Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
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CONFIDENTIAL |
Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 55.
CONFIDENTIAL 118 Report on Oneration "DYNAMO". Page 7. 116 CONFIDENTIAL 115 Report on Operation "DYNAMO". Page 6. re 117 fighting formations were encountered. French troops handl ist were either demoralised and had to be controlled by force or n by the use of fire-arms, or were so rigidly bound by disciplin and tradition that they would not embark except by complete formation under their own unit officers. In either case, the rate of embarkation was much slower than with British troops. 12. INITIATIVE SHOWN BY COMMANDING OFFICERS AND last SUBORDINATE PERSONNEL. A most satisfactory feature of the operation was the high degree of initiative shown by Commanding and Subordinate Officers of units operating off the coast, ranging from H.M. Destroyers to comandeered motor boats. The majority of officers and ratings in command were in situations requiring independent action in extrenely difficult S conditions. Often the easiest course was to be satisfied with work already achieved' and to return to the United Kingdom with a final load of troops. The reverse action was invariably executed, namely, continued operation off the 1 coast as long as there were both troops ashore to be n. evacuated and vessels off shore to receive them. If the craft in use was damaged or sunk the crew invariably seized some other boat to continue their efforts. gh Unaware of the military situation ashore and ofter forced to move westward by bombardment from German artillery or even by rifle fire from advancing German forces, the majority of these boats, commanded often by stokers or ure hostility only seamen, had only one object in view, to lif from the beach any, and all troops, British or Allied, with sight of the water's edge. e On their return to the United Kingdom when asked report their proceedings it was only in answer to direct enquiry that it would transpire that these young men had subjected, in many cases, to an unparalleled bombardment an the air. They appeared to consider that this was part of day's work requiring no comment. ork 13. LOSSES OF TROOPS AFTER EMBARKATION. It is a distressing fact that many ships were or damaged on the return voyage when laden with troops. is fortunate that in most of such cases the majority of troops were saved owing to the large volume of traffic t) was coming and going between Dunkirk and the United King Exceptions to this were due to the rapidity with which ce cer ships sank after having been bombed or torpedoed, Such cases" are as follows:- loat WAKEFUL torpedoed. Ship broke in half and only those on hore, the upper deck were saved. About 600 troops were belostaff CRESTED EAGLE. Was bombed and then beached in a burning ven condition. Only about 300 saved out of 600 on board ence to SKIPJACK. 250 - 300 troops on board, most of whom, Chi unfor tunately, went down with the ship when sh sank. aff, Bombed