Minister again con-
ferred with M. Reynaud and General Weygand in Paris ; an extract is quoted
below from the telegraphic report of this conference which Lord Gort received
from the Secretary of State for War :
"Both are convinced that Weygand's plan is still capable of execution and only in
its execution has [?lies] hope. of restoring the situation. Weygand reports French
VII Army is advancing successfully and has captured Péronne, Albert, and
Amiens It is essential that you should make every endeavour to co-operate in
this plan. Should however, situation on your communications make this at any
time impossible you should inform us so that we can inform French and make
Naval and Air arrangements to assist you should you have to withdraw on the
north coast"¹.
Lord Gort says that he fully appreciated the importance of attacking
early, before the enemy could bring up his infantry in strength, but facts had
to be faced "!. These were some of the facts :-
(a) General Weygand's report of the recapture of Péronne, Albert and
Amiens was, says Lord Gort, 'inaccurate None of these three
towns on the line of the Somme had been recaptured.
(b) Two British divisions were still closely engaged with the enemy, and
three others were awaiting relief by the French and Belgians, and
would not become available for a further 48 hours.¹
(c) Only about 300 rounds per gun were immediately available to the
B.E.F., and with communications cut the prospect of further supply
was remote.¹
(d) Serious losses in Allied tanks had already been suffered and could
not be replaced.¹
(e) The Belgian cavalry was unlikely to be able to engage, at short notice,
in a battle 40 miles away, and on French soil.¹
Nevertheless, after consultation with General Blanchard, Lord Gort agreed
that in order to implement their share of the Weygand plan they should attack
southwards with 2 British divisions, one French division and a French Cavalry
Corps. The attack however, could not take place till the 26th May at the
earliest, owing to the reliefs in progress and the need to assemble the 2 British
divisions which were still closely engaged with the enemy.¹ Furthermore,
Lord Gort emphasised, both to the Secretary of State and to General Blanchard,
that the principal effort must come from the south, and that the operation of
the northern forces could be nothing more than a sortie.
It will be seen therefore that the British and the French Governments were
both urging a counter offensive on a large scale, barely 48 hours before the
Dunkirk evacuation became a desperately urgent necessity.
24TH MAY
The Allied position on the canal line was considerably strengthened during
the 24th May. On this day also Lord Gort prepared for the proposed counter-
attack southwards on the 26th May, with the ultimate objective Plouvain -
Marquion - Cambrai. In effect, this attack was never carried out.
Fighting troops hold on at Calais
In the meantime the evacuation of Boulogne was completed. At Calais
evacuation was limited to non-fighting personnel. The fighting troops held
on, and a supply ship [the Benlawers]² with stores and transport unloaded for
them at Calais.
1 Lord Gort's Second Despatch, para. 38.
2 T.M. 6213/40.
11

Details

Details

PLAN 1
Soate of Miles
10
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The German
break-through
on 17th.18th
KENT
OSTEND
ANTWERP
DUNKIRK LA PANNE NIEUPORT
BRUGES
18th MAY
may
13th
MAY ON MAPS IN LORD CORTS DESPATCH
R.M.
FURNES
Yser
GAND
MALINES
GRAVELINES
a
BERGUES
CALAIS
SPYKE
RIYS
R.Senna
ALOST
WORMHOUTE
th
F.
LOUVAIN
YPRES
18MAY
Phyle
WATTEN
COURTRAI
MENIN
Escaut
BRUSSELS
13th MAY
CASSEL
COMINES
BOULOGNE
StOMER
R.Dendre
WAVRE
HAZEBROUCK
ARMENTIERES
P.LYS
AIRE
MERVILLE
LILLE
ATH
R.Meuse
EXOLISH
NAMUR
StAMAND
LA BASSEE
R.Sambre
VALE CIENNES
DOUAI
Fscaut
RRA
R.
18th MAY
18thMAY
13th:MAY
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
ABBEVILLE
R
2.50mm
ALBERT
DIEPPE
PERONNE
AMIENS
st QUENTINE
18th MAY
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oire
Approximiste BritishFrenchead Belgiadine on 13ᵗʰ May:
R.Aisne
"
" " 18th " :
German break break-through shewn in blue
RMass
TSD/HS (655)
C.B.H. 16675- Wt.41534 Dd. -625-6/49

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
N
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
.
30ᵗMAY
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
+
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
30th May
May
+
4.
FURNES
MALINES
Yser
GAND
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
LINES
C
GRAVE
STATES
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
R
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
Escant
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
Dandre
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
ZEBROUCK
INS
ARMENTIERES
R.
R
AIRE
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
St. AMAND
NAMUR
.
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R.
Sambre
St.POL
.
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
BARRAS
Escaut
a
CAMBRAI
OULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
R.Somme
PERONNE
him
AMIENS
StQUENTIN
French 10th Arm
MEZIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
Mause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May.
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shewn in blue
TSD/HS (ESG)
C.B.H.16675

Details

PLAN 2
Scale ofMiles
to
5
o
10
20
30
40
&
The Allied
withdrawal into
18th MAY
the Dunkirk
KENT
GSTEND
30thmay
BRUGES
ANTWERP
PANNE
perimeter on the
NIEUPORT
23rd MAY
+ 30th May May +
+
x
FURNES
GAND
MALINES
LINES
Yser
BASED ON MAPS IN LORD GORT'S DESPATCH
C
SAYKER
BERGUES
R.Lys
ALOST
a
WORMHOUTE
LOUVAIN
CHANNEL
YPRES
COURTRAI
R.Dyle
WATTE
MENIN
BRUSSELS
.
R
St. OMER
CASSEL
COMINES
WAVRE
BOULDONE
.
Dandre
ZEBROUCK
IVS
ARMENTIERES
R.
AIRE
LALT
MERVILLE
ATH
LILLE
23rd:MAY
Meuse
23rd MAY
.
St. AMAND
NAMUR
BASSEE
CARVIN
.
18th MAY
R
Sambre
St.POL
VALENCIENNES
DOUAI
ARRAS
R.Escaut
CAMBRAI
DOULLENS
BEVILLE
B
ALBERT
Somme
PERONNE
AMIENS
him
St.QUENTIN
French 10th Army
MEDIERES
SEDAN
R.Oise
RMause
The Dunkirk Perimeter on 30th May
Allied line on 18th Щау
French 3rd Army R.Aisne
Approximate British, French and Belgiantine on 23rd May
German progress shown in blue
TSD/HS (E56)
C.B.H.16675

Details

Page 8.
s OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART II - FOREIGN WARSHIPS
POLISH
BLYSKAWICA
FRENCH
AMIENS
DILIGENTE
MARCEAU
AMIRAL MOUCHEZ
EPERVIER
MISTRAL
ARRAS
FLORE
M.T.B. 24
BELFORT
#
FOUDROYANT
SIMOUN
BOUCLIER
IMPETUEUSE
SIROCCO
#
BOURRASQUE
INCOMPRISE
T. 112
BRANLEBAS
LEOPARD
T. 113
CYCLONE
T. 143
DUTCH
NETHERLAND MOTOR-BOAT M 74
# Sunk

Details

Page 8.
LIST OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATION "DYNAMO" - 26TH MAY - 4TH JUNE, 1940
PART II - FOREIGN WARSHIPS
POLISH
BLYSKAWICA
FRENCH
AMIENS
DILIGENTE
MARCEAU
AMIRAL MOUCHEZ
EPERVIER
MISTRAL
ARRAS
FLORE
M.T.B. 24
BELFORT
#
FOUDROYANT
SIMOUN
BOUCLIER
IMPETUEUSE
#
SIROCCO
#
BOURRASQUE
INCOMPRISE
T. 112
BRANLEBAS
LEOPARD
T. 113
CYCLONE
T. 143
DUTCH
NETHERLAND MOTOR-BOAT M 74
#
Sunk