Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
1 matching pages. OCR may contain transcription errors.
| Page | Image | OCR text | OCR tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| 59 |
|
122 |
Unformatted machine-generated OCR for document page 59.
122 CONFIDENTIAL. Page i. 0 Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events. 120 1189 6/5 INTRODUCTION. As far as the Dover Command is concerned, the genesis of this operation took place at a War Office Meeting on Sunday, the 19th May, 1940, at which the Vice Admiral, Dover, was represented. This Meeting discussed (1) Temporary maintenanced of the B.E.F. through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, and (2) Evacuation of personnel through Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne. Under this last item was included, amongst other items, the problem of "the hazardous evacuation of very large Forces." This was considered "to be unlikely". (This problem ne ultimately became that of Operation Dynamo). 1e The main decision of this Meeting was that the control must be delegated to the Vice Admiral, Dover, and available 1 shipping placed at his disposal. 3, Further Meetings were held at Dover on the 20th May, and at the War Office on the 2lst May, to consider the "emergency n evacuation across the Channel of very large Forces." These Le Meetings determined the number of personnel vessels and small craft available, and confirmed that the control of all sea movements rested with the Vice Admiral, Dover, a liaison officer from the War Office Movement Control and from the Ministry of Shipping being attached to the Vice Admiral. The need for air protection of sailings, including the period of embarkation and disembarkation was recognised, and was to be arranged by the Vice Admiral, Dover, direct with the Fighter Command. The reception arrangements at the points of disembarkation were provided for. At the Dover Meeting it was pointed out that in the event of evacuation it would be necessary to make provision for lifting troops from beaches, and that owing to p. the very gradual shoaling of the beaches it would be necessary to have a large number of small boats to carry troops from the beaches to the off-shore ships. Further, it was thought extremely doubtful if the whole of the troops to be evacuated could be lifted from the beaches, and that, if at all possible, the ports must be used as well. d Subsequent to the Dover Meeting of the 20th May, continual telephone conversations took place between Dover, the Admiralty, Ministry of Shipping and the Commander-in-Chief, at Nore, as to the provision of small craft for the final evac- ce uation, and the provision of Naval personnel for manning the 72 small boats required for ferrying, and skoots and other small vessels taken up for transport purposes. A Meeting was held at the Admiralty on Sunday, the 26th t May, to consider the same subject and to examine the number of craft available. The notes of this Meeting were subsequently 0 supplied to the Vice Admiral, Dover, who was not represented at/