TNA ADM 199 792

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Report on Operation "DYNAMO".
CONFIDENTIAL
115
Page 4.
8
(d)
Shore
Artillery.
At
the
the southern batteries Route Z was found commencement to be under of the operation,
from only be used by near night. Calais, The and consequently gunfire could
only by night fire to when later the northern batteries Route near Y was usable
brought too narrow to permit bear on the Zuydecoote Pass, Nieuport which was
running Route X was gauntlet of fire. By this time, however,
the a reasonable chance of ships
batteries available, and was free of gunfire
German Dunkirk near Gravelines brought its exit until into
the Roads under gunfire. This occurred in
with the of enemy air attack, led to the
the afternoon result on Saturday, 1st June, and in conjunction
suspension of daylight traffic altogether.
(e) Submarines. U-boats do not appear to have caused any
casualties. It is unlikely that the one thought to
be present penetrated further than the northern Route Y.
It may well be that this U-boat laid moored mines, which
are thought to have caused the loss of two A/S trawlers.
8.
AIR CO-OPERATION.
The system of co-operation between the Naval and
R.A.F. Commands does not permit of direct contact with the
R.A.F. operational units allocated for duty with the Naval
Command. For this reason much time appears to be lost
and the needs of the ever-changing situation may not be
provided for. Delays and lag occur, resulting often in
the R.A.F. effort being brought to bear either in the
wrong place or at the wrong time, or with inadequate force
to meet the current situation. The requirement is for
the Naval Commander in charge of an operation to be able to
convey his requirements direct to the R.A.F. Commander of
the R.A.F. Operational Units, and for this latter officer
to communicate direct to the Naval Commander the steps that
he is taking to meet the stated requirement.
It is unnecessary to stress the vital necessity
for effective air co-operation in an operation of this
nature. Not only did unopposed German air effort interrupt
and reduce seaborne traffic, but it also prevented
embarkation by suspending troop movement. To both Naval
and Military observers on the coast, the situation at times
was extremely disheartening. Rightly or wrongly, full air
protection was expected, but instead, for hours on end the
ships offshore were subjected to a murderous hail of bombs
and machine gun bullets.
Required by their duty to remain offshore waiting
for the troops, who themselves were unable to move down to
the water for the same reason, it required the greatest
determination and sense of duty, amounting in fact to
heroism, on the part of the ships' and boats' crews, to
enable them to complete their mission.
In their reports, the Commanding Officers of many
ships, while giving credit to the R.A.F. personnel for
gallantry in such combats as were observed from the ships,
at the same time express their sense of disappointment and
surprise at the seemingly puny efforts made to provide air
protection during the height of this operation.
In this connection, as one Commanding Officer
remarks, the formations of our own fighters when operating
machines surprise down than were enemy, and feelings
was no area were to so the observer to note that more of
over the outnumbered by enemy aircraft British that it
disgust were were engendered shot on listening in to the B.B.C. of report