← Document collections
TNA / ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792

TNA ADM 199 792
Collection details

TNA ADM 199 792

Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.

Holding archive
TNA
Collection reference
ADM 199 792
View the archive catalogue entry ↗

Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Showing only pages tagged with the vessel name Deal. Tags are exact matches from this collection’s OCR tag index. Clear vessel filter ×
Showing only document page 52. Show all matching pages ×

1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.

List page 1 of 1 Showing document pages 52–52 of this collection
Page ImageOCR textOCR tags
52 Page 52 Log in to enlarge

CONFIDENTIAL 114
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
8
Page 3. 11?
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
consisted
Attempts of the following:- by the enemy to frustrate the operation
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfiro by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying hours by aircraft. Minelaying during the and was probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, dark following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk the Roads maintained with great intensity during mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route x and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering and the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note that only two British ships are known for certain to have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational area were blown up by what was at first thought to be a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were victims of moored mines. The impunity with which degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily mined area alone made the operation possible and one reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines, the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first occasion on which a massed target of ships was presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at this early date. From then onwards the scale and vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in the approach channels, were subjected every two hours to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal with the situation. In this connection experience appears to indicate that in simil ar circumstances fighters must be present in such numbers that they can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and bombing formations. Otherwise the enemy bombers remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, Route two and two trawlers, while the north 26 miles
Y further was destroyers in use. the When south the westward, middle Route was brought X, some into though use the to M.T.B. units failed to follow up, the the continuous stream and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads Commander. provienemy of unescorted traffic during ded dark a hours tempting target to any enterprising (a)/

Raw OCR

Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 52.

CONFIDENTIAL 114
Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
8
Page 3. 11?
7. ENEMY EFFORTS TO FRUSTRATE OPERATION.
consisted
Attempts of the following:- by the enemy to frustrate the operation
(a) Minelaying by aircraft.
(b) Intensive air attack.
(c) Action by Motor Torpedo Boats.
(a) Gunfiro by coast artillery.
(e) Submarine operations.
(a) Minelaying hours by aircraft. Minelaying during the
and was probably commenced during the night 28th-29th, dark
following two nights. Not only were the Dunkirk the Roads
maintained with great intensity during
mined, including the Zuydecoote Pass, but also Route
x and the area round the Kwinte buoy. Folkestone
Dover Harbour entrances were also mined. Considering and
the number of mines laid, it is interesting to note
that only two British ships are known for certain to
have been mined, the personnel vessel MONA's QUEEN
and the F.A.A. Yacht GRIEVE. 1 Hospital Carrier was
damaged at anchor off Dover when a mine was blown up
by a LL. trawler sweeping close at hand. Two A/S
trawlers on patrol to the northward of the operational
area were blown up by what was at first thought to be
a M.T.B., but later evidence suggests they were
victims of moored mines. The impunity with which
degaussed ships were able to operate in this heavily
mined area alone made the operation possible and one
reaches the conclusion that if the enemy on this
occasion had had at hand the means of laying moored
contact mines by aircraft, instead of magnetic mines,
the results would have been very different.
(b) Air Attack. On the evening of the 29th, the first
occasion on which a massed target of ships was
presented in Dunkirk Harbour, the enemy seized the
opportunity for air attack in great strength, and it
was only by good fortune that the vital Dunkirk
Harbour channel was not blocked by sinking ships at
this early date. From then onwards the scale and
vigour of the air attack increased, and during the
1st June all ships in Dunkirk, off the beaches, or in
the approach channels, were subjected every two hours
to an unprecedented scale of air attack by aircraft
in such numbers, that the R.A.F. were unable to deal
with the situation. In this connection experience
appears to indicate that in simil ar circumstances
fighters must be present in such numbers that they
can simultaneously attack both enemy fighting and
bombing formations. Otherwise the enemy bombers
remain undisturbed to continue their bombing attacks.
The scale of enemy air attack on the 31st and
1st was primarily responsible for the suspension of
daylight evacuation from the 2nd June.
(c) Attack by M.T.B.s. These caused 4 casualties, namely, Route
two and two trawlers, while the north 26 miles
Y further was destroyers in use. the When south the westward, middle Route was brought X, some into though use
the to M.T.B. units failed to follow up, the the
continuous stream and the ships lying in Dunkirk Roads Commander. provi-
enemy of unescorted traffic during
ded dark a hours tempting target to any enterprising (a)/