Admiralty records concerning Operation Dynamo and the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk, covering 1940–1941.
Source: The National Archives, Kew, ADM 199/792. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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123 121 CONFIDENTIAL. Page 2. Operation "DYNAMO" - Narrative of Events. Monday, 27th May, 1940. (continued) embarkation from beaches in the La Panne-Dunkirk area, as such matters as crews, fuel and general organisation were taken in hand. Five Personnel Vessels routed to start in day- light completed the round trip during the 27th and lifted a total of 3952. In addition 17 drifters of the Dover Command sailed from Dover for the Malc beach, and during the night X lifted 2000 troops from the beach by ships' dinghies. During the day destroyer patrols had been established to the North- ward to cover the passage of merchant ships between Dunkirk and the Downs, and the Admiralty asked Western Approaches to reinforce the Dover destroyers. 6. Commander-in-Chief, Nore, sailed 6 small skoots for the South Downs to co-operate in Dunkirk, and sailed 4 skoots loaded with Army stores direct to Dunkirk. In the evening Naval Officer-in-Charge, Ramsgate, was asked to take over the fuelling and despatching of all small power boats with the attendant pulling boats forming the inshore flotilla. Some unnecessary delays occurred at this stage as the majority of the Naval Authorities and the Admiralty were directing the small craft for Dunkirk to be routed to Dover, although the Vice Admiral, Dover, had asked for the Downs to be their destination. Once despatched by the Authorities no communication with these vessels was possible until they arrived at their destination, and so the requirements of assembling these craft at the Downs or Ramsgate was in many cases delayed by as much as 24 hours or more since during the night misfortune befell many tows that came adrift due to moderate weather or collisions and the business of rounding them up could not be effected until daylight. 7. The Vice Admiral had intended to maintain a destroyer at Dunkirk as a W/T link, but the S.N.O., on arrival, decided that conditions at Dunkirk made this impossible, 8. At 2025 the Vice Admiral, Dover, received a Most Immediate message from the S.N.O., Dunkirk, who had just reached his station, as follows: "Port consistently bombed all day, and on fire. Embarkation possible only from beaches East of harbour A.B.C.D. Send all ships and passenger ships there to anchor. Am ordering WOLFHOUND to load there and sail T.O.O. 2005/37". Meanwhile Vice Admiral, Lover, had asked the Commender-in Chief, Nore, to send every available shallow draught power boat, capable of ferrying from beaches to ships lying off the beaches Eastward of Dunkirk, stocked with fuel and provisions for two days; this move being made with a view to saving time by cutting out the passage to, and subsequent reorganisation, at Ramsgate, prior to proceeding to the French Coast. It should be noted at this time X (2000/27) there were no pulling boats, cutters or whalers immediately available for attendance on Power Boats. A further signal: "Please send every available craft to beache East of Dunkirk immediately. Evacuation tomorrow night is ir problematicalTo01958/27 was received from S.N.O., Dunkirk. Later that evening a roport WAS received from